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Using the American careers of Walter Gropius and Gyorgy Kepes as case studies, this 
dissertation addresses the intersection of art and architecture with the reciprocal politics of 
knowledge production and state formation in the mid-twentieth century United States. Inasmuch 
as the careers of Gropius and Kepes—wartime émigrés from Germany and Hungary, 
respectively—retrace the narrative of importation and assimilation linking interwar European 
modernism and its post-World War Two American legacies, this project also implicates that 
larger narrative and its constructions. Avant-garde practices in the Weimar Republic orbit 
advanced a model of design as a practice of knowledge, ideation or “expertise,” which found 
fertile ground in the new political conditions of postwar America. The intersection of design 
practices with practices of knowledge production reconfigured design from material 
craftsmanship or artistic invention to a fluid set of competences and techniques oriented towards 
establishing new cultural, political, and economic agency for the designer. The constitution of 
this agency and its limits is the central historical and conceptual problem of this dissertation. 
From their strategic positions on architectural faculties at Harvard University and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and in their multiple roles as administrators, 
educators, writers, and designers, Gropius and Kepes both responded to and shaped several 
emergent discourses on knowledge that traversed the academy, the federal government, the 
design professions, and the wider political and intellectual life of the nation: the discourse of 
economic “stimulus” that posited the intersection of knowledge and legislative practices and 
their combined agency in the social body; the discourse of planning that charted the intervention 
of the “managed economy” regime across the nation’s urban fabric; the discourse of the creative 
mind that posited knowledge as a key economic and political resource; and finally, the discourse 
of instrumentality that defined the political agency of knowledge-production  within the postwar 
research university. Among the events leading Gropius and Kepes to confront those discourses, 
as chronicled in this dissertation, were the wartime administrative reorganization of the Harvard 
Graduate School of Design, the establishment of the Carpenter Center for the Visual Arts at 
Harvard and the Center for Advanced Visual Studies at MIT, and postwar curricular reform at 
MIT at large. 
In each of those instances, art and architecture emulated the disciplinary practices of 
knowledge production: research, education, methodology, collaboration. But more importantly, 
the disciplines of design adopted and elaborated in their own terms the ends of those organized 
knowledge practices in the promotion of unpredictability and innovation, necessitating in turn 
the curbing of controls and the circumscription of agency. The pursuit of this mode of practice, 
characterized by internal delimitation, situated design within an emergent political regime 
dedicated to the maintenance of socio-economic freedoms, articulated in the United States within 
a newly consolidated and organized federal government institution, and accompanied by new 
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In the 1930s, a number of European artists and designers, many of them linked to the 
Bauhaus, relocated to the United States. Settling in their adoptive country, they proceeded to 
leave a profound mark on the development of American art and architecture in the immediate 
postwar period. Walter Gropius, Mies van der Rohe, Josef Albers, Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, Gyorgy 
Kepes, Marcel Breuer, Herbert Bayer, and others, shared an aesthetic, and a commitment to 
experimental approaches defined, however loosely, as the Bauhaus “idea.”1 They also shared the 
experience of working under the conditions of profound social, political, and economic 
destabilization that defined the 1910s and 1920s in Germany and Eastern Europe—conditions 
that prompted a wholesale reevaluation of the disciplinary practice and professional identity of 
the artist and designer. Thus, design innovation and disciplinary dislocation form the two sides of 
a complex cultural legacy born across the transatlantic and the midcentury divides.  The former 
                                                 
1 The notion of the Bauhaus “idea” (never precisely defined) was implicit, perhaps, already in the title of Walter 
Gropius’s 1923 text “Idee und Aufbau des Staatlichen Bauhauses Weimar.” Walter Gropius, Idee und Aufbau des 
Staatlichen Bauhauses Weimar (Munich: Bauhausverlag, 1923), translated as “The Theory and Organization of the 
Bauhaus” in Herbert Bayer, Walter Gropius, Ise Gropius, eds., Bauhaus: 1919-1928 (New York: The Museum of 
Modern Art, 1938), 20-29.  It was put into wide circulation in the postwar period. See, e.g., the statement by Ludwig 
Mies van der Rohe: “The Bauhaus was not an institution with a clear program—it was an idea… .” Ludwig Mies 
van der Rohe, untitled note, Bauhaus: A Teaching Idea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Carpenter Center 
for the Visual Arts, 1967), 11.   
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has attracted extensive scholarly attention—the latter has not been addressed as such, and will be 
the subject of this study. 
The history of postwar design is commonly narrated in relation to the cultural history of 
postwar America, focused on the emergence of the society of consumption and the ideological 
imperialism of the Pax Americana. Such narratives address the postwar commodification of art 
and architecture and the cultural and ideological meanings carried by artifacts in this context. 
Shifting focus from design artifacts to design practices and the social roles assumed by designers 
illuminates another historical site: that of the political organization and distribution of the social 
sphere, with the relative possibilities and constraints in social agency that carries.  
 It is true that relocation to America was for many émigré designers a return to normalcy 
in the conditions of practice. In the overall political stability and postwar economic prosperity of 
their adoptive country, many experienced relative institutional and professional security. The 
majority of the designers and artists associated in one way or another with the Bauhaus pursued 
the conventional model of practice in America, whether that of an independent artist or the 
practicing architect and commercial designer. There were, however, two significant exceptions to 
that general trend.  
From his arrival in the United States in 1937, to 1951 when he fully devoted his time to 
The Architects Collaborative (TAC), an architectural practice started with six of his former 
students, Walter Gropius aggressively entered the discursive arena of American design, 
functioning as an ideologue and promoter; while at the same time he actively engaged in, and in 
fact tried to dominate, academic policy and curricular philosophy as head of the architecture 
department at Harvard University Graduate School of Design (GSD). This was a period during 
which Gropius built or designed very little, but nonetheless became established as the avatar of 
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mainstream modern architecture in America as a “Bauhaus legacy.” On the one hand, Gropius’s 
withdrawal from conventional architectural practice during this time may be seen as in some 
measure enforced, or at least it was a matter about which he voiced some conflict. Before TAC, 
he engaged in two short-lived attempts to establish a working design practice—first with Marcel 
Breuer and later with Konrad Wachsmann.2 In 1959, he would reflect in retrospect to James 
Marston Fitch that, while focusing on other pursuits, “in his heart, he wanted to be a designer.”3 
On the other hand, Gropius’s withdrawal from architectural work during the 1930s and 1940s 
was accompanied by an intense engagement with the disciplinary and institutional issues of 
American architectural practice as a whole, motivated by the necessity to define a program of 
professional training at Harvard, as well as to establish himself in a new professional context. It 
was a project for which the founder and director of an educational institution such as the 
Bauhaus was perhaps especially well-suited. From that perspective, Gropius’s work in America 
continued a profound engagement with the organization and ideological articulation of practice 
started in Weimar Germany. 
Arriving in Chicago the same year as Gropius did in Cambridge, and over the span of a 
career that would subsequently take him to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology School of 
Architecture, Gyorgy Kepes elaborated—and embodied—an expanded and differentiated model 
of practice rooted in his debts to the Hungarian avant-gardes of the 1910s and 1920s, as well as 
to his long-time colleague and mentor Laszlo Moholy-Nagy. Kepes painted, created several art 
installations, and engaged in various forms of commercial design—but his most extensive and 
                                                 
2 The most complete source of biographical information on Gropius is Reginald R. Isaacs, Walter Gropius: Der 
Mensch und sein Werk, volumes I and II (Berlin: Gebr.Mann Verlag GmbH & Co., 1983, 1984), published abridged 
in English as Walter Gropius: An Illustrated Biography of the Creator of the Bauhaus (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1991). 
 
3 James Marston Fitch, Walter Gropius (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1960), 24. 
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important project by far was the organization of a forum for discourse and practice between the 
visual arts and the sciences, first through a series of publications and later through the 
establishment in 1967 of the Center for Advanced Visual Studies (CAVS) at MIT, a 
collaborative work community for artists and scientists. Having followed Moholy-Nagy, whom 
he met in Berlin in 1930, to Chicago, Kepes taught at the New Bauhaus until 1944. The MIT 
School of Architecture hired him the following year to teach the Bauhaus-inspired program he 
had worked out in Chicago as an adjunct to the professional training of the architecture student.4 
Perhaps because of the relatively autonomous position he occupied with respect to design 
training, Kepes never devoted very much time to professional or disciplinary issues. His life’s 
work was motivated, however, by what he understood as the need to establish the social 
relevance and redefine the social role of the artist and designer. Thus, although he belonged to a 
younger generation than most of the Weimar-era émigrés in America, Kepes explored their 
legacy of innovative practice most fully. 
 This dissertation will examine the interrogation of practice in the American work of 
Gropius and Kepes. Rather than advance an overarching thesis about the careers of the two 
figures, I trace a series of pivotal moments from the 1930s to the 1960s when each tried to define 
design practice in response to new pressure points situated outside the professions and the 
discourses of art and design. Each of the historical moments traced here involves the intersection, 
in one way or another, between the discourses and practices of art and design and those 
conducted in a number of contemporary social sciences and related organized fields of 
knowledge—mainly, economics, public administration, psychology, and education. In each of 
those confrontations, therefore, the expansion of design practice at issue was, specifically, its 
                                                 
4 For biographical facts, see Elizabeth Finch, “Languages of Vision: Gyorgy Kepes and the “New Landscape” of Art 
and Science” (Ph.D. diss., The City University of New York, 2005). 
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construction as a practice of knowledge, both aligned with the social sciences and competing 
against them for agency. 
For Gropius, arriving in Cambridge in 1937 to confront an architectural profession in the 
grips of the Depression, and facing the problem of devising a curriculum that would prepare the 
student to confront current professional challenges, economic conditions were an overriding area 
of concern and determinant of action. But more than concrete issues of economic expediency, it 
was a new conception of the economic—as an area of the nation-state subject to intervention and 
control—that emerged as the key referent of discourses on design practice during the 1930s. In 
the discourse of “method”—which sought to represent design as objective, quasi-scientific 
procedure—architectural practices claimed a new mode of social agency parallel to that  
articulated at the time by the discourses of economic theory. Gropius arrived in America at a key 
moment in this development, and contributed to it both discursively and programmatically, 
through his work at the GSD.  In the 1940s, those practices were supplanted by questions of 
planning, marking the emergence of the discipline of public administration as a new model for 
the relationship between organized knowledge and social agency. Architectural discourses 
increasingly turned around a notion of the “planning function” that oriented conceptions of 
architectural work as organization or management. This confrontation between design practice 
and the practices of public administration was played out through important shifts in GSD policy 
during the early 1940s, as well as in several projects carried out by Gropius together with his 
GSD colleague Martin Wagner.  
The years during and immediately after the war were marked by the ascendancy of 
discourses on psychology and education. Although Gropius engaged in issues arising out of 
those discourses, it was Kepes who brought them to the forefront of his own agenda. During his 
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years in Chicago, he developed the idea of design as a perceptual technology for the training of a 
particular kind of socially-oriented subjectivity. In the postwar period, the social task thus 
outlined for design evolved to encompass the problem of training the creative mind, articulated 
within the discourses of general education. Kepes’s participation in this wider project continued 
in relation to the epistemological and productive structures of the postwar scientific 
establishment he encountered in Cambridge. It was here, too, that the problem of the social 
agency of organized knowledge took on a programmatic, and increasingly political, significance. 
Kepes both responded to and made important contributions to pedagogical and research 
initiatives at MIT, which focused on the cooperative organization of knowledge production and 
the definition and delimitation of its social instrumentality. 
 Chronologically, the discussion of Kepes in this dissertation picks up where the 
discussion of Gropius leaves off, in the midst of America’s wartime mobilization, to engage 
further aspects of a larger history of which the two figures become, ultimately, disparate case 
studies. That history charts the reverberations in the design field of the emergence of knowledge 
production, concentrated primarily but not exclusively in the natural and social sciences, as a 
pivotal strategic resource within the politics of the state. The series of efforts described here to 
explore design as a practice of knowledge coincided with the emergence in America of a newly 
consolidated and organized federal government institution, accompanied by new legislative and 
ideological articulations of national identity. The historical relationship between milestones of 
state formation at mid-century and moments of exploration in design as a practice of knowledge 
is the larger problem posed by this dissertation. 
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The concept of knowledge as a domain open to the play of political forces and 
relationships of power is classically associated with the 1960s and 1970s, when it was advanced 
by a diverse and growing number of American and Western European intellectuals and social 
theorists, against the background of university protests. Although the discourse on the politics of 
knowledge ranged widely, its primary historiographic legacy is focused in the notion of 
“postindustrial society.”5 It describes the advent, in the middle of the twentieth century, of a new 
period of social development, driven by fundamental shifts in technology and the economic 
structure. The basic characteristics of postindustrial society include the eclipse of manufacturing 
by the service sector—encompassing such areas as finance, recreation, research, education, and 
government—as the primary economic engine, the preponderance of administrative and 
professional occupations, and the emergence of computer-based or intellectual technologies. 
Such developments, wrote the leading American postindustrial theorist Daniel Bell, signaled the 
emergence of “theoretical knowledge” as “the strategic resource [and] axial principle” of society, 
and the “intellectual institutions where theoretical knowledge is codified and enriched” as its 
“axial structures.”6  
 It is also in the 1960s and 1970s—at the tail end of this dissertation’s chronological 
range—that one finds the widespread opening of art and design to strategic practices of 
knowledge as identified by postindustrial theory: traceable, for example, in the engagement of 
both artists and architects with information technologies and communication systems; the 
                                                 
5 The range of contemporaneous discourses on the relationship between knowledge and politics is incompletely 
encompassed by the philosophical reflections of Michel Foucault, Hannah Arendt, Herbert Marcuse, and Jurgen 
Habermas; the historical and sociological studies of scientific communities, such as those by Thomas Kuhn and Don 
K. Price; the politically engaged critiques of the academy by, e.g., Noam Chomsky and Sheldon S. Wolin. Among 
the key writings on the postindustrial concept are those by Daniel Bell, Alain Touraine, Jacques Ellul, Ernst Mandel, 
and David Harvey. 
 
6 Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic Books, 
Inc., 1973), 26. 
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redefinition of artistic practice as intellectual production in conceptual art; the emergence of such 
initiatives as the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies in New York City and Emilio 
Ambasz’s Universitas project at the Museum of Modern Art, positioning the designer as 
intellectual. An emblematic expression of that shift is Peter Cook’s statement in 1970, on behalf 
of the new vanguard, that “the future of architecture lies in the brain.”7 In that sense, the 
postindustrial hypothesis is itself historically linked to the experimental art and design practices 
of the ‘60s and ‘70s. Because I discuss a different set of practices, I approach the model of the 
postindustrial society at some distance. The history I outline does not trace the advent of 
knowledge as the “axial principle” of society, but rather analyzes several moments when the 
problem of knowledge—its institutional organization, structuring principles, and social agency—
arose as a question of strategic significance in the construction of the nation state. Rather than 
addressing social or cultural patterns, therefore, this history deals with moments of political 
articulation, understood as an interface between “society” and the “state.”8  
 Writing in 1963, the political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset posited the United 
States as the “first new nation”—the first constitutional state founded where none existed prior, 
through a break with colonial rule rather than through regime change—which continued to hold 
the moment of foundation at the core of national identity.9 A federation of states under a 
constitution whose scope and powers were contested from the start, America lacked a stable 
tradition of discourses and institutional structures of the nation state even into the twentieth 
                                                 
7 Peter Cook, “The Future of Architecture Lies in the Brain” in Experimental Architecture (New York: Universe, 
1970), 133-153. 
 
8 The relationship between the “state” as a centralized juridical apparatus and “society” or “civil society” as the 
complex of social and economic institutions outside of the state is constitutive of the concept of the political in 
modern political philosophy.   
 
9 Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective (New 
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963). 
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century. To a remarkable extent, the early twentieth century American state was new, in an 
ongoing and unfinished process of construction. Writers of the progressive era theorized 
democracy itself as a process or a project, rather than an established political system. At the same 
time, they linked conceptions of political agency directly to state construction at the national 
level; tying it, furthermore, to a modern managerial notion of governance. “The idea of the 
state,” wrote Woodrow Wilson in 1912, “is the conscience of administration.”10  
But it was the entirely unprecedented expansion of the federal government’s 
administrative body in the New Deal that constituted, in the words of Alan Brinkley, the 
“phenomenon that created and legitimized much of the modern American state.”11 As a political 
process unfolding in the midst of economic collapse, it was distinguished by the articulation of a 
conflict between the atomizing forces of capital and the socializing functions of the state—the 
establishment of the nation-state as a commonwealth. The burgeoning state was, thus, a complex 
that tightly bound conceptions of collective political agency, the elaboration of a centralized 
governing apparatus, and ideologies of the nation. It was this complex that defined America at 
mid-century, a new state within a nation long established. In 1966, Bell wrote that 
only within recent decades has the United States passed from being a nation to becoming a 
national society in which there is not only a coherent national authority, but where the different 
sectors of the society, economy, polity, and culture are bound together in a cohesive way and 
where crucial political and economic decisions are now made at a “center.”12 
The Second World War further advanced this process of state formation. But what is remarkable 
is its novelty, and contingency, which continued to accompany the nation into its Cold War 
                                                 
10 Cited in James W. Ceaser, “What Kind of Government Do We Have to Fear?” in Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry 
Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman, eds., Politics at the Turn of the Century (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2001), 86. 
 
11 Alan Brinkley, “The Two World Wars and the Idea of the State” in Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. 
Richard Zinman, eds., Politics at the Turn of the Century, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 66. 
 
12 Daniel Bell, The Reforming of General Education: The Columbia College Experience in Its National Setting (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 69. Emphasis in the original. 
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geopolitical hegemony. In the immediate postwar period, Lipset was only one among an 
“extraordinary” number of writers attempting to come to terms with the still unfolding questions 
of national identity and social structure.13  
 In light of this history, it is notable that the American discourse on the postindustrial, as 
distinguished from its European counterparts, was preoccupied with projecting public or 
communal forms of organization at the level of the national society.14 In Bell’s writings, the 
primary referent of that organization was the welfare state, occupied with the generation and 
application of knowledge to problems of social governance and planning. He defined the 
postindustrial watershed as one in which “the conscious direction of social change [has become 
the purview of] the federal government.”15 The centrality of knowledge in the new regime Bell 
sought to describe, therefore, derived from its link to the “sociologizing”—as opposed to the 
“economizing”—modes of decision attendant to the newly centralized system of political 
organization, which bring to the fore strategically such “public” functions and resources as 
education, research, social services, or environmental quality.16 It is specifically in relation to 
those modes of political decision and the field of social agency they circumscribe that the 
developing complex of the social sciences was disposed, defining the postindustrial society, in 
Bell’s terms, as “one in which the intellectual is predominant.”17 Therefore, Bell’s formula must 
                                                 
13 As the best known of numerous examples, Lipset cites Vance Packard, The Status Seekers (1959); C. Wright 
Mills, The Power Elite (1956), William H. Whyte, The Organization Man (1956), David Riesman, The Lonely 
Crowd (1950); R.L. Bruckberger, Image of America (1959); Max Lerner, America as a Civilization (1957); and Eric 
Larrabee, Self-Conscious Society (1960). See Lipset, First New Nation, 1. 
 
14 See Howard Brick, “Optimism of the Mind: Imagining Postindustrial Society in the 1960s and 1970s,” American 
Quarterly 44 (September 1992): 348-379. 
 
15 Bell, Reforming of General Education, 88. 
 
16 See Brick, “Optimism of the Mind,” 359. 
 
17 Daniel Bell, “The Post-Industrial Society” in Eli Ginzberg, ed., Technology and Social Change (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1964), 44. Brick suggests the growth of the social sciences—sociology, anthropology, 
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be read against the grain of its historical context to correct for the techno-economic bias implied 
in the very terminology of “postindustrial” periodization.18 Rather than linking the political 
problem of knowledge to new phases of advanced technological or socio-economic development, 
the history plotted in this dissertation traces the symbiotic relationship between knowledge 
production and the formation of a modern nation-state in America. As will be seen later, this also 
implies that the periodizing historiography of postindustrial analyses must be rethought in this 
context. 
For the moment, however, it remains to establish the mode of social agency opened up 
for practices of knowledge within the politics of the state. This will also be precisely the mode of 
agency sought in every bid outlined in this dissertation to establish design as a practice of 
knowledge; and the corresponding strategies will, in turn, rely on defining design as a practice 
that corresponds to those patterns of agency.  
The idea of technocracy is still perhaps the standard model for envisioning the 
relationship between knowledge and the state.19 Bell himself invoked the locus classicus of 
                                                                                                                                                             
and psychology— and their new professional standing in the academy at midcentury as the broader context for the 
rise of postindustrial theory. See Brick, “Optimism of the Mind,” 360. The natural and social sciences are the clear 
referent to Bell’s concept of “knowledge.” As is typical at the time, he defines the “literary intellectual” as a 
category distinct from—and even opposed to—the “technical intellectual.” Bell poses the relationship between the 
two as a problem, but it is not one to which he devotes much attention. See Bell, Coming of Post-Industrial Society, 
43, 214. 
 
18 Bell does not see his own position as technological or economic determinism. “The concept of the post-industrial 
society,” he writes, “deals primarily with changes in the social structure, the way in which the economy is being 
transformed and the occupational system reworked, and with the new relations between theory and empiricism, 
particularly science and technology. … I do not claim that these changes in social structure determine corresponding 
changes in the polity or the culture. Rather, the changes in social structure pose questions for the rest of society… .” 
Bell, Coming of Post-Industrial Society, 13. Emphases in the original. 
 
19 Although the term “technocracy” itself was not coined until the first decades of the twentieth century, the ideology 
it commonly describes—advancing a form of government in which political decision making is controlled by 
technical experts—has a longer pedigree and a more profound influence on how the political role of organized 
knowledge production has been historically conceptualized than may be suggested by its utopian connotations. For a 
history of the techno-bureaucratic rationale in political philosophy, see Sheldon S. Wolin, “The Age of Organization 
and the Sublimation of Politics” in Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), 352-434. For a discussion of scientific management discourses and 
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Saint-Simonian ideology in describing postindustrial society as one that has as its purpose 
“social control,” the “organization of decisions, and the direction of change,” which are all 
functions that have “an increasingly technical character.”20 But he also considered the project of 
bringing a rational order to “mass society” a utopian vision and “a social alchemist’s dream.”21 
For Bell, writing in 1973, the proper way to conceive the relationship between knowledge 
production and governance—or knowledge and “politics,” by which he meant political functions 
as organized and centralized in the state—was through the recognition of “limits.”22 “The 
conception of a rational organization of society stands confounded,” he wrote 
Rationality… finds itself confronted by the cantankerousness of politics… . [T]he adherents of 
rationality… are now in the difficult position of having to rethink their premises and to understand 
their limits. And yet, the recognition of those limits is itself the beginning of wisdom.23 
Bell’s observations were certainly a reflection on the technocratic impulse humbled by the 
politics of 1968, which focused on the critique of institutional power structures centralized in 
what was referred to as the military-industrial-academic complex.24 Much of the discussion on 
                                                                                                                                                             
projects and their relation to conceptions of political organization in Europe and America in the first half of the 
twentieth century, see Charles S. Maier, “Society as Factory” in In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical 
Political Economy (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 19-69. 
 
20 Bell, Coming of Postindustrial Society, 20, 344. On Henri de Saint-Simon and technocracy, see ibid., 49, 74-80. 
 
21 Ibid., 33. 
 
22 Bell wrote, for example, that “no matter how technical social processes may be, the crucial turning points in a 
society occur in a political form. It is not the technocrat who ultimately holds power, but the politician.” Ibid., 360. 
 
23 Ibid., 366. 
 
24 A term inspired by the 17 January 1961 “farewell address” of departing President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in 
which he warned of increasing ties between the Pentagon and industry, the “military-industrial-academic complex” 
describes a system of collusion among the sectors of economic and political power and the scientific-technological 
research that serves them, resulting in a technocratic power establishment intent on organizing society according to 
the imperatives of maximum economic and geopolitical dominance. The critique of a new technocratic phase of 
social control, centralized in the alliance between state and economic institutions, characterized French theories of 
the postindustrial society in particular. See Alain Touraine, The Post-Industrial Society: Tomorrow’s Social History: 
Classses, Conflicts and Culture in the Programmed Society, trans. Leonard F.X. Mayhew (New York: Random 
House, 1971), 54, 84-84, 220-22; Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. 
Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 64-66. See also Brick, 
“Optimism of the Mind,” 357, 377 n.37. 
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the politics of knowledge around this period centered on the role played by both the natural and 
the social sciences in the operations of the national security state—the entrenched and ever-
expanding power structure of alliances among major corporations, private foundations, and 
federal defense institutions that had become the most notorious manifestation of the Cold War 
American nation-state.  
However, it can also be said, following Brinkley, that the process of state formation 
initiated in the United States in the 1930s resulted in the development, alongside the national 
security state, of a parallel centralized structure of governance—the national welfare state. 
Initiated by the New Deal and built through the social initiatives carried out by subsequent 
Presidents—from Harry Truman’s expansion of social security and creation of national health 
insurance to the Great Society programs of Lyndon B. Johnson—the welfare state became the 
“weak” other of the national security state, developing in symbiosis with the latter but 
responding to a different organization of agency and relationships of power.25 The political 
structure of the “weak and embattled liberal state,” as Brinkley describes it, was defined by its 
“cumbersome and inadequate welfare mechanisms battling constantly for legitimacy,” its 
“primitive fiscal mechanisms,” and its “consistently frail… claim on popular loyalties.”26 This 
other nation-state also commanded resources in knowledge production—and therefore involved a 
politics of knowledge—that could hardly be described as technocratic in their relationship to 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
25 Brinkley, “Two World Wars,” 71. The idea that there were not one, but two, models of the nation-state that 
evolved during this period is proposed by other historians as well. Michael Hogan, for example, argues that there 
was a succession of state conceptions, with the New Deal state premised on social welfare ultimately superseded in 
the postwar period by the national security state governed by military objectives. See Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of 
Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998). Brinkley’s conception of the “weak liberal state” as an adjunct or parallel system, originating in the 
New Deal and persisting far into the postwar period, however, seems more accurate and compelling. 
 
26 Brinkley, “Two World Wars,” 71. 
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“frail and struggling”27 power mechanisms. In fact, starting already in the 1950s, the operations 
of the welfare state engaged research resources to an extent that rivaled the national security 
state. By 1962, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare contributed the same 
proportion of the total federal spending on research as the Department of Defense. This pattern 
accelerated through the 1960s as the greatest relative growth in knowledge production could be 
traced in disciplines such as biophysics and genetics, nutrition, psychology, sociology, mental 
health, education, and urban affairs. When Bell formulated his ideas, the knowledge complex he 
placed at the heart of postindustrial society involved such new “life sciences” at least as much as 
it did the sciences of war.28 
The politics of knowledge production described in this dissertation involved, by and 
large, not the military-industrial-academic complex of the national security state, but rather the 
weak liberal state that arose alongside it. The model of technocratic control, whether achieved or 
projected as a goal, is inadequate in describing that politics. Instead, we might take the notion of 
“limits” employed by Bell in describing the political agency of knowledge as a reflection of the 
very organizing logic of the liberal state. It is this logic of limits that also describes the 
mechanisms of “governmentality” identified by Michel Foucault as operative in the formation of 
modern Western liberal states in general.29 Foucault’s description of the liberal state oriented to 
the “production” of freedoms, including the freedom of the market, through the delimitation of 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
 
28 These trends in the growth of research areas and funding allocations are described by Bell as a “shift into the ‘life 
sciences’” in Bell, Reforming of General Education, 90-91. See also Bell, Coming of Post-Industrial Society, 226, 
232, 256. 
 
29 Because the liberal state is focused not on the expansion of its own power, but rather on the cultivation of 
economic and political freedoms in the society it governs, its structuring principle is that of “self-limitation.” Michel 
Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. 
Graham Burchell (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 44. 
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its own power on the one hand, and the establishment of “strategies of security,” including 
welfare programs, on the other echoes Brinkley’s description of the American weak liberal state 
as a “compensatory” state, dedicated to both the promotion of economic growth and the 
amelioration of its destructive effects through social security initiatives.30 
Following Foucault, who did not conceive of “governmentality” as a project localized in 
the institutions of organized politics, but rather as an interface between society and the state, or 
the mode in which political society is both imagined and practiced, we might propose that the 
politics of knowledge in the weak liberal state emerging in America at the end of the 1930s was 
also driven by the imperative of self-delimitation. In the case studies of the production and 
organization of knowledge examined here, the crucial question for those involved was always 
that of how to devise a structure, method, or procedure that would not only allow for, but 
necessitate, the emergence of the new, the unforeseen, and the uncontrolled. The real task, in 
other words, was to establish the optimal conditions for the development of aleatory effects 
within the social domain in question—without destabilizing that domain. If knowledge was 
employed here as a tool of social planning and control, it was to be a programmatically blunt 
instrument. It may be said that the organization of knowledge production in each of these 
instances revolved around the problem of how not to know too much—marking it as a function 
of a political regime intent on not governing too much.31  
 
It would seem that the ideology brought to America by both Gropius and Kepes as a 
legacy of design practices and philosophies developed in the 1920s was precisely a technocratic 
                                                 
30 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 63-65; Brinkley, “Two World Wars,” 70. 
 
31 Cf. Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 319. 
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one—expressed, on the one hand, in Gropius’s Taylorist preoccupations with the organization of 
large-scale building production, and on the other, in the technological sublime of “new vision” 
taken up by Kepes from his older colleague Moholy-Nagy. Of the two, it is certainly Gropius, a 
canonical figure of modern design, whose association with the technocratic project has had the 
most lasting and important historical effects. In the addendum to this introduction, therefore, I 
explore some themes in the reception of Gropius’s American work that illuminate the historical 
figure of Gropius as an index of the disciplinary and political problem of architectural agency at 
mid-century. Particularly, I suggest that the idea of the technocratic had become around the 
1960s and 1970s an allegory of the limit, in which questions of architecture’s political agency 
were confronted—and at times elided—with questions of its formal or aesthetic integrity.  
Although in America Gropius largely abandoned his earlier concern with the 
rationalization of the building industry, he continued to promote a conception of design premised 
on cost efficiency calculations and functional assessments of program first worked out in his 
Existenzminimum studies of the 1920s.32 It was, however, his master conception of the 
architect’s role within a system of building practice resonant with larger social connotations that 
ultimately linked Gropius with the technocratic tendency in design. Frequently summarized as a 
                                                 
32 Gropius continued to voice a commitment to the “industrialization” of building production (see, e.g., Walter 
Gropius, “Gropius Appraises Today’s Architect,” Architectural Forum (May 1952), reprinted as “The Architect 
Within Our Industrial Society” in Walter Gropius, Scope of Total Architecture (New York: Collier Books, 1943), 
76-77). His practical efforts to that end, however, were increasingly limited. In 1941, he carried out a short-lived and 
failed collaborative venture with Konrad Wachsmann to implement a prefabricated house system. For a discussion, 
see Gilbert Herbert, The Dream of the Factory-Made House: Walter Gropius and Konrad Wachsmann (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1984). For Gropius’s Weimar-era positions on the rationalization of building and design, see, e.g., 
Walter Gropius, “Die soziologischen Grundlagen der Minimalwohnung” (1929); “Rationelle Bebauungsweisen, 
‘Flach-Mittel-oder Hochbau?” (1931); and “Ein Versuchshaus des Bauhauses” (1924), translated and reprinted as 
“Sociological Premises for the Minimum Dwelling of Urban Industrial Populations”; “Houses, Walk-Ups or High-
Rise Apartment Blocks?”; and “Housing Industry” in Gropius, Scope of Total Architecture, 91-102, 103-115, 128-
135. For a discussion, see Winfried Nerdinger, Walter Gropius (Berlin: Bauhaus-Archiv and Cambridge, Mass.: 
Busch-Reisinger Museum, 1985). A critical discussion of these aspects of Gropius’s design approach and pedagogy 
in America can be found in Klaus Herdeg, The Decorated Diagram: Harvard Architecture and the Failure of the 
Bauhaus Legacy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983).  
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basic statement of belief or position, it outlined a managerial conception of architectural pra
conducted within a complex inter-functional structure of organized production. “The architect is 
to be a coordinator,” Gropius wrote in 1950, “whose business it is to unify the many social, 
technical, economic and artistic problems which arise in connection with building.”
ctice 
                                                
33 “If he will 
build up a closely cooperating team,” he elaborated in 1952, “together with the engineer, the 
scientist and the builder, then design, construction and economy may again become an entity—a 
fusion of art, science and business.”34 As I argue in the addendum, critical reviews of Gropius’s 
American built work starting in the early 1960s tended to explain perceived lapses in design 
quality as the result of a compromise of the architect’s creative independence. By the 1970s, this 
loss of creative autonomy was coupled to the loss of political autonomy and identified with more 
recent technocratic or postindustrial tendencies in design practice. In this context, the legacy of 
Gropius was invoked as a figure of threat to architecture’s disciplinary identity and social 
agency. That discursive evolution in the reception of Gropius’s American work situates it, still 
today, as a cipher for the political problematic of architectural practice and its postindustrial 
revisions. 
As I have suggested above, the technocratic question occludes more than it illuminates in 
the problem of design’s engagement with the politics of knowledge traced here. In Chapter One, 
I explore a different historical hypothesis, linking Weimar-era conceptions of design as 
intellectual production to projects of collective group or institutional organization undertaken by 
artists and designers. The relevant context for those revisions of practice, I argue, was the 
consolidation of a new form of organized politics in the emergent Weimar social democratic 
 
33 Walter Gropius, “Plan pour un enseignement de l’Architecture,” L’Architecture d’Aujourd’hui (February 1950), 
translated and reprinted as “Blueprint of an Architect’s Education” in Gropius, Scope of Total Architecture, 55. 
 
34 Gropius, “The Architect Within Our Industrial Society,” 74. 
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state. Although there are a number of suggestive scholarly precedents for the reevaluation of the 
relationship of design to intellectual production in Germany in the 1920s, this subject has not 
been examined in its own right. Manfredo Tafuri posited the problematic of “intellectual labor” 
as a framework for the analysis of modern architecture in general, with the Weimar avant-garde 
constituting a crucial node.35 Marcel Franciscono and Francesco Dal Co have variously 
addressed the Wilhelmine precedents and utopian connotations of the discursive link between 
design and the creative intellect.36 Finally, Maria Gough has recently illuminated in the 
discourses of Russian constructivism a link between the notion of “intellectual production” and 
the rejection of an object-based conception of art in favor of a process- or organization-based 
conception.37 The historical connections among the Russian and Weimar avant-gardes make her 
research relevant here as well. The Russian discourse was, moreover, mediated in Germany by 
its reception among the Hungarian avant-garde, the third important link in this history and a 
direct source for Kepes’s ideological positions. The 1920s was a wellspring of expanded 
conceptions of practice in the Weimar orbit of the international avant-gardes. In situating those 
revisions of practice in relation to the politics of state formation in that historical context, this 
chapter charts a background for the issues of practice encountered and developed by Gropius and 
Kepes in America. 
Chapter Two situates Gropius’s arrival and early reception in America in the context of 
contemporaneous discourses on practice motivated by pressures exerted on the architectural 
                                                 
35 Manfredo Tafuri, “The Historical Project,” The Sphere and the Labyrinth: Avant-Gardes and Architecture from 
Piranesi to the 1970s, trans. Pellegrino d’Acierno and Robert Connolly (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 14. 
 
36 Marcel Franciscono, Walter Gropius and the Creation of the Bauhaus in Weimar: the Ideals and Artistic Theories 
of its Founding Years (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971); Francesco Dal Co, Figures of Architecture and 
Thought: German Architecture Culture 1880-1920 (New York: Rizzoli, 1990). 
 
37 Maria Gough, The Artist as Producer: Russian Constructivism in Revolution (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005).  
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profession by the economics of the building industry. The 1929 economic crash precipitated 
efforts to integrate the national economy as a whole, and the building industry as its then most 
strategically significant sector, within the legislative domain of the state. By the end of the 
1930s, the process was resolved in the eclipse of the technocratic project of economic planning 
first proposed in the 1920s by a new interventionist model of “stimulus,” advanced by John 
Maynard Keynes and applied in America largely in the building industry. According to the 
stimulus model of intervention, the managed economy state was to act as the guarantor of 
(economic) freedom. At the same time, the Keynesian solution outlined a new role for theoretical 
knowledge in the operations of the state, focused on delimiting the function of theory as a tool of 
control and prediction in policy applications. During the same time, segments of the American 
architectural community articulated a discourse on design practice focused around the notion of 
“method”—embraced and promoted by Gropius immediately upon his arrival in the United 
States. The “method” discourse sought to position the architectural profession in relation to the 
emergent model of the national economy. By defining design as an objective, calculable 
procedure, it aimed to secure the status of design services as a sound investment. At the same 
time, intuitive judgment and flexible response in unforeseen situations was increasingly 
emphasized as a crucial element of design “method.” This sustained balance between control and 
contingency, I argue, signaled architecture’s orientation to the developing managed economy 
regime.  
It is easy to see that Gropius embraced the notion of “method” as it resonated with the 
rationalization and systematization of the design process undertaken at the Bauhaus after 1922.  
Nevertheless, it was his skillful immersion in the problems of practice at the core of the 
American architectural profession around 1937 that assured him the relevance he would enjoy in 
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the American context at least through the 1940s—and that is hard to imagine would have been 
granted him had he simply acted as the Bauhaus evangelist that he is most frequently envisioned 
today to have been.38 This chapter also aims to revise that understanding of Gropius’s activity 
upon arrival in America, situating his published statements and his pedagogical initiatives at 
Harvard within the professional, disciplinary, and political context of his adoptive country.  
Chapter Three carries this analysis into the 1940s, when the discourse of “method” was 
eclipsed in the architecture community by an emergent discourse of “planning,” linking the 
disciplinary project of city planning to the state project of economic planning in the context of 
the Second World War. Massive workforce migrations that accompanied industrial war 
mobilization prompted the first extensive application of stimulus in the building industry as 
entire “new towns” had to be rapidly erected to accommodate an influx of workers. At the same 
time, postwar plans for federally-sponsored urban and housing development were being 
advanced. The very young American planning profession responded to the imperatives 
established by such federal activity in the urban fabric by moving the concept of “planning” 
away from “design” and redefining it as a governmental process or managerial “function.”  As a 
process rather than a blueprint, planning could thus maintain the now requisite distance from 
control and embrace the delimitation of its agency in the urban fabric as the very condition of its 
disciplinary knowledge. Because of the evident national prominence accorded to planning and its 
incomplete disciplinary differentiation from architecture, the latter approached the problematics 
of “design” opened up within the former as a challenge to its own political and economic 
viability. Between 1942 and 1944, Gropius engaged in negotiating the relationship between 
“design” and “administration” with respect to city planning: first together with Joseph Hudnut in 
                                                 
38 Most recently and extensively, this interpretation of Gropius’s American career through the 1940s has been 
elaborated in Jill Pearlman, Inventing American Modernism: Joseph Hudnut, Walter Gropius, and the Bauhaus 
Legacy at Harvard (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2007). 
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a program of curricular revision at the GSD dedicated to preserving architecture’s disciplinary 
agency within the planning field, and second in a series of postwar planning proposals in 
collaboration with GSD colleague Martin Wagner. 
Writing in 1938, the leading American Keynesian economist Alvin Hansen theorized the 
managed economy regime, whose formation he oversaw as government advisor, in relation to the 
notion of a closed frontier. The exhaustion of the physical frontier, with its virgin land and 
material resources, necessitated the invention of new “intensive” development outlets. For 
Hansen, the theory charted the economic logic of urban redevelopment—the federal program 
under which already developed but stagnating urban areas were designated for demolition and 
entrepreneurial reinvention, and therefore, the practically fiat creation of new investment 
opportunities at the site of already once accomplished ventures. If delimitation described the 
strategic rationale of the weak liberal state, the closed frontier image served as both its 
metaphorical counterpart and its empirical justification—the former dictated the rules of the 
game between freedom and security, contingency and control; the latter indicated the field across 
which that game would unfold.  
The exhaustion of the frontier signaled a corresponding shift of agency into domains that 
may best be described as immaterial. State action in redevelopment, which Hansen had by the 
early 1940s projected to spread across the entirety of the nation’s built fabric, was imagined as 
fundamentally that of a catalyst for private initiatives, whose concrete physical manifestation 
was left programmatically undetermined. When Hansen and his colleagues outlined their ideas at 
a 1942 Harvard conference, Gropius and Wagner, representing the design professions at the 
event, pointed out precisely the lack of concern with physical outcomes in the described project. 
But their intervention was not naïve; they, along with other designers who tracked and attempted 
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to adapt to the shifting modalities of agency in the emergent regime of governmentality, had 
already been struggling to find new models of practice that could respond to the growing 
strategic irrelevance of traditional design expertise. The discourses on design as “method” and as 
“planning function” focused on processes severed from material outcomes, thus displacing the 
invention and production of physical structures as the exclusive or even the principal goal of 
professional design practice.  
Starting in the 1940s, Kepes encountered and responded to a set of discourses that 
charted a further development of the closed frontier rationale. At the end of 1944, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed a letter to the director of the wartime Office of Scientific 
Research and Development, inaugurating the opening of a new frontier—which the letter’s 
addressee, Dr. Vannevar Bush, would famously declare to be “endless” in the title of a 1945 
report he prepared in response.39 “It is in keeping… with basic United States policy,” wrote 
Bush, entirely in accord with Hansen, “that the Government should foster the opening of new 
frontiers.” The Bush report, thus, announced the opening of another field of “intensive” 
redevelopment—to take place on what he called the “frontiers of knowledge,” or as Roosevelt 
himself had put it, the “new frontiers of the mind.”40 As it was frequently both argued and 
implied, postwar federal funding of scientific research conformed to the rationale of stimulus 
investment as the preferred mode of state intervention in the national economy, opening a new 
outlet for that intervention. The frontier of the national mind, in that sense, was composed of 
“human resources”—a new kind of national resource that came to supplant the exhaustion of the 
land’s material riches. Although scientific knowledge production was the primary focus, it did 
                                                 
39 Vannevar Bush, Science: The Endless Frontier: A Report to the President on a Program for Postwar Scientific 
Research (National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C., July 1945). 
 
40 Ibid., 8, 6, 4.  
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not exhaust the domain of agency thus opened up for the state. That expanded domain was, 
rather, encompassed by federal investment in educational institutions at all levels, oriented to the 
promotion of, specifically, innovative and creative talent. The central imperative of the mind as a 
national resource was that it be to the utmost free. 
As I show in Chapter Four, Kepes discovered the emergent politics of the mind already 
during the war, and was immediately drawn into its orbit. His interests in perceptual 
psychology—which he long shared with Moholy-Nagy but evidently studied much more 
extensively than the latter—were supplemented by his encounter through various civilian 
defense initiatives undertaken at the Chicago School of Design with the role played by 
psychology in the management of “human resources” involved in the execution of the war. 
Influenced in part by those experiences, he developed the idea of vision as a technology (in the 
sense of a set of techniques or tools) for the training of what he called the “social man.” After the 
war ended and Kepes moved from Chicago to Cambridge, he increasingly presented the 
perceptual technology he continued to advance as, fundamentally, an intellectual technology—a 
training of the creative mind. His project merged with widespread efforts on the part of 
American artists, intellectuals, and educators to link studio art and design practices to the 
national imperative for intellectual creativity. Such efforts found institutional expression in 
projects to integrate studio art into “general education” programs. In the general education—or 
“liberal studies”—movement of the postwar years, which aimed to promote intellectual 
flexibility as an antidote to rigid constraints of “specialization,” the interface of control and 
freedom was played out across one particularly large segment of the human frontier. Kepes’s 
encounters with pedagogical discourses of the creative mind were numerous, but his most 
important engagement outside of M.I.T. with their institutionalization in relation to “general 
 24
education” was through related initiatives at Harvard, resulting in the establishment of the 
Carpenter Center for the Visual Arts, whose directorship Kepes was offered and turned down in 
1957. 
Kepes’s ideology of perception as a technology of intellectual training proved fruitful at 
M.I.T. As I discuss in Chapter Five, when Kepes arrived in Cambridge in 1946, the School of 
Architecture had just undergone a curricular restructuring intended to bring it pedagogically and 
conceptually in line with the Institute as a whole. Kepes’s courses, structured as exercises in 
cognitive-perceptual technique, offered designers a way to conceive their specialized 
professional competence as part of the knowledge regime epitomized at the Institute by the 
research sciences. The immediate postwar period opened a new era in M.I.T. institutional 
history. From a polytechnic institute focused on developing technological applications for 
industry, M.I.T. was reinvented as an entirely new model of a research-based scientific 
university. The success of this transformation would make it one of the most prominent 
American centers of scientific research and the institutional recipient of some of the biggest 
outlays of federal research funds in the postwar period. As part of its institutional reinvention, 
M.I.T. developed a particular logic of instrumentality that would govern its techno-scientific 
research complex. It entailed the adoption of a necessary caesura between knowledge production 
in the theoretical or “basic” sciences and its instrumental applications for the needs of the state. 
This gap defined the political agency of M.I.T. research in terms of its “potential”—a deferred 
instrumentality that supplied scientific knowledge production with the requisite degree of 
strategic unpredictability. The relationship between autonomy and instrumentality in M.I.T. 
knowledge production was expressed in its ideologies of “service to the nation” and the citizen-
scientist.  
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Kepes adopted the Institute’s premise of deferred instrumentality and developed it in a 
novel direction. Discovering photographic records of scientific experiments conducted in M.I.T. 
labs, he envisioned these as tools of a new perceptual practice, at once empirical (or natural) and 
instrumental (oriented to social goals). Linking the indexical-instrumental condition of 
perception thus revealed to the collaborative cross-disciplinary modes of research practice 
institutionalized at M.I.T., Kepes proceeded to elaborate the visual discipline he had developed 
as a strategy for the construction of productive communities of knowledge with direct social 
effects. The initiatives he carried out during his tenure at M.I.T.—in exhibition design, 
publication, and ultimately, the inauguration of CAVS in 1967—should be understood as 
ventures within a larger ongoing project. Scientific photographs and works of art produced at 
CAVS, student design exercises and essays published in Kepes’s themed anthologies, were all 
precincts in an extensive interdisciplinary community of knowledge production Kepes attempted 
to build. They were related to each-other less by the content of the knowledge produced than by 
the strategic logic of deferred instrumentality they all shared. 
 
 In the end, the projects of Gropius and Kepes in America are exceptional in that, of the 
Weimar artistic diaspora, they were the only ones dedicated explicitly and intensively to an 
ideological and programmatic elaboration of the designer’s social identity in terms of practice. 
As exceptional case studies, they do not offer a master revision of the established historical 
narrative charting the migration and transformation of design approaches from prewar Europe to 
postwar America. However, they provide an opportunity, and even a necessity, to question that 
narrative’s ideological premise. The immediate postwar years in America usually describe a late 
modernist period, seen in its relationship to European high modernism as a trajectory of demise: 
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capitulating to the temptations of the emergent society of consumption and the pressures of the 
Pax Americana’s ideological imperialism, European modernism’s radical aesthetic and social 
project waned, devolving into an increasingly institutionalized and commercial “international 
style.” This retreat from radical aspirations, in turn, marks the immediate postwar years as a 
transitional period between the utopianism of the early twentieth century and its various 
reinventions starting in the 1960s. The ideological moment of this narrative couples a 
historiography structured by periodic breaks or transitions to a model of the relationship between 
art and politics rooted in the concept of the avant-garde as cultural production dedicated to social 
transformation.41  
 The historical problems raised in situating design in relation to the politics of knowledge 
do not fit well into that schema. First, because as I have tried to show, these are issues of practice 
rather than of ideology: it is not the content of knowledge that ultimately matters in each case, 
but its productive organization and social function. Shifting attention from design artifacts and 
ideological programs as products of artistic practice to the practices themselves as they constitute 
the designer’s identity as a social and cultural producer, the relevant question becomes not 
whether one can locate forms of emancipatory anticipation in design works and discourses, but 
                                                 
41 While there have been theories of the “avant-garde” premised upon cultural autonomy, the concept of the avant-
garde as cultural production dedicated to social transformation is the accepted reading—deriving from the canonical 
Marxist interpretation by Peter Bürger, Theorie der Avant-Garde (1974). While Bürger himself granted this position 
exclusively to the historical avant-garde, positing the postwar avant-garde instead as a vacuous recycling of the 
forms and critical strategies of the former, the presence of effective political critique in the artistic practices of the 
postwar (neo-) avant-garde is now widely accepted. See, e.g., Benjamin Buchloh, Neo-Avantgarde and Culture 
Industry: Essays on European and American Art from 1955 to 1975 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), xxiv-
xxvi. The critical evaluation of the architectural neo-avantgardes, on the other hand, as practices of social 
transformation or resistance has been, as a legacy of Manfredo Tafuri’s incisive analysis, confronted with the 
ambivalent model of utopian thought. For key recent reflections, see Felicity D. Scott, Architecture or Techno-
Utopia: Politics after Modernism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007); Reinhold Martin, Utopia's Ghost: 
Architecture and Postmodernism, Again (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).  
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rather how one can describe the reciprocal motivation between practices and representations.42 
Thus, for example, the radical utopianism proclaimed by early Weimar artistic groups can only 
be understood in its strategic relationship to forms of political organization institutionalized by 
Weimar parliamentary democracy; while the apparent conformism of Kepes’s notion of the 
“social man” must be read against his efforts to advance the designer into a position of direct 
social agency in the context of national war mobilization. The relevant question, in other words, 
is always that of the strategic function of discourses rather than of their relative position on the 
ideological spectrum from radicalism to affirmation. 
 Second, a reading of design as a (political) practice of knowledge is fundamentally 
incompatible with a conception of design as a cultural practice and the relative autonomization of 
socio-historical registers that implies. Therefore, the task can no longer be that of establishing 
channels of communication between historical developments in the (cultural) field of design and, 
putatively essentially heterogeneous, developments in political, economic, or technological 
history. Instead, one is dealing with a history of various practices that conform to the same mode 
of agency established within a general political regime of the liberal state, including its 
constitutive elements (managed economy, the interface of social security and political and 
economic freedoms, the bureaucratic and techno-scientific organization of governance). The 
                                                 
42 Methodologically, I would distance my approach from that of the sociology of practice, as represented in, e.g., 
Magali-Sarfatti Larson, Behind the Postmodern Façade: Architectural Change in Late Twentieth-Century America 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); or Dana Cuff, Architecture: The Story of Practice (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1991). Such discourses address architecture on the model of the “profession” as an analytical entity 
with constant characteristics—therefore justifying comparison, in a recurring trope, to the “medical profession.” 
Throughout this dissertation, I engage a number of excellent art historical studies that have some methodological 
recourse to the sociology of practice: Paul Louis Bentel, Modernism and Professionalism in American Architecture, 
1919-1933 (Ph.D diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993); Andrew Michael Shanken, 194X: 
Architecture, Planning, and Consumer Culture on the American Home Front (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2009) and Andrew Michael Shanken, From Total war to Total Living: American Architecture and the Culture 
of Planning, 1939-194X (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999); David Deitcher, “Teaching the Late Modern 
Artist: From Mnemonics to the Technology of Gestalt” (Ph.D. diss., City University of New York, 1989). I am, 
however, interested in the politics—rather than the sociology—of practice.  
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question for the history of design practices, then, is how they manifest the mode of agency 
established within that regime.  
 If the politics of knowledge model necessitates that we rethink the relationship between 
cultural production and social transformation, it also invites a parallel reconsideration of the 
geographical and chronological divisions that shape the historical narrative of the European 
avant-garde and its American assimilations. In describing manifestations, in different registers, 
of a mode of political agency defined by limits, we must stratify according to their own 
properties the historical field across which they unfold. A suggestive elaboration of this idea is 
expressed in the political philosophy of Etienne Balibar. In response to “periodizing” political 
theories, Balibar proposes a concept of a contradiction fundamental to the Western democratic 
regime that finds different political manifestations throughout its history, including the present. 
The aporetic contradiction between freedom and equality in the very principle of democracy at 
once delimits its universal extension and continuously brings any established democratic 
institution to its limits, necessitating its ongoing revision. Thus, in place of a linear historical 
progression, one finds a serial, both concurrent and sequential, elaboration of “layers of the 
political,” according to the emergence of “objects of contention” that articulate the democratic 
contradiction in relation to specific historical contingencies.43  
This is a productive way to understand the relationship among the various political 
revisions of practice described in this dissertation. Weimar Germany and New Deal America are 
both historical moments of liberal democratic state formation, which engage processes of 
delimitation in a number of areas intersecting with design. It is possible to understand the 
discourses and practices of Weimar parliamentary organization, New Deal economic planning, 
                                                 
43 Etienne Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx, trans. James 
Swenson (New York: Routledge, 1994): xiii. 
 
 29
postwar general education, etc., as “layers of the political,” which describe the constitution of 
liberal democratic governance within a contingently apportioned range of its agency. Another 
way to describe the serial elaboration of these moments is to say that they all trace the emergence 
of knowledge as a new “object of contention,” specifically at what Balibar describes as the 
historically privileged site of conflict. “Private property,” he notes, has been historically the most 
obvious and consequential site for the articulation of the liberal democratic political paradox—
defining the economy as at once “the principal area of state intervention in social practice [and] 
an unceasing obstacle to the efficacy of state intervention”; and, more generally, “the debate on 
the forms, limits, and attribution of property [as] a political debate par excellence.”44 While the 
establishment of the managed economy regime during the New Deal (also characterized as 
“mixed economy” for the complex interplay of “public” and “private” institutions that defines it) 
was a paradigmatic example of the negotiation of private property as object of contention, it was 
at the same time here that expert knowledge directly entered the political problem of property 
through its articulation as an economic policy tool.   
Balibar considers knowledge as a tool of social agency or social stratification (what he 
calls “intellectual difference”) to be a counterpart of private property, traceable throughout the 
history of the democratic regime, but latent as an object of contestation.45 From the New Deal 
                                                 
44 Etienne Balibar, “Politics and Truth” in Masses, Classes, Ideas, 168; Etienne Balibar, “What is a Politics of the 
Rights of Man?” in Masses, Classes, Ideas, 214. 
 
45 The dialectics of “intellectual difference” are directly linked to those of “private property” in democratic political 
philosophy and practice, according to Balibar, and thus share the same aporetic development. Property can only 
constitute a “natural right” inasmuch as, before any possession of things, it implies the “property of oneself,” a “free 
disposal of one’s forces and of their employment,” as the generic concept of intelligence. Because to possess it is 
first necessary to know, the role of knowledge within property introduces the latter also to an internal contradiction: 
the fundamentally social (or “transindividual”) nature of knowledge predetermines the impossibility of its being 
owned exclusively, and therefore contradicts the very concept of “private property.” See Étienne Balibar, The 
Philosophy of Marx, trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2007), 49-52; Balibar, “What is a Politics of the Rights of 
Man?” 221-224; Étienne Balibar, “’Rights of Man’ and ‘Rights of the Citizen’: The Modern Dialectic of Equality 
and Freedom,” Masses, Classes, Ideas, 54-59. See also Jason Read, “The Present as Pre-History: Adorno and 
Balibar on the Transformation of Labor,” International Studies in Philosophy 37: 2 (2005): 95-112. 
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administration of economic recovery to the postwar “new frontier,” then, we can trace the 
emergence of knowledge from its latency as a political object to the central place it would 
occupy in the political conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s. From within the history of design 
practices, the benefit to understanding these events as a serial elaboration of a foundational 
liberal democratic dialectic of limits, rather than the advent of a new socio-cultural “paradigm,” 
postmodern or post-industrial, is that it suggests new connections or patterns across the divides 
that currently separate design practices after 1960 from their postwar precursors—and the latter 
in turn from their 1920s avant-garde counterparts.46 If the chronological range of this dissertation 
stops at 1967, therefore, it is not to be understood as marking the end of a complete cycle of 
development. The serial organization of historical space works to fragment the narrative drive of 
history even within a prescribed set of chronological parameters. It also makes those parameters 
ultimately tentative and contingent. 
 
 
46 Within debates internal to political philosophy, Balibar’s intervention addresses the displacement of class conflict, 
centered around the object of property, with new forms of political contestation. 
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ADDENDUM “A FIGURE COVERED WITH LABELS”: THE RECEPTION OF 




“I realize that I am standing among you as a figure covered with labels, maybe to the 
point of obscurity.” 







Of the three canonical founding fathers of modern architecture—Le Corbusier, Mies van 
der Rohe, and Gropius—the latter has had the most uneven reception history. Lionized by early 
critics, Gropius arrived in the United States as a “pioneer” and leader of the modern movement.2 
While his early accomplishments continued to be universally praised, his work in America came 
under fire already by the early 1960s, and with increasing vitriol thereafter.  This discrepancy in 
Gropius’s early and late periods, moreover, continues to be an unresolved aspect of the critical 
and historical assessment of his legacy. Unlike Kepes, who sank into obscurity after his 
retirement from CAVS in 1976 not to be brought back to scholarly attention until fairly recently, 
Gropius is an important figure for the historiography of twentieth-century design—and one that 
is fraught with tension.   
Arguably, the still-current critical consensus on Gropius’s late work and legacy was 
forged between the early 1960s and the 1980s. In tracing the formation of this consensus, several 
rhetorical themes emerge, which—as they reinforce one another in unexpected ways—constitute 
                                                 
1 Arts and Architecture (June 1953): 19. 
 
2 See Nikolaus Pevsner, Pioneers of Modern Design: from William Morris to Walter Gropius (New York: Museum 
of Modern Art, 1949), originally published as Pioneers of the Modern Movement (London: Faber & Faber, 1936).  
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a figure of both temporal discontinuity and perceptual occlusion.  First, Gropius’s work 
consistently failed to be reconciled with a Romantic model of artistic subjectivity, understood to 
be manifested in individual artifacts and within an overall unified oeuvre. This lack of fit marked 
both Gropius’s production and his creative persona as indistinct, illegible, aesthetically and 
conceptually obscure. Second, the lack of critical interest in his most recent work made Gropius 
paradigmatic for an emergent periodizing narrative that sought to mark a break between current 
design tendencies and those represented by the modern movement. Thus, the figure of Gropius 
was rendered at once to go out of focus and to disappear into the (historical) distance. That 
critical legacy established the historiographical figure of Gropius, it might be said, as a cipher—
in the double meaning of that term as a representational code and as a symbol for zero, or the 
absence of value. As one critic put it in 1984, Gropius’s “influence waned rather quickly and… 
there remained little of lasting importance.”3 As such, Gropius still functions as a code name for 
the historical eclipse of the modern movement and a blind spot for critical assessment.  
The humanist terms of mid-century critical analysis may appear dated today.4  The 
relevance of that analysis, however, exceeds the conventional conceptual framework within 
which it was articulated. Once constituted, the cipher of Gropius would serve as a key referent in 
later, and highly influential, discourses on the social and political agency of architectural 
practices. In the writings of Colin Rowe and Manfredo Tafuri, architectural agency was 
                                                 
3 Walter Segal, “Unkind to Grandad,” The Architectural Review 176 (July 1984): 69. 
   
4 This does not preclude these from being reproduced in the two most recent scholarly assessments of Gropius’s 
American work. Anthony Alofsin, The Struggle for Modernism: Architecture, Landscape Architecture, and City 
Planning at Harvard (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co, 2002) covers one hundred years of institutional 
history. While it offers a much fuller picture than previously available of the early years of the Graduate School of 
Design, it rehearses the established interpretations of the figure of Gropius. The same is true of Jill Pearlman’s more 
polemical Inventing American Modernism: Joseph Hudnut, Walter Gropius, and the Bauhaus Legacy at Harvard 
(Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2007). Her focus is on giving Joseph Hudnut the 
historical attention he certainly deserves, and Gropius’s primary historiographical function here is that of Hudnut’s 
foil.    
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differently articulated as a function of limits. The architectural work as an integral aesthetic 
object situated in the context of a larger urban fabric was here an allegory of architecture’s 
disciplinary identity and social agency. Within that framework, the cipher of Gropius emerged as 
a threatening de-differentiation or dissolution of the borderline both critics considered to be 
essential. It is ultimately this situation of Gropius within a dialectic of agency and delimitation 
that remains most fruitful today, both for its diagnostic accuracy and the precision with which it 
circumscribes the analytical reach of frameworks that hold the material products of design as an 




“[B]y 1955,” commented Gropius’s former student at the Harvard Graduate School of 
Design Paul Rudolph in 1961, “the limitations of the European architectural philosophies of the 
first part of the 20th century were crystal clear…”5 The “modern movement,” another former 
student, Philip Johnson, privately noted the same year, was “winding up its days.”6 At the turn of 
the 1960s, the emergent narrative of modern architecture’s historical eclipse was mirrored in 
assessments of Gropius’s current work, in which metaphors of a loss of vitality and promise, of 
persistence without a future and ineluctable obsolescence proliferated. Obliquely, and with all 
due respect for his indisputable position as “a powerful catalytic agent in the evolution [of 
modernism],” Gillo Dorfles suggested, again in 1961, that the architect’s progressive trajectory, 
“projecting himself into the future from the very beginning of his career,” had come to a halt in a 
                                                 
5 The Rise to World Prominence of American Architecture, Voice of America Forum Lectures, Architecture Series, 
volume 1 (Washington, D.C.: United States Information Agency, 1961), 192. 
 
6 Philip Johnson to Jurgen Joedicke, 6 December 1961, cited in Philip Johnson, Writings (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), 124-125.   
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“limited capacity for innovation,” marking the limits of his “participation in the future of U.S. 
architecture.”7 Two years earlier, and less delicately, Time found Gropius “so firmly planted in 
architectural history that people were sometimes amazed to find him still a part of the present.”8 
Similarly, James Marston Fitch opened his 1960 monograph on the architect by confessing that 
Gropius represents the “dilemma” of living history—an originator of the contemporary 
commonplace, the “prophet [who] had overrun his prophecy.”9 Nine years later, such general 
perplexity at discovering the great man still alive was found well-suited for an obituary by The 
New York Times. Citing Fitch’s “dilemma,” the Times concluded that Gropius was “one of those 
rare accidents of history, a man who became a legend in his own time.”10 At Gropius’s passing 
in 1969, the narrative had already fully coalesced. For the general public who may still have no
been in-the-know, New York Times architecture critic Ada Louise Huxtable explained that 
Gropius’s death “did not mark the end of an era; the era was already over.” The erasure had 
become evident enough that Huxtable found it possible to plead—or provoke—that “[Gropius] 
was not irrelevant.”
t 
                                                
11 For some time prior to his actual death, the architect had been a ghost.  
Spectral metaphors abounded at the brief flurry of scholarly activity during the mid-
1980s “resighting (or hindsighting)” Gropius, as one observer put it.12 “Gropius and the 
 
7 Gillo Dorfles, “Walter Gropius Today,” Zodiac 8 (1961): 35-36. 
 
8 “The Lawgiver,” Time, 29 June 1959. 
 
9 James Marston Fitch, Walter Gropius (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1960), 7. 
 
10 “Gropius, the Shaper of Modern Design, Dies in Boston at 86,” The New York Times, 6 July 1969. 
 
11 Ada Louise Huxtable, “He Was Not Irrelevant,” The New York Times, 20 July 1969. 
 
12 Jane Holtz Kay, “Harvard Salute (?) to Walter Gropius,” Progressive Architecture (November 1985): 25. A 1983 
critical appraisal of the Harvard Graduate School of Design educational program by Klaus Herdeg was the first 
salvo, followed by an official biography by Reginald Isaacs, and completed with a retrospective exhibition of 
Gropius’s work focused on the holdings of the Harvard Busch-Reisinger Museum and accompanied by a catalogue 
raisonné. See Klaus Herdeg, The Decorated Diagram: Harvard Architecture and the Failure of the Bauhaus Legacy 
(Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1983); Reginald R. Isaacs, Walter Gropius: Der Mensch und sein Werk, v. 1 
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Bauhaus,” noted another critic, “are ghosts that continue to haunt the design studio.”13 To take 
“old man Gropius” too seriously, observed yet another, is to “se[e] ghosts.”14 Such rhetorical 
devices secured the link between the figure of Gropius and the narrative of temporal 
discontinuity, which continued to define conceptions of the modern movement. In 1992, for 
example, it could be said explicitly that “what happened to Gropius has its parallel in what 
happened to Modernism itself.”15 The narrative that located in postwar America the endgame of 
the European modernism of the first decades of the twentieth century began to coalesce into the 
specific trajectory of devolution in the 1960s, propelled by a growing desire to counter the 
triumphalism of a perceived modernist orthodoxy. Such early critiques of “late modernism” in 
America suggested that the utopian optimism of the modern movement, its faith in aesthetic and 
social progress spearheaded by modern technology, was brought to ground in an ironic 
fulfillment (in the midst of the International Style’s evident hegemony), which was at the same 
time its negation in dogmatic formalism and frank commercialism. In the mid-1980s, this 
historicist trajectory was consolidated into the narrative of postmodern periodization, declaring 
the death of modernism “itself” in a thematic of failure.16  
                                                                                                                                                             
and 2 (Berlin: Gebr.Mann Verlag GmbH & Co., 1983, 1984), published abridged in English as Walter Gropius: An 
Illustrated Biography of the Creator of the Bauhaus (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1991); Winfried 
Nerdinger, Walter Gropius (Berlin: Bauhaus-Archiv and Cambridge, Mass.: Busch-Reisinger Museum, 1985).  
 
13 Mary N. Woods, “Modernism’s Decline,” Progressive Architecture 65 (November 1984): 149. 
 
14 “Professor Herdeg burdens old man Gropius,” wrote Walter Segal in his review of The Decorated Diagram, “with 
the truly heroic responsibility for the ugliness of modern architecture in America. He does, of course, see ghosts.” 
Segal, “Unkind to Grandad,” 69. 
 
15 Jonathan Hale, “The Failure and Success of Walter Gropius,” Progressive Architecture (February 1992), 108. 
 
16 The classic texts outlining this argument are Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961); 
Peter Blake, God’s Own Junkyard: The Planned Deterioration of America’s Landscape (1964); Peter Blake, Form 
Follows Fiasco: Why Modern Architecture Hasn’t Worked (1974); Tom Wolfe, From Bauhaus to Our House 
(1981); Brent Brolin, The Failure of Modern Architecture (1976). For the classic version of a similar argument in 
relation to “high modernism” in the art world, see Serge Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). For the narrative of cultural postmodernism, see, e.g., David Harvey, 
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The figure of Gropius remained tied to this narrative charting modernism’s demise at the 
moment of its Pyrrhic victory partially because his postwar production – unlike that of all the 
other modern “masters”—was never critically redeemed in any other form of ongoing vitality. 
“Halfway through his career,” one critic rehearsed the consensus position, “at the peak of 
success, [Gropius] declared victory, and seemed to give up the fight unwittingly… Modernism 
was no weaker in the 1950s than in the 1920s – think of the Seagram Building, think of 
Ronchamp – yet the work of Gropius lacked its previous fire.”17 Gropius was commonly invoked 
at the points of intersection between aesthetic evaluation and historicist logic. In an influential 
1969 text, William H. Jordy described the American practices of émigré designers linked to the 
Bauhaus as an “aftermath”—with connotations of the calm after the storm—tying that metaphor 
specifically to Gropius’s work, the “mildness” of which made the “blandness of both visual 
qualities and theoretical commitment in most [postwar American] modern architecture… more 
evident.”18 That “mildness,” in other words, indicated the capitulation of a previously rigorous 
aesthetic and ideological position in a morally compromising American context. Gropius’s “fame 
secure,” the critic speculated,  
his work at the close of his career blurs his former ‘position’ to that of the merely distinguished 
professional. Breuer, and especially Mies, who remained most faithful to the old cause amid the 
distractions of their new environment, have pursued the steadiest careers.19 
In 1976, Huxtable used the same moral-aesthetic criteria in summarizing the narrative of 
modernism’s demise: “the perversion of the modernist ideal, the failure of its social aims, the 
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explosion of the myth of progress, the deadly spread of the commercial cliché, the disruptive 
impact on the receiving environment, plus the poverty and rigidity of design from which any 
allusion to the past has been expunged.” She called all this “the gospel according to Giedion and 
Gropius.”20   
 Moral-aesthetic formulations of blandness or superficiality in Gropius’s American 
production were frequently expressed as a weakness in his authorial position, his status as both 
the designer of a specific set of architectural works and the originator of a specific legacy in 
theory and design. At stake was the issue of collaboration, expressed by Gropius, first, as the 
ideal of creative “teamwork” among architects, presumably realized in the formation of The 
Architects Collaborative;21 and, second, as the championing of architectural production by teams 
of specialists, with the architect in the role of “co-ordinator.”22 This model of practice directly 
contradicted the values of originality and authenticity linked to the authorial figure in humanist 
discourse.23 It was Gropius himself, in fact, who first articulated that polarity. He positioned the 
                                                 
20 Ada Louise Huxtable, “The Gospel According to Giedion and Gropius is Under Attack,” The New York Times, 27 
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then design, construction and economy may again become an entity – a fusion of art, science and business.” Walter 
Gropius, “Gropius Appraises Today’s Architect,” Architectural Forum (May 1952), reprinted in Walter Gropius, 
The Scope of Total Architecture (New York: Collier Books, 1943), 74. 
 
23 The classic formulation of the role played by the concept of authorship in humanist discourse is Michel Foucault, 
“What Is an Author?” in Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, trans., Donald F. Bouchard, ed., Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 113-138. 
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“teamwork” ideal as a polemical other to “the work of the egocentric prima donna architect who 
forces his personal fancy on an intimidated client, creating solitary monuments of individual 
esthetic [sic] significance.”24 Gropius’s polemic had as its immediate target Frank Lloyd Wright, 
whose work was interpreted—with much help from Wright himself—exactly in terms of 
anarchic and intransigent “solitary genius,” and whose own vehement critiques of prominent 
European modernists were well-known.25 The effect of such exchanges was to situate Gropius 
on the opposite side of the Romantic model of creative subjecthood and its aesthetic expressio
“[W]here Wright designed soaring, poetic buildings that smote the eye and branded their 
creator's name in the memory,” Time magazine wrote in 1959, “Gropius was… modern 
architecture's idea-giver, analytical thinker and greatest educator.”
n. 
                                                
26 Unlike other leaders of the 
modern movement, in other words, Gropius was not a “form giver.”27 
The criterion of aesthetic originality, moreover, was inseparable from the assessment of a 
distinct and unified authorial subjectivity. After describing one of Gropius’s designs with TAC 
as “stylistically ‘neutral,’” for example, Dorfles proceeded to note the architect’s “humility… in 
‘neutralizing himself’ in [a] group of disciples [at TAC], without wishing in any way to stand out 
from the teamwork which he had founded.”28 “[TAC] buildings are not without quality,” echoed 
 
24 Walter Gropius, “Eight Steps Toward a Solid Architecture,” Architectural Forum (February 1954), reprinted in 
Gropius, Scope of Total Architecture, 85.  
 
25 See, for example, Walter Gropius, “On Frank Lloyd Wright,” Apollo in the Democracy, 167-170. 
 
26”The Idea-Giver,” Time, 18 July 1969. The same journal had also previously called Gropius a “lawgiver.” “The 
Lawgiver,” Time, 29 June 1959. 
 
27 “[Gropius] does not share [the category of the ‘great architect’] on the level of a Wright, Mies, or Le Corbusier… 
[They] are correctly called form givers, and the forms are those their age demands, shaped by both the individual 
creative act and the historic moment.” Huxtable, “He Was Not Irrelevant.” 
 
28 Dorfles, “Walter Gropius Today,” 36. My emphasis. 
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Jordy, “but they are without personality.”29 The significance assigned to Gropius’s lack of 
drawing skill is also notable in this context. Marcel Franciscono asserted that fact to be 
“probably the single most important disclosure” of the architect’s 1983-84 biography, concluding 
that “his vaunted teamwork was for him a strict necessity, since he was unable to commit his 
ideas to paper.”30 Perhaps that revelation so potently distilled the negation of creative 
subjectivity in Gropius’s work because it harkened back to the Beaux-Arts conception of 
drawing, founded in the prominence afforded to the esquisse as what has been called “the 
quintessential romantic act of invention and creation.” Produced in total seclusion and based on a 
momentary spark of intuition, the esquisse proved that “architectural creation lay in the 
‘conscience’ of the individual architect.” 31 When Paul Rudolph announced in 1961 the end of “a 
long period where the specialists talked only of… the architect as a coordinator,” he certainly 
had his former GSD teacher in mind. In contrast, Rudolph instructed the young architect to  
understand that in the exhilarating, awesome moment when he takes pencil in hand, and holds it 
poised above a white sheet of paper, that he has suspended there all that has gone before and all that 
will ever be. The creative act is all that matters.32 
The task of parsing out individual contributions in a series of Gropius’s various 
partnerships, from Adolf Meyer to TAC, is a scholarly parallel to the critical problem of creative 
subjectivity. Such stipulations have generally not allotted much to Gropius’s hand. As 
Franciscono sums up, “the designs of his buildings… were due in significant part to his 
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collaborators, since the character of his work seemed to change as they did.”33 Like the dilemma 
of the split in quality between Gropius’s early and late work, the scholarly investigation of the 
collaboration problem has reinforced the logic of authorial erasure by splintering the consistent 
articulation of work over time. There can be no author without an oeuvre.34  
Another discursive index of the problem in authorial function can be located in debates 
over the expressive content of Gropius’s architecture. In the first years after the architect’s 
arrival in America, these focused on the notion of a “Bauhaus Style.” Gropius had declared his 
intention “not to introduce a, so to speak, cut and dried ‘Modern Style’ from Europe.”35 This 
was, in part, a defensive formulation, intended to guard the American reception of his work 
against the highly influential characterization of current European architecture as “International 
Style” by Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson.36 Although the authors did not coin the 
ubiquitous term “Bauhaus Style,” they had offered a conceptual framework for understanding 
modernism within a Beaux-Arts idiom and a taxonomy based on criteria of form and expression, 
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34An “oeuvre” exemplifies the “principle of unity” that Foucault considers necessary for the definition of an 
“author.” See Foucault, “What Is an Author?” 
 
35 From a statement made for The Architectural Record (May 1937), reprinted in Gropius, Scope of Total 
Architecture, 17.   
 
36 The notion of the “Bauhaus Style” was in circulation, and a polemic against it voiced, in Germany already in the 
1920s. See, e.g., Hannes Meyer, “bauhaus und gesselschaft” (1929); Ernst Kallai, “Ten Years of Bauhaus” (1930), 
cited in Barry Bergdoll, “Bauhaus Multiplied: Paradoxes of Architecture and Design in and After the Bauhaus” in 
Barry Bergdoll and Leah Dickerman, eds., Bauhaus: Workshops for Modernity, 1919-1933 (New York: The 
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Bauhaus and Weimar Germany’s Consumer Culture” in Kathleen James-Chakraborty, ed., Bauhaus Culture: From 
Weimar to the Cold War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 115-119. While the Hitchcock and 
Johnson formulation of “style” was articulated largely in relation to a domestic debate on modern architecture, their 
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Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson, The International Style (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 1995), 37. 
The text was originally published in 1932 as The International Style: Architecture Since 1922, a companion volume 
to an exhibition held at the Museum of Modern Art. For the American context of the Hitchcock and Johnson 
polemic, see Pai, Portfolio and the Diagram, 111-115. Moreover, the “International Style” formulation certainly had 
a much greater impact and relevance in the American context. 
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as a “contemporary style” consistent in its articulation with Classical and Gothic. “Style is 
character, style is expression,” wrote the two authors, “The architect who builds in the 
international style seeks to display the true character of his construction and to express clearly 
his provision for function.” 37   
Despite critiques directed against the Hitchcock and Johnson model, the “Bauhaus Style” 
idea remained in common circulation, inviting repeated refutations by Gropius and his supporters 
throughout his life.38 At the same time, while Hitchcock and Johnson saw “functionalism” as an 
expression of the modern style, signifying a desire on the part of the architect “to display the true 
character of his construction and to express clearly his provision for function,” the term soon 
thereafter came to refer to a lack of formal or symbolic expressive content.39 Because such 
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38 See, for example: “All too often, [the Bauhauslers’s] real intentions have been and still are misunderstood, 
namely, to see in the movement an attempt at creating a “style” and to identify every building and object in which 
ornament and period style seem to be discarded as examples of an imaginary ‘Bauhaus Style.’ This is contrary to 
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devitalizing inertia, that stagnating academism which I had called it into being to combat.” Walter Gropius, “My 
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forms, in: Gropius, The New Architecture and the Bauhaus (Faber & Faber, London, 1935); Gropius, “Education 
towards Creative Design,” American Architect and Architecture (May 1937); “The Gropius Symposium,” Arts and 
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about the “academization” of the Bauhaus in America. “The fact,” he wrote, “that the movement could be 
formulated as a ‘style’ suggested that the phase of initial discovery was past; the work of assimilation, diffusion, 
variation, and popularization had begun.” Jordy, “Aftermath of the Bauhaus,” 494. 
 
39 Hitchcock and Johnson, International Style, 58-59. Hitchcock and Johnson, it should be noted, drew a polemical 
distinction between the “generally accepted form [of] the idea of functionalism, [which] derives its sanctions from 
both Greek and Gothic architecture, for in the temple as well as in the cathedral the aesthetic expression is based on 
structure and function,” and the “doctrine of the contemporary anti-aesthetic functionalists, [who claim that] 
aesthetic questions must take a secondary place in architectural criticism [to economic and practical problems],” 
mentioning by name among the latter Sigfried Giedion and Hannes Meyer. The authors’ task was then to distance 
the “functionalist” modern architecture they championed from what they considered to be the erroneous 
interpretation of it on the part of the “anti-aesthetic functionalists.” “One may therefore refuse to admit,” they 
insisted, “that intentionally functionalist building is quite without a potential aesthetic element. ... [T]he European 
functionalists follow, rather than go against, the principles of the general contemporary style. Whether they admit it 
or not is beside the point. … Since the works of the European functionalists usually fall within the limits of the 
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content could still be located in both Le Corbusier and even Mies, it was Gropius who would 
most commonly be associated with the “functionalist” approach. This turned the original debate 
about definitions into an internal contradiction in the interpretation of Gropius’s legacy: it could 
at once be claimed that his work in America exemplified an “academization” of the modern 
movement as a Bauhaus Style, but that it was at the same time a non-style, rooted in an arid 
positivism. 40  
In his The Decorated Diagram: Harvard Architecture and the Failure of the Bauhaus 
Legacy (1983), Klaus Herdeg offered perhaps the clearest statement of this contradiction.41 
Herdeg’s critique focused on Gropius’s “legacy” as expressed in the work of his former students 
at the Harvard Graduate School of Design. “Bauhaus legacy” designs were characterized by a 
dichotomy between plan and elevation, where plans were “diagrams” of functional relationships, 
and facades unrelated exercises in purely optical play that “ha[d] no meaning beyond their own 
existence.”42 The resultant “decorated diagram” could appear at the same time as a “style” and as 
the perversion of that very concept in the severing of form from content, “program” from 
“character,” which Herdeg summarized as a disconnect between “seeing and thinking.”43 The 
image chosen for the dust jacket—a comparison of the human eye to the camera lens, borrowed 
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from The Scope of Total Architecture, a collection of Gropius essays—was obviously intended to 
stand as an allegory of mechanistic vision lacking the human richness of expressive content. 
(Figure 1) If the diagnosis was fragmentation, the treatment prescribed for future architectural 
production would lie in the realization that “social and psychological problems ultimately have 
to find their resolution in aesthetics.” Such resolution, moreover, would be accomplished through 
an “art of expressing something by means of seemingly opposite meaning,” namely: irony.44  
The argument for a reconciliation of architectural form and content on the model of a 
rhetorical device was a diligent application of the ideology of Herdeg’s teacher Colin Rowe. 
Already at the turn of the 1950s, Rowe was reviving the Classical concepts of “style” and “taste” 
to use as a weapon against, in part, what he called the “social or sociological ‘pabulum’ that 
Gropius was promoting at Harvard.”45 Rowe’s dialectical reading of modernism as a futile 
attempt to fuse the “physique-flesh” and the “morale-word” of architecture became one of the 
more ideologically powerful expressions of modernism’s “failure.” The modern movement’s 
social utopian promise had run to ground in “mostly trivial moral enthusiasm,” Rowe claimed, 
while its “physical product” remained invested with “an eloquence and a flexibility.”46 His 
solution to this insalubrious coupling of dead content and still vital form was to sever the latter 
and reinsert it into a new rhetorical totality, guaranteeing “the enjoyment of utopian poetics 
without… the embarrassment of utopian politics.”47 Rowe’s revival of the Classical aesthetic 
tradition secured the discursive circuit articulating Gropius as a cipher. 
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A key chapter of Collage City, the last canonical statement of Rowe’s philosophy, co-
written with Fred Koetter in 1978, opens by citing Gropius’s concept of “total architecture”—“an 
obvious version of the Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk”—and proceeds to define it as a 
representative articulation of a drive to extend the field of architectural expertise over the entire 
built environment, with far-ranging examples like Le Corbusier’s City for Three Million 
Inhabitants, Christopher Alexander’s Notes on the Synthesis of Form, Toulouse-le-Mirail, 
“advocacy planning,” and Archigram’s “instant cities.” Rowe and Koetter see here a detrimental 
loss of architectural identity in the “cherished prejudice that all buildings can be, and must 
become, works of architecture.” The “discriminatory concept” of design advocated by Rowe and 
Koetter as a corrective to such ambitions relies on the maintenance of “form” as a liminal 
condition or threshold negotiating between “building” in general, or the urban built environment, 
and “architecture” specifically. In fact, “form” was the operative concept of Collage City. The 
edge of the collage piece suturing the fragmentations of the urban fabric and discriminating 
therapy for architecture’s disciplinary identity-crisis, “form” was the antidote to the pervasive 
dichotomies Rowe diagnosed in the contemporary social and architectural field.48 The neglected 
other of function-driven design, “form” was really conceived here as a disciplinary boundary 
whose dissolution was theorized as a threat, a limit that had to remain impervious at all costs. 
The target of Rowe’s polemic, subsumed under the categories of “functionalism” and 
“utopia,” was architecture’s entanglement with a combination of urban planning and information 
sciences. In the 1960s, the widespread introduction into architectural theory and practice of 
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techniques borrowed from operations research, the behavioral sciences, and systems analysis 
appeared a logical development of the early modernist enthusiasm for industrial technologies and 
efforts to standardize the design process as a means of intervening in the entire built environment 
and thus spearheading social change. As K. Michael Hays points out, reaction to such tendencies 
was the persistent subtext of the critical discourse developed around the journal Oppositions, in 
part under the influence of Rowe. The legacy of modernism was polarized here into opposing 
ideological positions: “autonomy” and “functionalism.” Architecture’s disciplinary autonomy, as 
“a body of formal elements and operations,” itself a product of modernist discourse, was seen to 
be threatened by modernism’s other, the rationalizing doctrine of functionalism, that tended “on 
the one hand, [to] reduce architecture to a bloodless pseudo-science and, on the other, serve it up 
raw, as it were, as a mere condiment for the full optimizing appetite of… consumer capital.”49 
Thus, in the discourse of Oppositions, the thematic of modernism’s “failure” was drawn out in 
relation to what had already been identified in postwar America with the legacy of Gropius: 
“function” to the exclusion of “form.” 
At this point, it is necessary to confront the other discourse of anti-utopian dialectics that 
appeared in the field of Oppositions as a rock to Rowe’s hard place – that of Manfredo Tafuri.50 
Tafuri’s post-Marxist history of modernism diagnosed the same situation in contemporary 
architecture, read on a more comprehensive scale as the “rationalization of the urban order,”51 
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Princeton Architectural Press, 1998), ix, xii. 
 
50 Hays uses this expression to define Tafuri and Rowe as the two opposite poles of attraction for the discourses of 
Oppositions. Hays, “Oppositions,” ix. Ockman points to a more general relevance: “As the two most important 
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51 Manfredo Tafuri, Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development, Barbara Luigia La Penta, trans. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976), 170. For Tafuri, the importation of information-technology-based models 
into architecture and planning is but the latest manifestation of a more general disciplinary crisis, the roots of which 
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and the questions he asked corresponded to those confronted by Oppositions: “[W]hat remains of 
the role played historically by architecture? Up to what point does architecture’s immersion in 
these [positivist] processes render it a pure economic factor?”52 Tafuri offered another 
ideological framework for linking the disciplinary crisis of architecture represented by 
“functionalism” to the narrative of modernism’s “failure.” In his thought, the total built 
environment, the instrumental “urban order,” was the material manifestation of capitalism’s 
relentless and systematic cooptation of the real, to which modern architecture attempted, and 
failed, to respond at the level of ideology. “[T]he crisis of modern architecture,” he wrote, “is not 
the result of ‘tiredness’ or ‘dissipation.’ It is rather a crisis of the ideological function of 
architecture.” 53 This was the context in which Tafuri’s American readers would have understood 
his pithy analysis of Gropius’s disappearance in Modern Architecture (1976), co-written with 
Francesco Dal Co: “For [Gropius in the United States] the break with the climate of the Weimar 
Republic proved fatal… [His] refusal to remain a ‘master’ and his disappearance into the reality 
of American professional life were paid for with a harsh price that necessarily affects any 
discussion of his career.”54 Tafuri identified the locus of Gropius’s disappearance as the very 
“reality” at the crux of architecture’s disciplinary crisis. 
Gropius’s pursuit of the avant-garde project to enter the means of production inevitably 
led to his disappearance into the American city as the representation of capitalist 
“disenchantment” in its pure and total form. The American “functionalism” of Gropius was no 
                                                                                                                                                             
go as far back as the Renaissance, and which is attributable to architecture’s engagements with city planning. For a 
helpful analysis, see Anthony Vidler, “Disenchanted Histories: The Legacies of Manfredo Tafuri,” ANY 
(Architecture New York), No. 25/26 (2000): 29-36. 
 
52 Tafuri, Architecture and Utopia, 176. 
 
53 Ibid., 181. 
 
54 Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, Modern Architecture, v.2 (New York: Rizzoli, 1986), 306-7. 
 
 47
longer here a betrayal or corruption of the historical avant-garde, but rather the logical endpoint 
of one trajectory in a series of its ideological projects. “The eye of the constructivists and the 
radical artists,” Tafuri wrote 
had assumed as its own duty remaining wide open behind the mechanical apparatus that governs the 
world, in the hope of being able to guide the movements of that apparatus. But faced with the 
discovery that on the set in which one thought oneself able to operate independent of external 
influences the true directional control was exerted by uncontrollable forces, … [Dziga Vertov’s] 
“man with a movie camera” is transformed into the man with half-closed eyes destined to end up in 
the limbo of somnambulism, wherein action remains action, despite the semiunconscious state of the 
actor. One can, however, maintain that such action without a subject is the only real action, … the 
only action that reconciles one with the world [as exemplified by] the Gropius of the Pan Am 
Building and of TAC (The Architects Collaborative).”55 
Tafuri’s guiding metaphor of the disappearance of the architectural “object” into the “city” as the 
concrete manifestation of capitalist relations of production was also a reflection of the 
significance of post-Keynesian “planning” in the contemporary activity of architects as 
administrative technicians-organizers of urban territory—a new role that made the avant-garde 
project of prefiguring a liberated society through architectural design appear hopelessly 
anachronistic.56 The architect as organizer of urban processes, and no longer the designer of 
aesthetic objects, appeared as the terminal figure of the avant-garde.  
It would be appropriate in this context to juxtapose Tafuri’s reference to the famous still 
from The Man with a Movie Camera (1928-29), reproduced as the closing image of the Sphere 
and the Labyrinth, with Herdeg’s allegorical reproduction of Gropius’s comparison between the 
human eye and the camera. (Figure 2) Arguably, Tafuri’s post-utopian ideology and the anti-
utopianism of Rowe depart from a similar set of premises and grapple with a similar set of terms 
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to arrive at very different political conclusions.57 The modernist “utopia” for both is the promise 
of architecture’s reconciliation with the social world, and its demystification leads, along 
different paths and to different effects, to a confrontation with the concept of “form.” 
Analogously, the diagnosis of the modern “rationalization of sight” at the root of a historical 
crisis of architecture can be equally attributed to both.58 If for Rowe, “form” is a threshold whose 
preservation guarantees the harmonious re-articulation of architecture with society, for Tafuri, 
this formal limit enables their necessary conflict.  
Rowe’s Collage City celebrated the potential of formal design to constitute an “analogue 
of politics and perception,” in whose integuments the unavoidable conflicts between 
individuality and society, “the necessary collisions of freedom and justice,” could be reconciled, 
and a liberal democratic totality thereby reconstituted at the level of autonomous aesthetic play.59 
Herdeg’s version of this argument for architecture’s new political efficacy as a product of formal 
design solutions was outlined in an example he gave of “the most graphic and politically 
important instance of deliberately manipulating… shape and symbolism.” It involved the shape 
of a table to be chosen for the 1968-69 Paris peace negotiations between the United States and 
South Vietnam on one side and North Vietnam and the Vietcong on the other. The solution of a 
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59 See Ockman, “Form without Utopia,” 117, 97. For a contextual analysis of the coupling of aesthetic formalism 
and liberal democratic political relativism in Rowe’s ideology, see Robert E. Somol, “Oublier Rowe,” ANY 
(Architecture New York), no.7/8 (1994): 9-14. 
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circular table with two rectangular wings appeared to simultaneously assert the equality of all 
negotiating partners and subordinate the position of the Vietcong, thus achieving a diplomatic 
compromise. The table was offered as a model for an architecture of “multivalent form, allowing 
the coexistence of… fundamentally opposed political positions.”60 (Figure 3)  
In his definitive methodological statement, “The Historical ‘Project,’” Tafuri introduced 
the idea of the “knight’s move,” borrowed from Russian literary formalism, as his own allegory 
of architectural aesthetics. Rather than redundantly mirroring the reality of the social world, 
architecture reproduces it obliquely, with a “swerve” into poetic language where the real 
becomes “estranged.” It was the task of the historian to stay true to the logic of the “swerve,” 
always tracing architectural ideology’s asymptotal relationship to the real, ever vigilant against 
the risk of the collapse of all distinctions in the “indifference” of the totally administered world 
or in utopian flight from it. “At issue,” Tafuri wrote, “is a question of recognizing… the thematic 
of the boundary intrinsic to forms, of the limits of language.”61 At the same time, in the 
destruction of the “fullness” of autonomous architectural language, manifested in its “slow 
transformation into purely technical labor” carried out through “manifold experiments… aimed 
at finding new roles for the work of a technician, who remains the traditional architect only in the 
less significant cases,” Tafuri located a contemporary “crisis of architecture.” The critic’s role, 
he maintained, was to exacerbate that crisis by drawing over and over again the “limit” or the 
“gap” between such experiments of dissolution into the real and the “forms of the architecture of 
                                                 
60 Herdeg, Decorated Diagram, 27. 
 
61 Tafuri, “The Historical ‘Project,’” 6. Emphasis in the original. 
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the Modern Movement.” Ultimately, such “forms” articulated the “swerve” of poetic language, 
thereby preserving intellectual work and assuring its political promise.62  
In his efforts to maintain the promise of an architectural avant-garde, which he shared 
with Rowe, Tafuri continued to privilege those projects that displayed high modernist values of 
autonomous aesthetics, even as his programmatically tragic critical position obliged him to insist 
on their futility. His writings made clear that the proud if impotent refusal of the Seagram 
Building was always preferable to the purblind somnambulism of Pan Am.63 Whereas for Tafuri 
“form” was a guarantee of the political efficacy of architecture as an accusatory index of 
intolerable social contradictions, and of architectural history as a discipline of radical social 
critique, the very same concept became for Rowe a negation of the necessity of critique in the 
disengaged freedom of refined sensibility. These two most significant post-utopian discourses on 
architecture labored in almost dialectical opposition on the problem of retrenchment, against the 





Nowhere had the thematics of form and disappearance around the figure of Gropius 
coalesced more publicly and with greater symbolic force than in the “travesty” of the Pan Am 
(later MetLife) Building. (Figure 4) Designed by Gropius in association with Pietro Belluschi 
and Emery Roth & Sons, the building and the critical reaction to it, soon after its completion in 
1963, became one of the two events commonly invoked as terminal in the narrative of 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 20-21. 
 
63 Tafuri and Dal Co, Modern Architecture, vol. 2, 312. 
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modernism’s demise.64 The spectrum of response to the building described an entire economy of 
visual tropes, productive of an irresolvable conflict between form and its negation, vision and its 
occlusion. That the building appeared to collapse these foundational distinctions was the precise 
source of the outrage it provoked and the reason that it could stand as a potent representation of 
architecture in crisis. At the same time, the polemics around Pan Am serve as an excellent case 
study of a displacement of issues of architecture’s social and political agency onto issues of 
aesthetic quality and design integrity.  
The main point of contention that emerged as soon as preliminary designs were released 
was that the 59-story concrete slab, with its north-south orientation, blocked the visual axis of 
Park Avenue. The space around Grand Central Station, wrote Douglas Haskell in 1955, is a study 
in the urbanistic use of empty space, with the low-rise of the terminal like a piece of furniture 
that “lets the tall buildings around it compose themselves as if in a big room.” This void, and the 
“endless vista” opening up behind it, was the spatial essence of this urban complex and the 
source of its beauty. 65 It was this void that the Pan Am building negated, wrote Huxtable in 
1961, with “its rising mass [that] black[ed] out sky, light and view.” “There was no pleasanter 
sight in New York,” she insisted, “than the open space after the demolition of the old Grand 
Central office building, no more depressing sight than the heavy steel of the Pan Am Building 
filling it up again.”66 The lost void and the aesthetic pleasure it provided became an 
extraordinary focus of desire: the freedom of the eye in its swift movement down the axis of the 
                                                 
64 The other event is the 1972 demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe housing development, designed by Minoru Yamasaki. 
 
65 Douglas Haskell, “Grand Central’s Outdoor Concourse,” Architectural Forum (February 1955): 116-119, cited in 
Meredith L. Clausen, The Pan Am Building and the Shattering of the Modernist Dream (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2005), 32. 
 
66 Ada Louise Huxtable, “Our New Buildings: Hits and Misses,” New York Times Magazine (April 29, 1962), vi, 16-
17, 105-106, cited in Clausen, Pan Am, 180. 
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avenue, and the release of the sky at the vanishing point, were rhapsodized in numerous 
commentaries. (Figure 5) “All that is gone now,” wrote Paul Goldberger in 1979.  
[T]he precast concrete monster that was set in between the New York Central Building and the Grand 
Central Terminal… soars way above the pyramidal top and steals from the sky the role of backdrop. 
And it is wide, so wide that the eye can no longer travel around the older tower and have a sense of 
Park Avenue’s continuity to the south. In short, it blocks everything.67 
A corollary to the thematic of the void itself was the issue of the manner in which it was 
negated. Pan Am did not replace the space it took from the city with a monumental form, as was 
anticipated, and proposed by Gropius himself, who envisioned the building as an anchoring 
landmark and focal point for the area, its shape distinctive enough to be “grasped at a glance like 
a symbol.”68 The built structure appeared to be the very opposite of this monumental coupling of 
formal clarity and symbolic legibility—a “mass,” a “behemoth… shouldering aside all sense of 
proportion and elegance in its gigantism.”69 That Pan Am was a colossal obliteration of empty 
form as auratic presence, of the Miesian “void as a symbolic form” celebrated by Tafuri, was 
discerned with absolute precision by Claes Oldenburg in a sketch for an urban monument as a 
surreal melting ice-cream bar, the informe looming at the vanishing points of Manhattan’s 
Cartesian geometry.70 (Figure 6)  
The frustration of the transcendent pleasures of disembodied vision in this building as 
amorphous scale-less mass was one side of its foreclosure of the modernist narrative—what Joan 
                                                 
67 Paul Goldberger, The City Observed: New York; Guide to the Architecture of Manhattan (1979), 127, cited in 
Clausen, Pan Am, 371. 
 
68 Walter Gropius, “Design Conception of the Grand Central City Building,” 22 August 1959, cited in Clausen, Pan 
Am, 83. 
 
69 John Tauranac, Essential New York: A Guide to the History and Architecture of Manhattan’s Important Buildings, 
Parks, and Bridges (1979), 158-159, cited in Clausen, Pan Am, 372. 
 
70 Tafuri and Dal Co, Modern Architecture, vol. 2, 312. For the concept of the informe in the work of Oldenburg, see 
Yve-Alain Bois and Rosalind Krauss, Formless: A User’s Guide (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). 
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Ockman has called its “epic degeneration.”71 The correlate was a collapse of distance and 
erasure of distinctions in the building’s interface with its site. Unlike Seagram and even Lever 
House, to borrow again from Ockman, Pan Am was “unable to liberate itself from the urban 
fabric,” to “effectively negotia[te] new and… radical relationships with the preexisting urban 
context.”72 At street-level, Pan Am’s grey curtain-wall simply contributed one more modulation 
to the staccato rhythm of the surrounding facades, merging seamlessly into the undifferentiated 
surroundings. Instead of urban estrangement, Pan Am offered a “vertical city”—channeling 
several modes of transportation through the interstices of its structure, requiring more utility 
services than any other city building, 2,000 gallons of water per minute, and 20,000 kilowatts o







                                                
73 Poured grotesquel
into the void taken from the metropolis was the metropolis itself, a replication of the logic of 
Manhattan on the site of what was expected to be a formal monument to the negation of this 
logic. Pan Am as a system of representations—the last cipher—could become a tombstone for 
modernism exactly inasmuch as its undifferentiated mass, in superseding the dialectics of for
and void, could signify the loss of distinctions and erasure of limits threatening architecture in it
confrontation with the city. Its abrogation of the claims of vision appeared to occlude, more 
that, the possibility of freedom, constituting it as a material allegory of pe
 
71 Joan Ockman, “Midtown Manhattan at Midcentury: Lever House and the International Style in the City” in Peter 
Madsen and Richard Plunz, eds., The Urban Lifeworld: Formation, Perception, Representation (London: Routledge, 
2002), 196. 
 
72 Ibid., 196, 195. 
 
73 Emerson Goble, “In Defense of the Pan Am Building: Pan Am Makes a Point; A Plea for the Vertical City as a 
Planning Principle; A Three-Dimensional City Planned for Pedestrians instead of Autos,” Architectural Record 131 
(May 1962): 195-200, cited in Clausen, Pan Am, 190.  
 
74 More recently, the aesthetics of Pan Am as the informe were revisited by Rem Koolhaas in a provocative 
inversion of terms within the formative dialectic between the architectural object and its urban context. “[T]he 
avant-garde needs the city,” Koolhaas posed, “but… the city can do very well without the avant-garde.” In this 
context, Pan Am emerges as the true avant-garde object, one that revolutionizes architecture by virtue of refusing to 
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However, as the historical material unearthed in a recent monograph on the reception of 
Pan Am demonstrates, behind the nostalgia of the void and the dialectics of form burgeoned an 
entire strategic machinery of local protest hinging on the problem of “air rights.” The decision on 
the part of the New York Central Railroad, a privately-owned company, to build an office tower 
over the Grand Central railroad tracks was motivated by a conjunction between zoning laws, 
which allowed high density construction around Park Avenue, and climbing property values in 
the area with the influx of corporate investment. Even before the plans for Pan Am were 
announced, a discourse of “open space” was beginning to emerge, which pitted civic or public 
rights against the development rights of private property. Behind the problem of space and what 
comes to fill it was the problem of control and its instruments, in the terms of which the 
dialectics between public and private were translated into the dialectics of the visible and the 
invisible, the transparent and the occluded. Private “air rights” were an instrument of ownership 
that was increasingly becoming, in the words of one observer, “faceless.”75 Speculative building 
                                                                                                                                                             
revolutionize the city. “The largest building in the world,” Koolhaas continued, “is so effortlessly integrated that it 
is, ironically, both unavoidable and hard to locate. … It is a disappearing act, an apotheosis of background. It is one 
of those ironies of history that the one operation that could be called revolutionary—the… building… that embodies 
in its section the most fully developed representation of the ‘metropolitan’—has been lost in a fog of indifference, 
strictly (or can one by now say ‘merely’?) through its lack of architectural merit.” The “vertical city” no longer 
appears monstrous; in fact, its very surrender of “architectural merit” in the faithful replication of the city, its 
“disappearing act,” offers it up to be seen anew as an “unacknowledged, invisible utopia.” Rem Koolhaas, 
“Eno/abling Architecture” in Robert E. Somol, ed., Autonomy and Ideology: Positioning an Avant-Garde in 
America (New York: The Monacelli Press, 1997), 294-299. Koolhaas’s re-envisioning of Pan Am as “[a] project 
that straddles, orients, accommodates flows” (ibid., 298) invokes a recent revival of the functionalist “diagram,” 
once ridiculed by Herdeg. This recent discourse opposes definitions of avant-garde criticality through the problem of 
the boundary, or the mediation between architecture and its social context. Operating outside of the dialectics of 
mediation, the “functional” diagram is therefore rehabilitated for a new post-avantgarde architecture of process and 
performance, in which the relationship of design to society can be construed in non-oppositional ways. See Pai, 
Portfolio and the Diagram, 278-290; Robert E. Somol and Sarah Whiting, “Notes around the Doppler Effect and 
Other Moods of Modernism,” Perspecta 33 (2002): 72-7.  Here, however, the problematic of peril that had 
originally haunted the discourse of mediation is submerged. No longer hazardous, the erasure of formal limits 
becomes an operative code for the production of innovative design, the informe surreptitiously given back to form. 
Arguably, this is an aestheticization of the politics of architecture analogous to that discussed here with respect to 
the early reception of Pan Am, albeit with the opposite aesthetic values. 
 
75 Douglas Haskell, letter to August Heckscher, 25 March 1962, cited in Clausen, Pan Am, 336. 
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as it was shaping the urban fabric materialized through channels of dispersed decision-making—
money and investment management, financing through banks and insurance companies, building 
market projections—organized around an immaterial property—finance capital.76 The urban 
right to air was no longer being exercised by entities, individual or corporate, with transparent or 
intelligible motivations and responsibilities (Pan Am was planned as a real estate investment by 
the New York Central Railroad, then sold to Pan American Airlines, then sold again to MetLife 
Insurance), but rather by variations in a set of processes, both invisible and immaterial, that 
converged under the heading of “private property.” In opposition to this space of occlusion, 
“public space” was construed as a space of transparency and the void.  
Therefore, the idea of open space was linked to a juridical-economic formulation of a 
new danger, a perceived uncertainty or lack of control, which was neither expressed nor 
exhausted by the dialectics of form. It was rather a problem of agency, its limits and its 
instruments—a problem of the legibility of the limits to that which was invisible and immaterial. 
This danger gave rise to a set of discourses and strategies—including architectural criticism that 
was preoccupied with the nostalgia of the void and the aesthetics of form and its limits, but also 
the burgeoning landmark preservation movement taking shape around the defense of the Grand 
Central Terminal. It also involved the problem of architectural agency in the transactions of 
design with its new “faceless” client. When the key question was raised, that of how much open 
space the architects could preserve given the client’s prerogative to optimize the speculative use 
                                                 
76 Douglas Haskell wrote: “Under the heading of ‘private,’ we have the new entrepreneur, the canner of office space 
under 100% financing. These people operate with an apparatus of leases, leasebacks, overlapping commitments, 
separate sales of land and buildings which are physically inseparable, syndicates, the swapping depreciation 
accounts.” Haskell, “Half a Revolution,” introduction to panel discussion, “New Dimensions of Architectural 
Knowledge,” AIA annual convention, Dallas, May 1962, cited in Clausen, Pan Am, 337. 
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of its air rights, the conclusion was always that the building’s mass was “inescapable,” the 
solutions—merely “aesthetic refinements,” the architects—“victims of circumstance.”77  
Such critical discourses turned around the perceived impotence of architects as agents for the set 
of political techniques coalescing around the problem of immaterial property and its occluded 
operations, and the irrelevance of the artifact that focused and channeled such techniques. From 
the standpoint of a properly architectural problematic, what the architects of Pan Am did was not 
so much the point, the point was the limits of what they could do. The politics of Pan Am was 
energized at the limits of agency: “public” agency, “private” agency, and architectural agency in 
an overlapping constellation. This political conjunction has since been overshadowed by the 
aesthetic discourse of form and void, which had functioned as a frame for the peril of limits, but 
is now naturalized as a matter of design quality. 
 The historical example of Pan Am demonstrates the limitations of analyzing architectural 
production in terms of design artifacts as expressive vessels for aesthetic and ideological content. 
There are issues of architectural practice that, even as they may occasionally involve buildings, 
remain, like air rights, immaterial. As the problem of agency addresses practice, it requires a 
strategic rather than a hermeneutic reading. It is not the task of this dissertation to theorize a 
strategic framework of interpretation, but rather to approach it empirically in a series of specific 
historical studies.   
 
77See Clausen, Pan Am, 165. 
 57
1 THE POLITICS OF PRACTICE IN THE 1920s 
 
A spider conducts operations which resemble those of the weaver, and a bee 
would put many a human architect to shame by the construction of its 
honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the worst of architects from the best of 
bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in 
wax.  
--Karl Marx, Capital (1867).1  
 
“Architects, sculptors, painters ... all of us must return to the crafts”???—No, we 
must move forward toward the demanding service of the intellect! 
   --Adolf Behne, “Art, Craft, Technology” (1922).2 
 
 
The Weimar Republic, notes historian Charles Maier, “was a system in which the 
political implications of every distributive or cultural decision were always visible.”3 The 
relationship between Weimar-era avant-gardes and politics has been well-discussed. The very 
idea of the avant-garde, of course, implies a link between political and cultural radicalism. 
Beyond ideological affinities, pragmatic alliances have also been addressed—as, for example, in 
the case of relationships between the Bauhaus and the Social Democratic party.4 However, 
Maier’s observation hints at a systematic pervasiveness of the political that exceeds questions of 
ideological orientation or pragmatic affiliation. He traces the emergence in the early years of the 
twentieth century of a novel mode of political practice, replacing or supplanting earlier political 
forms such as parliamentary representation and mass revolt, and defined by a corporatist strategy 
                                                 
1 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, volume I, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 1977), 
283-4. 
 
2 Originally published as “Kunst, Handwerk, Technik,” Die Neue Rundschau 33, no. 10 (1922), translated and 
reprinted in Francesco Dal Co, Figures of Architecture and Thought: German Architecture Culture 1880-1920 (New 
York: Rizzoli, 1990), 338. 
 
3 Maier continues: “The length of working day, the percentage of contributions to the social insurance pool, the 
permissiveness of art and mores were all issues that implicated the regime itself.” Charles S. Maier, In Search of 
Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 268. 
 




of alliances and oppositions among organized groups, each with its own internal hierarchy of 
governance.5 This evolution in political practice is a key factor in the success of the 
revolutionary movements that open the century, in turn making a profound mark on the 
formation of the artistic avant-gardes. For the revolution to succeed, the state had to enter the 
revolution. The implications for avant-garde practices of this realignment in the very conduct of 
politics have not been explored. Taking the power structure of interest-group politics as an 
analytical framework entails posing for artistic production the problems of strategic organization, 
representation, and identification (accepting that “interests” are not material givens but products 
of the political process).  
The establishment of functional state institutions in the Weimar Republic was 
accompanied by the emergence of new problems of democratic organization, involving strategies 
of socio-political stratification and representation. Because such political practices took the 
entirety of the social fabric as their subject, they also presented concrete problems of 
identification for members of cultural circles. To what social group, already claimed or yet 
undefined, did the cultural producer belong; and what mode of relation structured that 
belonging? Not only did Weimar-era avant-gardes engage in multiple forms of organized 
affiliation—groups, institutions, or networks—and pursue attendant discourses of community-
formation, but they also engaged with discourses of representation. The most important of the 
latter was the discourse on the intellectual and his relationship to “class,” which was the 
dominant Weimar-era category of socio-political stratification. The idea of intellectual 
production as a paradigm of artistic practice was thus borne by the contingencies of democratic 
state formation.  
                                                 
5 See Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade 
after World War I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
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An important precedent for any discussion of that relationship should be considered 
before proceeding. The avant-garde was first analyzed in relation to a concept of intellectual 
production by Venice Institute theorists. Manfredo Tafuri, for example, proposed that at stake in 
the activities of the Weimar avant-garde was “the very function of the intellectual.”6 Francesco 
Dal Co has also traced the origin of an intellectual conception of artistic practice in modern 
German architectural discourses to the nineteenth century.7 However, because both read 
intellectual activity through the lens of ideological critique, they ultimately gave an apolitical 
interpretation to the “function of the intellectual.” Dal Co demonstrates that a fundamental 
relationship between two binaries—that of intellect and feeling, and that of the individual and the 
group—supported the dialectic of Kultur and Zivilisation fundamental to German modernism. 
The city, as the classic form of civilization, was not only the site of communal fragmentation—
where, according to Ferdinand Tönnies, “individuals or families are separate identities”—but 
also the “place of the intellect”—where, in the words of Oswald Spengler, “[m]an, as civilized, 
as intellectual nomad, is again wholly microcosmic, wholly homeless, as free intellectually as 
hunter and herdsman were free sensually.”8 The task assumed by art was to reestablish a new 
                                                 
6 Manfredo Tafuri, “USSR-Berlin, 1922: From Populism to ‘Constructivist International’” in The Sphere and the 
Labyrinth: Avant-Gardes and Architecture from Piranesi to the 1970s, trans. Pellegrino d’Acierno and Robert 
Connolly (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 120. Tafuri’s entire oeuvre on the problem of the avant-garde may be 
read as an extended analysis of the political function of the intellectual. The history of the Weimar avant-garde is, 
therefore, a moment in the development of architecture as “a mode of intellectual production” whose origins lie in 
the Renaissance. See Tafuri, “The Historical Project,” The Sphere and the Labyrinth, 19. See also Andrew Leach, 
Manfredo Tafuri: Choosing History (Ghent: A&S Books, 2007), 141-145. 
 
7 Dal Co’s inquiry is wide-ranging and multi-disciplinary: “It is… clear that the tradition that formed in the 
convergence around similar or related themes in the work of some of the principal exponents of German culture—
from Johann Heinrich von Thunen to Alfred Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies to Oswald Spengler, Werner Sombart to 
Max Weber to Georg Simmel, Friedrich Naumann to Theodor Heuss to Hugo Preuss—had a lasting and decisive 
influence on the internal developments of the architectural culture, as the history of the Werkbund from 1907 to the 
1920s serves to demonstrate.” Francesco Dal Co, Figures of Architecture and Thought: German Architecture 
Culture 1880-1920 (New York: Rizzoli, 1990), 30. 
 
8 Cited in Dal Co, Figures of Architecture and Thought, 26, 27. Emphasis in the original. 
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community within the intellectual and individualistic element of the city by discovering a 
mediating term between “division” and “joining.”9 That assumption of intellectual “mediation,” 
or “representation,” Dal Co concludes, is what destined architecture to become “essentially an 
ideological construction” when architectural “language” surrendered its cultural autonomy and 
was placed in a dialectical relation to “politics [in] its broadest meaning and historical 
perspective,” which is simply the totality of the “real.”10  
For Tafuri as well the relationship between architecture as an intellectual activity and 
politics is constituted through mediation or “representation.” He describes the ideological context 
of avant-garde discourses between 1917 and 1920 as a tension between organized party politics 
and a “spontaneist” thesis, embraced by the Weimar left.11 It was the latter, Tafuri asserts, that 
animated the messianic hopes of the avant-garde, even as it led to a misinterpretation of the 
Russian October Revolution as “the epiphany of the Spirit self-fulfilled in the proletariat.”12 The 
“anti-bureaucratic stance” of the avant-garde was, then, directed at the Social Democratic 
“compromise” of the Weimar Republic.13 Tafuri theorizes how idealization of the Soviet state, 
coupled with theoretical contradictions in the German Social Democratic platform, led the post-
1922 avant-garde to embrace a paradoxical anti-bureaucratic and apolitical ideology of industrial 
                                                 
9As theorized by Georg Simmel, the city only “appears as dissociation [but] is in reality only one of the elementary 
forms of socialization.” Cited in Dal Co, Figures of Architecture and Thought, 61, 64. 
 
10 “[T]he mediation of politics,” writes Dal Co, “condemns the modern project to operate within the confines of a 
now definitively secularized reality, assuming its rituals, its teleologies, and its techniques. The relationship between 
the artistic project and the world is thus stood on its head; the project no longer possesses an autonomous idiom, but 
is forced to ‘sublimate’ creatively the requirements of reality.” Dal Co, Figures of Architecture and Thought, 85. 
 
11 The “spontaneist” thesis holds revolution to be the inevitable outcome of the historical development of class 
conflict. 
 
12 Tafuri, “USSR-Berlin,” 122. 
 
13 Ibid., 122-3. 
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organization.14 The avant-garde saw technology and organization as a “fiction,” a revolutionary 
“image” that it tried to represent. Thus industrial organization had to remain for the avant-garde 
explicitly ideological “in order to be expressed with all the fullness and completeness that belong 
to pure intellectual elaboration.” The avant-garde’s intellectual-ideological function, therefore, 
serves to “declare once again its nonpolitical nature.”15 In juxtaposing politics as a real or 
practical process to ideology as a fictional image of the latter, both Tafuri and Dal Co fail to 






                                                 
14 The Social Democratic program of economic planning, Tafuri argues, was based not so much on the state control 
of the economy but rather on the preservation of extant forms of organized monopoly capitalism, “humanized” by a 
transfer of power to the socialist state. According to the theory of “spontaneity,” the process of ever-increasing 
capitalist organization was not to be interfered with as it would naturally lead to its own elimination. The proletarian 
state would not, therefore, present an alternate form of economic organization, but rather negate its deleterious 
consequences for the worker. As it turned out, this “split between politics and the economy” would appear to be 
reproduced in Lenin’s own plan for electrification and the industrialization of the country.  Thus it was no longer 
anarchy but the centralized organization of production that represented an “image” of revolution embraced by the 
avant-garde. That investment in economic organization without a corresponding political organization made the 
constructivist turn of the avant-garde “purely ideological.” Ibid., 125. 
 
15 Ibid., 137, 145, 148. 
 
16 A case in point is Tafuri’s partial reading of the theoretical conflict between “spontaneism” and “organization” in 
Marxist discourses of the period. The polemical counterpart to Rosa Luxemburg’s theory of spontaneous mass 
action, Lenin’s thesis of “organization” required the strategic participation of an intellectual “vanguard” whose task 
would be to induce a revolutionary consciousness within the proletariat and to organize it for political action. Thus, 
the debate actually involved opposing strategies of political organization, which addressed the function of 
“intellectual” leadership as a central problem. See, e.g., Ernest Mandel, “The Leninist Theory of Organization: Its 
Relevance for Today” in Revolutionary Marxism and Social Reality in the 20th Century: Collected Essays of Ernest 
Mandel, ed. Steve Bloom (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1994), 77-127. 
 
The fact that the politics of intellectual production occupy a blind spot in Tafuri’s analysis is perhaps ironic, given 
that the political function of architecture as intellectual work is the focus of his research. It is possible to see the 
concept of “ideology”—that, in the words of Georges Teyssot, “hovers like some toxic event, undefined, irresolute” 
in Tafuri’s thought—as an obstacle to his theorization of politics. Georges Teyssot and Paul Henninger, “One 
Portrait of Tafuri,” ANY 25/26 (2000): 12. 
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1.1 STRATEGIES OF ORGANIZATION 
 
Groups, movements, exhibition societies, and other forms of collective affiliation among 
artists are characteristic of the modern period in general. The artistic organizations of the 
Weimar-era avant-gardes, however, were distinguished by an approach that married an 
ideological platform to the pursuit of institutional models of formation, as well as, frequently, 
affiliations with existing political institutions. In that respect, Marcel Franciscono has proposed 
for example, Weimar avant-garde groups “constituted an essentially new type of artistic 
organization.”17 Moreover, he notes, of all the protagonists of Weimar architectural history, it is 
Gropius who typified that institutional orientation most fully, choosing as his preferred mode of 
artistic agency “programs of practical action” and “proposals directed at solving concrete and 
immediate problems of architecture and education,” rather than “words” and “visionary 
proposals.”18 What accounts for the innovation in those instances of group formation in which 
Gropius was a key participant, I would like to suggest, was that they were modeled specifically 
after contemporaneous forms of political association.  
                                                 
17 “[The] notable and characteristic groups of the time,” Franciscono writes, “combined in a singular fashion the 
intellectual solidarity, visionary spirit, and far-reaching commitment to cultural renewal… with an involvement in 
practical issues of art education and the relationship of art to the state… . In this respect, they differ significantly 
from the earlier, more narrowly conceived twentieth-century artists’ groups and secession movements, or the 
Werkbund.” Marcel Franciscono, Walter Gropius and the Creation of the Bauhaus in Weimar: the Ideals and 
Artistic Theories of its Founding Years (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971): 149-150. 
 
The Weimar avant-gardes shared those modes of collective affiliation with contemporaneous avant-garde groups in 
Soviet Russia and revolutionary Hungary. Tafuri observes, for example, that “the Arbeitsrat was to reveal itself to be 
anxious for [an] institutional bond with the innovations, especially those on an organizational level, then underway 
in Soviet Russia. Nor must it be forgotten to what an extent the Berlin groups—from the Arbeitsrat to the 
Novembergruppe, until the Ring—had as one of their primary objectives a relationship between avant-garde 
experiments and national and municipal institutions (educational, administrative, and commercial).” Tafuri, “USSR-
Berlin,” 128. 
 
18 Franciscono, Walter Gropius, 125. 
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This is most evident in the Arbeitsrat für Kunst (Worker’s Council for Art), founded in 
1918 explicitly on the model of the revolutionary Räte or “workers councils.” The same group, 
however, advanced a utopian ideology, ostensibly distancing itself from practical forms of 
political activity or concrete political goals. In that respect, the evaluation of the political 
meaning of Weimar artistic groups based on their declared ideological positions can be 
misleading. “I want to found an apolitical community here,” Gropius remarked on his intentions 
for the Bauhaus, for example, in a clear statement of political withdrawal. But the reason he gave 
for that desire sets it in a concrete context that works to essentially reverse its ostensible 
meaning: “I now see quite clearly,” Gropius explained, “each party is dirt, it creates hate and 
more hate. We must destroy the parties.”19 The reference is legible as part of a political argument 
with Gropius’s interlocutor, the architectural critic Adolf Behne, an Arbeitsrat colleague and 
ideological fellow traveler—and an active member of the USPD (Independent Social Democratic 
Party).20 Rather than his apolitical convictions in general, Gropius declares here his opposition to 
a specific form of political organization. In 1920, when he wrote the letter cited above, Gropius 
was exploring an alternative model of political collectivity for artistic practices, expressed in his 
conception of the Arbeitsrat as a “conspiratorial” elite, a vanguard “Geistes-Clique”—in other 
words, a revolutionary cell. 
As a model of artistic practice, however, the Bauhaus is usually discussed in relation to 
industrial, rather than political, organization. It is well known that Gropius’s initial conception 
                                                 
19 “Ich sehe jetzt mit voller Deutlichkeit: jede Partei ist Schmutz, sie erzeugt Hass und wieder Hass. Wir müssen die 
Parteien zerstören. Ich will hier eine unpolitische Gemeinshaft gründen.“ Walter Gropius to Adolf Behne, 31 
January 1920, cited in Franciscono, Walter Gropius,148, n.50. 
 
20 Behne was a member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) before the war, and of the USPD after the war; he also 
wrote for socialist periodicals Die neue Zeit and Sozialistische Monatshefte. See Rosemarie Haag Bletter, 
Introduction to Adolf Behne, The Modern Functional Building, trans. Michael Robinson (Los Angeles: Getty 
Research Institute for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1996), 7. 
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identified the institution with medieval Bauhütten, or artisan guilds, and in later years the 
relationship between the Bauhaus and large-scale industry was also addressed.  The relationship 
to the industrial model, however, must be understood in light of its function in the prewar 
Werkbund. Frederic Schwartz has shown that, already before the war, Gropius was among those 
architects seeking an alternative to the Werkbund’s dominant model of “spiritualized economy” 
to be achieved through strategic association with large-scale industry, the Grossbetrieb (trust or 
cartel).21 At the same time, remarkably, the cartel, in its capacity to regulate the market and 
suppress speculation, was associated with the ethical productive spirit of the medieval guild. The 
mediation of the latter, in turn, could align the cartel as a form of industrial association with the 
modern labor union as a form of political association: “The trust looked back to the guild of the 
past and embodied already the socialism of the future.”22 While Gropius’s postwar proposals for 
artistic organization still revolved around the Hütte model, its association with the cartel was 
abandoned. His writings of the immediate postwar period exhibit a reaction against prewar 
“organizations grown to grotesque proportions,” reflecting a widespread belief that the 
“Weltvertrustung” [universal cartelization] of corporate capitalism had been both a major 
contributor and an irreversible casualty of the war.23 If the postwar artistic guild could offer a 
workable alternative to the “large spiritual organizatio[n]” of the Werkbund, it would have to 
draw on a new set of associations.24  
                                                 
21 As this was the model championed by Hermann Muthesius, Gropius’s opposition to the latter in the 1914 
Werkbund debate is instructive. See Frederic J. Schwartz, The Werkbund: Design Theory and Mass Culture before 
the First World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 79. 
 
22 Ibid., 114. 
 
23 Walter Gropius, “Baugeist oder Krämertum?” Die Schuhwelt (Pirmasens), no. 37 (October 15, 1919): 820, cited 
and translated in Franciscono, Walter Gropius, 22. 
 
24 “[During the period before the war] we designed artistic ashtrays and beer mugs, and in that way hoped to work 
up to the great building. All that by smooth organization. That was an incredible presumption on which we were 
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There was a readily available model at hand that would seem to offer the simplest 
solution to the problem of scale and an obvious counterpoint to the Werkbund paradigm—the 
Kleinbetrieb (small business) model of industry that had been displaced by the Werkbund at its 
foundation.25 Neither the Arbeitsrat nor the Bauhaus, however, was conceived as an association 
of small producers. In fact, as has been frequently noted, Gropius’s management of the Weimar 
Bauhaus lacked any clear vision of the relationship between the products of its workshops and 
large-scale industry, which was the central problem of the Werkbund.26 On the other hand, 
starting with the famous Address to the Students of 1919, Bauhaus documents demonstrate a 
clear preoccupation on Gropius’s part with the institution’s publicity or public relations in 
general. The Hütte model, in fact, had another connotation—that of a “small, secret… 
conspiracy[y].”27 “I suggest,” Gropius stated to the Bauhaus community in 1919, “that, for the 
time being, we refrain from public exhibitions and work from a new point of departure, so that, 
in these turbulent times, we can collect our thoughts anew” and work out how to present the 
institution to “the entire people,” whose “community of spirit [artists need] as much as [they] 
need bread.”28 Such logic situated the Bauhaus within the public sphere of political discourse, 
rather than the circuits of economic exchange.  
                                                                                                                                                             
shipwrecked, and now things will be reversed. No large spiritual organizations, but small, secret, self-contained 
societies, lodges.” Gropius, “Address to the Students of the Staatliche Bauhaus, held on the Occasion of the  Yearly 
Exhibition of Student Work in July 1919,” in Hans M. Wingler, The Bauhaus: Weimar, Dessau, Berlin, Chicago 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1976): 36. 
 
25 See Schwartz, Werkbund, 115. 
 
26 It was not until 1922-1923 that the question of organizing the workshops for production was first consistently 
discussed at the Bauhaus, and the mass-production of Bauhaus objects on a large scale would, in fact, never be 
accomplished. For a discussion, see Robin Schuldenfrei, “The Irreproducibility of the Bauhaus Object,” Bauhaus 
Construct: Fashioning Identity, Discourse and Modernism, ed. Jeffrey Saletnik and Robin Schuldenfrei, (London: 
Routledge, 2009): 37-60. 
 




Gropius’s strategy for the Bauhaus was identical to his concurrent program for the 
Arbeitsrat. “[W]e can be thankful,” he posited to that group in 1919, “that a secret mystery still 
hangs over the Arbeitsrat… We have to trust our strength to persevere until the day when we can 
stand… fully prepared before the public [Öffentlichkeit].”29 Such records are traces, I would like 
to suggest, of a shift in Gropius’s overall strategy of collective association for artistic production, 
from the model of organized production and economic planning that dominated prewar German 
discourses, to the model of political affiliation and representation.30 Tellingly, in a 1920 speech 
before a local parliamentary assembly, Gropius equated the Bauhaus’s spirit of cultural 
experimentation to  
a development… [that] already is taking place everywhere in the country… . [T]oday, adaptation to 
the completely changed times…  means experiment in the usual sense of the word. You can certainly 
see this development in politics; it is exactly the same. [A]nyone who governs… must today always 
look upon his government as an experiment.31 
When, the same year, Gropius proclaimed his opinion that “each party [was] dirt,” he was 
echoing the ideological position of the Worker’s Councils, or Arbeitsräte, movement. Extra-
                                                                                                                                                             
 
29 Walter Gropius, typed fragment of a speech to the Arbeitsrat, March 1919 (?), cited and translated in Franciscono, 
Walter Gropius, 143; reprinted in the original in Franciscono, Walter Gropius, Appendix D, 279. Last sentence of 
the quotation is my translation from the latter: “Wir müssen uns die Kraft zutrauen, auszuharren, bis der Tag kommt, 
an dem wir—und dann mit Vehemenz—vollkommen vorbereitet an die Oeffentlichkeit treten.“ Emphasis in the 
original. Moreover, this position was also articulated as the alternative to the attempt to engage in “art policy on a 
broad basis”—a clear reference to the Werkbund: “Die Kluft zwischen den beiden grundverschiedenen Absichten, 
die von Anfang an verhängnisvoll miteinander verquickt wurden, ob wir Kunst politik auf breiter Basis treiben oder 
aber durch Zusammenschluss einer kleinen Minorität einem radikalen künstlerischen Bekenntnisse zum Siege 
verhelfen wollen, hat sich erst nach und nach zu Gunsten der letzteren Auffassung überbrücken lassen.“ (279) 
Emphasis in the original. 
 
30 The concept of Öffentlichkeit is notoriously difficult to pin down. Schwartz has shown that around 1914 the notion 
of “publicity” was championed by the Henry van de Velde faction, including Gropius, in opposition to the 
“organization” faction of Hermann Muthesius. While its pragmatic translation in the commercial realm (as 
“advertisement”) is apparently no longer at issue in Gropius’s postwar strategy, even before the war, the commercial 
firm’s interface with its “public” in the market could be thought of in the terms of bourgeois political liberalism: 
“Bürgerrecht—literally, the rights of the burgher—means not only access to the public sphere of political discourse; 
no less importantly it means the right to own, buy and sell commodities. … Culture was not equated exclusively 
with production but with something like a public sphere in which products and ideas can change hands, with 
something like a market.” Schwartz, Werkbund, 168. 
 
31 Walter Gropius, Speech before the Thuringian Landtag in Weimar on 9 July 1920, translated and reprinted in 
Wingler, Bauhaus, 42. 
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political labor organizations that had a key role in the 1918 Revolution, Workers Councils served 
as the explicit model for the Arbeitsrat für Kunst group. Originally conceived as a radical 
alternative to the bourgeois parliamentary system, the Councils movement focused on securing 
labor’s control of the national means of production through an independent hierarchy of 
temporarily elected delegates—from the factory, to the region, up to a general “economic 
parliament.”32 During the process of Weimar state formation leading from the revolutionary 
break to the establishment of functional governing institutions, however, the Councils underwent 
a strategic transition. While the “transcendence of parties and parliamentarism,”33 as one 
representative wrote in 1920, remained their ideological platform, the Councils’ political strategy 
now moved away from the goal of economic socialization to that of integration within the new 
political structure of the state.  Already in 1918, the Councils fought for inclusion in the Weimar 
constitution, and were thus “anchored” within the parliamentary system as a quasi-party.34 By 
1920, the Councils had largely abandoned in practice the pursuit of the socialized economy. 
Thus, the very institution whose radically anti-political ideology was emulated by the Arbeitsrat 
für Kunst—and the Bauhaus—was, in fact, undergoing a transition similar to that of the two 
artistic groups—from the paradigm of organized production to that of political articulation and 
competition. 
While control of production and economic planning certainly remained central political 
issues during the Weimar Republic, and therefore remain key sites for the analysis of 
contemporaneous cultural discourses and practices, we must also explore the cultural impact of 
                                                 
32 Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe, 139. 
 
33 Ernst Jacobi, “Wesen und Bedeutung des Rätesystems,” Wirtschaftliches Kampfbuch für Betriebsräte (Berlin, 
1920), cited in Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe, 138. 
 
34 Ibid., 64. 
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the emergence in the postwar years of what Maier has described as a new “corporatist” politics, 
characterized by “the displacement of power from elected representatives or a career bureaucracy 
to the major organized forces of… society… .”35 The Weimar Workers Councils movement was 
one example of that transition. The same process could be traced in the parliamentary 
counterpart of the Councils. The Weimar Republic Reichstag at once democratized and 
professionalized its Kaiserreich predecessor, replacing the aristocratic dominance of local 
“notables” (Honoratioren) with government by alliances of centralized parties and organized 
interests.36 Similar processes of organization unfolded across Western Europe, and encompassed 
both left and right. On the left, the Marxist Third International of 1921 represented a strategic 
reevaluation of the new distribution of power. With its platform of party discipline and 
dogmatism of class unity, the Third International, as Maier puts it, “responded to the same 
imperatives of organized political and economic competition to which successful bourgeois 
groups were adapting. The communists were not prepared to play the game of interest-group 
politics, but unyielding opposition to the system required preserving a party that was at least as 
centralized and cohesive as those participating.”37 
Ideological discourses, in turn, responded to new modes of political practice. The Kultur-
Zivilization binary central to the German philosophical and cultural tradition was employed in 
Weimar-era discourses in service of a critique of the emergent corporatist democracy. Within 
that dialectic, communal bonds, tied to locality (the Heimat) and organic national culture, were 
                                                 
35 The term “corporatism” is advanced by Maier with respect to contemporaneous developments in Germany, Italy, 
and France. See Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe, 9. 
 
36 See Jens Borchert and Jürgen Zeiss, “Germany: From ‘Guilds of Notables’ to Political Class,” The Political Class 
in Advanced Democracies, ed. Jens Borchert and Jürgen Zeiss (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): 141-5; 
Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, Edward Dimendberg (eds.) The Weimar Republic Sourcebook (Berkeley: The University of 
California Press, 1994): 36. 
 
37 Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe, 152. 
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opposed to atomization, the rule of the intellect, and cosmopolitanism. Because this critique of 
the “Enlightenment” implicated the long-standing and overdetermined French-German 
antagonism (heated up by the military defeat), it was easily translated into a critique of the new 
Weimar constitutional system that, with its displacement of local (estatist) with centralized 
political organization, appeared to reproduce the “Jacobin” model of “mass democracy.” German 
Democratic Party member and parliament representative Theodor Heuss summarized the 
common themes of such critiques:  
Germany has become infatuated with a couple of catchwords. Democracy ‘atomizes’ the people by 
turning the individual, as a fundamental elector cut off from any social estate and heritage, into a 
political factor. This homo politicus, pronounced sovereign on voting days, is regarded as a fiction; a 
person is not a citizen per se, but a member of a society of manifold stratifications, which is now 
being leveled by force of doctrine.38  
The same thematics was invoked by leading intellectual Thomas Mann in his, at the time 
sensational, embrace of Weimar as a properly “German democracy.” The Weimar regime, he 
wrote,  
is the mean between aesthetic isolation and undignified leveling of the individual to the general; 
between mysticism and ethics; between inwardness and the state; between a death-bound negation of 
ethical and civic values and a purely ethical philistine rationalism; it is truly the German mean, the 
Beautiful and Human, of which our finest spirits have dreamed. … [A] unification of our political and 
national life… .39 
In the name of a reformed Kultur, Mann proclaimed: “The State has become our business.”40  
The dialectical equation Dal Co outlines as the central task taken on by the avant-garde—
how to arrive at a new form of community within the very medium of the metropolis—was 
translated during the Weimar Republic into a problematics of the new polis. Gropius was no 
great dialectician, but he was clearly steeped in this logic and the language that carried it. In 
                                                 
38 Theodor Heuss, “Democracy and Parliamentarism: Their History, Their Enemies, and Their Future” (1928), 
translated and reprinted in Weimar Republic Sourcebook, 54. 
 
39 Thomas Mann, “The German Republic” (1922), translated and reprinted in Weimar Republic Sourcebook, 109. 
My emphasis. 
 
40 Ibid., 106. 
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America, he would frequently embrace “democracy” as a “unity in diversity”—the mediation of 
thought and feeling, of business and culture—and declare it the central concern of the architect. 
That common term of postwar American liberal democratic discourses could resonate with 
Gropius because its dialectical formulation recalled the political debates of the Weimar-era 
democracy.41 A 1944 letter written by Ise Gropius, the architect’s wife, demonstrates that the 
couple was aware at least of Mann’s position on democratic political organization. Adapting the 
terms of Weimar discourse to the new cultural context, Ise Gropius replaces the erstwhile 
Jacobin Zivilization with “Anglo-American civilization,” writing that  
[Walter and I] have asked ourselves… how far we are capable to accept [sic] this Anglo-American 
civilization idea for the sake of its good sides and how far we are willing to bury our more absolute 
conceptions. Thomas Mann has turned this problem around already during [sic] the First World War 
and decided then for the other side. … Maybe we ask too much if we ask also for Kultur within a 
tamed civilization; maybe we have to make a choice? … Until then we may continue to explain to 
each side the disadvances [sic] of the other side. The advantages are obvious anyway.42 
 
 
1.2 INTELLECTUAL LABOR 
 
Parallel to the interest in modes of collective affiliation and public representation in the 
context of an emergent corporatist democracy, one can trace a rise in ideation, as opposed to 
material production, as a paradigm of artistic activity. This transition is typically understood in 
                                                 
41 See, e.g, Walter Gropius, “Unity in Diversity,” Apollo in the Democracy: The Cultural Obligation of the Architect 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), 21-34. For a discussion of “unity in diversity” in the American context, see 
Chapter Two of this dissertation. 
 
42 Ise Gropius to Herbert Bayer, 3 February 1944, translated from the original German by Ise Gropius, Isaacs Papers, 
AAA, Box 7. Gropius must be referring to Mann’s famous speech of 1922, because during the war Mann was an 
ardent nationalist, justifying the war exactly in terms of support for German Kultur against the encroaching forces of 
civilization. That earlier position is expressed, for example, in his Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man (1918). 
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the economic context of the eclipse of handicraft production by large-scale industry.43 However, 
another important referent can be found in the contemporaneous discourse on the relationship 
between intellectual work and the state.   
Both Franciscono and Schwartz have demonstrated that, already in the prewar Werkbund, 
the opposition between handicraft and industrial production was supplemented and even 
supplanted by a concern for the integrity of design as an intellectual practice. Older distinctions, 
both formal and moral, between the product of the hand and that of the machine had in the 
twentieth century gradually become replaced by a shared concept of Gestaltung, an abstract 
“formal conception, in respect to which the distinctive values imparted by the touch of the 
craftsman’s hand in execution were of secondary consequence.”44 As revealed by the Werkbund 
debate of 1914, the assumption that products of both hand and machine shared a basic 
relationship to conceptual form-giving processes was shared by all participants—the real issue 
was whether the artist or architect’s privileged position in the generation of creative insight 
should be maintained, or whether it should only serve as a stepping stone to the development of a 
broadly based aesthetic culture.45  
The philosophy and history of art was an important reference for the relationship between 
“form” and “technology” that preoccupied the discourse of German modernism. For example, in 
Alois Riegl’s concept of Kunstwollen—a primordial creative will—the history of art was seen as 
“a constant struggle with the material, [in which the] primary element is not the object or 
                                                 
43 Here the canonical example is perhaps that of Laszlo Moholy-Nagy’s “telephone pictures,” the specifications for 
which the artist claimed to have called in to be manufactured at a sign company, thus replacing craftsmanship with 
concept as artistic product. See, e.g., Rainer K. Wick, Teaching at the Bauhaus (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz Verlag, 
2000), 133-134. 
  
44 Franciscono, Walter Gropius, 25.  
 
45 See ibid., 64-69; Schwartz, Werkbund, 147-163. 
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technique, but rather the creative thought that tends to expand its sphere of activity… .”46 
Through the action of creative thought, art (and architecture) is freed from a purely 
“materialistic” condition, and realized as the manifestation of the “spirit.”47 Whether the artist or 
designer was creative agent, or merely conduit for the expression of a metaphysical drive, the 
discourse shifted focus from aesthetic “objects” or artifacts to a preoccupation with artistic 
processes, for which questions of form and material were secondary. Because the divine will to 
form (“göttliche Formungswille”), wrote Behne in 1919, is by definition unknowable, “art is not 
a matter of form, but an attitude. … Art is the uncreated-created that requites us.”48 “We know 
no forms,” Mies van der Rohe echoed him in 1923, “only building problems. Form is not the 
goal but rather the result of our work.”49  
In the 1920s, an entire philosophical compendium was invoked in avant-garde circles to 
support a project that revolved around the notion of Gestaltung, described by Detlef Mertins as 
an “architectonics of becoming.”50 The “biotechnics” of Raoul Francé, Ernst Haeckel’s notion of 
a universal spiritual-material substance, the “biocentrism” of Ludwig Klages, the “energeticism” 
of Wilhelm Ostwald, and the “tektology” of Alexander Bogdanov combined to give an air of a 
                                                 
46 Cited in Dal Co, Figures of Architecture and Thought, 121, 123. My emphasis. As Dal Co shows, Riegl maintains 
here an analogy—or even a fundamental identity—between art history (a discipline of historical investigation) and 
the history of art as an immanent process of cultural development: “Historiography is forced to shatter the technical-
material appearances of objects in order to get at their meanings, in the same way that the will, in its act of 
transforming the world, asserts itself independently of such appearances.” (123) Emphasis in the original. 
 
47 Ibid., 126. This conception of art as essentially intellectual—in the sense of “geistig”—is also what aligned the 
Gesamtkunstwerk model of the early “expressionist” Bauhaus with the institution’s later focus on basic laws of 
Gestaltung, inasmuch as both could ultimately be thought as neither formal nor material expressions, but as specific 
manifestations of the Kunstwollen. See Franciscono, Walter Gropius, 106-118. 
 
48 Adolf Behne, Die Wiederkehr der Kunst (Leipzig, 1919), cited in Franciscono, Walter Gropius, 107. 
 
49 Mies van der Rohe, G, no. 2 (September 1923), cited in Detlef Mertins, “Architectures of Becoming: Mies van der 
Rohe and the Avant-Garde,” Mies in Berlin, ed. Terence Riley and Barry Bergdoll (New York: Museum of Modern 
Art, 2001), 122. 
 
50 Mertins, “Architectures of Becoming,” 110. 
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general vitalist revival to avant-garde discourses, within which one could nevertheless detect a 
continuation of the earlier Kunstwollen thematic.51 The idea that design could be re-founded 
upon a conception of the physical world as a manifold of interactive constitutive processes—
forces or energies—that organically tied the products of technology to the manifestations of 
nature was forcefully advanced, among others, by Laszlo Moholy-Nagy and El Lissitzky, who 
were, from the beginning of the 1920s, introducing Berlin to their version of “Soviet 
Constructivism.”52 
Moholy’s stratospheric ascent, from a young, destitute, and virtually unknown Hungarian 
artist disembarking in Berlin for the very first time in the spring of 1920, to the highly coveted 
teaching position at the Bauhaus in the spring of 1923, can only be explained by the convergence 
of his developing ideas not only with key concerns of German architectural culture, but also 
more specifically with Gropius’s aspirations for the Bauhaus. In fact, it is tempting to see in 
Gropius’s documented enthusiasm about the new hire, and Moholy’s subsequent overwhelming 
influence at the Bauhaus, an indication that the latter’s project offered a solution on some level to 
the problem of artistic collectivity Gropius confronted.53 For Moholy, the physical world as a 
system of interacting biotechnical processes was a correlate of the social world, and therefore 
                                                 
51 The notion of Gestaltung as “becoming” coexisted perfectly well with the neo-Kantian aesthetics and art history 
(Riegl, but also Heinrich Wölfflin) that grounded the thought of key figures of the avant-garde, such as Behne, Hans 
Richter, and Sigfried Giedion. See also ibid., 117. 
 
52 For El Lissitzky’s role in the formulation of International Constructivism, see, e.g., Christina Lodder, “El 
Lissitzky and the Export of Constructivism,” Situating El Lissitzky: Vitebsk, Berlin, Moscow, ed. Nancy Perloff and 
Brian Reed (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2003), 27-46. For Moholy-Nagy’s intellectual formation and 
activities in Germany, see Oliver Botar, Technical Detours: The Early Moholy-Nagy Reconsidered (New York: The 
City University of New York, 2006). See particularly pp. 141-144 for a discussion of his relationship to the 
discourses cited above. 
 
53 Lyonel Feininger reported in 1925 on “the question of Moholy and his influential opinions; these [are] considered 
by [Gropius] to be the most important at the Bauhaus. And for him … Moholy is the only person of practical 




organic representations would project an image of a cooperative society to come. “I believed,” he 
later summed up his position circa 1922, “that abstract art not only registers contemporary 
problems, but projects a desirable future order… . Abstract art, I thought, creates new types of 
spatial relationships, new inventions of forms, new visual laws—basic and simple—as the visual 
counterpoint to a more purposeful, cooperative human society.”54 Influenced by the concept of 
“pictorial architecture” (Képarchitektúra, or Bildarchitektur in German) proposed by his 
Hungarian avant-garde colleague Lajos Kassák, Moholy was projecting a “collective architecture 
of the future, which will be the pivotal art form of communist society.”55 Expressed as a 
negation of “form” and “material” in favor of “force relations” that encompass both social 
(“human”) and natural (“cosmic”) life, Moholy’s “collective architecture of the future” was a 
resounding echo of that building, “which will one day rise toward heaven from the hands of a 
million workers like the crystal symbol of a new faith,” pronounced as the Bauhaus telos at its 
founding.56 It did not hurt that Moholy was calling his artworks “Glass Architecture” 
(Glasar
ce 
                                                
chitektur). (Figure 7) 
The link between the emphasis on process and the projection of social collectivity was 
further established in Moholy’s notion of the artwork as a conceptual diagram. Judging from his 
statements about it, Moholy’s “collective architecture” was conceived in a way that was at on
 
54 Cited in Botar, Technical Detours, 146-7. 
 
55 László Moholy-Nagy, Ernő Kállai, Alfréd Kemény, László Péri, “Manifesto” (1923), translated and reprinted in 
Krisztina Passuth, Moholy-Nagy (London: Thames and Hudson, 1985), 288. See also: Oliver A.I. Botar, 
“Constructed Reliefs in the Art of the Hungarian Avant-Garde: Kassák, Bortnyik, Uitz, and Moholy-Nagy, 1921-
1926,” The Structurist 25-26 (1985-86): 87-95; Botar, Technical Detours, 145-149; S. A. Mansbach, “Revolutionary 
Engagements: The Hungarian Avant-Garde” in Standing in the Tempest: Painters of the Hungarian Avant-Garde, 
1908-1930, ed. S. A. Mansbach (Santa Barbara: Santa Barbara Museum of Art and Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1991), 67-71. For a discussion of Kassák’s Képarchitektúra, see Mansbach, “Revolutionary Engagements,” 94-95. 
 
56 Laszlo Moholy-Nagy and Alfred Kemeny, “Dynamic-Constructive System of Forces” (1922), translated and 
reprinted in Passuth, Moholy-Nagy, 290; Walter Gropius, “Program of the Staatliche Bauhaus in Weimar” (1919), 
translated and reprinted in Wingler, Bauhaus, 31.  
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utopian and pragmatic. On the one hand, it would be dedicated to working out blueprints f
practical “city construction”; on the other hand, such designs could be “realized only in a 
communist society,” and would rely on materials “not used hitherto in architecture,” posse












dematerializing the natural world and collectivizing the social, but they could demonstrate it 
                                                
57—as illustrated most dramatically by his Kinetic-
Constructive System model of 1922/1928, a funhouse tower that seemed more a literalization 
than an illustration of the energeticist notion that “matter is nothing but a spatially ordered group
of various energies which do not require any material substrate.”58 (Figure 8) First conceived 
1922, but worked out in detail with the assistance of a trained engineer working in Gropius’s 
Berlin office in 1928, the Kinetic-Constructive System is a perfect illustration of the intermediary
status between ideation and realization that Moholy-Nagy imagined for his projects. Because no
structural details were worked out, and moreover, because the design could not even have been 
structurally stable as drawn, Oliver Botar maintains that the model “seems to have been me
s a conceptual diagram than as a basis for the eventual generation of blueprints.”59  
It seems that conceptual diagrams were exactly what Moholy-Nagy was after. Collective
architecture, he wrote, “clearly sees the partial role it fulfils in the integrated process of social 
transformation at the present time”: the existing projects are “interim solutions,” “experimenta
demonstration devices for testing the connections between man, material forces and space.”
The works themselves would not bring about a free dynamic interaction of forces, at once 
 
57 Moholy-Nagy, Kallai, Kemeny, Peri, “Manifesto,” 288. 
 
58 Milic Čapek, cited in Oliver Botar, Technical Detours, 171. 
 
59 Ibid., 173-4. 
 
60 Moholy-Nagy, Kallai, Kemeny, Peri, “Manifesto,” 288 (emphasis in the original); Moholy-Nagy and Kemeny, 
“Dynamic-Constructive System of Forces,” 290. 
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experimentally, and thereby “train” the viewers’ consciousness toward a collective 
accomplishment of such natural-social transformation.61 
The notion of the artwork as an “experimental demonstration device” was likely 
influenced by the Hungarian reception of Soviet constructivism in its so-called “laboratory 
period.” Members of the Hungarian avant-garde Béla Uitz and Alfréd Kemény were in Moscow 
in 1921, where they were privy to the formation and debates of the Working Group of 
Constructivists at INKhUK (Institute of Artistic Culture), and saw the Second Spring Exhibition 
of the OBMOKhU (Society of Young Artists).62 In his statements of 1922, Moholy echoes the 
Soviet constructivists’ definition of artwork as “laboratory work” and “experimentation” in the 
“communistic expression of material structures.”63 The drawings produced as part of the debates 
within the INKhUK attended by Kemény—and, by extension, the works on display at the 
OBMOKhU exhibition—were called by the constructivists “demonstrations.”64 Further, the 
notion of “laboratory” was linked to the constructivists’ conception of Communism as essentially 
                                                 
61 “Man as a construct is the synthesis of all his functional apparatuses, i.e. man will be most perfect in his own time 
if the functional apparatuses of which he is composed—his cells as well as the most sophisticated organs—are 
conscious and trained to the limit of their capacity. Art actually performs such a training… .” Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, 
“Production-Reproduction” (1922), translated and reprinted in Passuth, Moholy-Nagy, 289. See Chapter Five of this 
dissertation for a discussion of Moholy’s concept of perceptual training. 
 
62 The famous debate on “composition versus construction” was carried out by the members of the Moscow 
INKhUK from January through April of 1921, in what is now considered to be the inaugural moment of Russian 
constructivism. During this debate in March 1921, several of its like-minded participants—Karl Ioganson, 
Konstantin Medunetskii, Alexandr Rodchenko, Georgii and Vladimir Stenberg, and Varvara Stepanova—joined to 
form the Working Group of Constructivists. See Maria Gough, The Artist as Producer: Russian Constructivism in 
Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 25-27. A version of the “Program of the Working 
Group of Constructivists” was published in a 1922 number of the Hungarian avant-garde journal Egység, along with 
several images of works. See Christina Lodder, Russian Constructivism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 
236, 281-2 n.102. 
 
63 “Program of the Working Group of Constructivists of INKhUK” (“Programma rabochei gruppy konstruktivistov 
INKhUKa”) (1921), translated and cited in Lodder, Russian Constructivism, 94.  
 
64 See Gough, Artist as Producer, 25. 
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“dynamic”65 in two senses: first, inasmuch as post-revolutionary Russia was in a “transitional”66 
or “purifying period”67 of work towards Communism; second, inasmuch as Communism in its 
Marxian definition was, as such, not an ideal “state of affairs” but a “real movement which 
abolishes the present state of things.”68 While Moholy may have misinterpreted certain specific 
Constructivist works, his conception of the dynamics of “interim solutions” seems to be perfectly 
aligned with the status of the work of art in relation to society in “laboratory” constructivism—
which, in Maria Gough’s words, “foster[ed] the momentary, transitional, flexible, and adaptable 
over the monumental and eternal.”69 
The “laboratory” artwork was part of a redefinition of the identity and function of the 
artist in relation to a communal or social organization that was, even for the Soviet artists, not 
derived exclusively from Marx. Their idea of constructivism as “intellectual production”70 was, 
of course, based directly on the Marxian premise of consciousness as labor (“men are the 
producers of their conceptions”) and the consequent definition of Communism as the eradication 
of the division of labor, most fundamentally the division of manual and mental labor.71 But, as 
Gough has argued, when it came to the translation of this idea into the terms of aesthetic analysis 
and formal criteria, it was the autotelic principle of “valorization of genesis over mimesis, or 
                                                 
65 Aleksei Gan, Constructivism (Konstruktivizm) (1922), translated and cited in ibid., 71. 
 
66 Ibid., 70. 
 
67 Aleksei Gan, Constructivism, translated and cited in Lodder, Russian Constructivism, 94. 
 
68 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (1845-1846), 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/index.htm, consulted February 2, 2010. 
 
69 Gough, Artist as Producer, 71. For discussion of Moholy-Nagy’s misinterpretation of Karl Ioganson’s Spatial 
Construction (VIII) (1921) as kinetic in intent, while it was rather meant as a demonstration of “the process by 
which rigidity is established,” see ibid., 87. 
 
70 “Program of the Working Group of Constructivists of INKhUK,” cited in Lodder, Russian Constructivism, 95. 
 
71 Marx, The German Ideology, n.p. 
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process over product,” first formulated within the German romantic tradition, that the Russian 
artists invoked.72  
In 1924, Gropius was beginning to refer to the Bauhaus as an “experimental institute.”73 
In relation to the artifacts produced there, this would be expressed in the identification of the 
workshop as a laboratory for the development of product prototypes for mass production.74 In 
relation to architecture, however, the notion of prototype was replaced by a much more radical 
revision of practice as “speculative experiment[ation].”75 On the occasion of the 1923 Bauhaus 
exhibition featuring several designs inspired by the Gropius-Fred Forbat 1922-23 Baukasten im 
Grossen (Large-Scale Building Blocks) scheme for prefabricated housing, Gropius proposed the 
initiation of a “Bauhaus Research Department,” a “center for experimentation” in standardized 
building solutions.76 (Figure 9) Prefabricated construction, thus, became a medium for the 
                                                 
72 The “shift of attention from the relationship among forms… to the process of production,” championed by critic 
Tzvetan Todorov on the basis of Romantic aesthetics, explained the practical results of the identification between 
“construction” and “production” in the “composition-and-construction” debate of 1921. Gough, Artist as Producer, 
56-57. This association, in turn, brings us back full-circle to the contemporaneous theorizations of the German 
avant-garde that sought to found an intellectual-creative Gestaltung in a notion of “process.” In fact, Botar has 
suggested that Moholy-Nagy was introduced to the “energeticism” of Bogdanov and Ostwald by Kemény, who in 
turn was informed of the theories through the INKhUK debates he attended. See Botar, Technical Detours, 142-144. 
 
73 Walter Gropius, “The Intellectual Basis of the Staatliche Bauhaus in Weimar” (April 1924?), translated and 
reprinted in Wingler, Bauhaus, 77. 
 
74 “The Bauhaus workshops,” Gropius wrote in 1926, “are essentially laboratories in which prototypes of products 
suitable for mass production and typical of our time are carefully developed and constantly improved.” Walter 
Gropius, “Bauhaus Dessau – Principles of Bauhaus Production” (March 1926), translated and reprinted in Wingler, 
Bauhaus, 110.  As is well known, a number of utilitarian objects were indeed produced—if not exactly mass-
produced—by Bauhaus workshops. For a discussion of contradictions between the goal of industrial production and 
the products of Bauhaus design, see Robin Schuldenfrei, “The Irreproducibility of the Bauhaus Object” in Bauhaus 
Construct: Fashioning Identity, Discourse and Modernism, ed. Jeffrey Saletnik and Robin Schuldenfrei (London: 
Routledge, 2009), 37-60. Except for the novel terminology of “laboratory,” however, the interface between the 
institution and industry through design “prototypes” appeared to simply reproduce the Werkbund Typisierung 
model.   
 
75 Walter Gropius, “Bauhaus Dessau – Principles of Bauhaus Production” (March 1926), translated and reprinted in 
Wingler, Bauhaus, 110. 
 
76 Walter Gropius, “The Theory and Organization of the Bauhaus” (1923), translated and reprinted in Bauhaus 
1919-1928, ed. Herbert Bayer, Walter Gropius, and Ise Gropius (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1938), 20-29. 
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expression of “research as a form of practice.” As a paradigm of artistic practice, moreover, 
“research” in this sense did not supplant or precede, but entirely replaced production, dedicated 
as it was to developing a kit-of-parts that would eliminate contingencies of construction, and 
therefore serve, in practice, as the realized design. “If architecture were conceived of as 
prefabrication,” Wallis Miller has observed, “students would produce drawings and models 
rather than concrete objects. … In this laboratory for housing types design became research into 
a standardized world, and drawings and models became themselves sites of experimentation.”77 
The models executed by Bauhaus students were not built structures, nor even finalized building 
designs, but rather logical diagrams of a building process. By the end of his tenure as director, 
Gropius formulated Bauhaus institutional identity in entirely speculative terms as “a center for 
the gathering of all ideas concerning the contemporary intellectual and theoretical foundations of 
building.”78 Here too, the auto-teleology of intellectual production replaced the teleology of the 
artistic object. 
At the same time, it also presupposed and structured a specifically collective form of 
practice—from the Bauhaus itself as a collaborative enterprise, to the projected realization of its 
research findings through the organized channels of the construction industry. The 
reconfiguration of artistic practice as intellectual production, thus, was inextricably coupled to 
ideologies of community and strategies of collective association. An example of this link can 
also be discerned in a series of experimental building projects undertaken around 1920 by the 
Arbeitsrat für Kunst to “test the theory” of Arbeitsgemeinschaft, or collaborative work 
                                                 
77 Wallis Miller, “Architecture, Building, and the Bauhaus” in Bauhaus Culture: From Weimar to the Cold War, ed. 
Kathleen James-Chakraborty (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006),” 79, 76. 
 




community, among craftsmen, artists, and architects.79 In improvised construction without 
models or preliminary drawings, Behne wrote, invoking the “cathedral of socialism” paradigm, 
buildings were “created not so much from a ‘design’ (Entwurf) as through the free cooperation of 
countless anonymous hands, through the cooperation of the people.”80 The crucial issue, again, 
was that of replacing design as a trajectory from preconceived form to realized product with a 
focus on process and its role in reconfiguring architecture as collective labor. 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft would imply the entry of all participants into the realm of spiritual 
Kunstwollen through the active use of their imaginations—in other words, through creative 
work. The merging of manual and intellectual labor would mean, in that sense, intellectualized 
(spiritualized) manual labor—in parallel to the intellectual production of Bauhaus research.81  
Arbeitsgemeinschaft, however, was not an invention of avant-garde practice but another 
extant model of political organization. Established by the earliest legislation of the revolutionary 
regime, a series of labor-management arbitration committees was consolidated in the Central 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft (ZAG). Symbolizing the spirit of cooperative negotiation between labor and 
management, the ZAG was symptomatic of Weimar’s unfolding experiment in democratic 
governance.82 By 1924, a similar spirit of cooperation manifested itself in the construction 
industry with the establishment of the Gemeinnützige Heimstätten-, Spar- und Bau-
Aktiengesellschaft (GEHAG) or the Public Benefit Homestead, Savings, and Building 
                                                 
79 Behne wrote that these were undertaken “um die theoretisch so oft vertretenen Möglichkeiten einer künstlerischen 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft praktisch zu erproben.“ Cited in Franciscono, Walter Gropius, 109 n.60. 
 
80 Behne, Wiederkehr, translated and cited in Franciscono, Walter Gropius, 109. 
 
81 Likewise, already on the occasion of the first Bauhaus student exhibition in 1919, Gropius chided students for 
submitting “finished pictures” rather than the preferable “sketches of projects and ideas.” In this case, the privileging 
of creative process over product would be reinforced through an association with “ideas” as opposed to the nature or 
quality of their material realization. For Gropius as for Moholy, “interim solutions” could resonate with social or 
collective dynamism. Gropius, “Address to the Students,” translated and cited in ibid., 140. 
 
82 See Meier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe, 59-65. 
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Corporation—where the labor movement, the banks, and the socialized building trades would 
collaborate in the production of nonprofit low-cost housing. By 1927, yet another organizational 
echo of Arbeitsgemeinschaft could be discerned in the new Reichsforschungsgesellschaft für 
Wirtschaftlichkeit im Bau- und Wohnungswesen (RFG) or the Federal Society for Research in 
Building and Housing Economy, dedicated to work on the technical, economic, and social 
problems of housing that engaged representatives from the construction industry, the social 
sciences, and architecture in a collaborative effort that could, this time, be understood 
exclusively in terms of intellectual production.83 Gropius would actively participate in both of 
those organizations. It was the latter that he clearly had in mind as an analogy in describing the 
Bauhaus in 1927 as “a center for the gathering of all ideas concerning the contemporary 
intellectual and theoretical foundations of building”: the “center’s” director, Gropius pointed out, 
“is a member of the committee on housing types which was formed by the Reichsrat and is 
working in the section on modern building construction and building materials.”84  
The wide-scale participation of designers and artists in such centralized institutions of the 
corporatist state poses the problem of their group identification and representation. The retooling 
of artistic practice as intellectual production ultimately entailed a redefinition of the Weimar 
artist’s social and political identity, to which I will devote the last part of this chapter. To 
complete the discussion of the ideological link between processes of ideation and of collective 
organization, however, requires a brief detour through Hungarian avant-garde discourses. 
 
                                                 
83 For a brief history of the GEHAG, the RFG, and related organizations in the building industry, see Ronald 
Wiedenhoeft, Berlin’s Housing Revolution: German Reform in the 1920s (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1985), 
28-32, 43-51. 
 
84 Gropius, “Request for Contributions to the Bauhaus,” 125. 
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1.3 HUNGARIAN EXCURSUS 
 
 Because relationships between the Hungarian and German artistic cultures were very 
close, the triangulation among art, intellectual production, and politics received a parallel and 
particular expression in the Hungarian context, especially relevant for Moholy. That context also 
had a much greater influence on Kepes, by his own admission. Having entered the orbit of the 
Weimar avant-garde only at the tail end of its historical trajectory, Kepes later frequently 
emphasized the formative influence of the Hungarian artistic circles on his youthful creative 
development, repeating that his “bones were almost set” by the time he arrived in Berlin.85  
The key figure for both Moholy and Kepes was Lajos Kassák, leader of the avant-garde 
group the Activists.86 Much has been made of Moholy’s influence on Kepes—undoubtedly 
significant—but Kepes himself tended to place Moholy rather within the larger context of the 
Activists group.87 “You know Moholy?” he would ask in a 1968 interview, “[Kassák] made 
Moholy.”88 The Activists strove to forge links with the international cultural avant-garde—in the 
teens, through the periodical A Tett (The Deed), modeled after the Berlin left-wing journal Die 
                                                 
85 Gyorgy Kepes to Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, 8 September 1948, Kepes Papers, AAA, Reel 5303, frame 220. Kepes lived 
in Berlin from 1930 to early 1932, and then again in 1934-35. See Gyorgy Kepes to Francois Burkhardt, 2 July 
1973, Kepes Papers, AAA, Reel 5309, frame 414. He traveled to Berlin on the invitation of Laszlo Moholy-Nagy to 
assist in the latter’s commercial studio, which worked in advertisement, film, photography, graphic design, and stage 
sets; Kepes was also introduced there to Gropius and Marcel Breuer, and briefly assisted in their joint office. See 
Elizabeth Finch, “Languages of Vision: Gyorgy Kepes and the ‘New Landscape’ of Art and Science” (Ph.D. diss., 
The City University of New York, 2005), 90-93. 
 
86 Just eighteen years old in 1924, Kepes entered the Budapest Academy of Fine Arts, and fell under the influence of 
Kassak and the Activists shortly thereafter. 
 
87 “Kassak… was a great innovator… to whose circle Moholy had belonged in his early days,” Kepes wrote to Sibyl 
Moholy-Nagy. Gyorgy Kepes to Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, 8 September 1948, Kepes Papers, AAA, Reel 5303, frame 
220. 
  
88 See Gyorgy Kepes, oral history interview by Dorothy Sekler, 18 August 1968, tape recording, Kepes Papers, 
AAA, transcript available at http://www.aaa.si.edu/collections/oralhistories/transcripts/kepes68.htm. Misstated in 




Aktion; and later through Ma (Today), published in Budapest from 1916 to 1919 and continued 
in Viennese exile from 1920 to 1926, for which Moholy-Nagy served as the German 
correspondent.89 It is likely that Kepes saw issues of Ma, smuggled into Budapest from Vienna, 
which would have served as his first introduction to that particularly Hungarian reading of the 
1920s avant-gardes. When he later recalled his youthful reception of the “leading revolutionary 
artists”--“cubists, constructivists, suprematists and neo-plasticists”—he and his friends 
encountered reproduced on the pages of avant-garde periodicals, he recalled being “guided by 
the powerful Hungarian poet-artist, Lajos Kassák, whose courageous social commitments never 
blunted the experimental nature of his artistic spirit.”90 When Kassák returned to Hungary in 
1926, Kepes joined his circle and went on to assist in Kassák’s new editorial venture, the journal 
Munka (Work).91  
 As Kepes recalled his foundational artistic trajectory, it started with his enthusiastic 
discovery of “images of authentic intense individuality” in works by Van Gogh and Kokoschka. 
“But the involvement in the vigorous, subjective gestures,” he went on,  
had inevitable limitations. As the adolescent’s experimentations with the not yet experienced life 
dimensions, sooner or later have to face the logic of the ‘common’ social life, the discipline of the 
social structure, so I had to recognize that my uninhibited personal excursions in limitless expressive 
                                                 
89 The repressive regime of Admiral Miklos Horthy after the fall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919 
prompted the exile of many left-wing cultural and political figures. Many of the Activists emigrated to Vienna and 
Berlin; with Kassák settling in Vienna, and Moholy-Nagy in Berlin, both in 1920. 
 
90 Gyorgy Kepes, untitled transcript of a lecture at the Universita Internazionale Dell’Arte Di Firenze E Venezia, 29 
June 1972, pp. 11-12, Kepes Papers, AAA, Reel 5308, frame 455-456. Kepes would frequently note his debt to 
Kassák. See Gyorgy Kepes, Sekler interview, n.p. He would also recall having access to the journal Cahiers d’Art 
and “books of Ozenfant and Corbusier.” See Gyorgy Kepes, interview by Robert Brown, 7 March and 30 August 
1972 and 11 January 1973, Kepes Papers, AAA, p.3. See also Finch, “Languages of Vision,” 57. 
 
91 See Finch, “Languages of Vision,” 59-60. Kepes mentions that he “worked and cooperated on a pioneer magazine 
edited by Kassák” in Budapest. Kepes to Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, 8 September 1948. Munka was founded in 1928. See 
also Judith Wechsler, “Gyorgy Kepes” in Gyorgy Kepes: The MIT Years, 1945-1977 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
Visual Arts Series, 1978), 8-10. 
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realms, without relating myself to the common social reality, could easily become a futile emotional 
exercise.92  
Here, Kepes outlines the origins of his cardinal task to integrate the artist into society, and thus to 
help “harmonize [the] inner and outer vistas [of] our age.”93 However, the narrative of an 
original discovery of and subsequent disillusionment with subjective approaches that Kepes 
claims for his personal artistic history in fact mirrors the early twentieth century cultural history 
of Hungary. The turn-of-the-century flowering of Hungarian modernism was prompted by a late 
discovery of Western European Impressionist and Symbolist currents, interpreted as 
manifestations of cultural “aestheticism”—the liberation of art from all external social and 
ideological constraints, and the radical individualism of subjective artistic vision. While 
aestheticism stimulated the first breaks with academic convention, its rejection as early as 1909 
grounded the platform of the first Hungarian avant-garde group, the Eight. The Eight, who 
considered themselves Post-Impressionists, in contrast to their predecessors, and embraced the 
work of Cézanne and Gauguin as their artistic heroes, would in turn become the father-figures of 
Kassák’s generation. It is evident that Kepes had some familiarity with this immediate history; 
he later recalled reading an early essay on Gauguin by Georg Lukács, who had been the 
unofficial spokesman and intellectual leader of the Eight, as “a revelation” and his first encounter 
with “a clear formulation of an artistic stand which is related to the need for social context.”94  
                                                 
92 Gyorgy Kepes, untitled transcript of a lecture at the Universita Internazionale Dell’Arte Di Firenze E Venezia, 
pp.10-11, Kepes Papers, AAA, Reel 5308, frame 454-455. The Austrian Expressionist Oskar Kokoschka was known 
in prewar Budapest through reproductions of his work in issues of Der Sturm, as well as a 1918 German monograph 
distributed by Kassák at the Ma Gallery. See Botar, Technical Detours, 83. 
 
93 Gyorgy Kepes, “Introduction,” The Visual Arts Today, ed. Gyorgy Kepes (Middletown: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1960), 7. It can also be seen as a point of departure for his frequently stated opposition to the “general 
tendency [on the part of post-WWII artists influenced by Abstract Expressionism toward] a recoiling into 
themselves and a loss of confidence that their artistic work was part of a broader, richer, coherent cultural pattern.” 
Gyorgy Kepes, “The Artist’s Response to the Scientific World,” Technology and Culture in Perspective 
(Cambridge, MA: The Church Society for College Work, February 1967), 37. See also discussion, citing Jackson 
Pollock and Willem DeKooning, in Kepes, “Introduction,” Visual Arts Today, 10-11. 
 
94 Kepes interview by Brown, 7 March 1972, p.5. 
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 Lukács’s essay “Paul Gauguin” first appeared in 1907 in Huszadik Század (Twentieth 
Century), one of the two key cultural and intellectual journals of the prewar generation and an 
important platform for the Lukács circle.95 The essay presented Gauguin as an artistic model for 
going “beyond Impressionism,” that is, beyond the impasse of aestheticism, the tragic isolation 
of artistic autonomy.96 Having “broken its bondage to intellectual content and symbols,” Lukács 
wrote, art found itself deprived of an ability to communicate and thereby to constitute an organic 
culture where “the same instinct determines the shape and form of one’s home, one’s style of 
furniture, the fashion of one’s clothes and one’s artistic taste.” The result was stylistic 
eclecticism, with “individuality” and “originality” the only remaining criteria of cultural value.97 
Because Gauguin was “an intellect,” “conscious and spiritually complex,” he was able to 
discover in the cohesive traditional culture of Tahiti a “solution to the problem [of the] 
relationship of art and life.” Growing “attentive to old legends…, the primitive symbols of the 
natives,” Gauguin found himself “restored… as a human being.” 
He had found his place in society, no longer an exotic, luxury item in the hands of amateur collectors, 
nor a restless anarchist who threatened public safety. A primitive man pointed out to him… that he 
was a useful human being.98 
 The Gauguin text is representative of Lukács’s early essays, collected in Soul and Form 
(1910), which drew on the communitarian themes of the German neo-Kantian intellectual 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
95 On Huszadik Század, see Mary Gluck, Georg Lukács and His Generation, 1900-1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), 87-91. For a discussion of the Gauguin essay, see ibid., 130-131. See also Finch, 
“Languages of Vision,” 82-83. 
 
96 Georg Lukács, “Paul Gauguin,” translated and reprinted in The Lukács Reader, ed. Arpad Kadarkay (Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell, 1995), 163. 
 
97 Ibid., 160-161. 
 
98 Ibid., 162-163.  
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tradition.99 Influenced by Max Weber and Georg Simmel, Lukács was led to transcribe modern 
art’s autonomy and subjectivity as a manifestation of general cultural fragmentation brought 
about through the advance of a positivist and technocratic Weltanschauung. The intellectual 
specialization and objectivity demanded by the sciences was linked here to social alienation and 
loss of communal values, and both could be countered through the discovery of a new cultural 
metaphysics, uniting the artist and the intellectual, and integrating both in the life of society.100 
In an essay titled “Az Utak Elváltak” (The Parting of the Roads), with which he entered the 
debate on Impressionism, Lukács elaborated his formulation of the relationships among art, 
thought, and the social world. In place of an “art of sensations”—the “art of surfaces… which
signify nothing,” aligned with the atomized world of liberal individualism and bourgeois 
materialism—he defined Post-Impressionism as a new art that would “express the essential 
nature of things” in a new “order.” “Today,” he wrote, “we long to recognize order… We long 
for permanence… We also want to assign meaning to all our experiences… We long for 
evaluations. … We long for profound thought.”
 
 in 
nto it with our 
tellec
l 
                                                
101 This union of art and the intellect in a new 
metaphysics was echoed by the Eight themselves, who took as their motto: “We are believers
nature, but no longer do we copy it with the eye of the academies; rather, we dip i
in t.”102 
 The postulate of fundamental dualisms between the public and private worlds, between 
the “rational” drive of science and the “human” content of art, entailing the need for dialectica
 
99 For Lukács’s early connections to German intellectuals, see Gluck, Georg Lukács, 141-173. 
 
100 See ibid., 132-141. 
 
101 Georg Lukács, “Az Utak Elváltak,” Nyugat 1 (1910), reprinted and translated as “The Parting of the Ways” in 
Kadarkay, ed., Lukács Reader, 169, 170. For a discussion of the text, see Gluck, Georg Lukács, 138-141. 
  
102 Catalogue of the first exhibit of the Eight, ca. 1908, cited in Gluck, Georg Lukács, 116.  
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reconciliation, would be an essential premise of Kepes’s developing philosophy as well. The
search for “the total world, the common world that unites the thinking mind, the motivating 





, was also part of Kassák’s reimagining of the philosophical legacy of Lukács 
and the
 
                                                
103 declared by Kepes as the primary task of his mature work, also 
motivated his practical efforts to advance a concept of the artist as intellectual. “[I]t should be 
insisted,” he would write, “that the creation of a visual image in the arts is not the instinctive ac
of certain individuals but rather a fusion of their deepest inner workings with the messages of 
society, including information from the realm of knowledge and rational thought. … [T]he 
profoundly affects our world outlook.”104 Just such an operative role assigned to art in the 
creation of a Weltanschauung, and the Idealist conception of the latter’s agency in the creation
the social world
 Eight. 
“Az Utak Elváltak” was first delivered as a speech at a 1910 meeting of the Galilei 
Circle, a radical student group that brought together Hungarian progressive intellectuals and the
avant-garde, providing the latter’s ideological foundation.105 Kassák and the artists who would 
go on to comprise the Activists group also attended Galilei Circle debates. Although he would 
declare a more socially radical stance than his progenitors, Kassák was clearly indebted to their 
 
103 Kepes, “Introduction,” Visual Arts Today, 11. An elaboration of this position sustained Kepes’s project to unite 
art and science: “Where our age falls short is in the harmonizing of our outer and our inner wealth. We lack the 
depth of feeling and the range of sensibility needed to retain the riches that science and technique have brought 
within our grasp. The images and symbols which can truly domesticate the newly revealed aspects of nature will be 
developed only if we use all our faculties to the full—assimilate with the scientist’s brain, the poet’s heart, the 
painter’s eyes. It is an integrated vision that we need; but our awareness and understanding of the world and its 
realities are divided into the rational—the knowledge frozen in words and quantities—and the emotional—the 
knowledge vested in sensory images and feelings. Artists and poets on the one hand, scientists and engineers on the 
other, appear to live in two different worlds.” Gyorgy Kepes, The New Landscape in Art and Science (Chicago: Paul 
Theobald, 1956), 20. 
 
104 Ibid., 6. 
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nschauung of the world. Art is creation and therefore the most 
ural formulations. In a notable moment of the above text, Lukács presented an architectonic 
aphor for the cultural synthesis he sought:  
This art [the art of the Eight] is an old art, the art of order and values; it is a constructive art. … The 
new art is architectonic in the old, true sense. Its colors, words and lines are merely expressions of the
essence, order and harmony of things, their em
harmony of force and substance, and can only attain expression in the equilibrium of materials a
far as it expresses this: the equilibrium of force and substance that comprise things, in their simplest, 
clearest, most concentrated and essential way.106 
The elision of aesthetic and ethical categories in the concept of “order” was adopted by the 
Activists as their platform. Even as they declared themselves impatient with Post-Impressionis
metaphysics, the Activists remained resolutely Idealist in their insistence on the life-tr
power of the artist’s creative concept. “Form,” wrote Lukács, “becomes a Weltanschauung, a 
viewpoint and a stance in face of life which brought it into existence, a possibility of 
transforming and recreating that itself, even if only in thought and experience… . If art were able 
to mould life, if goodness could become a deed – then we should be gods.”107 Kassák radicaliz
the intellectual’s measured formulation: “Art is a Weltanschauung. Creation alone is life, and l
the materialization of the Welta
                                                 
106 Lukács, “The Parting of the Ways,” 171. The architectonic metaphor also appears in Lukács’s Gauguin essay, 
where the discovery of the artist’s social function is identified with a shift to the “functional” art of architecture as 
Gauguin begins to see his paintings as “decorative frescoes.” Lukács, “Paul Gauguin,”164. “[The] decorative value 
[of modern art],” Lukács elaborates, “is to furnish architecture with ornaments, and modern paintings have no place 
here. Indeed, the whole development of the architectural style of public buildings and private homes has made no 
allowance for the organic necessity of paintings. As a result, painting has become separate from every ‘functional’ 
rt.” Ibid., 161. Lukács’s position not only reproduces the Gesamtkunstwerk ideal, but also echoes Kepes’s 
 Georg Lukács, “A lelki szegénységről” (On Spiritual Poverty), A Szelle (1911), cited in Júlia Szabó, “Ideas and 
 The 
: Arts Council of Great Britain, 1980), 9, 16 n.5. 
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Programmes: The Philosophical Background of the Hungarian Avant-Garde,” The Hungarian Avant-Garde:







ogressively greater geometric abstraction, culminating with Kassák’s 
Kép
wro
world, but the essence of the world. Architecture. The synthesis of the new order. … The artist with a 
eption of order in art as “ideological form” or “intellectual architecture”112 is certainly 
hat Kepes would have taken away from his youthful engagement with the Hungarian avant-
ardes.  
                                              
te life. … From eternity art has been an ever-present force, like ethics, like revolution
like the whole world itself.”108 
Spurred on by the Hungarian Soviet Revolution, Kassák drew a parallel between the 
intellectual act of the artist and the political act of the revolutionary.109 At the same time, the 
premise that the artist’s creative concept was to reveal an essential platonic formal order w
accepted and likewise radicalized by the Activists. The analytical approach to pictorial structur
discerned by the Eight in the work of Cézanne was pursued by the Activists after 1918 in 
Cubism—which  they interpreted as revealing an “inner-world construction”110—in mechan
Dada, and finally in Russian constructivism. Their own artworks, reproduced in Ma, exhibited a 
similar tendency to pr
architektúra (pictorial architecture), first proposed in 1920. (Figure 10) “The artist of today,” 
te Kassák in Ma, 
as a man with a concept of the world, again bears his art with him as a manifesto. Not his view of the 
concept of the world can create anything. Creation is the constructive good deed. Construction is 





   
8 Lajos Kassák, “Bildarchitektur” (Pictorial Architecture), Ma (1921), trans. George Cushing, reprinted in 
Hungarian Avant-Garde, 114. 
 
10
109 He was influenced in this by the ideology of German Activism. See Szabó, “Ideas and Programmes,” 13-14. 
 
110 Ma, vol.II, no.6/7, cited in Szabó, “Ideas and Programmes,” 33. 
 
111 Kassák, “Bildarchitektur,” 114-115. 
 
112 See Béla Uitz, “Kísérlet az ideológiai formáról” (Experiment in Ideological Form), Ek (1923), cited in Szabó, 















“organic” unity between the worker and his products is indeed destroyed by the industrial 
1.4 THE “MAN OF MANY FUNCTIONS” 
 
The Bauhaus, Gropius wrote in 1922, strove “to replace the principle of division of lab
with that of unified collective work… The only basic contrast lies in the division of labor on the 
one hand and the unity of labor on the other… .”113 The division of labor concept was pivotal fo
the redefinition of the artist’s social and political identity in the revision of artistic pract
intellectual production. This relationship may be traced through an exemplary text, published in
the same year that Gropius wrote the statement cited above. In 1922, Behne wrote a defense of 
the growing constructivist turn in avant-garde discourses in an essay titled “Art, Craft, 
Technology.” Typically read as an argument
artistic model, the essay in fact presents a remarkable theorization of design as intellectual labo
conceived in terms of practices—what Behne calls “actions”—and collectivities, and of the 
designer as a “man of many functions.”114   
 The critic enters the Marxist debate on the industrial division of labor as the source o
alienation, translating its terms for artistic production. He shifts the problematics of alienat
from the relationship between the worker (or artist) and his material product, to the relationsh
among workers under the conditions of organized production. Although, Behne posits, the 
                                                 
113 Walter Gropius, “The Viability of the Bauhaus Idea” (3 February 1922), translated and reprinted in Wingler, 
auhaus, 51. 
 Colquhoun, “Criticism and Self-Criticism in German 
odernism,” AA Files, no. 28 (Autumn 1994): 26-33.  
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division of labor, a “higher, novel cohesion [is introduced in its place] created by the human 
intellect and consciousness.”115 “Conscious forming,” Behne reminds his audience, is the 
essence of the creative “profession.”116 The machine introduces a “lifeless, hard, and general”
element into the organic unity of nature—but it is only through this element that an “enhanced 
vitality” emerges when the “shape” of nature is replaced by a “new immaterial body [that] 
consists of people’s actions.”
 
herefore, through the 
neg
acti the age of the crafts,” writes Behne,  
the material was distributed and each craftsman worked with it through all phases. Today it is the 




observation that tools (“means of production”) require collective organization, and the 
                                                
117 One proceeds to an emancipated society, t
ation of objects, their individuality and materiality, within a collective of free (conscious) 
ons, practices, or “functions.”118 “During 
work that is distributed. …
and, if you wish, an intellectual construct.
ects, sculptors, painters,” he concludes, “we must move forward toward the demanding
service of the intellect!”120 
Behne’s argument is, in fact, a nuanced reading of Marx, who had proceeded fro
anthropology of man as “toolmaking animal,” and therefore conscious producer, to the 
 
115 Behne, “Art, Craft, Technology,” 327. 
 
116 Ibid., 330. 
 
117 Behne, “Art, Craft, Technology,” 326, 332. 
 
118 From this perspective, Behne’s ideas in 1922 can be aligned closer with the project of “artist as a producer” 
defined by Gough, as opposed to the trajectory pursued by the Russian utilitarian “productivists,” who sought to 
invent, as Christina Kiaer has shown, a “socialist object.” See Kiaer, Imagine No Possessions: The Socialist Objects 
of Russian Constructivism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). Frederic Schwartz’s analysis of Behne’s writings in 
the late 1920s is very suggestive in this regard. Schwartz argues that Behne’s attempt in those works to define the 
Sache (thing, object) is ultimately frustrated by his inability to define its necessary correlate—the Mensch. The 
failure of the project “to make the thing an object of knowledge” for architecture, therefore, is a symptom of the 
emergence of a new and as yet unarticulated “subject” of architecture—which Schwartz identifies as “sociological 
man.” Schwartz, “Form Follows Fetish: Adolf Behne and the Problem of Sachlichkeit,” Oxford Art Journal 21.2 
(1998): 73.  
 
119 Behne, “Art, Craft, Technology,” 333-4. 
 
120 Ibid., 338. 
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conclusion that it is through their relations with each other that men produce at once their own 
material reality and themselves as thinking beings.121 As intellectual production, art, then, is
once the constitution, through practice, of the artist’s social identity and of the society as a 
whole. Behne’s analysis of the social body engages the polarity between the “individual” a
“mass” employed, as discussed earlier in this chapter, in the contemporaneous critique of 
Weimar democracy—but reverses the terms of that critique. Against the volkisch reading of the
urban, industrial “masses” as “undistinguishable, dull, featureless … matter,” Behne advances
the idea that dematerialized or intellectualized “collectively interconnected work [will] set in











starting point of the classic Marxian problematic of the division of manual and mental labor, 
                                                
122 The community is mass as intellectual 
production—a “totality” defined through a set of processes or practices. Because each individua
producer here is a part of the whole, he is no longer identified with a single form of labor. The 
assembly-line worker, Behne writes, who “spends his whole life making pinheads and nothi
else… is stamped according to this one function”—the worker becomes identified with th
product of his labor.123 But he then turns that orthodox concept of alienation on its head, 
asserting that it can only happen in an era of manual production. In the age of intellectual 
production, on the other hand, “every person carries out a variety of functions [leading] in
different directions, making many different demands on him.” No longer objectified, the 
producer is dissolved into multiple practices; man becomes “a carrier of functions.”124 From t
 
121 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, volume I, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 1977), 
286. See also Etienne Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx (London: Verso, 2007), 27-30. 
 
122 Behne, “Art, Craft, Technology,” 337, 338. 
 
123 Ibid., 333. 
 
124 Ibid., 333. 
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Behne arrives at the very negation of the Marxian definition of man—and, ultimately, the 
artist—as homo faber.   
 Behne’s remarkable discourse may be seen to comprise a defense, in Marxist terms, of 
the emergent political constitution of the corporatist social democracy. In fact, while much 
political discourse in the Weimar Republic still proceeded under the rubric of “class,” it was 
becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile its terms with both the conduct of interest politics 
and the composition of Weimar society that those politics attempted to articulate. While the 
Marxian “urban masses” were coterminous with the proletariat, in Weimar that identity was 
beginning to dissolve. The advent of the modern service economy was reconstituting the Weimar 
masses into a Mittelstand. The fastest growing segment of the labor force by the mid-1920s, 
white-collar workers (die Angestellten) occupying a wide range of professions, were a social 
group defined more than anything else by heterogeneity and unassimilability within traditional 
class hierarchies. The new artist-worker theorized by Behne, the new mass man as “carrier of 
[multiple] functions,” was thus also the Angestellte.125 
 What is particularly significant about the Angestellten for the present context is their 
status as “knowledge” workers. Although white-collar occupations required different skill levels, 
those who were bank and corporate clerks, civil servants, managers and administrators were 
close in their educational background to the bourgeoisie.126 Another category of skilled white-
collar workers were the former artisans who were now employed in industrial production or 
commerce. This additional “transitional category,” the “former artisan who today has become a 
                                                 
125 As argued by Sabine Hake, the white-collar worker was the primary referent and addressee of Weimar 
architectural avant-garde activities and discourses. See Hake, Topographies of Class: Modern Architecture and 
Mass Society in Weimar Berlin (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), 2. 
 
126 See ibid., 69. 
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merchant of wares that were at one time self-produced but are now produced in the factory,”127 
was the pivotal figure of avant-garde discourses around the relationship between “craft” and 
“industry.” Both in his manifestation as small merchant (in the Kleinbetriebe), and even more 
fundamentally as the factory Musterzeichner (the draftsman producing pattern drawings for 
products), the former artisan had already oriented Werkbund efforts to redefine the social and 
economic identity of the architect. It was precisely against the threat of the collapse of the 
designer’s status in industrial production into that of the Musterzeichner, as Schwartz has shown, 
that Werkbund architects sought to define themselves within a new legal discourse as 
“inventors” or claimants to “intellectual property.”128 For the designer, creative intellect was not 
only a philosophical preoccupation but a key politico-economic differential. Not only was the 
specter of the Musterzeichner still a concern for Gropius in his formulation of the Bauhaus 
program,129 but the problematics of “intellectual property” also continued to orient the design of 
industrial products at the Bauhaus throughout the 1920s.130 
 Although perhaps not so much “educated” as “trained,” the Musterzeichner were, in their 
social standing, the precursors to the salaried professionals of the Weimar era.131 But it was 
perhaps equally the state bureaucrat and the corporate administrator that threatened the Weimar 
                                                 
127 See Theodor Geiger, “The Old and New Middle Classes” (1932), translated and reprinted in Weimar Republic 
Sourcebook, 192. 
 
128 See Schwartz, The Werkbund, 147-212. 
 
129 “[H]ow are the factory Musterzeichner to be replaced?” Gropius wrote in his comments on Otto Bartning’s text 
“Bau-Kunst, -Verwaltung und –Unterricht” (1919) that served as a key influence on the Bauhaus pedagogical 
program. Cited in Franciscono, Walter Gropius, 134. 
 
130 See the research in this area conducted by T’ai Smith, e.g., “The Identity of Design as Intellectual Property” in 
Bauhaus Construct, 226-244. 
 
131 For the nineteenth century political and economic development of the Mittelstand, particularly in relationship to 
artisans, see John V. Maciuika, Before the Bauhaus: Architecture, Politics and the German State 1890-1920 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 15-24. 
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architect’s social identity as a member of the elite Bildungsbürgertum (educated classes), since 
through the 1920s the avant-gardes increasingly took on positions within the “new cadre of urban 
managers, entrepreneurs, and technocrats.”132 The intellectualization of the architect was, in that 
sense, directed at forestalling his own transformation into a (mere) paid professional.  
On the other hand, Schwartz has recently argued that the technocratic professional, or 
“expert,” was a figure of avant-garde identification, rather than resistance. As “expert,” the 
Angestellte was positioned within a new mode of socio-political stratification—by occupation, or 
productive “function.”133 Here, particularly, Moholy’s definition of “man [as] the synthesis of all 
his functional apparatuses” situates his discourse with respect to the emergence of the “expert” as 
a paradigm of artistic practice. Moholy’s idea of “function” may be compared with the effort by 
Behne, whose work Moholy cited approvingly, to describe the new social subject as a “man of 
many functions,” as opposed to the proletarian defined solely by the labor of his hands.134 The 
opening pages of The New Vision (1928) demonstrate that Moholy’s ideology centered on a 
redefinition of work or “occupation.” Much as Behne had done, Moholy proceeds from the 
Marxian postulate of alienated labor. Unlike “primitive man [who] combined in one person 
hunter, craftsman, builder, and physician,” he writes, “the worker under the conditions of 
advanced capitalism “becomes a man of one calling,” which is contrary to the needs of 
“biological existence.”135 This repression of man’s “biological functions” through the division of 
                                                 
132 Hake, Topographies of Class, 10. 
 
133 Frederic J. Schwartz, Blind Spots: Critical Theory and the History of Art in Twentieth-Century Germany (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 95-96. 
 
134 See Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, The New Vision and Abstract of an Artist (1928), trans. D.M.Hoffman (New York: 
Wittenborn, 1947), 59. Moholy cites Adolf Behne’s Neues Wohnen – Neues Bauen (Verlag Hesse & Becker, 
Leipzig, 1927). 
 
135 Ibid., 14. 
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labor is not unique to the “working class,” but is a basic condition of “all those caught within the 
mechanism of the present economic system.” The list of occupations Moholy offers is 
instructive: a cabinet-maker, a lawyer, a locksmith, and an architect.136 Again like Behne’s, his 
solution is not to oppose the division of labor in itself, but rather to supplement its role in 
technological progress with a countervailing “recognition of man’s organic function,”137 making 
possible work that is freely chosen rather than “imposed”138 by economic necessity.  
“The revolutionist,” Moholy writes,  
should always remain conscious that the class struggle is, in the last analysis, not about capital, nor 
the means of production, but actually about the right of the individual to have a satisfying occupation, 
a life-work that meets inner needs, a balanced way of life, and a real release of human energies.139 
His well-known doctrine of “everyone is talented” works exactly to preclude the reduction of 
identity to a defined occupational function associated with oppressive division of labor: 
“Everyone is equipped by nature to receive and to assimilate sensory experiences [therefore 
anyone] can become a musician, painter, sculptor, or architect, just as when he speaks, he is a 
‘speaker.’”140 Moholy’s thesis that one is no longer born with a specific talent that predestines 
his professional identity is a pedagogical counterpart of Behne’s argument that one is no longer 
born into a specific estate stamping him with a social identity according to the character of his 
labor. It may be said that Moholy’s “new vision” is thus un-classed, a conception of socially- 
mobile, education-based society that ideologically resembles a liberal democracy.   
                                                 
136 Ibid., 14-15. 
 
137 Ibid., 17. 
 
138 “Our modern system of production is imposed labor, a senseless pursuit, and, in its social aspects, without plan; 
its motive is to squeeze out profits to the limit.” Ibid., 15. 
 
139 Ibid., 18. 
 
140 Ibid., 17. Moholy’s resistance to “trade specialization” was also a strong direction at the Bauhaus already since 
its inception. See, e.g, Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, letter of resignation from the Bauhaus, January 1928, reproduced in 




 At the same time, Weimar left discourses linked the figure of the Angestellte to the figure 
of the intellectual, and attempted to construct around this alliance strategies of political 
organization. When Sigfried Kracauer, the ethnographer of Weimar’s “masses,” was described 
by Walter Benjamin as a “ragpicker at daybreak,” it was to compare him to those he 
chronicled.141 Like the classic figure of Parisian modernity, so abject as to be below class, the 
Weimar intellectual was a social “outsider.”142 The definition of the intelligentsia as a “socially 
unattached, relatively classless stratum which is not too firmly situated in the social order” was 
well-established in Weimar left discourses, advanced by Alfred Weber in the early 1920s and 
developed by Karl Mannheim.143 An active Marxist discourse on the intellectual was also 
conducted in the ‘20s around the journal Die Aktion—well-known among the avant-garde. Here, 
the “intellectual” was defined—in effect, blurring the definition with that of the Angestellte—as 
“teacher, scholar, engineer, priest, doctor, judge, party leader, and artist.”144 Here, also, the 
intellectual’s position in the class struggle was theorized through the division of labor, and 
particularly the division of manual and mental labor. “The exploited class,” wrote Franz Seiwert 
in a 1923 number of Die Aktion,  
                                                 
141 Walter Benjamin, “’An Outsider Attracts Attention’—On The Salaried Masses by S. Kracauer,” translated and 
reprinted in Sigfried Kracauer, The Salaried Masses: Duty and Distraction in Weimar Germany, trans. Quintin 
Hoare (London: Verso, 1998), 114. 
 
142 For a discussion of the “ragpicker” figure and its mythology, see Molly Nesbit, Atget’s Seven Albums (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 165-175. 
 
143 Karl Mannheim, “Ideology and Utopia” (1929), translated and reprinted in Weimar Republic Sourcebook, 298. 
 
144 Franz W. Seiwert, “The Function of Intellectuals in Society and Their Task in the Proletarian Revolution,” first 
published as “Die Funktion der Intellektuellen in der Gesellschaft und ihre Aufgabe in der proletarischen 
Revolution,” Die Aktion 13, nos. 21-22 (14 June 1923), 281-285, translated and reprinted in Weimar Republic 
Sourcebook, 292. My emphasis. 
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breaks down into two groups: the one that supplies the thinking and the other that does the work and 
for which the thinking is supplied. … The classless society… must transcend the precondition of 
exploitation, the division into the knowing and unknowing.145 
This proposition certainly resonates with the avant-gardes’ own dilemmas of “head” and “hand.”
 The notion of a classless society—whose observance as a utopia is routinely claimed, 
since Tafuri, to have distracted the avant-gardes from political realities—was shared by all on the 
Weimar left as the self-evident goal of political activity. Its correlate, class identity, on the other 
hand, was not the entire reality of political practice, but rather one of its strategic articulations—
championed by many on the left, but critiqued by others. The real politics of class in the Weimar 
Republic was defined by uncertainty; dissolving at times into “mass,” “class” was as frequently a 
strategic mode of defining political collectivity as it was an identifiable social entity. Rather than 
an example of ideological false consciousness, therefore, the classless utopia was a displacement 
of the “real” necessary to every form of political organization.146 It was the imaginary other of a 
politics that thought itself, for the moment, largely in terms of class, even as the social conditions 
within which it unfolded already prefigured the exhaustion of class as a viable strategy. That 
tension was encompassed in Weimar politics of knowledge and sustained by avant-garde 
discourses on the problem of intellectual production. Carrier of multiple functions—intellectual, 
artist, administrator, worker—how would the designer define himself, produce himself, as a part 
of his social world? What collectivity could he form—one of class or some other one as yet 
vaguely defined? These were some of the critical questions of the Weimar era. 
 
145 Ibid., 291-292. 
 
146 Etienne Balibar locates such a displacement—a necessary “distance of all politics from the real”—in the concept 
of Nebenzweck (a lateral or fictive goal) as it appears in the strategic reflections of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. 
See Etienne Balibar, “Politics and Truth” in Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and 
After Marx, trans. James Swenson (New York: Routledge, 1994), 162. 
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2 THE METHOD OF APPROACH: GROPIUS AND THE NEW DEAL 




We are, in my very confident belief … at one of those uncommon junctures of 
human affairs where we can be saved by the solution of an intellectual problem, 
and in no other way. 





Walter Gropius arrived in the United States to take on the chairmanship of the 
Department of Architecture at the Harvard Graduate School of Design in April of 1937. October 
1937 marked the beginning of a rapid and severe economic recession, in some ways more severe 
than the crash of 1929 that inaugurated the Great Depression. This set of circumstances 
positioned the arrival of the famous European modernist technocrat at the precise moment when 
the program of economic planning announced by the New Deal was plunged into crisis. At a 
time when national attention was riveted to the solution of what John Maynard Keynes called the 
“intellectual problem” of the economy,1 American architects were reframing their own 
profession as a set of expert competences in the solution of social and economic problems. In the 
concrete issues to which architectural “expertise” would be addressed in the 1930s and 1940s--
prefabrication, urban planning, cost management—Gropius would have found much overlap 
with the Weimar Republic. What changed, however, was the function of intellectual production 
in the project of state formation—with significant consequences for the construction of design as 
a practice of knowledge, and the politics of that practice. The Weimar state unfolded as a project 
                                                 
1 John Maynard Keynes, “A Self-Adjusting Economic System?” The New Republic 82 (20 February 1935): 37. 
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of political aggregation, representation, and confrontation.2 The legislative body of the state, the 
parliament, was also the emblematic site of state formation. The American state coalesced in the 
1930s as an institutional mechanism for the correction, management, and perpetuation of the 
ailing social body identified as “the economy.” The economy was the locus of the state, the site 
of its agency.3 When set within the domain of the state, the social function of knowledge 
became, remarkably, juxtaposed, and even elided, with the social function of capital. The 
American project of state formation unfolded between the dynamic imperatives of generating 
capital and knowledge.  
In the market collapse of 1929, the entanglement of real estate with finance capital was 
made glaringly apparent and, under crisis conditions, urgently problematic. The prosperity of the 
1920s was carried in large part by a boom in the building industry, particularly the housing 
sector. While evident across the North Atlantic economy, in the United States the residential 
construction boom was almost exclusively a function of private, speculative building—and it 
was fueled by credit lending. The devastating effect on the building industry of the collapse of 
financial institutions following the stock market crash was, therefore, one of the more significant 
blows to the national economy as a whole.4 Federal economic recovery measures to prop up the 
                                                 
2 “[T]he real framework of the Weimar Republic,” Charles Maier has written, “comprised a set of [ultimately 
unstable] treaties among the powerful social and political forces of Germany.” Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: 
Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988), 57.  
 
3 For example, from within a Marxist framework, David Harvey has argued that the 1930s were the pivotal decade 
for the emergence of “state-monopoly capitalism” (a term coined by Rudolf Hilferding) through unprecedented 
direct state intervention in the economic spheres of production and exchange. See David Harvey, The Limits to 
Capital (London: Verso, 1999), 137-138, 150-153.  
 
4 Real estate was one of the fastest growing sectors of the American economy in the 1920s, together with 
automobiles, electrical appliances, and chemical industries. Construction was the second largest industry (following 
automobiles), residential construction covered 60 percent of developed urban land, and almost 30 percent of all 
national job losses in 1933 were in the building trades.  
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building industry continued through the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who 
believed home building to be “the wheel within the wheel to move the whole economic engine.”5 
The apparent economic centrality of real estate brought the architectural profession in the 
1930s into an intense confrontation with the national economy in a period when the economic 
appeared at the same time as the most pressing contingency and an intractable problem. 
Throughout the decade, major architectural journals— Pencil Points, Architectural Record, 
Architectural Forum, and American Architect—published a steady stream of material on the 
economic recovery: status updates for the private building industry, reports from Washington, 
advice on running a business. (Figure 11) As professional discourse kept a vigilant eye on the 
development of federal government policies, architecture was tapping into the discursive 
approaches to the economy, which in turn gave it a new set of goals and meanings. The practice 
of architecture and the professional identity of the architect were shifting, and this transition 
pivoted on an identification of design with “method.” Arriving in America, Gropius found 
himself at the heart of these transformations in the architectural profession. His first original 
statement upon arrival, published in the Architectural Record, outlined a notion of “method” as 
the foundation of a pedagogical and design identity. (Figure 12) “My intention,” he wrote, “is… 
to introduce a method of approach which allows one to tackle a problem according to its peculiar 
conditions.”6 Flexible and instrumental, the “method of approach” situated design along a 
spectrum between a technology of control and an ethic of contingency and uncertainty. In the 
                                                 
5 See Gail Radford, “The Federal Government and Housing During the Great Depression,” From Tenements to the 
Taylor Homes: In Search of an Urban Housing Policy in Twentieth-Century America, ed. John F. Bauman, Roger 
Biles and Kristin M. Szylvian (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000); Gail 
Radford, Modern Housing for America: Policy Struggles in the New Deal Era (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1996); Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), 381-383, 461-462. 
 
6 Walter Gropius, “Architecture at Harvard University,” The Architectural Record (May 1937): 9-10. 
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context of current architectural debates, Gropius’s programmatic position would have had a 
significant resonance, accounting in part for the tremendous early success of his ideology on the 
American scene.  
The architectural and economic discourses of this period found a point of intersection in a 
common problem: what is the social function of expertise in a situation of fundamental 
uncertainty? Catalyzing a shift in dominant economic theory driving federal policy, the events of 
1937 marked the end of a cycle of legislative activity and the gradual emergence of a new set of 
relationships between the economy and the state. A regulatory economy modeled on scientific 
management was abandoned and a new set of governmental techniques emerged, focused around 
the model of “stimulus,” which described an economy whose vitality depended on continuous 
exposure to risk—produced, paradoxically, through perpetual state intervention. This solution 
embraced the instabilities of finance capital as the foundation of the economic system. Sustained 
unpredictability was the given in both the economic discourse of “stimulus” and the architectural 
discourse of “method.” The instrumentality of knowledge had to depend on its never being able 
to find the solution, the general law valid for all circumstances, the empirical application of 
which would assure success. Although the framing of expertise in the 1930s had its roots in the 
“technocratic” mentality of the preceding years, it was in fact the antithesis of the latter. Contrary 
to what is commonly thought about the intellectual culture of this period, planning, prediction, 
and control were no longer its organizing concepts. The new problem was how to maintain 
internal limits on what could be solved, planned, and controlled; how to produce knowledge that 
would be in essence self-limiting in its social agency. In this sense, the intersection of such 
different discourses as those of architecture and economics is an index of the emergence of a new 
politics of knowledge. In architecture of the immediate postwar period, no one would become as 
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prominent or as exemplary a figure of the contradictions inherent to this politics than Walter 
Gropius. 
 
2.1 ECONOMIC STIMULUS 
 
The resolution of the post-1929 economic crisis in the establishment of the managed 
economy—characterized by ongoing regulatory state interventions, primarily through fiscal 
policy, oriented to stimulating consumption and increasing income equality—is usually credited 
to the influence of John Maynard Keynes. However, the eclipse of laissez-faire orthodoxy with a 
version of “Keynesian” economic regulation actually involved a more gradual evolution in the 
relationship between the economy and the state. The 1930s and early ‘40s witnessed a succession 
of two conceptions of economic regulation, each feeding a set of changes in the federal 
legislative apparatus: an elevation to the national level of the program of “scientific 
management” in the idea of the cooperative (public-private) rationalization of the economy; and 
its gradual replacement by a “stimulus”-oriented model of planning as a series of flexible and 
reactive processes embracing economic uncertainty as a dynamic force. Keynes’s contribution 
was to root this conversion conceptually in a paradigm shift in economic theory based on a 
redefinition of the role of money in the economy of production. The agency of money opened up 
a constitutive maladjustment between supply and demand, income and employment, interest and 
investment—a glitch in the self-regulating mechanism of neoclassical economics that short-
circuited the autonomous progress of the market, exposing it to contingency and open-ended 
strategic manipulation. The transition from the regulatory technology of control to “stimulus” as 
a tactic of opportunistic interventions was moved along by a series of practices that negotiated a 
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role for the state as the managerial center of the nation newly conceived as an integral social-
economic unit.  
The circuit of transactions opened up by the economic crisis of 1929 that aimed at 
redefining the state’s relationship to the economy around the problem of regulation has been 
discussed by Michel Foucault as a “crisis of governmentality,” in which a politics of danger 
focused around the theoretical questioning of the economy as a domain governed by 
fundamentally intelligible natural laws. 7 The set of power relations both symbolically 
localizable in the state and tactically diffused through the entire fabric of society, that Foucault 
describes by the term “governmentality,” is focused on both enabling and delimiting social
freedoms—guaranteeing the free circulation of social and economic exchanges and constraining 





                                                
8 The emergence of planned economy 
projects across Eastern and Western Europe and North America in the 1920s, threatening to 
constrain the free circulation of social and economic processes to an intolerable degree, 
prompted a gradual mutation in the regime of “governmentality” that sought to recalibrate the 
interface between the economy and the state. By the 1970s, the state-economy relation shifted 
from the laissez-faire state that defined its limits in relation to the economy as a substratum of
nature or reality to a state that modeled its operations on the logic of the economic, conceiv
now as a domain permeated by juridical artifice. Whereas both the laissez-faire and the planned
economy were premised on the scientific intelligibility of the economic, the emergent “neo-
 
7 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, ed. Michel Senellart, 
trans. Graham Burchell (Houndmills, Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Foucault discusses these events in 
the context of the emergence of “neo-liberalism” from the 1930s to the 1970s, both in Europe and America. 
 
8 Foucault sees the eighteenth century as a point of emergence for liberal “governmentality” that regulates 
relationships between society and the state through a series of “apparatuses of security,” focused on the production 
of freedoms and the cancellation of risks. For a full discussion, see Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: 
Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (Houndmills, Great 
Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
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liberal” conjunction required an economy whose processes were permanently occluded, eve
they no longer occurred spontaneously, but were rather produced by an active and perpetual 







                                                
mental policy.”9  
While the “Keynesian” ideology of the New Deal has served—and continues to serve—
as the point of opposition and the representation of threat for the discourses of “neo-liberalism
the history of the New Deal arguably already demonstrates a departure from the logic of the 
planned economy and a realignment of the state-economy relationship similar to that descr
by Foucault. Prior to the New Deal, the emergence of the state as the centralized locus of 
political authority within the fragmented federalist system was held in check by capitalist 
interests legitimized by the classical doctrine of the market as natural law. The project of 
economic planning unfolding already under the Hoover administration did not attempt to 
contradict the natural course of the market, but rather to position the state as a centralized 
clearing house, a visibility mechanism, exposing the operation of economic processes and thus 
assuring their general stability and the nullification of risk effects. In contrast, the econom
only made political, in the sense of fully open to manipulation through the techniques of 
“governmentality,” when the project to control it through planning was finally surrendered in the 
later years of the New Deal. At this point, an economy whose vitality depended on its continuous 
exposure to risk was produced, paradoxically, through the perpetual intervention of the state—an 
intervention, finally, that was not oriented to the production of specific effects, of which it coul
never be certain, but to the maintenance of uncertainty and the guarantee of risk. In this sense, 
 










 to invest with the potential for such non-partisan centralized administration in a 
country with a highly localized political system was the nation-state, embodied in the federal 
ent.10 
nesian discovery of money as the aleatory and fictional heart of the economic served to 
sever it from the natural and expose it to the strategies of governing.  
The idea of managed production, like much in the New Deal, was an inheritance of the 
progressive era. It emerged as a response to the reorganization of the economic domain in th
age of “managerial capitalism,” distinguished by the emergence of corporations. Colluding to 
exert influence on prices and the flow of goods, these massive private concerns appeared to 
function outside of the self-correcting mechanism of the free market, whose “invisible hand” was 
supposed to equilibrate the conflicting interests of private economic players. At the same
the scale and complexity of the corporation demanded highly organized forms of administrative
and managerial control. A new cadre of experts emerged to fill this need; guided by the 
techniques of “scientific management” modeled on Newtonian mechanics, and the ideology of 
the firm as a productive machine, impartial corporate managers would organize its functions, 
distributing human and physical elements as parts moving in concert, coordinating “inputs” and 
“outputs” to the objective end of the maximization of profits. While crusading against the abuse
of monopoly power and the speculative excesses of laissez-faire, progressives sought to harness
the organizational power of the corporation to a more comprehensive structure, expanding
model of corporate control to the collective, “society,” or “nation.” The private cartels should, 
they believed, submit to a super-cartel, managed by an oligarchy of disinterested experts, 
dedicated to ensuring efficiency and stability in the operation of the economic whole. The most 
plausible entity
governm
                                                 
10 The concept of “managerial capitalism” was introduced by Alfred D.Chandler, Jr. in The Visible Hand: The 
Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977). See 
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The program of “scientific management” that animated the first decades of the twentieth 
century came to be institutionalized at the federal state level in the 1920s through the efforts of 
Herbert Hoover. As secretary of commerce from 1921 until 1928, and later as president, Hoover 
worked to build an integrated system of rational economic management based on planning 
within individual firms and voluntary coordination among businesses, local governments, and 
welfare groups in the exchange of information and administrative decisions, facilitated by the 
federal government. The state would act in this capacity by establishing structures for the 
creation and circulation of knowledge on the variables affecting the market, such as 
technological innovations, efficiency methods, and investment opportunities. Through a series of 
committees, trade associations, and promotional conferences overseen or expedited by the state, 
relevant information would be gathered and disseminated, transforming the national economy 
into a state-sponsored empirical science, grounding rational decision-making on the part of the 
integrated private and public economic agents that comprise it. Thus the idea of planning as 
cooperative management did not involve direct intervention of the state in economic processes, 
but rather the invention of the nation as an autonomous economic unit, the extension of the 
structural model of the market to the nation as an integrated totality.11  
For the American progressive economists,12 influential in the formulation of government 
policies and setting the tone of current academic orthodoxy in the 1920s and into the 1930s, 
“control” was the password of a new conception of market equilibrium, counterposed to laissez 
                                                                                                                                                             
Oxford University Press, 1979); Richard P. Adelstein, “’The Nation as an Economic Unit’: Keynes, Roosevelt, and 
the Managerial Ideal,” The Journal of American History (June 1991): 160-187. 
also David F. Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (Oxford: 
11 See Adelstein, “’The Nation as an Economic Unit’”; Guy Alchon, The Invisible Hand of Planning: Capitalism, 
Social Science, and the State in the 1920s (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). 
 
12 American progressive era economic theory is identified as “institutional economics,” understood to be the legacy 
of Thorstein Veblen. Among institutionalists active in the New Deal were Rexford Guy Tugwell, Mordecai Ezekiel, 
Wesley C. Mitchell, and Gardiner C. Means. 
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faire as a public policy alternative, but leaving the orthodox theoretical model of the market
the most part untouched. The public agencies they advocated would replicate the power of 
overall coordination in the public interest performed automatically by the free market un
theoretical conditions of perfect competition. In accounting for the disruptive effects of 
administrative centralization in the private sphere, progressive economists did not question the 
self-adjusting and equilibrating function of the classical “invisible hand,” but sought instead to 
make it visible or intelligible by linking probability calculations to the oper
 for 
der the 
ations of control.13 As 
Alvin H
so the growth of 
 in the 
 of 
                                                
ansen wrote in 1932, articulating the orthodox economic position, 
It is not necessary to labor the point that we are living in an era of increasing social control. 
Social control includes not merely government regulation of business, but al
voluntary institutions which substitute conscious and deliberate regulation of our economic life 
for the impersonal and automatic regulative principles of a free market.14   
Planning through the agency of economics as an empirical social science embodied
state meant that the collective of Adam Smith’s economic agents, each of whom selfishly 
“neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it,” would 
simply be induced to acquire both this knowledge and this intention.15 The economic policies
 
13 The classic text that outlines this position is Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property (1932); see also Theodore Rosenof, Economics in the Long Run: The New Deal Theorists and 
Their Legacies, 1933-1993 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 28-43. 
 
14 Alvin Harvey Hansen, Economic Stabilization in an Unbalanced World (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 
1932), 314. My emphasis. 
 
15 The famous passage from the Wealth of Nations reads: “Every individual necessarily labors to render the annual 
revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor 
knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends 
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he 
intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which 
was no part of his intention.” Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776), cited in Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. and Robert 
F. Hébert, A History of Economic Theory and Method, Third Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 101-2. As 
Adelstein puts it, “[Hoover] would use the leverage of the state to encourage a vast, interconnected system of private 
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t years of the New Deal were rooted in this conception of planning inherited from th
 administration. (Figure 13) As Roosevelt announced in 1932, planning would ensur
such balance among productive processes as will tend to a stabilization of the structure of 
performs. Each unit of it must think of itself as part of a greater whole; one piece in a large 
design.”16  
Although the influence of Keynes, a British economist, did not begin to be felt in the 
Roosevelt administration until after the publication of his The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest, and Money in 1936, he had been concerned with the unfolding economic crisis and 
engaged in publicizing his own recovery strategy in America at least since his famous open letter
to Roosevelt, published in The New York Times on December 31, 1933.17 Keynes assaulted
classical model of the self-adjusting economic system, to which American economists remained
tethered.18 Based on a continuous flow of goods, classical economics graphed supply and 
demand schedules, of which wages and prices were functions, along correlated curves, where a
shift in one would cause movement along the other until equilibrium was reestablished. The 
equilibrium system was logically supported by the postulate of the “neutrality of money.” Th
classical economy functioned like a barter economy, where goods were exchanged for goods, 
and money was simply the medium of that exchange, or a “veil” concealing the real flow of 
commodities. According to Keynes, it was this postulate that enabled the theoretical equilib
tion of the market as an intricate arrangement of precisely proportioned interdependent 
variables in constant movement, a Newtonian machinery of calculable causes and effects.  
 
16 Cited in Adelstein, “’The Nation as an Economic Unit,’” 178. 
 
17John Maynard Keynes, “From Keynes to Roosevelt: Our Recovery Plan Assayed,” The New York Times, 31 
December 1933. 
 
18 John Maynard Keynes, “A Self-Adjusting Economic System?” 
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Into this elegant mechanism, Keynes threw a number of wrenches. The flow of go
observed, was in fact interrupted by periodic holding of stocks; the circulation of money was 
thrown off balance by money market speculation; investment decisions were affected by 
expectations of return as much as by interest rates. The common thread uniting all these 
irregularities in market behavior was the idea that economic transactions in the present were 
based on estimations of future losses or profits; thus uncertainty was the structural foundation 
and driving force of the market.
ods, he 
ion 





encourage private investment. “I lay overwhelming emphasis,” Keynes wrote in his open letter to 
 19 The economic system was built on a gamble. This recognit
effectively reversed the mechanical causality model of classical economics, driving the future 
into the pre
nal vitality of the economic system became virtual.20 The figure of this virtuality was 
money, shaken from its “neutrality” and inserted directly into the operations of the productive 
economy.  
In the modern system, Keynes wrote, money was fundamentally a process of the creation 
and extinguishing of debts, regulated by the willingness of economic agents to borrow and lend
(what he called “liquidity preference”). Interfacing between the value of debts, attached to 
expectations of future cash flows, and the purchasing power of credit, money is a “subtle
for linking the present to the future.”21 Keynes’s advocacy of deficit spending by the state was 
based on this hypothesis. Acting like a public bank when private banks dry up, the state
institute “business confidence” in the productive powers of the economy, and therefore 
                                                 
19 See Ekelund and Hébert, History of Economic Theory and Method, 137, 157, 517-527. 
s and Keynes: Their Assault on Laissez Faire,” Journal of 
conomic Issues XXXII, no.4, (December 1998): 1024. 
ymoigne, “Keynes and Commons on 
oney,” Journal of Economic Issues XXXVII, no.3, (September 2003): 534. 
 
20 See Glen Atkinson and Theodore Oleson Jr., “Common
E
 




Roosevelt, “on the increase of national purchasing power resulting from governmental 
expenditure which is financed by loans… .”22 It did not particularly matter what the money was
spent on (“It is beyond my province to
 




a gamble. This was the expression of an economic field traversed and 
destabilized by aleatory strategies and therefore subject to political intervention in the mode of 
contingent techniques. 
                                              
), just that it was spent, that the process of “linking the present to the future” should go
on, animating the economic whole.24  
Like the postulates of American progressive economists, Keynesian macroeconomics 
relied on an expansion of public-private agency to the level of the national whole; but whereas 
“control” implied state manipulation of the structural variables of the national economy tow
market equilibrium, Keynesian “stimulus” was a pure operation, bypassing structural con
The former was focused on the goal of eradicating economic uncertainty through rational 
planning; the latter aimed to hijack the function of uncertainty itself, redirecting it from 
stagnation to growth. “Stimulus” would be a contingent, reactive manipulation of uncertainty 
through the targeted application of the very mechanism of uncertainty—speculation.25 You 
confront a gamble with 
 
   




24 According to Keynes, money by fiat, as merely a token imposed by law, was the contemporary stage in the 
“dematerialization” of money under the impact of the banking system. As such, it was a purely juridical fiction that 
performed the interchange of debt and credit—or had the power to “discharge” debts, in Keynes’s terms. (See 
Tymoigne, “Keynes and Commons on Money.”) This linkage between the declarative and the productive aspects of 
the economy in Keynes is similar to that developed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari on the model of Austin’s 
“performative statements” in their essay “November 20, 1923: Postulates of Linguistics,” in A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 75-110. 
 






2.2 ARCHITECTURAL METHOD   
 
Although Keynes himself did not specify the preferred targets of state spending, the 
circumstances and the already established policies at the end of the 1930s determined that a great 
percentage of it would be materialized in new construction. A move in this direction was already 
predicted in Keynes’s 1933 open letter to Roosevelt. It was illustrated, by contribution of The 
New York Times editors, with a photograph of an urban construction zone under the caption 
“Slum Clearance, a Type of Expenditure Which Mr. Keynes Recommends as the Best Sort of 
Recovery Measure”—misquoting the author, who had in fact suggested no such thing.  (Figure 
14) Under the auspices of economist Alvin Hansen, the “American Keynes” who dominated 
New Deal policy from 1937 on, the Keynesian concept of deficit spending was grounded in the 
historical conditions specific to the United States and itemized into appropriate specific units of 
investment. These would be “community consumption projects, useful public works, and the 
conservation and improvement of human and natural resources”; more specifically:  “good 
public roads, hospital facilities, recreational and cultural facilities,” and, of course, housing.  To 
the Keynesian analysis of the causes of the Depression, Hansen added his theory of “secular 
stagnation,” according to which the end of territorial expansion in America at the start of the 




26 Keynes wrote instead: “It is beyond my province to choose particular objects of expenditure. But preference 
should be given to those which can be made to mature quickly on a large scale, as, for example, the rehabilitation of 
the physical condition of the railroads. The object is to start the ball rolling.” Keynes, “From Keynes to Roosevelt,” 
n.p. 
 
27 Alvin Hansen, “Investment Incentives” in University of Pennsylvania Bicentennial Conference: Studies in 
Economics and Industrial Relations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941), 84.  
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twentieth century necessitated the opening of new “intensive” outlets for investment. Public 
works would spur an “intensive” redevelopment of America’s physical resources, translating into 
Keynesian speculative form this “kind of public expenditure not usually thought of as 












Act of 1934 and the Wagner Act of 1937 were ad hoc measures motivated by the logic of the 
s 
                                              
 to recovery. Under Hansen’s watch, stimulus was equated with new construction through 
ion of public or “community” expenditures. “The development of science and the 
ments of modern ways of living in an urban community,” Hansen wrote, 
entail community consumption expenditures on a scale formerly not dreamed of. … Consumption
enjoy good public roads, hospital facilities, recreational and cultural facilities, without community
expenditures.29 
From the beginning, New Deal discourses had tied building directly into the logic of th
economy; by the late 1930s, the trajectory of state policy had led construction from a role w
planning as a technology of control on the national scale to a position as part of a flexible publ
private investment process. Encouraging capital liquidity and stimulating private investment 
became the preferred approach by the end of the 1930s.30 The other side of stimulus in the 
building industry was the encouragement of private development through shifting investment 
risk to the state. Swayed by powerful real estate lobbies, the two pieces of New Deal legislatio
with the most dramatic and lasting effect on the physical landscape of urban America were 
oriented towards encouraging its private speculative development. Both the National Housin
market rather than elements of a comprehensive plan to order the economy through control of it
   
ard Full Use of Our Resources,” Fortune, November 1942: 162, cited in 
osenof, Economics in the Long Run, 61. 
n, “Investment Incentives,” 84. 
. Knopf, 









physical manifestations in the built environment.31 Buildings functioned more and more as 
fragments of flexible and shifting finance capital and embodiments of state strategies for open-
ended economic intervention. For American architecture, these strategies and their effects were 
not only conditions to grapple with, a set of pragmatic opportunities and constraints; more tha
that, in transfiguring the very products of 
n 









                                                
ture with a new set of meanings. 
Arriving in America in 1937, Gropius emerged immediately and precisely at the hu
these changes in the architectural profession. It may be said that Manfredo Tafuri’s astute 
diagnosis of his “refusal to remain a ‘master’ and… disappearance into the reality of American 
professional life” was prefigured here.32 Through a set of circumstances, Gropius found himself 
allied on arrival to those in the American architectural community advocating a tidal shift in t
practice of architecture and the professional identity of the architect in response to perceived 
socio-economic realities of the 1930s. The curricular reform that Gropius was recruited to help 
carry out at Harvard under the slogan of modernization was one element of this strategy. In fact
it was through such strategies, discernable in a loose assemblage of programs and associations 
pivoting on an identifica
ern architecture. 
The standard narrative of the tremendous success enjoyed by representatives of European
modernism in America—under the paradigm of importation and subsequent victory—obscures 
the complexity of the existing domestic discourse on the meanings of modern architecture d
 
31 The National Housing Act of 1934 encouraged home ownership by enabling government sponsorship of 
dividual mortgages; the Wagner Act of 1937 set the outlines of postwar urban renewal strategy by prioritizing 
 Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, Modern Architecture, vol. 2 (New York: Rizzoli, 1986), 307. See also the 
in
slum clearance to protect inner-city land values.  
 
32
discussion in the Addendum to the Introduction. 
 
 115
and immediately prior to this period.33 Gropius entered a new battlefield of ideas about th
modern, and his initial steps in America appear to have been conditioned by an adequate 
understanding of its contours. His reception of American architectural discourse would hav
been greatly influenced by the contacts he had made prior to arrival. The architect’s initial 
introduction to the American architectural community was during a 1928 research trip sponso
by the Reichsforschungsgesellschaft für Wirtschaftlichkeit im Bauwesen (National Research 
Institute for Efficiency in Building Construction). Among the most significant acquaintances he
made during this trip was Robert L. Davison of the Columbia University Research Institute f
Economic Housing, whose research on “housing materials and methods of construction,” 







ed to find 
al team. 
                                                
34  Davison, who went on to direct housing research for the John B. Pierce 
Foundation, was devoted to advancing prefabrication. At the end of his trip, Gropius met A. 
Lawrence Kocher and introduced him to Davison. At the time, Kocher had just been appointed 
managing editor of the Architectural Record, which he would go on to transform into a leading 
journal for modern architecture; Davison would be one of his early recruits to the editori
In the decade that intervened between Gropius’s first American visit and his permanent 
relocation, both Davison and Kocher actively corresponded with the architect, on at least one 
 
ern 
the narrative of an importation of a more 
r less clear paradigm of modernism from Europe to America. For an overview, see Gwendolyn Wright, USA: 
ls 
nformation on 
ousing research which I had been sent to the United States to obtain.” See also Reginald R. Isaacs, Walter Gropius: 
6-8. 
33 More recent scholarship has pointed out the existence of a vibrant domestic discourse on the meaning of mod
architecture in the 1920s and ‘30s in America, significantly complicating 
o
Modern Architectures in History (London: Reaktion Books, Ltd., 2008). 
 
34 Walter Gropius to Robert L. Davison, 26 May, 1928, Isaacs Papers, AAA, Box 7. “For four weeks I searched 
everywhere in the United States for some person or organization actively interested in research in housing materia
and methods of construction to complement the research work which I started in Germany fifteen years ago. Not 
until I met you and other members of the Research Institute for Economic Housing did I find the i
h
An Illustrated Biography of the Creator of the Bauhaus (Boston: Bulfinch Press, 1991), 14
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documented occasion sending him articles from the Record.35 Both also became active 
promoters of Gropius’s work, and schemed tirelessly for ways to bring him to the United S




val at Harvard was published 
in the A  
most fr
endently to create true, genuine forms out of the technical, 
ula 
onto surroundings which may call for an entirely different solution. It is not so much a ready-
h is 
oseph Hudnut, as dean of the architecture school, was then engaged in developing a new 
modern curriculum.36 Two years later, Hudnut, now at Harvard, followed up on his suggestion. 
Not surprisingly, Gropius’s first original statement upon arri
rchitectural Record; and it was a sally in the American discourse on modernism.37 The
equently cited and most important passage of that text read: 
My intention is not to introduce a so-to-speak cut-and-dried ‘Modern Style’ from Europe, but 
rather to introduce a method of approach which allows one to tackle a problem according to its 
peculiar conditions. I want a young architect to be able to find his way in whatever 
circumstances; I want him indep
economic and social conditions in which he finds himself instead of imposing a learned form
made dogma that I want to teach, but an attitude towards the problems of our generation whic
unbiased, original and elastic.38 
The reference to a “Modern Style” was certainly meant to resonate with the Hitchcock and 
Johnson definition of European avant-garde architecture as an International Style. This well-
publicized interpretation of recent European architecture was at the time already five years old 
and commonly accepted in the professional mainstream. Gropius had a chance to attest to its 
currency and implications at the May 1937 Convention of the American Institute of Architects 
(AIA), where his speech was preceded by that of Everett Meeks, Dean of the Yale School of 
                                                 
35 Walter Gropius to Robert L. Davison, 31 October 1929. Isaacs Papers, AAA, Box 7. 
 
36 See Isaacs, Walter Gropius, 180-182; Margret Kentgens-Craig, The Bauhaus and America: First Contacts, 1919-
1936, trans. Lynette Widder (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 198-200.  
 
37 Another Gropius text was published at the same time in American Architect and Architecture, but it was culled 
from previously published material; whereas the Architectural Record statement was written specifically for the 
occasion. See Walter Gropius, “Education Toward Creative Design,” American Architect and Architecture (May 
1937): 26-30. Compare with Walter Gropius, “Unity Between Art and Technique as the Aim of Public Education in 
Art,” in Year Book of Education (London: Faber and Faber, 1936), 493-527. 
 
38 Walter Gropius, “Architecture at Harvard University,” The Architectural Record (May 1937): 9-10. 
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Architecture, on the “Foreign Influence on Architectural Education in America.” As cited b
Architectural Record, Meeks presented his views on the “gas pipe and cardboard” design of 
German (and French) modernism’s post-WWI “school of the ugly,” acceding to it nevertheles
current “sane point of view towards stylism.”
y the 
s a 





                                                
39 Gropius, “Europe’s leading modernist,” as 
Record reported, “made no direct reference to the style.”40 It was likely the first but certainly not 
the last confrontation Gropius would have with the xenophobic and conservative response to 
modern architecture, and not the last time he w
rm of the “politicization” of European modernism in America is well known; its focus on 
the formal elements of modernism, as synthetically identified by Hitchcock and Johnson, may 
have had some impact on Gropius’s rhetoric. 
But the idea of the modern as a style, present in the architectural mainstream at the ti
did not apply only to European architecture and did not have exclusively negative connot
A more representative diagnosis is offered by Loius LaBeaume in a January 1938 issue of 
Octagon, the official journal of the AIA. “[A] change of orientation,” wrote LaBeaume, “is 
undoubtably [sic] taking place with regard to architectural practice. Many architects are 
approaching such concrete problems as are presented to them, from a new point of view. … [W]e
 
39 Everett Meeks, “Foreign Influence on Architectural Education in America,” speech at the 69th Convention of the 
American Institute of Architects, Boston, MA, cited in “A.I.A. Convenes in Boston in 69th Session,” Architectural 
Record (July 1937): 36. See also Everett Meeks, “Foreign Influences on Architectural Education in America,” The 
Octagon (July 1937): 36-42. 
 
40 “A.I.A. Convenes,” 36.  
 
41 Meeks himself was not necessarily opposed to modernism, and had even invited Gropius to lecture at Yale in 
1935. Nevertheless, he reproduced in this speech elements of the conservative critique that understood modernism as 
a challenge to the academic conventions of beauty. See Meeks, “Foreign Influences.” See also Contemporary 
Architecture: Report on the Symposium Held at the 63rd convention of the AIA in Washingon, DC, May 21-3, 1930, 
introduction by Louis LaBeaume, distributed by the AIA Committee on Education. Meeks was one of the 
participants, with John Galen Howard and C. Howard Walker articulating the conservative position. Cited in Paul 
Louis Bentel, Modernism and Professionalism in American Architecture, 1919-1933 (Ph.D diss., Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 1993), 356-7. 
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are even now witnessing a gradual evolution which, whether based on romantic or classical 
tradition, will modify the architectural scene.” As to “the term ‘modernism,’” he continued, it is 
“an unsatisfactory one,” and is used here as shorthand for “those more revolutionary approach




t manifestations of modern architecture. The language 
used to
statement, Gropius was simply repeating a previous assertion. Already in 1935, he wrote: “The 
42 
Thus the reading of modern architecture associated with the term “style” saw it as a continuous 
development, whether positive or negative, of the Beaux-Arts tradition. It could comfortably 
accommodate associations with the “unorthodox,” “experimental,” even “revolutionary” (or at 
least “more revolutionary”); rejecting the notion of “modern style” did not communicate simply 
that one was a progressive rather than a conservative architect.43 For example, in taking stock of 
the “modern” in 1938, Architectural Forum, an avowedly modernist-leaning journal at the 
also hewed closely to International Style precepts, even while acceding that the term itself is
broad enough” to accommodate the curren
 identify the modern was still one of “functionalism,” “utilitarian purpose,” lack of 
ornament, “consistent architectural expression of [the building’s] purpose,” “acceptance of 
machine forms,” and “simplification.”44  
It would initially appear that in rejecting the notion of “style” in the Architectural Record 
object of the Bauhaus was not to propagate any ‘style,’ system, dogma, formula, or vogue, but 
                                                 
42 Louis LaBeaume, “Looking at 1937” (excerpted from The American Year Book, ed. William M. Schuyler, New 
ork City), The Octagon (January 1938): 7-9. 




the latter part of the 1920s and the early 1930s, both positions in fact fit comfortably within a general Beaux-Arts 
paradigm. Pai, The Portfolio and the Diagram: Architecture, Discourse, and Modernity in America (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), 106-115. 
 
44 “Where is Modern,” Architectural Forum (January 1938): 465-470. 
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simply to exert a revitalizing influence on design.”45 Now, however, “style” was for the first 
time negatively counterposed specifically to “method.” More generally, the impetus to 
standardize or rationalize the design process was prominent at the Bauhaus after 1922. 
Nevertheless, one is hard-pressed to find it expressed positively through the concept of 
“method,” specifically. Gropius would speak, for example, of the need to “implant a clear 





thod of approach.”48 
The ad
                                                
46 On the other hand, he would write that “art rises above all 
methods.”47 Similarly, despite the preoccupation with process, discussed in Chapter One, and t
systematic approach to design education evident in the Bauhaus work of Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, it 
is one of his first statements on behalf of the New Bauhaus in Chicago that gives a clear 
articulation and emphasis to the notion of “method.” “[O]ur concern,” wrote Moholy in the 1937
New Bauhaus catalogue, “is to develop a new type of designer, able to face all kinds of 
requirements, not because he is a prodigy but because he has the right me





the central pedagogical principle at this point for Gropius, was not “method of approach,” but rather the pursuit of 
“the vital spark of life behind life’s ever-changing forms.”  
45 “We did not base our teaching on any preconceived ideas of form,” Gropius continued, “but sought the vit
of life behind life’s ever-changing forms. The Bauhaus was the first institution in the world to dare to embod
principle in a definite curriculum.” Walter Gropius, The New Architecture and the Bauhaus, trans. P. Morton Shand 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1935; reprint, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), 92. Thus, the counterpoint to “style,” and 
 
46 See Walter Gropius, “Recommendations for the Founding of an Educational Institute as an Artistic Counseling 
Service for Industry, the Trades, and the Crafts” (1916), cited in Rainer K. Wick, Teaching at the Bauhaus 
(Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz Verlag, 2000), 73; Walter Gropius, “The Intellectual Basis of the Staatliche Bauhaus in 
Weimar,” translated and reprinted in Hans M. Wingler, The Bauhaus: Weimar, Dessau, Berlin, Chicago 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969),  77. 
 
47 Walter Gropius, “Program of the Staatliche Bauhaus in Weimar,” in Wingler, Bauhaus, 32. 
 
48 Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, New Bauhaus Catalog, 1937, cited in Lara N. Allison, Perception and Pedagogy: Design, 
Advertising and Education in Chicago, c. 1935-1955 (Ph.D. Diss., Columbia University, 2009), 58. 
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In framing his own work in terms of “method,” Gropius was in fact allying himself with a
specific existing discourse on modern architecture—one represented in great part by the venue
which his text appeared, the Architectural Record. It was in this journal that the circuit of ide
linking modernism to the economic was most fully developed by recourse to a concept of 
“method.” By 1937, under the editorship of Kocher, Record had established itself as the le
advocate of modernism. As Hyungmin Pai has shown, from 1928 onward, Record was engaged 
in developing a definition of modern architecture that dislodged it from the channel of forma








 the practice of design to 
conditi
49 Departing from the premise that mass production and “modern technics” were the 
fundamental conditions of modernity, and that they were expressed in all the “useful arts, 
including commerce and industry,” in a new experimental “method” of organizing and applyi
disciplinary knowledge in practice—a new “attitude of mind”—the editors claimed that the 
central problem of modern architecture was how to analogously “adjust”
ons of modern life.50 Technology and the economy were thus conceived no longer as 
problems fundamentally external to architecture, demanding a professional response or an 
                                                 
49 See Pai, Portfolio and the Diagram, 148-159. Pai offers a compelling reading of the distance between this 
modernizing discourse of the 1920s and the rationalization of architectural practice in French academic theory sin
the Enlightenment. (The classic analysis of the latter can be found in Alberto Pérez-Gómez, Architecture and the
Crisis of Modern Science (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983).) In contrast to academic theory, the “cognitive 
project” represented by Architectural Record posited the rationalization of architectural practice as a route to its 
integration into a set of socio-economic conditions that were themselves understood to be rationally constituted: 
“[a]rchitecture could participate directly in capitalist society because it was now perceived… to have an underlying
rational structure. … [C]ause, symptom, and solution were deemed to have the same epistemological structure.” 
Thus, modern “method” articulated architecture’s disciplinary identity no longer through a system of architectural 
representations, but as “a social, economic, and technical discipline.” It is in that sense that the “central task of the 
architect in becoming modern was defined not as an issue of form but as a cognitive and methodological problem.”
Pai, Portfolio and the Diagram, 159. While Pai’s argument has certainly been tremendously suggestive, the inte







economic” as they oriented architectural discourse in the 1930s. More generally, this study resists the logic of 
on. 
itecture,” Architectural Record 66 (January 1929): 65-66.  
“
periodizing historical frameworks, including that of the epistemological shift. See discussion in the Introducti
 
50 Michael A. Mikkelsen, “Two Problems of Arch
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architectural expression, but rather architecture itself was now seen to be coextensive with a 
social sphere understood primarily in technological and economic terms—a recognition that 
demanded a procedural adjustment in the design process.51 (Figure 15) 
In this context, Gropius’s statement reads practically like a Record editorial—with its 
invocation of “method of approach,” an “attitude,” characterized as “unbiased, original and 
elastic,  
Nevert s was not aligned exclusively with 
the Record’s editorial polemic. “Method” was rapidly becoming a widely-used counterpoint to 
the discourse of “modern style.” For example, William Lescaze, contributing with Gropius to the 
“Architecture Section” of the semi-annual progressive journal Twice a Year in 1939, wrote:  
It has been said before. Still, it needs to be said again and again: modern architecture is not just 
 
lculation—based on a rather lengthy reproduction and 
percent rs 
                                                
” that would ground architectural design in “technical, economic and social conditions.” 52
heless, the set of key associations brought up by Gropiu
another architectural style… No great hall, no columns haunt the modern architect… No ready
made pictures clutter his mind, but a method guides him.53  
Further, the closing argument of Lescaze’s polemic against “style architecture” exemplified the 
aspect of this wider discourse on “method” pursued here: its relationship to the economy. 
Lescaze focused his ire on the ca
age allocation of construction industry statistics—that “we have for a number of yea
invested at the rate of approximately 1,500,000,000 dollars per year in heterogeneous ‘style’ 
architecture, from which we have earned no more than an infinitesimal interest.”54 A big part of 
thinking in terms of “method” in the 1930s was being able to conceive of buildings as units in 
the national investment pattern. 
 
51 See Pai, Portfolio and the Diagram, 148-159. 
 
52 Gropius, “Architecture at Harvard,” 9. 
 
53 William Lescaze, “Architecture Today,” Twice a Year 2 (Spring-Summer 1939): 122, 126. Gropius’s contribution 
was called “Training the Architect,” idem, 142-151. 
 
54 Lescaze, “Architecture Today,” 134. 
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During the dramatic expansion of speculative construction in the 1920s, American 
architects had engaged in a collective rethinking of their disciplinary identity in confrontatio
with the new conditions of industrial production. In the first decades of the twentieth century, 
construction industry was expanded and rationalized as part of the corporate reorganization of a
sectors of production. Thus the real estate boom was an artifact of the “managerial revolu
American capitalism, discussed earlier in this chapter, made possible in the articulation of 
buildings as units of finance capital actualized through the coordinated action of corporate 
entities. Architecture had to find its way within a new pattern of working relations within the 
building industry, what Paul Bentel has described as a “horizontal and interdisciplinary matrix 
occupied by engineers, contractors, financial experts, [and] labor representatives, which 
displaced the vertically hierarchical chain of authority formerly surmounted by the ‘artistic’ 










 a plan or 
a design, what an architect now offered to his client was a “service”: sustained expert attention 
                                                
55 Drawing on the model of corporate administration and the ideology o
“scientific management,” architects repositioned themsel
ation of industrial processes and techniques for efficiency in production to the op
of the market. “[M]ore than merely the designer of a building,” as American Architect wrote in 
1929, the architect must be well-versed in such subjects as “economics, real estate values, rental
problems, remodeling problems and methods, the character of materials and their possibilitie
the contacting of clients, the handling of employees.”56  
This meant that the architectural profession was increasingly identified with its 
institutional processes, rather than with its material products. Specifically in contrast to
 
55 Bentel, Modernism and Professionalism, 94. 
 
56 “The ‘New Architecture’ and the New ‘American Architect,’” American Architect 136 (November 1929): 20. 
Cited in Pai, Portfolio and the Diagram, 144.  
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focused on a specific problem, unfolding in predetermined but flexible steps of experienced 










Under this general epigraph, the article went on to a lengthy summary of the financing 
                                              
 reflected a more abstract, theoretical concern with systemic operations of the econom
prefiguring the correlation during the Depression years of the idea of the architect as a 
rationalizing agent of the building industry to the idea of national planning for recovery. (Figure 
16) 
“The depression has made many architects think with a new seriousness about their 
professional position and its relation to the whole sociological and economic present,” wrote 
Talbot Hamlin in 1933, “… the architect is beginning to examine with a new interest and 
point of view the whole economic basis of life. …”57 This concern for the bigger picture, th
holistic social consciousness that characterized architectural discourses of the ‘30s and ‘40s, 
meant in practice a preoccupation with the national economy as an organic unit, the looming ne
problem to be processed and internalized by the profession. The shift
se of the economic during the depression from the logic of production efficiencies, 
construction financing costs, and profit optimization to that of national wealth, taxpayer saving
and income distribution is traceable in architectural journals of the early 1930s, and appears to
have been a fait accompli by the time Gropius arrived in the States.  
For example, an article on “The Minimum Building for Varying Land Values” i
April 1930 Architectural Record opened by stating: “Architecture is not only a matter of good 
floor plans. Rather, these must go together with the appropriate economic solution… It is the 
architect alone who can correlate the economic with the engineering and aesthetic interests.” 
   
57 Talbot Faulkner Hamlin, “The Architect and the Depression,” The Nation 137, no. 3553 (August 9, 1933): 153-4. 
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calculations for a “minimum building,” understood to be a corporate office building that “wi
earn 10% on an equity investment of about 20% of the total cost”—the baseline version, in oth










ined, must now be “remoulded to 
form to
                                                
58 (Figure 17) Just three years later, 
in May 1933, Louis LaBeaume, as Chairman of the new AIA Committee on Public Works, 
reported on his agitation for the involvement of private architectural firms in P.W.A. buildi
projects, based on the argument that “real economies [would] be achieved with resulting savings
to the taxpayer … if businesslike processes and modern practices in the specification of materials
were followed, as in our private practice.”59 The profession was adjusting its accumulated 
expertise in the achievement of “appropriate economic solution[s]” to the national scale. A few 
months later, Elmer Roswell Coburn was prepared to summarize the new general wisdom in th
American Architect: “Events of the past few years have emphasized the folly of considering
architecture as a thing apart from the commerce and industry of the nation…”60 (Figure 18) He
called upon his colleagues to take the “part in the economic structure that the architect should
rightfully occupy,” and assume leadership in finding a solution to problems in the national 
building industry. “[A]rchitectural thought,” Coburn mainta
 the pattern of our industrial life” on the national level,61 rather than being focused as 
 
 376. The famous definition of a skyscraper as a “machine that makes the land pay” was coined by 
e architect Cass Gilbert in his article “The Financial Importance of Rapid Building,” Engineering Record 41 (June 
 Louis LaBeaume, “A.I.A. Public Works Committee Seeks Federal Reforms,” in “How Can Architects Develop 
 Elmer Roswell Coburn, “Economics—The New Basis of Architectural Practice,” American Architect 143 
933): 50. 
58 W. R. Morton Keast and A. B. Randall, “The Minimum Building for Varying Land Values,” Architectural Record 
67 (April 1930):
th
30, 1900): 624. 
 
59





61 Ibid., 53. 
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before on “correlate[ing] the economic with the engineering and aesthetic interests” at th




lace in the discourse and practice of architecture. Under the pressure of 





has always been to shun any formalism and preconceived style idea, but to proceed instead, 
62   
Reproducing National Industrial Conference Board statistics, reporting on the NRA, 
proposing ways to take advantage of new legislation for both public and private cons
lobbying in Washington, architects shadowed the economic recovery discourses and activities of
the federal government, and more importantly, worked to adapt their own practices and 
rationalizations to the perceived effects of governmental activity. In the language of the period, 
architects were actively developing their new “function” within a changing socio-economic 
“system.”63 In the process, the logic of the macroeconomic became operative in the 
transformations taking p
ent to the construction industry in the era of “managerial capitalism,” architect
redefined as a “service” for the coordination and administration of disparate tasks. Architectural
practice was beginning to be expressed in the concept of “method” as a set of techniques for 
application of disciplinary knowledge, in turn linked in the ‘30s to the organism of the national 
economy.  
Moving from the specifics of the individual building to the abstractions of the 
macroeconomic reinforced the pure instrumentality of “method,” its detachment from singu
predetermined goals or outcomes—a point Gropius continued to stress in America, cloaked 
frequently in the language of opposition to “style.” “My own approach,” he wrote in 1958, “
                                                 
62 Keast and Randall, “The Minimum Building,” 376. 
 
63 See for example, Robert D. Kohn, “Planning for Changed Needs,” Architectural Record (April 1933): 294. Kohn 








ing themselves to be more 
adaptable to changing conditions. …”65 In this, Gropius’s “method” paralleled Keynesian 
ul ng investment from 




64 The goal of “method” would be one of giving structural coherence to this 
empiricism of contingent responses: a “unity in diversity” to animate a practice productive of “
wide variety of patterns and designs which are constantly modify
“stim us” that refused to project the specific targets of its agency, dissociati
f contingent responses, linking the present to the future.  
“METHOD” AT THE HARVARD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF DESIGN 
 
“I regard my most impo tar nt task during the next ten years,” wrote Hudnut to Gropius in 
1936,  
to be that of devising a system of architectural education which will be in some ways rationally 
architect in our civilization is undergoing a profound change and I feel deeply the necessity of 
 
related to the changing responsibilities of the architect in this country. … [T]he role of the 
attempting some general revision. I know of no one in the world who could be of greater help to
me in this work than you.66 
Hudnut thus articulated what would become the primary responsibility and preoccupation of his 
new hire as the establishment of a productive linkage between design pedagogy and the shifting 
conditions of professional practice. To further clarify his intentions, Hudnut supplied Gropius 
with reading materials. Among the latter was his own response to a survey on the status of the 
architectural profession, published in American Architect and Architecture, and a Pencil Points 
                                                 
64 Walter Gropius, “The Inner Compass” (1958) in Apollo in the Democracy: The Cultural Obligation of the 
Architect (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 18. 
 
65 Gropius citing John Harkness, his partner at The Architects Collaborative, “The Inner Compass,” 18. 
 
66 Joseph Hudnut to Walter Gropius, 8 December, 1936, Houghton, Folder #925.  
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essay by Constantin A. Pertzoff, “The Teaching of Architecture: Some Notes on Its 
Rationalization.”67 In response to the question “How Is Architectural Practice Changing?” 
Hudnut wrote in American Architect:  
The economic pattern of society is always changing and with it the responsibilities and 
more with communal enterprises; with institutions and industries, with government projects and
town planning, with the housing of civic and rural populations.
opportunities for the professions, including architecture… Architects will be concerned more and 
 
68  
He was mostly reiterating the now familiar discourse that read in macroeconomic terms an 
expansion of architectural work from the private scale of individual buildings to the public-
private scale of national production. In fact, the next question posed by the editors, “How Can 
the Architect Increase His Service to Include More than the 30% He Now Serves?” prefigured 
Hudnut uct of ’s response in reflecting this very expansion in architectural practice as the prod
shifting economic conditions: rethinking architecture away from the luxury services market was 
a central preoccupation since the onset of the Depression.69  
Pertzoff, a Harvard Architecture School alumnus, echoed the by now standard 
observation about the “decline of architecture from its former position of leadership to its present 
state of being almost a useless and irrelevant luxury” and the concomitant “decline of the social 
and economic usefulness of the architect,” and proposed to locate a solution in the reform of 
architectural education. His program pivoted on “method.” To better “adjust [students] to the 
reality of architectural practice,” Pertzoff believed, design problems in schools of architecture 
                                                 
67 “I read your article in the American Architect,” Gropius wrote to Hudnut, “and Mr. Pertzoff’s article in Pencil 
Points… It was very thoughtful to provide these articles as they are most interesting to me. I made some notes which 
I should like to discuss with you in April.” See Walter Gropius to Joseph Hudnut, 24 January 1937, Houghton, 
Folder #925. 
 
68 Joseph Hudnut in “Not of One Mind… Yet with the Single Purpose of Bettering their Profession,” American 
Architect and Architecture 149 (December 1936): 27. 
 




should integrate research into the “function” of a building, understood to encompass “the social 
and economic field a given building serves.” This research, considered part of the formulation of 
the program and to be carried out by students prior to commencing design, would provide the 
fledgling architect with the necessary skills and knowledge to prevent his becoming “a sort of 
exterior decorato[r] ordered about by engineers, sociologists, economists … as seems … to be 
the case with the architects employed by the government.”70 Pertzoff outlined a program by 
means of which changing professional priorities and contingencies could become practical 
determinants of the design process when understood generally as social and economic facts. The 
process of translation between calculable socio-economic contingencies and realized design was 
governed by “method.”  “I believe that it would be unwise and undesirable,” Pertzoff wrote,  
even if it were possible, to force a student to acquire that enormous mass of detailed and unrelated
information that an architect mush possess if he is to practice competently. … More truly in the 
province of an educator lies the teaching of the basic underlying principles and of ha




Lastly, this approach to design was identified with “modern architecture” and “functional 
architecture.”72 
 Pertzoff, and Hudnut by implication, understood educational reform in architecture as an 
intervention in the cognitive processes of design modeled on the new procedural focus reflected 
by the professional discourse of progressive American architecture in its ubiquitous 
preoccu  of pation with “service” and “method.” Gropius absorbed this process-based formulation
the educational program and reiterated it in a 1937 draft of his pedagogic intentions for Harvard: 
ed and 
g his training, it is the method of approach to the problems, rather than the 
                           
As not all practical problems which an architect has to face in his later practice can be studi
memorized durin
                      
 Constantin A. Pertzoff, “The Teaching of Architecture: Some Notes on Its Rationalization,” Pencil Points 




71 Ibid., 541-2. 
 
72 Ibid., 544. 
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solution of them, which the student must learn. In order to fit him for the task of dealing with
starts designing. For only thorough studies of the social, technical and economical factors of hi
problem will enable him to find a creative conception of the functional, spatial and structural 
relationships of a building—a conception which will meet the spiritual and material needs of 
human life.
 any 
sort of scheme, we have to show him how to conduct his own research systematically before he 
s 
73 
This programmatic statement translated the practical curricular reform measures initiated at 
Harvard by Hudnut already in 1935 and continued after Gropius’s arrival. The basic program 
consisted in the administrative integration of the fields of city and regional planning, landscape 
architecture, and architecture under the umbrella of “design”; the modeling of the studio on the 
profess nd ional office; field work requirements with practicing firms and on construction sites; a
an emphasis on including “scientific studies such as economics and sociology” as part of the 
requirements for an architect’s training.74  
An example of the application of this “method” in practice can be seen in the earliest 
problems assigned by Gropius to his master’s studio. A residential development project, assigned 
to a spring semester 1937 studio, required the students to compile a program based on 
collaborative research into “all phases of the problem,” including financing and marketing, and a 
comparison with other developments in the assigned area. Aligned to a formula for calculating a 
6% return for the investor published in Architectural Forum, the program compiled by the 
students included the minimum number of rooms in the overall development, percentages of 
rooms per apartment, average dimensions of rooms, percentages of communal circulation per 
                                                 
73 Walter Gropius, “Suggestions for the Curriculum of an Architect’s Training at Harvard,” manuscript, 1937, 
er 
ofsin, The Struggle for Modernism: Architecture, Landscape Architecture, and 
ity Planning at Harvard (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co, 2002); Jill Pearlman, Inventing American 
Houghton, Folder #18, p.2. The focus on process over rote learning of facts—or “solutions” in this case—was also 
an important element of general educational reform, discussed in Chapter Four. 
 
74 Joseph Hudnut, “Memorandum on the Proposed School of Design,” 14 January 1936, HUA, UAI.5.168, Box 2, 
Folder: “School of Architecture.” For histories of curricular reform at the Harvard Graduate School of Design und
Hudnut and Gropius, see Anthony Al
C
Modernism: Joseph Hudnut, Walter Gropius, and the Bauhaus Legacy at Harvard (Charlottesville and London: 
University of Virginia Press, 2007). 
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total area of each floor, and total cubage of each apartment block.75 The following semester’s 
problem expanded the research phase beyond financing calculations to include “collective 
research into the population, needs and habits of the people, traffic conditions, etc.”76 In this 
way, the economic grounding of the design was already being augmented with the kind of large 
sample statistical data characteristic of later collaborative problems with regional planning and 
landscape architecture students. “Method” was showing its adaptability to the national economy. 
Driven by the logic of financing economies and population analysis, the definition of the 
program, to which a full third of the student’s time was devoted, was a fundamental part of the 
design process as it tightly and specifically circumscribed the basic design solution. The 
conceptual model of the design merged with the professional model of “service” that severed the 
productive process from a product conceived in formal or aesthetic terms—or, in Bentel’s words, 
separated “work and object.”77 A 1941 outline for an exhibition about the GSD, likely drafted by 
Gro of pius, posited this design process as segmented into two stages—the original development 
a “p
h  institution, the corporate civic body—which it is to serve. He will determine 
 the 
facilities. He will study the more fundamental relationships which exist, or might exist, among these. 
rm of a 
attern of ideas” and its subsequent “translat[ion] into a pattern of form:”  
The student begins by an analysis of the purpose of the proposed building in relation to the social 
unit—the family, t e
what is needed for that service and determine also what should be the essential characteristic of
The design exists as a pattern of ideas before it will assume, even in the imagination, the fo
possible building.78 
The interface between the “pattern of ideas” and the “pattern of form” was expressed as a 
moment of relative destabilization, when degrees of empiricism and contingency were 
                                                 
75 Walter Gropius and Holmes Perkins, “An Apartment House Group,” Architecture 4d, April 12-June 5 1937, 
HUA, UAV 322.7.4, Subseries IV, Box 3.   
 
76 Walter Gropius, Marcel Breuer, Holmes Perkins, “Boston Art and Recreational Center,” Architecture 4d, October 
8 1937, HUA, UAV 322.7.4, Subseries IV, Box 3.  
 
77 Bentel, Modernism and Professionalism, 225. 
 
78 “Outline for Exhibition in New York, Third Draft, February 4, 1941,” p.8, Houghton, Folder #43. My italics. 
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introduced into the design process. “The translation of ideas into form,” the draft continued, does 
not unfold merely through logical analysis, but equally through “experiment, … trial and error.” 
Success in the “process of checking and rechecking simultaneously all these relationships [in the 
correlation of program, structure, and space]” depends on the acquisition of design experience 
that allows for “freedom and breadth of thought.”79 But it was equally, on the other hand, a 
matter of mastering “the science of space” (the biological “nature of seeing” and the “problems 
of proportion, scale and rhythm … of light, shade and colors”) and the “science of building” 
(“statics and dynamics, … building materials and structures, … processes of manufacture and 
distribution”).80 Design method was conceived as a set of techniques for negotiating between the 
maintenance of uncertainty and the assertion of control. 
 The articulation of design as a dialectical process, balancing the subjective “originative 
creative power of the individual” with the objective laws or “foundations of creativity,” was a 
key aspect of Gropius’s pedagogical platform already at the Bauhaus.81 A similar negotiation 
between opposing conditions was seen to be fundamental to the design process by Moholy-Nagy. 
“There are,” he would write, for example, “countless cases in which the exact calculation of all 
the functional elements cannot as yet be made… . In every creative work there is a sphere in 
which a certain freedom is left to the artist. The creative problem enters at the point where this 
                                                 




 similarities between Gropius and 
eyer, see Wick, Teaching at the Bauhaus, 78; Barry Bergdoll, “Bauhaus Multiplied: Paradoxes of Architecture 
useum of Modern Art, 2010), 55. 
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80 Ibid., 12-13. 
 
81 Cited and discussed in Wick, Teaching at the Bauhaus, 76. There is also a notable similarity between Gropius’s 
formulation of program and the “functional” approach of Hannes Meyer, who posited already in 1928 that “build
[is] social, technical, economical, psychological organization.” Moreover, Meyer’s definition of the architect as “a
specialist in organization” also echoes Gropius’s idea of the architect as “coordinator.” Hannes Meyer, “Buildi
(1928), translated and reprinted in Wingler, Bauhaus, 154. For discussions of
M
and Design in and After the Bauhaus” in Barry Bergdoll and Leah Dickerman, eds., Bauhaus: Workshops for 
Modernity, 1919-1933 (New York: The M
 
 132
freedom e the  begins… .”82 However, the prior origins of this conception should not obscur
specificity of its relevance and function in a new context. 
The longstanding association between Gropius’s presence at Harvard and the 
modernization of architectural practice and education at mid-century in America, summarized in 
the notion of the “Harvard Bauhaus,” obscures not only the fact that the curricular reform 
platform and the pedagogical philosophy of the GSD were fully formed by the time Gropius 
arrived at the school, but also the extent to which they were in line with attitudes toward 
architectural practice in the profession at large and corresponded to trends in architectural 
education already underway in many parts of the country. The comprehensive scale of 
educational reform carried out at Harvard and the stature of the institution itself may have set its 
program apart, but neither Hudnut nor Gropius should be considered conceptual or strategic 
innovators in this respect. Practically any published report on the status of the architect and 
architecture for a profession that was constantly checking its own pulse during these years 
reveals correspondences to the issues addressed and measures taken at Harvard.  
For example, a September 1936 report on the country’s architectural schools, published 
in the Record, listed the following in its Summary of Recommendations for architectural 
education: the institution of “a well defined and applied knowledge of construction materials, 
processes, and construction methods;” “knowledge of pertinent facts about economics, living 
conditions, building management, building codes and financing;” “practical experience in 
construction in the nature of field work;” provision of “town planning” training for architects.83 
                                                 
 York: 
 
82 Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, The New Vision: From Material to Architecture, trans. Daphne M. Hoffman (New
Brewer, Warren and Putnam, 1932), 54. 
83 “Education of the Architect,” Architectural Record (September 1936): 214. The new GSD curriculum was 
presented on page 212. 
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Immediately preceding this overview of architectural education in the same issue, an article by 
R. L. Duffus reported on the results of an AIA questionnaire on the status of the profession sent 
out in 1934. As a reflection of contemporary professional concerns, it is particularly relevant for 
our purposes because Gropius studied it. The responses summarized by Duffus reflected 
concerns that architectural education should be integrated with “community planning” and “basic 
science;” “conform more closely to the demands of industrialization;” stress “the practice of 
architec re ture, its business and legal side;” include “more engineering and mathematics and mo
economic, political and social training” as well as education in “civic affairs” and “city 
planning.”84 He cited Hudnut’s activities at Harvard and at Columbia as part of a long list of 
programs at other universities moving in this direction.85  
The list suggests that the reforms instituted at Harvard were not forceful innovations 
dedicated to clearing the way for an importation and assimilation of the principles of Bauhaus 
modernism, but rather one specific accretion of indigenous practices within an architectural 
profession in the process of adjusting itself to a transition from an economic order structured 
around industrial technologies, mass production and speculative business practices to one 
increasingly dominated by the public-private products and the organizational patterns of a 
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of the 
red by the Colleges of Architecture and Engineering, and correlating the 
aching of architecture with regional planning and landscape architecture; and a series of similar developments at 
84 R. L. Duffus, “The Architect in a Modern World,” Architectural Record (September 1936): 187. Reprin
notes in pencil on the margins in Houghton, Folder # 29. 
 
85 The list included the reorganization of the New York University College of Fine Arts as the College of 
Architecture and Allied Arts, including courses in construction, low-cost housing, and community planning; the 
integration of architectural education with professional practice at the College of Engineering and Commerce 
University of Cincinnati (underlined by Gropius in his copy of the article); the adoption at the Princeton School of 
Architecture of a “viewpoint of architecture as a social art,” including experience at the building site and “analysis 
and research [into] the reasons for the program, social, economical or psychological;” the course in Regional 
Planning at Cornell University, co-sponso
te
the University of Illinois, Michigan, M.I.T., University of Oregon, University of Minnesota, and the Carnegie 
Institute of Technology. Ibid., 187-191.  
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managed economy.86 The new prominence of the public sector was reflected in the expansion of 
requisite disciplinary competences to include such characteristic elements of state bureaucracy as 
legislation, the political process, social sciences, and civic planning techniques; and it was also 
reflected discursively in a new imperative to redefine the architect’s social position and 
communal consciousness.  
As a European “master” who had already defined himself through published statements 
of general philosophy as well as built work, Gropius was well-placed, and perhaps predisposed, 
to enter into this new discourse. The sheer number of articles and speeches published during his 
first years in the United States testifies to the fact that Gropius was determined to make his mark 
discursively even as he actively pursued architectural commissions. His notes on the Duffus 
article reflect this orientation. In the middle of the list of activities taking place at architectural 
schools across the country mentioned above, Gropius scrawled across the margin: “towards the 
bigger and better in the spiritual not only in the material sense of the words.” A few pages 
earlier, he had underlined the following statement: “There is a job for the architect to do. … He 
will not succeed if he is trained to imitate and to obey. He must force building into the mold of 
his it own time. He must make it express the aspirations of a whole people. He must build into 
justice, democracy, truth.”87 Similar sentiments were expressed in a 1939 manuscript of 
Gro
ll create through his work an 
original, constructive expression of the spiritual and material needs of human life, thus renewing the 
human spirit instead of rehearsing the thought and action of former times; he should act as a 
coordinating organizer of broadest experience, who, starting out from social conceptions of life, 
                                                
pius’s own article “Training the Architect,” eventually published in Twice a Year:  
The architect of the future should be the man of new vision who wi
 
86 As Alofsin indicates, some of the reforms at Harvard were already underway in 1932-33, before the beginning of 
ee Alofsin, Struggle for Modernism, 94-95. Hudnut’s tenure. S
 




organic relationships.  
ceeds in integrating all social, formal and technical problems of our time into new forms of 
88
On the margins of the above passage, Gropius noted: “Duffus.”  
 The published version of the above passage excluded the words “man of new vision” and 
cut down “new forms of organic relationships” to just “organic relationships.”89 In clearing the 
text of this residue of Weimar-era discourse, Gropius was also performing another displacement. 
While Duffus understood the imperatives of the architect in the terms of “molding” and 
“expressing” a certain content in built form, Gropius focused on the figure of the architect as 
such and the architect’s social role. This displacement, and the accompanying figure of the 
architect as organizer, became a permanent element in Gropius’s ideology, whether in the 
context of a pedagogical program or in reflections of general philosophy. The specific 
articulation of form—its generation, quality, content, and meaning—was replaced with a general 
insistence on “creativity”; or the insistence on the insertion in the process of design of an 
exercise of creativity, a quality that could not be taught, which meant that its products could not 
be identified or prefigured.90 Parallel to this, the new focus would be on the designer—his 
relationship to his own activities in the work process, the regulation of his professional 
capabilities, and his structural position in society—conceived as the site for an open-ended, 
ongoing, and self-generating exercise of techniques.  
 In turn, the conception of the designer as a conduit for strategic processes and 
relationships was the correlate of an emphasis on the collaborative organization of practice. In its 
mature form, Gropius’s notion of the architect-organizer would read: “If [the architect of the 
                                                 
88 Walter Gropius, “Training the Architect,” manuscript, Cambridge 1939, p.2, Houghton, Folder #29. 
 
89 Walter Gropius, “Training the Architect,” Twice a Year 2 (Spring-Summer 1939): 143. 
 
90 For example: “Intellectual art is sterile, and no work of art can be greater than its creator. The intuitive directness, 
the short cut of the brilliant mind, is ever needed to create profound art.” Walter Gropius, “Is There a Science of 
Design?” in Walter Gropius, The Scope of Total Architecture (New York: Collier Books, 1943), 43. 
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future] will build up a closely co-operating team together with the engineer, the scientist and the 
builder, then design, construction and economy may again become an entity—a fusion of art, 
science and business.”91 This formulation was an outgrowth of Weimar-era concerns with the 
role played by the division of labor in the organization of industrial production.92 Following the 
Taylorist conception of factory organization as a division between the intellectual work of 
management and the manual work of production, Gropius then bemoaned the reduction of the 
craftsman or artisan to the role of “an organ for carrying into effect the platonic ideas of others. 
…”93 The primary danger was the “compulsory restriction of personal initiative” in the denial of 
access to “independent, speculative” work; the strategic solution, to merge the figure of the 
designer with that of the Taylorist manager through training oriented towards giving the former 
access to the expertise and methodology of the latter.94 At the Bauhaus, the ultimate goal of this 
training would still be “the creation of the generally valid type, the development towards a 
standard,”95 but the stakes were already articulated not in terms of control over the form of the 
final product, but in terms of the ongoing possibility, newly threatened, for the exercise of 
professional agency.  
 In America, the preoccupation with “type” or “standard” was decisively abandoned, its 
vestiges worked through in a few aborted efforts at prefabrication. (The history of the short-lived 
                                                 
91 Walter Gropius, “Gropius Appraises Today’s Architect,” Architectural Forum (May 1952), reprinted in Scope of 
Total Architecture, 74. 
 
92 See discussion in Chapter One of this dissertation; for another discussion of Gropius’s efforts to advance the role 
of the architect in the organization of industrial production, see Walter Scheiffele, Bauhaus, Junkers, 
Sozialdemokratie: Ein Kraftfeld der Moderne (Berlin: Form + Zweck Verlag, 2003). 
 
93 Walter Gropius, “Education Toward Creative Design,” 27. 
 
94 Walter Gropius, “Unity Between Art and Technique as the Aim of Public Education in Art,” The Year Book of 
Education (London, 1936), 496-497. 
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General Panel Corporation, founded by Gropius with Konrad Wachsmann, is instructive here for 
the tepid interest Gropius exhibited in his partner’s fanatical pursuit of the universal “jig,” the 
basic structural element and the key to standardization.96) Instead, it was the agency of the 
architect within a social world structured as a set of productive techniques and organizational 
relationships that continued to preoccupy Gropius for the rest of his American career. The 
“method of approach” was a closure to the project of 1920s revolutionary technocracy that 
wanted to proceed from the government of men to the administration of things. The society 
emerging in postwar America focused its anxieties on the practices of men. 
                                                 
96 See Gilbert Herbert, The Dream of the Factory-Made House: Walter Gropius and Konrad Wachsmann 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984). 
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“[T]he remote repercussion of [the bombs falling on England] is strongly felt,” wrote 
Architectural Record editor Douglas Haskell in March 1943. “It blew apart a whole peaceful 
group of charming somnolent Classical Revival towns on the seacoast of Virginia, replacing 
them with muck, smell, and claptrap. It made urban centers out of Wichita, Kansas, and Corpus 
Christi, Texas [and] pushed the Alcan Highway into the Alaska wilderness… .”1 (Figure 19) In 
America, total war was fought at a distance, through massive population migrations that altered 
national demographics and the physical landscape of the country to produce the weapons 
exploding on the homefronts of Europe and Asia. Fifteen million people travelled in search of 
wartime employment in existing industrial plants converted for defense production and new ones 
strategically scattered across the vast open spaces of the American continent away from 
vulnerable coastlines. Entire new towns, built with extraordinary speed, commonly for as many 
as 50,000 inhabitants, sprung up on these remote plateaus to accommodate the migration. (Figure 
20)  
                                                 
1 Douglas Haskell, “Britain’s Plans are Bold,” Architectural Record (March 1943): 49. 
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For Alvin Hansen, the preeminent American Keynesian economist and federal 
government consultant, the war experience appeared to prove what was already theoretically 
considered during the closing years of the New Deal—that, with the right policy of state 
intervention, the economy could be oriented toward unlimited growth. But mobilization also 
brought out in a dramatic fashion the investment in the development and redevelopment of the 
land latent to that hypothesis. Already in 1938, Hansen had tied the logic of stimulus to a version 
of the frontier thesis.2 The original dynamism of the American economy was catalyzed by 
territorial expansion; to avoid stagnation, a new frontier now had to be reopened to investment—
space that could no longer be conquered by extension had to be re-conquered “intensively.” If 
before the war, public works more generally were the answer, during the war, Hansen began to 
speak of building and rebuilding cities. The Fortune article was another entry in his campaign to 
promote a plan for postwar economic “reconversion,” developed together with fellow economist 
and Federal Reserve Board housing consultant Guy Greer, centered on a radical federally-
sponsored reshaping of the nation’s urban fabric. Their ideas were first outlined in 1941, with the 
publication of a booklet Urban Redevelopment and Housing—a Plan for Post-War. In 1943, they 
drafted a “Federal Urban Redevelopment Act,” which ended up voted down in the Senate.3 The 
year before, they had presented their case at an urbanism conference at Harvard, where Hansen 
was Professor of Political Economy at the Littauer School of Public Administration. Together 
with MIT city planning professor Frederick Adams and Littauer’s Morris Lambie, Gropius, 
                                                 
2 See Alvin H. Hansen, Full Recovery or Stagnation? (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1938). See also Rosenof, 
Economics in the Long Run, 53-65. 
 
3 See Mark I. Gelfand, A Nation of Cities: The Federal Government and Urban America, 1933-1965 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1975): 118-131. 
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Hudnut, and Martin Wagner joined the conference organizing committee, chaired by Hansen 
himself. 
Throughout the years 1940-1943, the Graduate School of Design was engaged in 
planning curricular reforms that focused on the role of city and regional planning within the 
School. At issue was the question of whether city planning should be properly affiliated with 
architecture or with public administration, and the attendant logistical problem of whether the 
administrative responsibility for it should be transferred from the GSD to Littauer. In that prosaic 
guise, a fierce battle unfolded at Harvard, with stakes to control the development of a 
disciplinary knowledge that promised, throughout the decade of the 1940s, to have strategic 
significance in the life of the nation—at war and at peace. Under the lead of Hudnut and 
Gropius, city planning was officially retained within the set of expertise comprising design—but 
at the cost of redefining “design” itself from the planning and arrangement of freestanding 
structures to a structured intervention within a social, economic, and physical “civic pattern.” 
The GSD solution became paradigmatic for the postwar linkage between the professional 
competences of architecture and planning; a pedagogical blueprint published under its auspices 
in 1943, John Gaus’s The Graduate School of Design and the Education of Planners, was so 
influential as to become a classic of planning education; and both Hudnut and Gropius 
established themselves as respected voices on city planning. 4 With the 1940-43 GSD events at 
its center, this chapter addresses the city planning initiatives of Gropius and Martin Wagner in 
                                                 
4 John Merriman Gaus, The Graduate School of Design and the Education of Planners: A Report (Harvard 
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the 1940s as part of architecture’s confrontation with a critical new problem of the “planning 
function.” 
 
3.1 ARCHITECTURE OF THE “ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION” 
 
The events at the GSD made clear that the issues of planning in the ‘40s were linked to 
questions not only of the professional identity of the architect, but also the social agency of 
architecture.5 On the one hand, city planning was moving away from architecture and beginning 
to be explicitly articulated as a practice of governing, rather than the organization of the physical 
characteristics of urban space. On the other hand, the demographic upheaval of war mobilization 
revealed to the aspiring strategists of post-New Deal governmentality the role of physical 
conditions and organization—the physical pattern—of settled land in what Greer called at 
Harvard the “gigantic task of reconstructing our society.”6 And thus, in the 1940s, it was 
architectural agency in its conventional definition as the skillful shaping of built form that was 
ushered for a time into the center of the politics of knowledge, linked to the techniques of 
governing.  
The operative logic of that politics, already sketched out in the development of New Deal 
planning for economic recovery, was the proposition of an instrumental knowledge 
                                                 
5 Andrew Shanken discusses the wartime shift to “planning” as an architectural paradigm as “part of a larger history 
of professional insecurity.” Because architectural knowledge has always occupied a shifting territory of expertise, 
among art, engineering, and planning, architects tend to “consistently hybridize professional archetypes in their self-
representations.” See Andrew Michael Shanken, From Total war to Total Living: American Architecture and the 
Culture of Planning, 1939-194X (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999), 20-21; see also Andrew Michael 
Shanken, 194X: Architecture, Planning, and Consumer Culture on the American Home Front (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2009). Shanken traces a diffuse and overdetermined “culture of planning” that 
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6 Guy Greer, “Post-Conference Reflections” in Greer (ed.) The Problem of the Cities and Towns: Report of the 
Conference on Urbanism, Harvard University, March 5-6, 1942 (Cambridge, MA, 1942): 94. 
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programmatically self-limiting in its applications. The discourse of city planning posited the 
problem in these terms: How to plan flexibly? How to offer a comprehensive blueprint that 
would not constrain? How to “so manage our affairs,” in the words of Hansen and Greer, that 
“the essentials of our institutions, freedom of the individual and freedom of enterprise, shall be 
preserved and strengthened as well?”7 The task of planning knowledge would be to discover and 
to implement within the urban fabric not only the perfect balance, but a symbiosis of freedom 
and control. “Building must work to a plan,” concluded the Architectural Forum in its 1941 issue 
on “Building’s Post-War Pattern”: “each building to its neighborhood, each neighborhood to its 
community, each community to its region—and ultimately each region to the nation.” But this 
plan would have to be “dynamic rather than static, … promot[ing] change [and] capable of 
change itself,” a “firm foundation for progress—flexible enough for all contingencies.”8 
Architects set about preparing for their new role in administering that plan so emphatically not 
set in stone.  
“[This] is the nature of the architect’s work today,” wrote the Architectural Record in 
1941, “to organize—organize more precisely, more comprehensively, more flexibly….”9 The 
preoccupation with processes of planning and organization on the part of the architectural 
profession around the nexus of WWII was, in fact, continuous with the redefinition of 
architectural knowledge ongoing since the New Deal. But mobilization imposed new and 
pressing contingencies. With civilian production and commercial construction severely curtailed 
by federal decree in 1942, it became increasingly apparent to architects that, as the Record put it, 
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“Uncle Sam [was], directly or indirectly, the sole surviving client.”10 And what Uncle Sam 
looked for was so-called “integrated services”—firms organized to reflect a comprehensive set of 
specialized skills in design, engineering, and site planning (“a complete package of architectural 
and engineering abilities”11), equipped with sufficient personnel and an established procedure for 
rapidly executing large-scale, complex projects. (Figure 21) The prototype for this kind of 
organization was found in industrial architecture; the most commonly invoked paradigm—the 
firm of Albert Kahn, Inc., in practice since the turn of the century and at the outset of the war 
employing 400 people, with 800 million dollars worth of construction to its record.12 Or, for 
example, the firm of Smith, Hinchman & Grylls, profiled in the December 1942 Forum, 
established in the 1890s, specializing in schools and universities and industrial work, then in 
office buildings in the 1920s, and now small arms ammunition plants, for which it had produced 
1,000 buildings by 1942, having grown to 1,200 people. (Figure 22) “The secret of the 
organization’s success,” wrote Forum,  
lies… chiefly in the organization itself. Its core is a tightly integrated group of highly competent 
professionals whose fields run from architectural design to chemical engineering, from machine 
layout to site planning. With this permanent core, and with an extremely carefully worked out office 
procedure, such an office can expand to any required size [and] handle virtually any type of building 
operation. Here we have a prototype of a professional organization built to the scale of vast war and 
postwar responsibilities.13  
Flexibility was key to the successful large organization, founded on a basic procedure capable of 
quickly adapting to unforeseen contingencies of scale or program. 
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The distinct wartime advantage of such firms made their organization structures and 
operational techniques the focus of professional attention as smaller offices began to consolidate 
en masse into partnerships in search of defense commissions. The new buzzword, however, was 
not so much collaboration as “coordination.” Military contracts required a hierarchical 
organization, with a “responsible head who [could] cut through discussion and settle matters 
expeditiously,” Record advised.14 Architects were encouraged, therefore, not only to engage in 
inter-professional teamwork, but to take its leadership—which entailed them becoming, in the 
words of Edwin Bergstrom, A.I.A. President ca.1941, “Coordinating Administrators,” skilled in 
“bring[ing] together other technical professions with financiers, builders, and labor in a 
cooperative procedure for every project.”15 The symbolic site of architectural practice was 
shifting from the drafting table to the conference table: “Architecture today,” observed the 
Record, “is wise heads around a table.” (Figure 23) Authority in a heterogeneous team was a 
function of comprehensive understanding. “The leader at the table,” the Record went on, “would 
be the man with the widest range of comprehension regardless of his title.”16 If the architect was 
to claim this kind of administrative leadership he had to become familiar with the dispersed 
“factors and functions” animating the new political-economic “pattern,” to be able to discern 
within it the workings of an uncertain, and always potentially elusive, “plan.” (Figure 24) 
The concepts of “planning” and “administration” that oriented architectural reflection 
during WWII had a specific genealogy, originating in the conjunction between the regulatory 
state and the methods and practices of city planning. Traditionally affiliated with architecture and 
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landscape architecture—with monumental public structures and master plans—city planning 
moved during the 1920s to the front lines of the progressive movement for the rationalization of 
the laissez faire economy. It became associated with techniques of municipal administration 
based on the city reconceived as a system of interacting heterogeneous functional processes 
integrating labor, industry, housing, recreation, transportation, and services. Through planning 
this City Functional, governmental agents would harmonize the competing interests of individual 
capitalists in the interest of the system as a whole, securing the value of investments and 
improving industrial productivity. The theory of state economic planning thus emerged 
concomitantly with that of the city as a system of productive interdependencies. Under the 
Hoover administration (1929-1933), planning was shifted from the local to the national level, 
where it was institutionalized through cooperative committees and centralized data collection.17  
The early years of the New Deal elaborated this relationship between methods for the 
administration of the urban fabric and the project of economic planning. One of President 
Roosevelt’s first acts upon entering office was to set up a National Land Use Planning 
Committee, which included American City Planning Institute members Alfred Bettman, Jacob 
Crane, Frederic A. Delano, Charles Eliot II, and John Nolen. Their recommendations led to the 
establishment in 1933 of the National Planning Board to help coordinate the activities of the 
Public Works Administration (PWA). The NPB progressed under various titles during its ten 
year existence—the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB) is the last and best known—to 
become the policy heart of the federal government’s philosophy of national economic recovery 
planning. Employing Delano as chair and Eliot as staff director, and by 1939 part of the White 
House Executive Office, the NRPB elevated city and regional planning to the status of what Alan 
                                                 
17 See M. Christine Boyer, Dreaming the Rational City: the Myth of American City Planning (Cambridge: MIT 
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Brinkley has called “microcosmic models for a larger concept of a planned society [in which the] 
federal government, through a combination of public investment, public welfare, and extensive 
regulation, could become a major actor in the workings of the national economy.”18 The analogy 
between city planning, linked historically to architecture, and the economy as an abstract 
functional order subject to rational manipulation, was tangibly manifested during the New Deal 
in PWA building projects, such at the Tennessee Valley Authority and the new towns of the 
Resettlement Administration. It also held the promise of a central role for the profession at the 
national command centers, as The American City Magazine eagerly forecast in its description of 
the NPB members as “architects building a habitation for a new social order.”19 
Significantly, it was also the NRPB that best reflected the transition, during the late years 
of the New Deal and war mobilization, from the concept of planning as state regulation of the 
economy to the Keynesian model characterized by ongoing flexible and reactive state 
interventions, primarily through fiscal policy (taxation and public spending), dedicated to the 
maintenance of economic growth and full employment. This transition was registered in the 
simultaneous release in 1943 of two NRPB publications that charted the outlines of postwar 
economic planning: Security, Work, and Relief Policies and After the War—Full Employment. 
Social security was thereby implicitly joined to the promotion of economic growth through free 
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enterprise, establishing the link between security and freedom articulated the following year in 
Roosevelt’s “Second Bill of Rights”—widely perceived to have been inspired by the NRPB 
reports. The President’s January 1944 State of the Union address may be considered to be the 
founding document of postwar American liberalism. The speech bound the social promise of the 
New Deal—“security and prosperity for all, regardless of station, race, or creed”—to the 
Keynesian solution of full employment through perpetually-increasing productivity. “[T]rue 
individual freedom,” Roosevelt declared, “cannot exist without economic security and 
independence.”20 The NRPB expressed this logic in the terms of planning. Whereas previously, 
“planning” implied the development of a comprehensive system for the distribution of national 
resources, within which public projects were lodged as segments of a projected total 
environmental reconstruction, the new vision of “planning” involved compiling a “reserve” or 
“shelf” of potential public works upon which the government could draw, “at a moment’s 
notice,” whenever a need for compensatory spending should arise.21  
Professional city planning, in turn, adapted to the new conception of economic planning. 
It would now have to be divorced from the outline of specific objectives in the blueprint or 
master plan and refigured as an ongoing permanent process—an “administrative function,” as it 
was defined in Robert Walker’s The Planning Function in Urban Government (1941). “[C]ity 
planning cannot reasonably stop with mapping the physical features of a possible future city,” 
wrote Walker. “Functions and activities, as well as land areas, can be planned.” 22 No longer 
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concerned with the development and implementation of a rational design, the planning of 
functions would rather approach any design as tentative, “an ever changing thing.”23 It would be 
an ongoing “participation in the solution of problems as they arise,” a “continuous study and re-
examination of the elements of the plan in terms of the decisions which political leaders and 
administrators must make in their daily work.”24 Installed as a subsidiary of the executive 
branch, this kind of operational planning would be modeled on the military “general staff,” 
“whose function it is to assist and advise the commanding officer but not to command in its own 
right.” Analogously, the new strategic planning assigned itself the task “to study administrative 
problems, to advise, to observe, but not to act.”25 In this way, the freedom of action would be 
assured to private enterprise. The plan, as the Record instructed architects, would be a “constant 
activity of projection into the future” of a state of security for ongoing private investment, a 
“constant adjustment of the framework within which private enterprise remains free to make 
decisions.”26 And the architect, as strategist-planner of the “administrative function,” would 
gather “wise heads” around his drafting table to mull over designs of programmatically delimited 
efficacy. (Figure 25) 
 
3.2 THE “PHYSICAL PLANNING” PROBLEM AT THE GSD 
 
In 1936, the GSD Official Register had this to say on the subject of planning, which 
comprised, together with architecture and landscape architecture, the threefold complex of the 
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school: “Regional planning is comparatively new as a profession and the number of men who are 
adequately trained to practice it is very small.”27 In the Official Register of the following year, 
the opening sentence had been changed, to end with “the number of men who are adequately 
trained to practice it is much smaller than the present demand.”28 Coinciding with Gropius’s 
arrival at the GSD, the discipline of planning and its administration slowly began to take center 
stage at the school. Planning education entered Harvard in 1929, with the founding there of the 
first School of City Planning in America. The School was established with a seven year grant 
from the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Memorial Foundation and a Charles Dyer Norton endowed 
chair in regional planning, given to professor of landscape architecture Henry Hubbard. Under 
Hubbard, the School suffered from chronically low enrollments and, after the initial Rockefeller 
grant ran out, serious budgetary shortfalls. It was rescued from potential closing in 1936-37, 
when it was incorporated into the new School of Design as the Department of Regional 
Planning.29 Three years later, in 1940, the new Dean started a campaign to reduce the influence 
of Hubbard and restructure GSD planning education. After Hubbard’s resignation in 1941, the 
School embarked on a curricular reform in city and regional planning that was concluded in 
1943. 
Scholars have tended to interpret the episode as an example of Hudnut’s commitment to 
modern architecture (and his privileging of Gropius’s vision) at the expense of city planning and 
landscape architecture.30 Therefore, the personal and political relationships among the three 
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players in these events—Hudnut, Hubbard, and Gropius—have been adequately mapped out, and 
have certainly been important.31 However, the clarity of personal alliances and rifts in this case 
did not translate into ideological clarity. It is impossible to say that Hubbard was on the side of 
planning, while Hudnut and Gropius were on the side of architecture: both “architecture” and 
“planning” were in transition, marked by strategic uncertainty. At issue was an instability in the 
disciplinary meaning of planning, specifically the role to be played in it by “physical planning.” 
At stake was the relationship of architecture to planning—a relationship Hudnut and Gropius 
saw as both newly threatened and newly important, and which they attempted to secure around a 
new concept of “design.”  
The 1928 Columbia University conference on city and regional planning that led to the 
establishment of the Harvard School of City Planning in 1929 already set the outlines of the 
problem. While the organizers affirmed the essential interdisciplinary nature of city planning—
drawing on “several arts and sciences,” with architecture listed alongside political economy, 
sociology, physical geography, and “the science of government”—they nevertheless asserted that 
the “city planner must be… trained to design the materials and objects which go to make up the 
physical environment of the community—ground forms and vegetation, buildings and structures 
of all kinds.” Therefore, the conference concluded, “even though it may be impracticable for any 
one man to be a master of all the aspects of city planning, a city planner should be a master of 
one, at least, which provides training in design.”32 By 1936, the issue had become more 
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32 Report of Conference on a Project for Research and Instruction in City and Regional Planning (New York: 
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complex. After 1934-35, the School of City Planning was renamed the School of City and 
Regional Planning. During the negotiations about the fate of the School of City Planning that 
followed Hudnut’s arrival at Harvard, the term “physical planning” was introduced as a special 
domain or sub-field—rather than the general requirement—of planning competence. Hubbard’s 
1935 memo to Harvard president James B. Conant, summarizing future policy proposals, 
clarified the new position: 
The School of City Planning has always conceived of its task [as] the improvement of the 
relationships among men and the relationships between men and their environment. … Social and 
governmental relations are primarily of the first kind. Economic relations are almost always of both 
kinds. The relations striven for by the engineer, the architect, and the landscape architect are primarily 
of the second kind. … The School of City Planning has considered that it must restrict its job… to the 
specific knowledge and processes and technique of planning the improvement of man’s physical 
environment… .33 
 For his part, Hudnut outlined in 1936 a proposal that foregrounded the idea of “regional 
planning.” Since regional planning dealt primarily with the formulation of policy and economic 
and social issues, rather than “design,” Hudnut wrote to Conant, it should be put under the 
jurisdiction of the newly established Littauer School of Public Administration.34 Hudnut was 
probably making a distinction here between regional planning and city planning, as his 
concurrent plans for the new School of Design included the latter, but made no mention of the 
former.35  Nevertheless, when Hubbard’s division—titled after 1934-35 the School of City and 
Regional Planning—would eventually be merged into the School of Design in 1937-38, it would 
be called the Department of Regional Planning. The contradictions were such that Hubbard 
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found it necessary to emphasize in a memo to Conant that—at least at Harvard, it would 
appear—regional planning is “thought of as ‘physical planning.’”36 Evidently, the issue of the 
relationships among planning administration, “physical planning,” and design was the real point 
of irresolution—and on that point no clear sides had yet been taken.  
By the end of 1939, what Conant called “a series of long discussions on the future of 
regional planning” was once more underway.37 By now, Hudnut appears to have changed his 
mind on the subject, and conveyed to Conant the outline of a new position taking shape:  
Professor Gropius believes—and I am in accord with him—that the teaching of regional planning 
should be closely integrated with the teaching of architecture. … Professor Hubbard, as you know, 
has organized our Department of Regional Planning upon [the principle that regional planning is a 
profession wholly divorced from architecture.] Professor Gropius and I believe that this principle 
leads to an unfortunate separation in a situation where unification is most desirable. However 
different may be the professional responsibilities and techniques in regional planning and in 
architecture, the two demand for success habits of vision and of thought which are substantially 
identical.38 
For his part, Hubbard posited “the economic and governmental side” of planning as the argument 
against the linkage of planning to architecture: 
The work [of regional planning] should not at once pretend to be more than some sort of setup which 
is small, reasonably unified within itself, practically useful… relatively easy to explain and to teach in 
essentials with a small staff. ... Such a setup can be found in “physical” regional planning. … Note 
however that as a basic regional planning idea which is implicit in many fields… we cannot choose 
esthetics. … Those who say that all design of man’s environment is architecture, that regional 
planning is therefore architecture, and that thus the architect, as such, is the best regional planner, are 
carrying a dictionary definition into practical politics.39 
This sharpening of differences brought the key issues into focus. Hubbard believed that the 
foundation of regional planning was in “physical” planning, consisting of a set of techniques that 
were not aesthetic in nature, and therefore not fundamentally architectural. Hudnut and Gropius, 
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on the other hand, proposed that at the heart of planning lay “habits of vision and thought,” 
shared with architecture regardless of any difference in techniques. To them, the distinction 
between aesthetic and polico-economic expertise was not essential. The crucial philosophical 
difference was rather that between a set of specifically-defined skills, on the one hand, and 
overall patterns or processes of practice, on the other. To understand those differences requires a 
detour outside of the Harvard archive.   
 
 In a 1932 issue of the journal City Planning, Hubbard and co-author Howard K. 
Menhinick outlined a definition of “city planning as a professional career.” “[A] city plan,” the 
authors wrote, “is the official record of the will of the community as to the use of the physical 
areas which it controls.”40 The city planner was the technician of that record—someone with the 
capabilities to produce it as a “workable scheme,” to record it “in words or on plans so that it 
may be carried out.”41 The Harvard city planning curriculum, the authors explained, was based 
on that general premise. Therefore, it consisted of a study of the “techniques” necessary to 
exercise control of a delimited physical area—land, buildings, and infrastructure: the techniques 
of architecture (“elementary drafting,” “theory of design,” “materials and methods of building 
construction”), of civil engineering (“water supply and sewerage”), of landscape architecture 
(“trees and shrubs used in municipal planting”), of financing (“capital improvement budgets”), 
and of legislation (“zoning ordinances,” “municipal administration”). Problems in the application 
of those techniques consisted of such units of urban organization as “thoroughfare systems, 
public open spaces, zoning, land subdivision, civic centers, transit systems, railroads, ports, 
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airports, and so on,” culminating in the preparation of plans for “an ideal town.”42 Such issues in 
the application of regulatory techniques to physical areas were also addressed in the series of 
research publications overseen by Hubbard, comprising the Harvard City Planning series: 
Airports, Their Location, Administration, and Legal Basis; Building Height, Bulk and Form; 
Neighborhoods of Small Homes: Economic Density of Low-Cost Housing in America and 
England; etc.43 That was the content of “physical planning” as Hubbard understood it. 
 Hubbard was a practitioner of a planning conception variously identified (to distinguish it 
from the earlier City Beautiful movement) as City Practical, City Functional, or City Scientific. 
Hubbard himself called it “City Practical.”44 Concomitant with the professionalization of city 
planning in America, this notion of planning centered on the development and exercise of 
regulatory controls over land within a municipal framework.45 Starting in the 1930s, and 
accelerating into the 1940s, City Practical planning was itself being displaced by new currents. 
“During the twenties,” American Society of Planning Officials director Walter Blucher would 
write in 1949, “[the emphasis in city planning] was on the city practical. Today, the emphasis is 
on the human beings who populate a community.”46 In practice, this meant the infiltration of 
planning by the methods and materials of the social sciences: population analysis, general 
economic trends, crime and disease statistics. Two tendencies originally marked this shift: a 
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focus on larger spatial areas lacking obvious or distinct physical or administrative boundaries—
“regions” rather than cities; and a focus on processes—processes of management and 
administration in confrontation with the processes of social development analyzed in a historical 
framework. The term “function” was beginning to be used to describe this new conceptual 
orientation, and opposed in that context to “skill” or “technique.”47 All this implied that the 
circuit of planning knowledge directly linking applied techniques and their physical 
manifestation in the built fabric was loosening.48 “Physical planning” was becoming obsolete. In 
the late 1930s, the planning discipline was undergoing a tidal shift, and Hubbard was facing 
against the tide.  
 This helps explain why, in the confrontation with Hudnut and Gropius, Hubbard would 
appear as “conservative.” That was the opinion expressed by Henry James, a behind-the-scenes 
operator in Harvard planning discussions and, eventually, Hudnut and Gropius’s advocate. As a 
representative of the Rockefeller Foundation (whose ongoing sponsorship of planning at Harvard 
was at issue) and member of the Harvard Board of Overseers, James had Conant’s ear. As an 
erstwhile member of the Committee for the Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs, as well 
as of the 1928 Columbia conference sponsored by that Committee, which had led to the 
establishment of Harvard’s School of City Planning, James was an eminent voice on planning. In 
1940, he confided to Harvard University Dean G. H. Chase: “professionally I think [Hubbard] is 
rather narrow-minded as well as extremely conservative.”49 James shared that negative 
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professional assessment with Frederic A. Delano, fellow Regional Plan of New York alumnus, 
chairman of the Columbia conference, and now NRPB chairman. “I do not think [Hubbard] 
knows a great deal about the problem of city planning as I see it,” agreed Delano.50  
 With respect to planning, James and Delano were not just moving with the tide, they 
were driving it. Published in 1929, the Regional Plan of New York was a pioneering document 
of a planning knowledge that thought in terms of regions and used for their analysis social 
sciences methods and concerns, such as population trends, industrial distribution and migration, 
economic development, changes in land valuation, and metropolitan growth.51 Since its 
inception in 1933, the NPB represented the development of that form of knowledge, even as it 
did not yet concern itself with cities. That would change in 1937, with the publication of a 
comprehensive NPB report titled Our Cities, Their Role in the National Economy.52 The report 
was rooted in the social sciences conception of planning, spelled out in its very opening 
sentences:  
Of all our national resources—natural and man-made—the most important, and the one in terms of 
which all the others have to be judged, is human life. The safety, welfare, and happiness of the men, 
women, and children who compose the American people constitute the only justification of 
government.53  
Now, however, the task of planning in the management and accommodation of “human life” on 
the national scale was linked specifically to the city, rather than the region. Prior to this moment, 
the American system had excluded any direct relationship between the federal and the municipal 
governments, with the political and economic administration of cities placed under the 
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jurisdiction of states. Even as America was becoming an increasingly urban society, cities were 
understood to be matters of local, rather than national, concern. Despite the conceptual link 
between city planning and government administration, spelled out in the constitution of the NPB, 
the board followed Roosevelt’s focus on rural areas in the early years of the New Deal. Signaling 
a shift in federal engagement with cities, Our Cities was the first product of a newly established 
NPB Urbanism Committee, and it was unequivocal in declaring its premises: “In looking at the 
urban problem…, we consider it… a problem of all the American Nation.”54 The Urbanism 
Committee called for direct federal investment in the cities, on everything from taxation policy, 
to welfare assistance, to urban land policy and public works. Although Hansen was not yet the 
economic mastermind behind the report, it nevertheless tied the emergence of the city as a 
central national concern to the closure of the frontier. “The United States can no longer be 
regarded as an undeveloped rural frontier country,” it stated, “If urbanization is a measure of the 
maturity of a country, then the United States may be said to have come of age.”55 The relevant 
question of planning was no longer whether aesthetic or technical concerns should dominate its 
disciplinary constitution, but how to confront the eclipse of the “region” and the emergence of 
the urban fabric as a national resource. 
 If Hubbard was rearguard in 1940, it still remained to Hudnut and Gropius to prove that 
their conception of planning would be progressive. The program they developed appears to have 
been a perfect confluence of the ideas of both men. In January of 1938, Gropius submitted 
“suggestions for the future policy of Harvard University regarding regional planning.” He 
launched right into the heart of the argument: the GSD suffers from a lack of integration; the 
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educational program should be unified under the basic premise of “design,” which all three 
component disciplines share. “In the first place,” Gropius stressed, “not [the three professions’] 
means of realization (i.e. materials and technical processes) should be emphasized, but the 
common ideal to which all are addressed.” That ideal, encompassed in the notion of “design,” 
does not only focus on “composition in space,” but on “social aspects.” Thus, “a constructive 
method of teaching should be followed which consistently would show all the students in design 
the relationship of their various tasks and their functions within human life… .”56 Gropius’s 
position was a combination of a developing pedagogical philosophy with general conceptions of 
regional planning as discussed at CIAM. What is relevant in the current context is how, in 
focusing on “design” as an intellectual—rather than a manual or aesthetic—practice, Gropius 
articulated it at the same time in relation to a discourse of the “social” or “human.” 
The New Architecture and the Bauhaus, Gropius’s resumé-cum-statement of philosophy 
written during his short stay in England, and published there in 1935, gives insight to his current 
positions. Emphasizing the “idea of the fundamental unity underlying all branches of design,” 
Gropius linked it to “the principle of training the individual’s natural capacities to grasp life as a 
whole, a single cosmic entity.”57 The first element of that binary was a translation of the familiar 
concept of German neo-Kantian aesthetics holding form to be the manifestation of the spirit of 
an age.58 As summarized in The New Architecture and the Bauhaus: “the outward forms” of 
architecture are “simply the inevitable logical product of the intellectual, social and technical 
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conditions of our age.”59 Gropius’s 1938 regional planning memo restated this now in relation to 
“design”: “Design as history shows it is an interpretation of life itself.”60 The second element 
was the notion of “idea” that formed the kernel of Gropius’s educational philosophy. As stated in 
the 1938 memo:  
to educate a designer towards independence of thought and vision, one should give him first of all a 
constructive idea of the tremendous creative possibilities of future design to be built up consistently 
from all aspects of life, social, aesthetic and technical. Not before a clear conception of such an 
idea—worth living up to—has begun to grow in a student’s mind will he understand, combine and 
absorb the manifold practical means towards its realization.61  
The notion of a fundamental “idea” as a counterpoint to “techniques” continued to animate 
Gropius’s developing argument against specialization. In a 1941 statement of philosophy 
published in the GSD student journal Task, Gropius counterposed the “scientific methods of 
minute collecting and analyzing of all available facts” to the “spiritual method of approach,” 
premised on the “qualitative investigation of present life relationships.”62 If one considers 
“spiritual” in this case as a translation of “geistig,” a concept that implies the intellect as much as 
divinity, the link between fundamentals of knowledge and a “totality of life [and] its social 
implications”63 emerges as central to Gropius’s pedagogy of design. 
The practical manifestation of design’s purview over the social “totality of life” would 
begin with architecture and end with national planning. The closing pages of The New 
Architecture and the Bauhaus summarized that trajectory: 
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My idea of the architect as coordinator—whose business it is to unify the various formal, technical, 
social and economic problems that arise in connection with building—inevitably led me on step by 
step from study of the function of the house to that of the street; from the street to the town; and 
finally to the still vaster implications of regional and national planning. I believe that the New 
Architecture is destined to dominate a far more comprehensive sphere than building means today; and 
that from the investigation of its details we shall advance towards an ever-wider and profounder 
conception of design as one great cognate whole—the mirror of the indivisibility and immensity and 
underlying unity of life itself, of which it is an integral part.64 
Thus, the ultimate endpoint of architectural knowledge and agency as “idea” would be at the 
scale of national planning, where it would affect such issues as “the readjustment of the relations 
between industry and agriculture and the redistribution of population on rational economic and 
geo-political principles.”65 Essentially a summary of the current CIAM platform, the statement is 
a clue to Gropius’s interpretation of “regional planning.” Not only was the version of 
regionalism grounding the CIAM “Functional City” derived in part from the Regional Plan of 
New York, its research methodology also relied on the kind of statistical analysis of large-sample 
social and economic data that grounded the American regional planning discipline.66 (Figure 26) 
Moreover, a focus on national economies was already evident at the first meeting of CIAM, 
where the “general economic system” was one of the main subjects of discussion, and where a 
“High International Commission for the extension of architecture to economics and sociology” 
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was proposed.67 By 1934, the emphasis at CIAM, as Eric Mumford writes, was on the “city as a 
part of an economic and social whole.”68  
 Hudnut’s conception of the relationship between architecture and planning had different 
roots, but a parallel articulation. As Jill Pearlman has argued, Hudnut’s city planning ideas were 
shaped during his tenure in the offices of Werner Hegemann and Elbert Peets from 1917 to 1921. 
Hegemann thought of the city as a historically evolving urban organism, comprising economic, 
political, and cultural factors. As such, the city was both an ethical and an aesthetic expression of 
a given society, as conveyed in Hegemann’s guiding concept of “civic art.” While the “art” of 
city planning consisted in formal and picturesque composition of “the aspect of the approaches” 
(buildings grouped into “harmonious ensembles,” creating a “monumental unity” ideally 
comprising the entire city),69 the “civic” meaning of that art was sustained by Hegemann’s 
ethical and political reading of aesthetics as the “knowledge of good and beautiful things and 
conduct” that should be “made central to all thought about policy.”70 That conviction grounded 
Hegemann’s advocacy of architecture’s role in city planning, of “the necessity of extending the 
architect’s sphere of influence.”71 A similar conviction was also at the heart of Hudnut’s ideas 
about the relationship of architecture to city planning.  
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Hudnut translated Hegemann’s ethico-political notion of aesthetics as the intimate 
relationship between the “physical pattern” of cities and the historical “idea-pattern” that governs 
society.72 In a May 1940 article, he posited that architectural expression was guided by a 
“collective mind,” a “pattern of contemporary idea” that, “even without the consent of 
conscience, shapes and colors the interests and aptitudes of each era and [directs] its ways of 
making and seeing.”73 The contemporary era’s pattern of idea was a consequence of “the 
growing complexity of the social and economic pattern,” and it was characterized by “a new 
consciousness of collective responsibility” and of the “organic character” of society.74 That 
pattern guided not only contemporary architecture but contemporary city planning as well. “I do 
not despair of planned cities,” Hudnut wrote: 
by which term I mean, not cities conformable to that geometric spirit which unhappily tradition still 
imposes upon our civic design, but cities molded by that communal intelligence which seeks, through 
a recognition of the integral relation of man to society, to bend natural law to human betterment.75 
Architecture’s role in city planning would consist not in upholding aesthetic principles, but in the 
ethical and intellectual agency of design in relation to “society” as an organic unit. The polemical 
subtext of that position was spelled out by Hudnut in a later article. “Nothing could be more 
misleading,” he wrote, 
or more damaging to the cause of planning than that description of architecture… as an art of 
‘physical planning’—a term intended to distinguish sharply the tangible and practical patterns of 
architects from the patterns of idea which occasion them and which would deny to architecture a 
social relevancy.76 
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For both Hudnut and Gropius, architecture could not be content in being relegated the task of 
shaping the physical fabric of cities—neither “Practical” nor “Beautiful”—it had to participate in 
decisions that shape “human life”—“from the street to the town, … to national planning”77—and 
“sustain the happiness of populations.”78 To accomplish this, architects had to secure their place 
among those who participate in the social life of ideas. Such were the stakes of the task to 
“provide [both] planner and architect with a common basis of thought and habit,” taken on by the 
Hudnut-Gropius alliance at the GSD in 1940.79 
 
In March of 1940, the University announced that Hubbard would retire the following 
year, and in the meanwhile, an independent committee would be appointed to explore the future 
of regional planning instruction at Harvard. The committee was chaired by Delano, and included, 
in addition to Hubbard, Hudnut, and Gropius: Alfred Bettman, the nation’s foremost expert on 
planning and zoning law who would assist Hansen and Greer in the drafting of their urban 
redevelopment bill in 1943;80 GSD instructor in landscape architecture Bremer Pond; and 
landscape architect Gilmore D. Clarke, installed by Hubbard. The committee’s Preliminary 
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Report was submitted on June 26, 1940, signed by all committee members, except for Hudnut 
and Gropius. It opened with a general definition of planning: 
Planning aims to create frames of reference, guides or instrumentalities whereby there may be 
brought about in the activities of the people of a city or region a greater degree of coordination and 
integration… For this integration and coordination in the very complex society of today… there needs 
to be … applied that special kind of intellectual approach, special concept and special art of technique 
which we mean by the term planning and which is capable of being stated and therefore of being 
taught.81 
The “intellectual approach” of planning was to be based on familiarity with “techniques and 
developments” in the fields of urban and rural sociology, economics, and political science. While 
the committee agreed that “physical planning” did play a part in that set of techniques, the 
concept of “techniques” itself was now very different from the notion earlier advanced by 
Hubbard. “[T]he things we build upon or do with the land,” the committee wrote, “are but the 
media for carrying out social and economic objectives,” and therefore the decisions that guide 
their manifestation should be the products of “knowledge of… those social and economic forces 
and processes which bear upon the objectives and possibilities of planning.” Knowledge of civil 
engineering, budgetary, and legal procedures was no longer at issue; planning was about 
defining, at the scale of society as a whole, the goals and possibilities—no longer just the 
instruments—of control. As to the knowledge of “design,” which “played a considerable part” in 
the committee’s deliberations, none of its varied definitions “compe[l] the conclusion that, in the 
structural organization of a university, planning belongs in the department of architecture or 
landscape architecture.”82 The committee concluded that planning should be removed from GSD 
jurisdiction, and a University Professorship in planning established to coordinate a curriculum of 
courses distributed among the faculties of sociology, economics, and government.  
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 The Preliminary Report reflected the most current conceptions of planning, identified 
with the NRPB; but it also demonstrated that, for the planners, contemporary architecture was 
not an easy fit. Hudnut and Gropius set out to prove them wrong. During committee 
deliberations that preceded the Preliminary Report, an NRPB speaker was invited to summarize 
new trends in the planning discipline. The emphasis was on concepts of “coordination,” 
“integration,” and “collaboration”—both with respect to disparate specialists engaged in 
planning projects, and the disparate disciplines of knowledge they represented. Committee 
minutes record Hudnut’s interjection that “the teaching of architecture has so broadened today as 
to provide the [necessary] training in integration,” that its basis was a discipline that could 
“for[m] in the student definite habits of thought,” and that “the essentials of an adequate 
education as a planner were inherent in the teaching of architecture at Harvard today.”83 
Hudnut’s confident statement reflected the current assumptions and goals of the architectural 
profession as a whole, oriented precisely to the practices of “coordination” and “integration,” as 
outlined earlier in this chapter. The battle lines were drawn. After the Preliminary Report was 
sent to Conant in June, Hudnut took the lead in drafting a dissenting opinion on his own and 
Gropius’s behalf. In August, he sent a draft of the Minority Report to Gropius for review. “I 
intend the report to be a ‘fighting’ document,” Hudnut wrote, “I intend it as a strong defense of 
the architect, i.e. the modern architect—face-to-face with the go-getters and politicians.”84  
 Hudnut would later admit that “[t]here is undoubtedly a great difference in the concept of 
planning as the term is ordinarily understood and design. I have attempted to resolve this conflict 
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by giving design a broader definition.”85 That definition was outlined in the first draft of the 
Minority Report: 
Design, as we understand it, is organization: that certain kind of organization which comprises first an 
arrangement of ideas and then an arrangement of visible forms which interpret these ideas. … Design 
as related to the three professions with which we are concerned is a process of first apprehending the 
functions and factors involved in a specific problem and then finding a unified solution of that 
problem; and even when social, economic, or legal problems are simultaneously involved, the process 
always leads to a visible ensemble whose essential element is the arrangement of living space. … The 
essential process is the integration of ideas and physical forms.86 
On the one hand, this was an apt analysis of the governing logic within an architectural 
profession that had, since the 1930s, been remodeling itself as a discipline for the organization 
and coordination of “factors” and “functions.”87 On the other hand, it was an original defense of 
the traditional pursuit of architecture in the shaping of built form, carried out as a claim to 
authority over the knowledge represented by the social sciences. “Design” knowledge could 
process and synthesize “social,” “economic,” and “legal” knowledge, and manifest it in 
“physical forms.” Hudnut struggled to find the right term for that synthetic discipline of thought, 
which could distinguish it from the traditional conception of skill on the one hand, and from 
specialized forms of knowledge, contained in disciplinary procedures or bodies of information, 
on the other. In both this early draft and the final draft submitted to Conant after Gropius’s 
comments and revisions, that discipline was variously called “art,” “understanding,” or “creative 
aptitude.” But, in all cases, it would ground the planner in exactly the kind of comprehensive 
viewpoint deemed necessary by the Committee. “Knowledge may be acquired through precept,” 
stated the final draft of the Minority Report,  
technique through a trained intelligence, skill through practice; but all of these are only auxiliaries in 
the field of design. We feel that the majority of your Committee have failed to understand this 
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principle. The majority appear to conceive design as a special technique and education as knowledge. 
Education is a discipline and a growth.88 
The comprehensive, organic, and process-based type of knowledge sought by the Committee for 
the education of the planner was already contained in “design.” The battle for planning in the 
name of architecture would be won on planning’s own turf. 
 
3.3 THE 1942-1943 CURRICULUM REFORM 
 
 Planning remained in its position as a department within the GSD, and the task of 
defining its program would fall to the next chairman.89 In September of 1941, John Merriman 
Gaus, Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, was appointed to that 
position for two years. Gaus’s professional focus was on public administration, and he had 
overseen the preparation of an NRPB report on regional factors in national development.90 
Because of his association with the very young idea of “public administration,” Gaus was an 
even more forward figure within the developing planning field than either Delano or Bettman. At 
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the same time, his intellectual disposition was in some sympathy with that of Hudnut and 
Gropius. “I am uneasy at the implication,” Gaus wrote to Conant, “in [the planning committee 
majority report] that there is a unique discipline and subject matter peculiar to planning of a 
professional school extent. I say uneasy, because as I don’t possess it, I would soon be out of a 
job in a school devoted to that peculiarity.”91  
While Gaus shared with Hudnut and Gropius the orientation against planning as a 
specialized technical discipline, he also had reservations when it came to the relationship of 
planning to “design.” The issue was the status of “physical planning” in the translation from the 
management of rural to that of urban areas. In his experience with TVA planning, Gaus 
explained, he had dealt with natural resources and features of the land; since there is little that is 
man-made in such regions as “the Cotton South,” or “the Northern and Southern Plains,” 
regional planning had “rarely to do with three-dimensional and space rearrangement, and much 
with legislation and administration.” Therefore, Gaus admitted, he thought of planning “as a part 
of general staff work in administration.” He granted, however, that “the European and the 
dweller on the Northeastern Seabord will think rather in terms of man-made autostrade and 
parkways when he thinks of regional planning and design.” Therefore, Gaus deferred his opinion 
on the status of “design” for planning the urban fabric. “[T]he design that is revealed by the 
naturalist and the student of institutions,” Gaus concluded, “is also and equally relevant... .  
There are some architects, however, and now notably Dean Hudnut and Professor Gropius, who are 
sensitive to these matters, and in addition to this the teaching methods and procedures in the schools 
of architecture so far as I know them point the way… to develop better techniques in training for the 
public service generally.”92  
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The problem of “physical planning” would continue to haunt the new phase of planning 
negotiations at the GSD, but it would now be weighed against the problem of “administration,” 
understood as the problem of governing in relation to urban, as opposed to natural, resources.  
That central question of the relationship between the social agency of knowledge and urban 
physical form would emerge in Gaus’s influential report The Graduate School of Design and the 
Education of Planners (1943), and in GSD discussions surrounding its formulation; moreover, it 
would continue to shape Gaus’s thinking on “public administration” after he left Harvard.  
In June of 1941, Hudnut wrote to Gaus: “I have read several times the long letter which 
you wrote to the President. …What I should like to do is to forget [the discussions of 1940] and 
begin our new development without any preconceptions of any kind. I want you to feel free to re-
study the whole problem and bring us your program.”93 Gaus’s arrival on the scene, however, 
was evidently accompanied by a round of in-depth discussions among himself, Hudnut, Gropius, 
and Wagner, during which both Gaus and the GSD contingent worked to change each-others’ 
minds. In May, Hudnut and Gropius outlined their platform, accompanied by a copy of 
Giedion’s Space, Time and Architecture. “The points you people made,” Gaus followed up, 
“concerning the importance of a sense and conception of form carried over from individual 
buildings to city and regional planning is challenging—and difficult; and I suspect that I shall be 
ploughed up further by Giedion on all this.”94 For his part, Hudnut observed: “I am coming more 
and more to realize the importance of administrative problems in this field and I should say that 
an architect could hardly hope to have any success in city planning if he did not take into 
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account… the administrative machinery and processes of an American city.”95 Both Gaus’s ideas 
as a planner and the GSD curriculum would be influenced by such give-and-take.  
Gaus’s appointment to the Norton Chair in regional planning entailed an assignment to 
carry out a study of the current status of the planning profession to aid in a plan for the 
reorganization of planning education at Harvard. The Graduate School of Design and the 
Education of Planners was finished in draft form by January 1943 and submitted for discussion 
to the GSD curriculum committee, formed in anticipation of postwar reorganization and 
composed of Hudnut, Gaus, Gropius, Pond, and architecture professor Henry Atherton Frost. 
Gaus’s assessment of the planning discipline followed the general outlines of the events traced in 
this chapter. He noted the distance traveled by the profession from the original conception of 
planning as an essentially aesthetic enterprise to the current dominant modes of “administrative 
planning” and “social research.” “Administrative planning,” he explained, was a function of 
coordinating “social research” into a complex of procedures—“work schedules and priorities”—
directed toward the guidance of policy-formation. “Administrative planners” were members of 
the “general staff” who had “no operating authority as such, but [were], so to speak, extensions 
of the eyes and ears and mind of the responsible directive heads of an enterprise…, staffs 
attached to presidents, governors, prime ministers, city managers, and committees of 
legislatures.”96 To be such a planner was to exercise the purely strategic function of coordination 
and integration. Since this form of planning was situated at a remove from “operating authority 
as such,” the administrator could be the expert as purveyor of scientific autonomy and 
objectivity. Further, and crucially, the administrative planner’s strategic position militated 
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against conceiving of urban form as a totality articulated in the “master plan.” Citing Walker’s 
The Planning Function in Urban Government, discussed earlier in this chapter, Gaus explained 
that the “plan” as an abstractly ordered finality was being replaced with “planning” as a 
permanent “function” of a dynamic governmental organism. “The older popular view,” wrote 
Gaus, “that a city… could hire an ‘expert’ to prepare its plan and that the job was then done is 
giving way to the view that there should be a continuing appraisal of the problems of the city and 
the means of meeting them.”97  
In all this, however, the training of designers had, paradoxically, “become more [and not 
less] important.” The planning profession, Gaus insisted, should be seen as divided into two 
areas: the activity of governing and the production of urban form. This resurrection of “physical 
planning” at the culmination of such an inauspicious analysis was prompted by the belief that the 
operations of government should at some point “of necessity be registered in physical change.”98 
Thus, planning, which had originated as part of the professional activity of architecture, was 
given back to the field of design—but not before undergoing a series of mediations, which the 
GSD was given the imperative to sort out as a condition of asserting its authority over the range 
of planning’s professional competences.  
Throughout the years 1942 and 1943, the GSD’s Committee on Curricula and the 
Pamphlet addressed that challenge, among others. First, it was decided that the school should lay 
an exclusive claim to the concept of “city planning,” while sharing the responsibility for 
“regional planning” education with the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. This was not fundamentally 
an issue of metropolitan versus regional scale, but rather of negotiating the limits of the school’s 
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authority in confrontation with the technical machinery of “administrative planning.” In fact, 
when the “committee on regional planning,” first resolved to be formed during one of these 
meetings,99 finally took shape in 1946 as the Council of the Department of Regional Planning, it 
was almost evenly divided between GSD and Littauer faculties.100 Second, it was decided to 
extend “collaboration” on city planning problems to members of other departments of the 
University as well as to “outside agencies.” It was decided that the GSD should provide an 
introductory course on planning for undergraduates, to be called “Site, Shelter and the 
Community”—conceived as a “propaganda course,” and a part of “an effort to reach the 
laymen.”101 Finally, the relationships among the three GSD disciplines were reassessed, as Gaus 
addressed the city planning proficiencies to be required of architects and landscape architects: 
Start with work on analysis of community, relation of population group to its hinterland, why it is 
located there, how changes in techniques and commodities tend to bring a lot of people, etc… 
Acquaint the students with the larger regions of the continent… constitution and legal powers, 
organizations and personnel for dealing with these problems, public services, etc… These are some of 
the things that will impinge on the architect and the landscape architect when he thinks about the 
future site and shelter in our communities.102 
Because Gaus’s contribution to the reorganization of the GSD curriculum came at a 
moment of internal transition in the discipline of planning, it was also a moment when the 
relationship of planning to architecture had the potential to be secured anew. From the point of 
view of architecture, engagement with planning re-conceiving itself as a vital discipline of 
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governance at the national scale promised new social agency—provided that architectural 
knowledge could be retooled to incorporate the techniques of planning at its very heart. The GSD 
responded by drawing closer to the discourses of management and the sciences on the level of 
professional education, while engaging in the popularization of physical planning at the general 
education level. From planning’s point of view, the possibility of securing a direct relationship 
between state agency and the nation’s urban fabric still appeared strong. The notion of “physical 
planning” and its future encompassed both of those wagers, imparting strategic significance to its 
definition. In her study of the American planning profession, M. Christine Boyer has 
demonstrated that the integration of planning into the bureaucratic state apparatus during the 
New Deal did not necessarily lead to the implementation of planning’s proposals. It rather, 
ironically, institutionalized the removal of planning from the arena of politics, where state 
control of the economy was set at odds to a plurality of special interests. The result was, on the 
one hand, an intensification of disciplinary techniques—as planning “turned inwards toward 
abstract policy formation, research, and information collection”—and on the other, efforts to fill 
a “void” in agency through the creation of a “popular sentiment” or “public will” in support of 
official intervention.103 However, during the mid-1940s, that outcome was not yet assured; and, 
possibly, the opposite would have appeared more likely. In 1943, Gaus’s claim that the 
operations of policy will “of necessity be registered in physical change”104 was a very educated 
guess.  
In December 1941, Alvin Hansen teamed up with Federal Reserve Board economic 
consultant Guy Greer to produce a plan for postwar cities, titled Urban Redevelopment and 
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Housing. The Hansen-Greer proposals were widely publicized between 1941 and 1943, and 
correspondence between Gaus and Hudnut indicates that they were also discussed at the GSD.105 
Hansen and Greer outlined a plan for a comprehensive rebuilding of the nation’s urban fabric, 
organized by state-municipality partnerships, and carried out by private enterprise with a 
substantial input of federal funds. It was the task of “society as a whole” to clean up “the social 
and economic mess left by past generations,” manifested in the physical form of cities. The 
solution would involve tying the nation-state to the locality through both financing and 
comprehensive coordination. A new national planning agency would determine “the proper and 
desirable role of each metropolitan area in the State or larger region and in the Nation as a 
whole” and would likely prescribe “changing the structure of the existing metropolitan areas,” as 
well as some “dispersal of populations.” New local planning commissions would prepare master 
plans in accordance with the national plan. The program would involve “planning of a character 
and on a scale heretofore unknown in this country,” and its outcome would be registered in the 
physical urban fabric. “Covering the whole metropolitan area,” Hansen and Greer wrote, “[the 
scope of the plan] would include virtually everything connected with the physical layout of the 
urban community.”106 
During the New Deal, professional planning at the national level had appeared as an 
administrative function guiding the distribution of natural resources for economic recovery. 
Now, following the new emphasis on urban resources introduced in NRPB’s Our Cities report, 
Hansen and Greer found a way to put physical planning on the national economic agenda 
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through the concept of “urban redevelopment.” However, in accordance with Hansen’s 
conception of “stimulus,” a certain amount of ambiguity was introduced into the structures of 
agency implied in that physical plan: throughout the document, the authors emphasized that 
government aid should be extended “in such a manner as to induce the maximum possible 
construction and reconstruction by private enterprise,” and government control should be 
exercised primarily to the end of removing “certain legal and financial obstacles [that] stand in 
the way” of redevelopment by private enterprise.107 Hansen and Greer’s idea of physical 
planning was not so much the exercise of governmental control over the nation’s urban fabric, 
but rather, the provision of a national public administrative framework that would enable and 
sustain the exercise of local and private agency. Gaus’s thinking would also continue to develop 
around the relationship between planning’s administrative function and the nation’s built fabric 
as a product of the relationship between private initiative and public organization. His 
prominence in the field of administration would guarantee an important legacy for the Harvard 
deliberations on the role of “physical planning.”  
Back at the University of Wisconsin in 1944, Gaus reflected to Henry James on his 
experience at the GSD: 
I think that now… the importance of some education in the essentials of civic design for many types 
of administration is being discovered. [At Wisconsin we have moved] to include in a central place in 
our program a course… in which the element of conscious design in various relations will be studied. 
… I think I may properly say to you that I shall apply various things that I absorbed in my very happy 
year at Cambridge in my future work here or wherever it may be.108  
At the end of 1945, Gaus delivered a series of lectures at the University of Alabama, published 
as Reflections on Public Administration (1947). Evoking a mixture of the modernist position 
advanced by Hudnut and Gropius and the social sciences approach of the NRPB, Gaus proposed 
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an “ecology of government.”109 The ecological approach to public administration, he wrote, 
builds “quite literally from the ground up; from the elements of a place—soils, climate, location, 
for example—to the people who live there—their numbers and ages and knowledge, and the 
ways of physical and social technology by which from the place and in relationships with one 
another, they get their living.”110 Through a case study of highway construction, Gaus charted a 
complex interplay of social, economic, cultural, and technological interactions put in motion by 
the invention of the automobile as a factor of “environmental change.” Legislative and 
administrative decisions intervened within this network to respond to various factors, and affect 
others in turn. “At last,” Gaus wrote,  
at a specific point in the landscape, a shovel bites into the earth… . The road is completed. The 
process of government has come ‘round at last to complete a circle, and now returns to the original 
invention, the automobile, and presents it with a paved highway on which to operate. … [Then the 
circle recommences as the] collective act, the highway program… itself becomes a new factor in the 
environment.”111  
The work of government was thus an ongoing process of both responding to and producing 
(physical) environmental change. But the ultimate goal of governing was to assure that such 
ecological transformations were truly “collective”; that is, that they integrated at every level 
governmental controls and local agency: from the nation-state to the municipality, from the 
municipality to the individual citizen. Only in such a way could the ultimate ends of 
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administration be realized in the maintenance of civil liberty.112 “The multiplying of services,” 
Gaus wrote,  
has made the individual citizen… a participant. Even where no formal procedures and organization 
enlist him in the more obvious aspects of the administration of the laws, his consent and indeed his 
positive contribution of knowledge… are necessary for successful government. I have seen this to be 
true in small village communities, where face-to-face relations are easy; but I have noted it as well in 
cities, where a groping toward some kind of neighborhood life even under the most difficult 
conditions asserts itself… .113 
From the socio-historical givens to the shovel biting into the earth, from the administrative 
function to the realization of participatory democracy, planning would be a process of balancing 
control and freedom. 
Gropius’s developing discourse on planning was another iteration of the same conceptual 
formula, focused on interrelating design and administration. In Rebuilding Our Communities 
(1945), Gropius outlined his idea of planning as a function of participatory democracy. Based on 
his “lifelong conviction that the future of architecture and building stands upon a sound 
reorientation of the entire community set-up,” Gropius declared himself to be part of a 
“generation of architects who are developing a set of standards focused on contemporary social 
conceptions, and who have therefore joined hands with the professional planners.”114 On those 
stated credentials, he outlined a set of premises to guide postwar urban development. The basic 
concept was the direct relationship between the organization of the urban “pattern” and the 
quality of “community life,” the determining variable of which was whether “a citizen [has] 
personal contact with his elected officials.” Gropius’s well-known vision of a close-knit or 
“integrated” community, modeled on the medieval town square or the New England village, 
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proceeded from the ability of “every one of us [to be] instrumental in the formation of his own 
environment” to the general defeat of metropolitan anomie.115 To that end, effective urban 
redevelopment would rely first and foremost on the reorganization of the nation’s 
“administrative framework” to enable participatory forms of government. Thus, the basic urban 
unit would also be the basic administrative unit of national government: a half-mile radius 
“neighborhood” with five to six thousand inhabitants. From the neighborhood, the 
“administrative area” would expand to the county or city precinct, then the state, and finally the 
federal government. In this way, “the social initiative of the people would… originate at a local 
level and gradually reach out into a wider region.”116 Thus, postwar physical planning would be 
premised on a direct relationship between a module of the urban fabric—the township—and a 
unit of government scaled to enable participatory democracy. Establishing the role of physical 
planning in regulating the interface between public controls and private freedoms would be the 
new task of architectural knowledge defined as “a flexible method of approach.”117 
 
3.4 THE COLLABORATION BETWEEN GROPIUS AND MARTIN WAGNER 
 
The concrete details of Gropius’s proposals focused on outlining an institutional structure 
that would enable architecture’s participation in realizing flexible redevelopment. The two-part 
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organization would consist, first, of an Institute of Building Integration that would “become an 
adjustable link between private enterprise and governmental control.” It would oversee a 
“synchronized [research] effort on the part of all those involved in building operations—
administrators, industrialists, financiers, realtors, architects, contractors, engineers, and 
workers”—yielding a plan for postwar reconstruction by private enterprise, to be submitted to 
the government for legislative action. The main task of such a plan would be to gradually 
eliminate government housing subsidies by “solving the housing problem economically”—that 
is, to reduce free market housing costs through “industrializing” the residential building process 
to make home ownership accessible to “the average income.” “Only such a plan,” wrote Gropius, 
“could, without infringing upon individual freedom, eliminate the bugaboo of excessive 
governmental control.” Individual dwellings would be given over entirely to the regime of 
freedom.118  
On the other hand, land would be gradually taken out of the systems of private ownership 
and dispersed agency. Localities should be given the power not only to zone already developed 
land, but to “regulate subdivisions” on outlying vacant land. The ultimate endpoint, although 
only suggested as a possible outcome, would be nationalization of the land. “[W]ithout 
undermining the basic conceptions of property,” Gropius wrote, “the ownership and use of land 
must be regulated by legislation so that the right of the community gradually rises above that of 
the individual when vital public problems are concerned.”119 In bifurcating the urban economic 
unit of land and building, each of the two elements could be given over to an opposing side in the 
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dialectic of freedom and control. That logic would underlie a series of collaborative projects 
Gropius carried out with Martin Wagner in the 1940s. 
Arriving at the GSD in 1938 as assistant professor of regional planning, Wagner brought 
with him a fully forged planning methodology and experience as Stadtbaurat of Weimar-era 
Greater Berlin. The central physical unit of the soon unfolding Gropius-Wagner planning 
conception—the “township”—was, most directly, a translation of the Siedlungen built in the 
suburbs of Berlin and Frankfurt under the planning authorities of Wagner and Ernst May, 
respectively. Both the Siedlung and the township were settlements of a few thousand inhabitants 
each, set within park or garden spaces, and provided with the basic social facilities and services 
necessary to maintain self-sufficient community life. (Figure 27) Its lineage in the international 
“garden city” conception made the township an entirely plausible intervention in the 
contemporary American planning discourse, buttressed by the recent examples of TVA 
Greenbelt towns and wartime defense housing settlements—not to mention the highly influential 
1920s RPAA model communities. (Figure 28) However, the Wagner-Gropius township would be 
grounded in an ideology of planning removed from both the anti-urban social utopias of the 
garden city and the socialist ideals of the Siedlung. Instead, it clearly resonated with positions 
developed by Wagner in the early 1930s, at the end of his career as Berlin’s Stadtbaurat.120 
As analyzed by Manfredo Tafuri, Wagner’s 1931 break with the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD), under whose auspices he had carried out most of the settlement projects around Berlin, 
was premised on linking an economic analysis of industrial decentralization to the imperative of 
centralized economic planning. Both the growth of corporate industrial concerns and the 
                                                 
120 Wagner was active in the GEHAG (Gemeinnützige Heimstätten-Aktiengesellschaft), one of the two biggest 
building cooperatives operating in Berlin, since its foundation in 1924; he was appointed Stadtbaurat (director of 
central building administration) in 1927, and stayed in that position until 1933.  
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increasing mechanization of factory work, Wagner now argued, augured the end of the 
nineteenth-century metropolis as the city of production. The metropolis was becoming 
increasingly the city of administration and “services”;121 while industrial production, freed by 
advancing mechanization of reliance on the skilled labor pool concentrated in the city, moved to 
the outskirts in search of cheaper unskilled labor. No longer contained by the Grossstadt, 
production had expanded to the territorial scale of the region, and, ultimately, the nation. 
Therefore, the SPD policy of municipal urban planning was no longer sufficient, and had to 
encompass national economic management. In the urban field, centralized planning was 
ultimately premised upon nationalization of the land—the only way to control the new territorial 
mobility of places of production and of residential communities that spring up around them. Das 
wachsende Haus (1932), Wagner’s contribution to the contemporaneous prefabrication debate, 
tied rationalization of the residential building industry to an efficient urban plan premised upon 
the eventual socialization of the land.122 
However, Wagner’s proposals were driven by a technocratic rather than a radical socialist 
imperative. The point of centralized planning was not to guarantee labor’s control of production, 
but rather the increased efficiency of economic administration. In his analysis of the concept of 
Sozialisierung in Weimar Republic politics, historian Charles Maier points out the ambiguity and 
flexibility of “socialism” as a policy objective, which, ultimately, “allowed even conservatives 
and business leaders to design a socialism that they could accept.” In the negotiations leading up 
to the drafting of the Weimar constitution, for example, the SPD tended to define socialism as 
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“the maximization of the general welfare,” rather than a redistribution of economic power. 
Correspondingly, the economic policy that would come to define Weimar democracy was 
founded in the idea of Gemeinwirtschaft—common or collective economy—premised upon 
industrial self-management by associations of labor unions, business leaders, and consumer and 
government representatives, to the end of the enhancement of overall national productivity. This 
version of economic management for more efficient production, leading to the presumed 
furthering of communal welfare, was also the basic premise of 1920s managerial technocracies 
throughout Europe and America.123 The conception of Wirtschaftsdemokratie (economic 
democracy) advanced by the DEWOG was an extension of Gemeinwirtschaft into the field of 
housing production.124 Wagner’s writings of the period repeatedly engaged the two economic 
concepts, and his “community economy,” proposed as the model of nationalization in Das 
wachsende Haus, took off from the same ground.125 
The Siedlung, Tafuri maintains, was conceived as a model city of labor, an enclave 
within a capitalist world, in which socialism could take hold and bide its time. That is the model 
Wagner rejected, after years of attempting to advance it, as unworkable in practice because 
sapped at the center by a multitude of compromises with private interests, bureaucratic 
inefficiencies, and wasted funds. The solution was to centralize and depoliticize decision-
making, to focus it in the hands of an architect-technician, whose task would no longer be that of 
providing ideal models of social organization at the scale of the city, but that of administering 
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territory at the scale of the nation.  So the new “technical-intellectual role,” as Tafuri puts it, that 
Weimar Republic architect-city planners found themselves called upon to perform,126 led 
Wagner from the city as the endpoint of organization, to the city as a mere mediating point 
between building as the site of individual freedom and national land as the locus of control and 
social agency. The wachsende Haus was the physical expression of that new relationship: the 
freestanding modular unit that dramatically displaced the collective row-house model of the 
Siedlungen, growing or shrinking to fit the changing needs of the inhabitant, and bypassing any 
intermediary municipal infrastructure to focus on the relationship between the dwelling and “our 
mother the land, which the good God has given to all the children of the universe.”127 
The Gropius archive preserves a letter Wagner wrote to Gropius in 1940, on the eve of 
their first public collaborative intervention in American planning discourse. The letter is a 
fragment of what must have already been an ongoing conversation between the two, and it 
concerns the question of prefabrication. Departing from his observation of Gropius’s reluctance 
to assign the development of new prefabrication systems in his student problems, Wagner 
advanced a passionate polemic on the need for ongoing technical and aesthetic research in that 
area.128 Has “my old Weimar- and Dessau-fighter Walter Gropius,” wrote Wagner, “lost his 
fighting power of 1924… ?” In urging Gropius to think back to his 1924 article on prefabrication 
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in housing, Wagner, however, appeared to be aware of Gropius’s current thoughts on the 
issue.129 As Wagner knew, Gropius had not abandoned his interest in prefabrication for housing, 
but he did shift focus in the late 1930s from technical to organizational issues, and moreover, had 
started to emphasize different aspects of that logistics.130  
The 1924 article focused on issues of construction technology, but organization was 
addressed as well. Gropius had premised the viability of industrialization in housing first on the 
involvement of a major corporation (a “large enterpris[e] involving all the separate branches [of 
production] under a single ownership… whose financial strength would be adequate to ensure 
the realization of such a major project”), and second, on public investment at the research and 
development stage (carried out by cooperative “consumer organizations”).131 In a 1938 article, 
on the other hand, Gropius no longer saw prefabrication as a problem primarily of 
standardization and mechanization in the building industry. “Surely,” he now wrote, “mass 
production methods must eventually permeate the building trade; but deep changes in the 
economic structure are indispensable before the market will be ready for prefabrication on a 
large scale.” Early experiments had demonstrated that “no single person or single firm alone can 
solve that gigantic task as Ford solved it for the automobile.” The solution had to be sought 
instead in “integration,” carried out by a “public institute” that could coordinate private research 
efforts in the various sectors of the building industry and “their practicability for the good of the 
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commonwealth,” and come up with a “guiding key plan [to] direct the future efforts toward 
housing.”132 That appeared to be the real point of contention for Wagner. “You do not believe 
anymore in a Henry Ford for housing the masses?” he wrote, 
You believe still in a ‘clearing house for building integration,’ and so on? … I have passed through 
that stage of belief when I made [sic] my special experience with that famous ‘clearing house,’ called 
‘Reichsforschungsgesellschaft,’ and when I encountered our double crossed and double cooked [sic] 
contractors in Germany. … No, let me out, Gropius, my belief is finally founded in deeds and deeds 
are inseparably connected with personalities, with creative personalities and characters, and thus I 
think that the Wright Brothers and Henry Fords have not yet grown old fashioned, they will continue 
to rule over industries… .133  
The problem of the dwelling now turned primarily around the question of administrative control, 
rather than building technology. Disenchanted by his experience with Weimar special interests, 
Wagner advocated centralized private control of housing production. On the other hand, Gropius 
envisioned a more diffuse cooperative system—perhaps chastened, for his part, by the failure of 
his 1931-32 collaboration with the German firm of Hirsch Kupfer in the production of a 
prefabricated Copper House model.134 
By July 1941, that disagreement was apparently resolved, as Gropius and Wagner 
presented their first collaborative proposal for low-cost housing. Remarkably, this initial venture 
was submitted as a report, titled “How to Bring Forth an Ideal Solution of the Defense Housing 
Problem,” to the 77th Congress of the House of Representatives that examined the effects of 
wartime demographic shifts on the labor market, the distribution of industrial activity, and the 
economic conditions of specific regions.135 The Gropius-Wagner proposal focused on those 
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“deep changes in the economic structure” broached by Gropius’s 1938 text. “[T]he time has 
come,” wrote the authors, “to mobilize a powerful attempt to rebuild the country on a large scale, 
[employing a] farsighted cooperation and coordination of all public and private agencies to be 
directed by a national key plan.”136 The plan would guide the development of a “town pattern” 
premised upon ongoing population migration, which the authors understood to be the basic 
condition of both wartime mobilization and postwar demobilization. This was a restatement of 
Wagner’s 1931 conclusions on the relocation of industries, necessitating the migration of 
workers, as a fundamental characteristic of the “Twentieth Century machine age.” The challenge 
was to channel and accommodate that permanent flux, rather than leaving it to the “so-called free 
play of forces,” the “automatic solutions following supply and demand of the free market.”137 
The proposed organization, combining public and private initiative, would consist of a new 
regional framework of settlement adapted to industrial decentralization and a new housing 
industry based on the production of mobile dwellings. The whole undertaking would be managed 
and supported through a national research Institute of Building Integration, centralizing all 
existing public and private institutions of housing research. 
It is evident and remarkable that the problem of large-scale territorial organization 
introduced by total war mobilization appeared to precisely parallel the problem of territorial 
expansion in Weimar-era settlements. Although the congressional hearings report of 1941 was 
the first Gropius-Wagner intervention in America, it was not their first collaborative planning 
proposal. In 1934, the two sent an unsolicited proposal for regional development in East Prussia 
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to the new government of the Reich. Their attention focused on how to effectively counteract 
urban concentrations in the region—how to carry out an “interior colonization” across the 
territory of East Prussia’s “Space without People.” That, and no longer the provision of 
affordable housing, was the goal. The solution of a “new synthesis” of city and country in a low-
density fabric of “city-country-city” (Stadt-Land-Stadt), in turn, dictated the “single family 
house” as the preferred residential unit.138 The formal relationship between the house and the 
land was not, however, emphasized. The goals of “interior colonization” would be the 
enhancement of industrial productivity through mechanization and the regulation of the work-
day, and the increase of per-capita purchasing power. “The problem of modern settlements,” 
wrote Gropius and Wagner then, “is far less a problem of physical planning than a problem of 
economic and technological planning.” 139  
In the 1941 proposal, on the other hand, the key issue would be the relationship between 
the demountable dwelling—the “new type of house, [which is] not definitely fixed to the site 
during its whole life-span”—as a basic physical unit, and a new national socio-economic 
“pattern” as the basic organizational structure. “Being built as demountable units,” Gropius and 
Wagner wrote, “such factory-built houses would have also the advantages… of being bought and 
sold second hand and third hand: hence of being produced and traded as a commodity. As long 
as the house was inseparably fixed to the noncommodity ‘land,’ it could not be traded as a 
commodity.”140 In a 1939 GSD lecture, Wagner had likewise sketched out a fundamental 
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opposition between land and commodities. The basic economic attributes of commodities—
mobility, reproducibility, and interchangeability—were the opposites of the attributes of land. 
Therefore, Wagner called for “a special kind of land politics and an exceptional position for land 
in ordinary economics and politics.”141 The severing of the economic link between building and 
land, central to the concept of real estate, would become crucial to the Gropius-Wagner 
intervention, even as it foretold the eventual failure of that intervention as a national planning 
solution in the American context. Beyond its immediate sphere of application, however, the 
caesura introduced between the set of competences having to do with the distribution and 
regulation of the land, and those having to do with the production of buildings, would become a 
strategic boundary erected within the domain of architectural knowledge. 
 In the spring of 1942, Hudnut and Gaus corresponded about Hansen’s urbanism 
conference, held at Harvard in March, mentioning particularly a “flirtation between Mr. Wagner 
and Mr. Hansen over post-war planning.”142 For both Wagner and Gropius, the Hansen-Greer 
proposals became a point of great interest, and also of contention. To recall, Hansen and Greer 
advanced a plan for catalyzing private investment through government-sponsored, planned 
redevelopment of urban areas – “cities and towns.” While their interpretation of city planning as 
a problem of the national economy would have been close to Wagner’s and Gropius’s own 
developing ideas, the element of the Greer-Hansen proposal that appears to have most attracted 
Wagner’s attention was the centrality they assigned to the issue of land costs. According to 
Hansen and Greer, overpriced urban land in “blighted” areas was one of the two major 
“obstacles” to redevelopment by private enterprise that planning had to remove. The second, and 
                                                 
141 Martin Wagner, “Is Land a Commodity?” 25 February 1939, Wagner, Loeb, p.54. 
 
142 John Gaus to Joseph Hudnut, 19 May 1942, HUA, UAV 322.7.4, Subseries IB, Box 4. 
 
 189
related, obstacle was the lack of municipal authority for large-scale redevelopment. Therefore, 
Hansen and Greer argued, cities should be empowered to purchase large tracts of overvalued 
land with federal subsidy, and then sell it (at a much reduced cost) to be redeveloped in 
accordance with a new master plan. In this way, “such portion of the present market value of 
slum and blighted land as is not sustained by the proposed future use [would be] eliminated.”143 
During discussion of the issue at Harvard, Wagner is recorded to have spoken up in support of a 
“new modern town planning law, either national or State,” that would make land acquisition a 
function of physical planning—both centralized in the planning board.144  
Although Wagner’s conception seems entirely aligned with that of Hansen and Greer, his 
vision of centralized public control over land exercised through the physical plan was not at all 
what the American economists had in mind. Hansen and Greer continuously emphasized the 
protection of “local initiative” and the flexibility of public controls. Planners, they wrote, should  
know full well that [cities] are living organisms, changing and adapting themselves to conditions 
many of which we can neither foresee nor control. … For each community, we must conceive of the 
master plan itself, not as a static thing but rather as a dynamic system of procedure subject to constant 
revision. About the most that we can reasonably expect is to proceed from a state of virtually 
unplanned chaos to one which is at all events less chaotic… .”145  
Therefore, while Wagner must have felt encouraged by Hansen and Greer’s putative embrace of 
“what in America may seem a wide departure from traditional concepts of land ownership and 
control, [but follows] principles long established [on] the continent of Europe,” their conception 
of control was rather different from his.146 
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To assure inclusion of “a point of view inadequately discussed at the conference,” 
Gropius and Wagner contributed a co-authored text to the published proceedings.147 The 
Gropius-Wagner “epilogue” opened with a plea for physical planning, situating it firmly in line 
with the concurrent GSD efforts to advance the role of “design” in planning discourse. “[E]ven 
the most perfect tools,” wrote the authors, “with which to organize life in the towns and cities—
legislative, administrative, economic or technical—are only the means of forming the living 
space of the people into a whole, organic, cultural entity.”148 However, the physical paradigms—
“models” or “blueprints for rebuilding our cities”—Gropius and Wagner proposed were only 
derivations of a vision of the political economy centered on control of the land. Self-contained 
“townships,” aggregated as needed into larger cities or regions, would “form the basic units of 
the new town pattern,” premised on a regional conception of “country-cities in city-countries.”149 
This physical blueprint for regional development could only be put into effect through a neat 
reversal of the land-acquisition policy proposed by Hansen and Greer: rather than using public 
funds to “eliminate” excess market valuations on overdeveloped land, public funds should be 
used to buy up cheap underdeveloped land. The community would then “gradually redeem land” 
for higher values through infrastructural development—“public improvements,” rather than 
speculation. Citing a contemporaneous, and clearly Hansen-influenced, NRPB report, Gropius 
and Wagner embraced the goal to “make urban land fluid again.” But the significance they 
assigned to that conception was strikingly different from that of the source. “The land,” they 
wrote, “has been traded across the counter of real estate offices as though it were a commodity. 
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But land is not a commodity; for, unlike buildings, it cannot be produced nor moved nor 
replaced. Land is of such a peculiar nature that it should be owned by the communities which 
will become increasingly the constant element of our society, with a more or less fluctuating 
population.”150  
Finally, the commodification of the individual dwelling was spelled out as the necessary 
counterpart to the public ownership of the land: “As soon as the non-commodity land can be 
legally detached from the commodity house, industrial plants producing modern shelter units on 
the assembly line basis will flourish.” 151 Because land would no longer be the catalyst of 
flexible endogenous growth, it would be housing that would provide the essential element of 
“flexibility” in the master plan, spelled out in all capital letters for emphasis: “the foremost 
principle of planning—FLEXIBILITY… conditions must be kept fluid!”152 The point was 
clarified in a collaborative problem given by Gropius and Wagner at the GSD in January, several 
months prior to the Hansen conference, and published as an article in the Architectural Forum in 
July of 1943. Assuming increased population mobility as the composition of the workforce 
changes with the changing needs of the industry, the boundaries of the “township” must be 
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allowed to grow or shrink over time. That flexibility would be accomplished “by making the 
housing facilities elastic.” Different housing types should be offered: permanent units adaptable 
to the evolution of the family (the wachsende Haus model), demountable units, and mobile units 
(trailer homes) for migratory workers.153 (Figure 29) With the functions of control and freedom 
thus distributed, respectively, between the master plan and the dwellings, a caesura was 
introduced in the practical development of the overall scheme.  
The Forum article presented an elaboration of the Gropius-Wagner national planning 
proposal, detailing the economic and administrative set-up, illustrated with student designs for a 
model township in the Boston metropolitan area. The project was illustrated on a scale sequence 
from the region to the individual dwelling: a geographical survey map of the area proposed for 
redevelopment; a map of the regional traffic distribution; a set of typological permutations of the 
“elementary features of a ‘township’”; the plan of the final layout; and, finally, several studies 
for dwelling units.154 (Figure 30) The presentation materials make visible both the continuity of 
development from the regional to the township scale and the disjunction between the township 
plan and the dwelling units. While the plan presupposes the use of single-family freestanding 
houses, it does not dictate the variability of type or treatment; in fact, the latter is excessive with 
regard to the requirements of the former.  
The break may be further illustrated through a comparison with RPAA studies, which 
Gropius and Wagner referenced as precedents for their own proposal. As Francesco Dal Co has 
pointed out, RPAA garden city designs presented “an organic fusion of plan and dwelling;” there 
was a conceptual continuity between the city layout and the building types, so much so that the 
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buildings became simply an architectural expression of the urban plan.155 (Figure 31) Building 
was conceived by the RPAA at the urban scale because, like the city itself, it was a product of a 
systematic application of economic standards and the calculation of efficiencies of services. 
Thus, architectural form was a matter of “indifference;” the formal rigor of the garden city was 
not in the “façades,” but in the functional urban organism itself.156 Such organic integration 
between the urban and the architectural scales is missing in the Wagner-Gropius “township.” As 
in the RPAA studies, the design of the dwellings begins here with an economic calculation tying 
it programmatically into the logic of the overall town (in this case, the calculation coordinates 
anticipated income of residents with per capita space apportionment, based on maximum feasible 
rental costs). But that is only the starting point; the ultimate task is to provide a “maximum of 
flexibility in housing design” so as to “fit the family in any state of its size, its age-composition, 
its income, and its other varying demands.” 157 Such flexibility must extend not only to size and 
use, but also to appearance. “The more standardization and prefabrication is used,” write Gropius 
and Wagner, “the more will be needed the vision of the designer to secure individual variety, in 
spite of the increasingly limited number of types to be used.”158  
Although intimately tied, building and land were autonomous functions both in concept 
and in practice:  
The town planner cannot make a site… ‘flexible,’ and he cannot [relocate a] neighborhood quarter…; 
he knows that not the land and not the landscape, but the man-made shelter form and shelter 
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construction grows obsolete… in the struggle with time and technological progress. … [T]he building 
of new settlements will in the future be based on planning principles that emphasize lasting site 
values in contrast to more flexible building values… .159  
The distinction between the evolution of the master plan and the dwelling, notably, did not also 
divide the competences of the architects from those of the planners. As per standard practice, the 
GSD problem was divided into three contiguous phases: “fact-finding” research, master plan and 
site layout, and design of housing types. While the planning studies were to be carried out 
collaboratively by architects, planners, and landscape architects, the design of housing units was 
assigned to individual students.160 Up to a point, “group work” linked planning and architectural 
knowledge; but a space of individual responsibility and invention was reserved for architectural 
design at the end.  
In March of 1942, Gropius wrote to Giedion putatively summarizing his impressions of 
the Hansen conference, but clearly also reflecting the impact of his ongoing confrontation with 
American planning discourse. There was a “fundamental change” in the political economics of 
planning afoot: “The economical and administrative aspect [of] our problem is of outstanding 
importance and cannot be separated from the social and technical points of view which we have 
been interested about so far mostly.” The CIAM model suffered from an insufficient emphasis 
on “the problem of administration.” A closer integration was needed between the administrative 
knowledge of the contemporary planner and the social and aesthetic technologies of architecture: 
“…our endeavor should be to bring them closer together because I see clearly that the solution 
can only be a simultaneous approach from all these fields.”161 Gropius’s practice in the 1940s 
                                                 
159 Ibid., 30, 45. Emphasis in the original. 
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elaborates the following strategic proposition: if architectural methodology was to join with 
planning knowledge, the task of rebalancing freedom and control set by planning’s 
“administrative function” would have to find an architectural equivalent. On the one hand, 
Gropius’s institutional collaboration with Hudnut aimed at the preservation of architecture at the 
heart of planning through recasting “design” as a form of knowledge fundamentally akin to that 
of the social sciences. His contemporaneous engagement with Wagner focused on the invention 
of a paradigm of that knowledge that could balance administrative control of the political 
economy with a relative freedom of its physical manifestations in the urban fabric. The 
bifurcation of land and building was its formal outcome. The preservation of “unity in diversity,” 
or the individual within the group, that Gropius would repeatedly promote as an architectural 
translation of “democracy,” would be the ideological expression of the same imperative. The 
design process that produced the superficial appearance of a “decorated diagram” was premised 
upon the maintenance within control’s necessary rigors of an integument of freedom.  
The closing of the NRPB in 1943 put an end to a phase of American planning policy that 
articulated a link between state control of the urban fabric and national economic planning, even 
of the limited and “fluid” type envisioned by Hansen. With the demise of the NRPB, federal 
policy began to circumscribe its range of agency to the provision of housing. The National 
Housing Administration (NHA), which displaced the NRPB as the center of urban study in 
Washington, had as its task “to build houses, as many houses as it could.”162 But it was not until 
the passing of Title I in 1949 that urban redevelopment was finally severed from the Keynesian 
logic of economic management at the national scale and given over to the task of preserving 
local real estate values. By the late 1940s, Gropius’s attempts to intervene in planning policy 
were over, and he was focused on building up a practice with The Architects’ Collaborative 
 
162 Gelfand, A Nation of Cities, 104. 
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(TAC). The 1940s, however, had also set the scope of his ideological influence in American 
architecture.  
 196
4 VISION’S VALUE FOR DEMOCRACY: KEPES AND THE EDUCATION OF 








“I wonder whether you have come across Kepes’s new book, The Language of Vision,” 
wrote Gropius to Alexander Dorner in 1945. “At last, after all our endeavours [sic] in the 
Bauhaus, someone has taken up again this problem of formulating in definite terms a language of 
design, making objective fact statements instead of talking in terms like ‘wonderful’ and 
‘beautiful.’”1 In the two previous chapters, I have argued that Gropius’s conceptions of design 
practice were oriented to the task of sustaining a balance of freedom and control, played out 
across different areas of design expertise. His notion of design “method,” discussed in Chapter 
Two, stressed the import of spontaneous or unprogrammed decisions within a process otherwise 
constrained by the outcomes of functional and financial analysis. With respect to city planning, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, that essential fraction of freedom was extended to the 
production of residential buildings when set within the urban fabric subject to overall state 
control and regulation. The interest in a “language of vision,” which Gropius proclaimed to share 
                                                 
1 Walter Gropius to Alexander Dorner, 20 March 1945, HUA, UAV 322.138, Box 2. 
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with Kepes, was similarly motivated by the need to establish a “controlling agent within the 
[otherwise intuitive] creative act.”2  
The need for such an agent was expressed by Gropius in a 1947 essay that may be taken 
as the most complete statement of his thoughts on the subject. Setting in a wider context his 
reaction to Kepes’s book cited above, Gropius wrote: “today, after a long, chaotic period of l’art 
pour l’art—so utterly unrelated to the collective life of man—a new language of vision is slowly 
replacing individualistic terms like ‘taste’ or ‘feeling’ with terms of objective validity.”3 A basic 
perceptual grammar, he continued, or an “optical ‘counterpoint’” similar to the twelve-note 
musical key, this language of vision was “based on biological facts—both physical and 
psychological”—and at the same time reflected the “impersonal cumulative experience of 
successive generations.” Instituted as a fundamental part of design education, it would also serve 
as a “common bond” linking the designer to the rest of society, enhancing his “stature as a 
responsible man and citizen.”4 The notion of design based on optical rules subject to objective 
analysis harkens back to the Bauhaus; and Gropius focused his practical efforts on behalf of the 
“language of vision” at Harvard on a struggle to set up a Basic Design program, modeled after 
the Bauhaus Vorkurs.5  Much like the Vorkurs, Basic Design as Gropius envisioned it would 
involve exploration of the properties of materials and abstract formal relationships.  
                                                 
2 Walter Gropius, “Design Topics,” The Magazine of Art 40 (October 1947): 304. Gropius and Kepes were friendly, 
and discussed issues of visual perception when they spoke. See, e.g., a 1968 letter to Gropius in which Kepes writes: 
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problems, and in particular problems of scale.” Gyorgy Kepes to Walter Gropius, 22 January 1968, AAA, Kepes 
Papers, Reel 5305, frame 573.  
 
3 Gropius, “Design Topics,” 304. 
 
4 Ibid., 304. 
 
5 For a brief history of Gropius’s efforts in this direction, see Jill Pearlman, Inventing American Modernism: Joseph 
Hudnut, Walter Gropius, and the Bauhaus Legacy at Harvard (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia 
Press, 2007), 200-233. 
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However, the educational rationale for the course no longer focused on the student’s 
ability to manipulate form and material, but rather on his ability to influence the psychological 
reception of design. “This is the task of [design] education,” Gropius now maintained: “to learn 
what influences the psyche of man in terms of light, scale, form, and color”; because, in 
possession of such knowledge, the designer could “organize the psychological effects of his 
creation at will,” and “create new and stimulating sensations which will make us more receptive 
and more active.”6 The relationship to the Vorkurs was, thus, ultimately superficial. The primary 
targets for Gropius’s interest in optical rules were, on the one hand, the receptive mind, and on 
the other, its counterpart in forms of community identified with citizenship. This remarkable 
overlap between perceptual psychology and socio-political identity belonged to the discursive 
environment of the 1940s and 1950s. It will be the task of this chapter to untangle its logic, as it 
was in the work of Kepes, rather than of Gropius, that this discourse would find its fullest 
articulation with respect to design practice. Nevertheless, it is instructive, by way of introduction, 
to pursue for a moment longer the impact of that discourse on Gropius. 
 
In 1947, when Gropius wrote the essay cited above, a preoccupation with psychology in 
general, and the psychology of perception in particular, was evident in both academic and 
popular culture.7 Life magazine, from which Gropius borrowed illustrations of optical illusions 
he frequently used in lectures and also included in his essay, ran multiple articles on perceptual 
psychology during the 1940s and 1950s, culminating in an entire three-issue series titled “The 
                                                 
6 Gropius, “Design Topics,” 300, 301, 303. 
 
7 See Ellen Herman, The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995); Mark Jarzombek, The Psychologizing of Modernity: Art, Architecture, and 
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Age of Psychology in the U.S.”8 (Figure 32) But perhaps the crucial reference for Gropius’s 
reflections on perception was an influential and enormously popular book Education for What is 
Real (1947), written by education professor Earl C. Kelley.9 Gropius evidently read the book as 
soon as it came out, and proceeded to make it a required reading for his GSD students.10 As will 
be seen later in this chapter, Kelley argued that education should focus on the effects of the 
social environment on the psychological and ethical constitution of democratic citizens. Gropius 
adopted that premise and translated it into a two-pronged reflection on the educational role of 
perception, encompassing both the education of the citizen through design and the education of 
the designer as a good citizen. 
As Gropius conveyed it, Kelley’s message was that “sensation comes from us, not from 
the object which we see.”11 Perception’s grounding in a complex of understanding, memory, 
anticipation, and other psycho-cognitive faculties called for a shift of focus from the aesthetic or 
functional properties of design to the psycho-social effects of its reception. “If we can understand 
the nature of what we see and the way we perceive it,” Gropius summarized, “then we will know 
more about the potential influence of man-made design on human feeling and thinking.”12 As 
some GSD student problems assigned by Gropius demonstrate, the practical application of 
                                                 
8 Although Gropius’s published essays did not identify the sources for the illustrations used, a related list of captions 
preserved among Gropius’s papers indicates that at least two were, indeed, borrowed from Life. See [Walter 
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Deceive You,” Life (16 January 1950): 57-63; “The Age of Psychology in the U.S.,” Life (7 January 1957): 68-83; 
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perceptual research in the design process could involve the production of optical illusions 
through texture and color. (Figure 33) Gropius also developed for use in his courses a list of 
optical illusions with direct consequences in architectural design. He observed, for example, that 
“architectural lines may be disturbed by irregular or diagonal textures of materials, for instance, 
wood grains or marble patterns, therefore the texture of materials must be a part of the intended 
composition”; and that a “diagonal poché effect on a wall changes its direction in space, from 
‘static’ to ‘dynamic.’”13 “Colors can be active or passive,” Gropius explained in an article,  
planes or walls can be made to advance or recede by color treatment. The dimensions of a room thus 
appear to be different from what the actual measurement tells us. In fact the designer—if he masters 
these means—can create illusions which seem to belie the facts of measurement and construction.14 
The production of such effects, which he called “the artist’s magic,” was one example of the 
influence the postwar discourse of vision had on Gropius’s design pedagogy and practice.15  
 Another can perhaps be traced in the design for the Harvard Graduate Center (Harkness 
Commons) of 1949, which Gropius executed with The Architects Collaborative (TAC). A 
dormitory complex with dining and recreational facilities on the northern edge of the Harvard 
campus, Harkness Commons consists of eight buildings grouped around open courtyards and 
connected by covered walkways or pergolas. Ever since William Jordy juxtaposed images of the 
complex with those of the Dessau Bauhaus in his canonical essay of 1968, Harkness Commons 
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has served as a telling example of the decline in quality in Gropius’s postwar design 
production.16 (Figure 34) Adjoining the striking axonometric, in which the Bauhaus floats like an 
abstract composition of sliding geometrical shapes suspended in a weightless Cartesian matrix, 
the Graduate Center in aerial view certainly appears formally stilted, at once rigid and diffuse. 
The images TAC chose to illustrate Harkness Commons, however, convey an entirely different 
perspective. They are evidence of a design conception that all but excluded consideration of the 
building as object. One is offered street-level, pedestrian-eye views, in which the architecture is 
glimpsed in fragments, as though by a casual observer, the occupant or the passerby.17 (Figure 
35)  
 This conception of the building as a framing device, with respect to which the open 
spaces of the courtyards are brought into focus, is evident in TAC narratives of the design 
process. The concept was to replicate the “spatial theme of the Harvard Yard,” which is laid out 
in a sequence of quadrangles framed by buildings.18 “[T]he shaping of well-proportioned open 
spaces between buildings,” the architects wrote, “is as important as the form of the buildings 
surrounding them.” Those interstices, moreover, were not treated as shapes or volumes, but 
rather as orchestrated spatial experiences. The recreation of the mobile viewer’s experience was 
then an essential part of the design process:  “Emphasis was laid on creating an illusion of 
motion from one open space to another… The open spaces… flow into each other. The onlooker 
                                                 
16 William H. Jordy, “The Aftermath of the Bauhaus in America: Gropius, Mies, and Breuer” in D. Fleming and B. 
Bailyn, eds., The Intellectual Migration (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969). See Addendum to the Introduction for 
further discussion of this essay. 
 
17 Though these photographs convey none of the drama and dynamism of 1920s urban cityscapes by Laszlo Moholy-
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18 Walter Gropius, Jean B. Fletcher, Norman C. Fletcher, John C. Harkness, Sarah P. Harkness, Louis A. McMillen, 
Benjamin Thompson, eds., The Architects Collaborative (Teufen AR: Arthur Niggli Ltd., 1966), 63. 
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becomes aware of more interlocking spaces beyond and is tempted to walk into the next space 
and another range of vision.”19 Gropius himself applied to his discussion of Harkness Commons 
exactly the terms he had earlier derived from Kelley’s text. “To understand design,” he wrote in 
an outline for a 1949 talk,  
we must realize… how much of what we think we see is actually the result of experience. 
Sensation comes from us, not from the object which we see. … The artist or designer, 
then, must compromise between reality and illusion; he must know and make use of the 
multitudinous optical and psychological peculiarities of the human being.20  
That agenda was extended in the Harkness Commons design, tailored to “the human capacity to 
experience and sense harmonious space and scale.” Finally, as such, the Harkness Commons 
would also contribute to the ethical education of the Harvard student through the perceptual 
properties of the university environment. “The impact of environment on a young man is 
decisive,” Gropius wrote, linking the physical environment to Kelley’s notion of the social 
environment, “[s]timulating environment is just as important as vigorous teaching.”21 In 
Harkness Commons, design’s educational role would be sustained precisely through the 
dissolution of the architectural project into an environmental experience. 
 
In spite of his best efforts, Gropius never succeeded in establishing a program of 
perceptual education at the GSD. Had he done so, it would have likely been linked to the general 
education program planned at the same time for Harvard University as a whole.22 However, the 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 63. 
 
20 Walter Gropius, “Architecture of the Graduate Center,” manuscript, 14 November 1949, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, Rotch Library of Architecture and Planning, The Architects Collaborative Papers, Reel 4903, p.1. 
 
21 Ibid., 1. 
 
22 The artist Richard Filipowski was hired to teach a trial program in Basic Design, under the heading of Design 
Fundamentals, for 1950-1951. At that time, GSD faculty discussed linking the Design Fundamentals courses to 
Harvard’s core curriculum in general education. Having been met with staunch opposition from Hudnut, such efforts 
were abandoned. See Pearlman, Inventing American Modernism, 218-222. 
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discourse linking vision, education, and citizenship through recourse to the interiority of the 
thinking and perceiving subject only gained momentum into the 1950s. Shortly after Gropius 
retired from the GSD in 1951, Harvard embarked on a university-wide program to advance the 
education of vision as a fundamental part of general education—realized eventually in great part 
through the efforts of Dean Hudnut’s successor at the GSD, Jose Luis Sert. That history will be 
traced later in this chapter. The part played in it by Gropius, however limited, already reveals a 
shift of attention in design practices from the physical attributes of design to their effects on the 
interiority of the receiving subject, always placed in a social context. It is not, of course, that 
aesthetic or functional decisions cease to matter in such instances, but that the designer’s 
material production ceases to be seen as the exclusive end goal of practice, and emerges rather as 
a medium for interventions that take place in entirely less tangible terrain. To that territory Kepes 
dedicated the greater part of his career.  
It may be said that Gropius’s activities as an educator during the 1930s and 1940s, traced 
in the previous two chapters, prefigured the disciplinary logic of educational discourses pursued 
by Kepes, inasmuch as they tended to shift from a concern with design processes to a 
preoccupation with design capacities, the faculties of the trained designer. The discourse of 
vision, however, indexed the emergence during and immediately after the war of a set of issues 
that exceeded the institutional and rhetorical structures of professional knowledge. Steeped in 
this larger discourse, Kepes increasingly moved away from concern with the training of the 
designer toward the problem of cultivating a collective subject he would refer to as the “social 
man.” His project, in turn, reflected design’s response to changing imperatives within the politics 
of knowledge traced in this dissertation as it shifted from the relationship between the 
professional and the state to that between the nation and its citizens.  
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At the end of the 1930s, it may be recalled, economists heralded the advent of a new 
“intensive” development of America’s physical resources after the closing of the frontier, in 
which entrepreneurial freedom would have to be balanced against the constraints of state control. 
As late as November 1944, for example, The New Republic editors proclaimed the need for a 
new postwar frontier that “government and the people together can create… not by extension of 
the nation but by intensive improvement of what we have.” The magazine’s ideas still focused on 
“great new regional developments and the rebuilding of cities.”23 In postwar discourses and 
federal policies, however, another vision of the reopened frontier came to displace that late New 
Deal formulation, one whose dimensions were no longer measured against the geography of the 
continent. The same month The New Republic editorial posed the question “Is There a New 
Frontier?” President Franklin D. Roosevelt privately suggested: “new frontiers of the mind are 
before us.”24 The vast expansion of federal investment in educational and research institutions 
heralded in that formulation relied on the same economic rationale that had previously defined 
federal funding of infrastructure and urban redevelopment projects. This is made clear in the 
language with which the state communicated its goals. The mind was declared in 1947 the 
nation’s “most precious natural resource,” its cultivation measured against the gross national 
product.25 Education was identified in 1956 as a “careful mining and refining of all human 
talents in the land.” The schools, it was said, “by providing a channel for ambition… have taken 
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24 Franklin D. Roosevelt to Vannevar Bush, 17 November 1944, reprinted in Vannevar Bush, Science: The Endless 
Frontier: A Report to the President on a Program for Postwar Scientific Research (National Science Foundation, 
Washington, D.C., July 1945), 4. My emphases. 
 
25 Higher Education for Democracy: A Report of the President’s Commission on Higher Education (1947), reprinted 




the place of the frontier, and… have preserved the independent spirit of a pioneer nation.”26 By 
the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy crystallized this rationale with unrivalled precision. 
“The human mind,” he announced, “is our fundamental resource. A balanced Federal program 
must [include], beyond incentives for investment in plant and equipment,… determined 
measures to invest in human beings.”27 But such measures would be “selective, stimulative and, 
where possible, transitional.” According to the logic of “stimulus” spending, investment in the 
nation’s minds was “Federal assistance without Federal control.”28 
This chapter will argue that the displacement from material to intellectual resources in the 
emergence of education as an important channel of postwar state formation was paralleled by a 
similar displacement from production to reception in the discourses of those who sought a role 
for design in the postwar educational enterprise. Kepes’s work during and immediately after the 
war manifests this displacement in a project to define what might be called the citizen’s mind as 
the endpoint of design practice. For Kepes, the (politically mediated) intellect, rather than the 
aesthetic artifact, is the ultimate product of the designer’s work. The problem becomes that of 
how to define the role of design practices in the cultivation of desirable intellectual 
characteristics. It is across the field circumscribed by that problem that the interface of freedom 
and constraint will be played out. 
 
 
                                                 
26 A Report to the President; the Committee for the White House Conference on Education, Full Report, April 1956, 
reprinted in Cohen, Education in the United States, v. 5, pp. 3342-3343. 
 
27 President John F. Kennedy, “Special Message to the Congress on Education, February 20, 1961,” reprinted in 
Cohen, Education in the United States, v. 5, p. 3348. 
 
28 President John F. Kennedy, “Special Message to the Congress on Education, January 29, 1963,” reprinted in 
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4.1 MORALE  
 
“Art transforms us,” wrote Kepes’s mentor, the Hungarian avant-garde artist Lajos 
Kassak, “and we become capable of transforming our surroundings.”29 We have seen in Chapter 
One how Moholy-Nagy articulated that revolutionary premise through his dual role as the maker 
of objects that perform a visual training and as the educator of aptitudes for the new knowledge 
worker, the “man of many functions.” The distinction, perhaps, is subtle; and, inasmuch as it can 
be claimed, the latter role was for Moholy subservient to the former. Throughout his practice, he 
maintained a focus on the metaphorical “architecture” defined at Weimar, in whatever visual 
medium it may have appeared, as the goal of the designer’s creative activity. In his last position 
statement, published in 1947, Moholy still rehearsed the notion of art as a “Weltanschauung 
[that] registers contemporary problems [and] projects a desirable future order,” a “visual 
counterpart to a more purposeful, cooperative human society.” Thus, art objects acquired “an 
educational… function” largely metaphorically.30 Extending that model to industrial production, 
his New Bauhaus in Chicago functioned as a laboratory of practical inventions or prototypes.31 
The focus of the school’s curriculum—even as it paid heed to the “whole man,” introducing the 
student to humanistic and scientific subjects—was unambiguously the “designe[r] of handmade 
and machine-made products.”32 The training of “new men with fresh mentality,” of the “new 
                                                 
29 Lajos Kassák, “Bildarchitektur (Picture Architecture)” (1922) in Between Two Worlds: A Sourcebook of Central 
European Avant-Gardes, 1910-1930, trans. George Cushing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 430. 
 
30 László Moholy-Nagy, The New Vision, 1928 (4th rev. ed.), and Abstract of an Artist (New York: Wittenborn 
Schultz, 1947), 76. 
 
31Founded in 1937, the New Bauhaus went through several institutional changes during Moholy’s tenure: it was 
reorganized in 1939 as the Chicago School of Design, and became in 1944 the Institute of Design. When referring to 
practices and policies that spanned those transitions, I will herewith use the “New Bauhaus” as an umbrella title. 
 
32 The School of Design catalogue, academic year 1939-1940, cited in Lara N. Allison, “Perception and Pedagogy: 
Design, Advertising and Education in Chicago, c. 1935-1955” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2009), 65. 
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type of designer, able to face all kinds of requirements,” interested Moholy to the extent that it 
ultimately bore fruit in new commercial applications.33 The designer as a flexibly skilled 
innovator was, in that sense, the counterpart of the artist who represents a possible future in the 
work of art. Artists, Moholy commented in 1943, “are always far ahead. … [They] were using 
chromium and aluminum long before manufacturers could find much use for those materials. 
The artist sees beauty in a new material, and then others see it."34 
 Reflecting on the differences between his approach and that of Moholy, Kepes 
emphasized his own interest in “organizing [the Bauhaus’s] new findings” in “materials, 
techniques, and sensory fields,” as well as his focus on “the meaning of order in the visual 
experience in its present social context.”35 The activity he described—that of consolidation, 
articulation, definition of meaning and relevance—is more akin to scholarship than it is to artistic 
exploration. In another context, Kepes would summarize: “Moholy was more interested in… 
express[ing] an achievement, …the last moment of artistic ideas. … I had... a very different basic 
attitude to both education and art than he had.”36 The statement again affirmed Kepes’s distance 
from the project of artistic innovation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
33 Ibid., 65. Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, New Bauhaus Catalog, 1937, cited in Allison, “Perception and Pedagogy,” 57-58. 
In his first public address in Chicago, Moholy declared “to you—the industrialists—we offer our services for 
research. We shall work on your problems. In our workshops we shall provide research possibilities for synthetic 
fibers, fashion, dying, printing on textiles, wallpaper design, mural painting, the use of varnishes, lacquers, sprays, 
and color combinations in decorating; we shall explore for you typography, layout, commercial and portrait 
photography, microphotography, motion pictures in color and black-and-white, commercial art in posters and 
packages. We shall design stage display, window and shop display, exposition architecture, and all other 
architectural structures from a prefabricated bungalow to a factory; and we shall work with stone, glass, metal, 
wood, clay, and all plastics in the product design and sculpture classes.” László Moholy-Nagy, untitled public 
address, 23 September 1937, Knickerbocker Hotel, Chicago, IL, reprinted in Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, Experiment in 
Totality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969), 148-149. 
 
34 László Moholy-Nagy, cited in R.N. Yoder, “Are You a Contemporary?” Saturday Evening Post (3 July 1943): 89. 
 
35 Gyorgy Kepes to Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, 8 September 1948, Kepes Papers, AAA, Reel 5303, frame 220. 
 
36 Gyorgy Kepes, interview by Robert Brown, 7 March and 30 August 1972 and 11 January 1973, Kepes Papers, 
AAA, pp. 17-18. 
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The fundamental difference in approach to design practice between Kepes and Moholy 
may be measured by comparing two remarkably similar hypothetical institutions or 
organizations, combining precisely art and education, imagined by each within a few years of 
each other. Writing in 1937, Moholy proposed establishing an Academy of Light, whose task 
would be to explore light as a “creative factor,” stemming from new technologies of photography 
and film. The “theoretical and practical study of the uses of light” pursued at this Academy 
“from the historical, physical, physiological and other points of view,” would then be put to use 
in various commercial applications—“press photos, book illustrations, theatrical lighting, 
advertising of films and illuminated advertising.”37 It is true that, employed a year later at 
Moholy’s New Bauhaus, Kepes carried out precisely that kind of project as instructor of the 
“Drawing and Light Studio” (and eventually, by 1942, head of the “Light and Color 
Workshop”).38 Documented in his first book Language of Vision (1944), Kepes’s workshops 
entailed explorations in various photographic techniques.39 (Figure 36) As indicated by the 
predominance of advertising design illustrations in the book, many using innovative 
photographic techniques much like those evident in the work of Kepes’s students, the 
explorations of light and color pursued in his courses were destined overwhelmingly for 
advertising applications, actively pursued in Chicago by Kepes himself with his work for the 
Container Corporation of America. (Figure 37)  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
37 László Moholy-Nagy, “Light Painting,” Circle: International Survey of Constructive Art (1937), reprinted in 
Krisztina Passuth, Moholy-Nagy (London: Thames and Hudson, 1985), 343. 
 
38 Kepes’s title would change slightly through his years in Chicago and include oversight of: “Drawing and 
Photography,” “Advertising Arts,” “Photography and Light Workshop.” See Elizabeth Finch, “Languages of Vision: 
Gyorgy Kepes and the ‘New Landscape’ of Art and Science” (Ph.D. Diss., The City University of New York, 2005), 
145-148. 
 
39 Gyorgy Kepes, Language of Vision (Chicago: Paul Theobald, 1944). 
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However, an undated note made by Kepes sometime after America’s entry into the 
Second World War indicates a different set of ambitions and educational aims. Here, he sketches 
out a proposal for a “University of Vision” that would marshal “history, sociology, political 
science, geography, [and] economics” to the end of “examin[ing]critically the impact of the war 
upon society”—including such topics as “unemployment, market, public opinion”; and targeting 
such outcomes as “intelligent citizenship [and] industrial safety.”40 It is a scheme that appears to 
be quite distant from the professional concerns of the artist or designer. Envisioned instead is a 
knowledge and information clearinghouse, organized for the cultivation of a subject constituted 
politically and economically in relation to the state. As notes further down on the same page 
suggest, Kepes conceived his “university of vision” by analogy to wartime public service 
initiatives, such as Disney films “designed to instruct soldiers… in the proper handling of their 
weapons, and to teach civilians how to combat desease [sic], improve sanitation and to perform 
other functions contributing to war efforts.”41  
As the School of Design explored ways to participate in the “war effort,” Kepes reflected 
that the designer was being called upon to “reorient” into “new fields of activity.” “Most of these 
new activities,” he observed, 
are based on the raw materials of knowledge acquired in various peace-time professions. … 
Many experts were selected by the armed forces for these duties, while many are voluntarily 
selecting and preparing themselves for war-time jobs in which their skills and talents may be 
most useful.42 
In another set of notes that appear to be related to his proposal for a University of Vision Kepes 
again explored this reorientation of design expertise into new channels.  Here, the “new fields of 
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activity” opened up for knowledge workers by the war effort were linked to a wholesale re-
conception of the battlefield. “Not war of techniques,” Kepes ventured, “but war of human 
resources. War of morale. The mobilization of morale is the first step in the full mobilization.” 43 
Inasmuch as it witnessed an unprecedented acceleration of technological warfare, the Second 
World War was precisely a war of techniques. That would also have been the likelier insight 
from the point of view of design practice. On the home front, the constraints of wartime material 
shortages and the imperatives of rapid large-scale construction led many designers to experiment 
in the use of new materials and production techniques. The School of Design eagerly participated 
in this rush to innovate, inventing mattresses made of paper and new methods for repairing holes 
in gunner’s hoods on bombers, redesigning barbed wire and chairs.44 In that context, Kepes’s 
redefinition of mobilization imperatives in terms of morale rather than technological innovation 
was significant, and consequential for his practice beyond the war emergency. “Morale is 
condition for victory,” he wrote in a related note, “in war and peace.” 45 I would argue that the 
wartime context and the reflections it prompted was notably important for Kepes’s developing 
conception of design as a medium in the formation of what he called here the “social man”—but 
would perhaps be more accurately called, in the context of the discourses he engaged, the 
individual as citizen.  
To pursue for a moment longer the logic of Kepes’s operative redefinition of 
mobilization, keeping in mind that its ultimate goal was the redefinition of the designer’s role in 
wartime, its first step was to shift the battlefield from the exteriority of objects (weapons) to the 
                                                 
43 [Gyorgy Kepes,] handwritten undated note, Kepes Papers, AAA, Reel 5312, frame 582. 
 
44 For descriptions of wartime inventions at the School of Design, see Yoder, “Are You Contemporary?”; Betty 
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45 [Gyorgy Kepes,] handwritten undated note, Kepes Papers, AAA, Reel 5312, frame 609. 
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psycho-physical interiority of the individual. “Morale,” Kepes wrote, “is a mental state or 
condition as evidenced in the readiness to endure in spite of the most testing circumstances.” 
“The endurance of [the] individual,” he proceeded to elaborate,  
gets reinforcement from a faith in something outside his personal existence. Morale is a 
social phenomenon characteristic of social man—[it] is based on recognition that the 
survival of himself is indivisible from the survival of the group, nation or other forms of 
social ties.46 
Finally, it was vis-à-vis this complex subject that the task of design would be specified: “show 
this identification of the individual with a more embracing dimension.”47 In the second note on 
the subject of “morale” preserved in the archives, Kepes began to explore the possible roles of 
design expertise more concretely: “The cultivation and maintenance of morale by propaganda. 
Propaganda uses language—verbal + visual… Pictures are the most easily understood language 
in the [primitive] level. … Poster is the main vehicle of picture expression.”48 What is the role of 
images in inspiring good morale, Kepes posits here, in the psycho-physiological reshaping, in 
other words, of the individual as “social man”? That was the implied goal of the University of 
Vision. “Propaganda” would only be a limited and transitional solution.   
Kepes would have encountered the term “morale” at least by 1942, when he and Moholy 
served on a Chicago metropolitan committee for civilian morale among Americans of Hungarian 
descent.49 However, the term had a much wider relevance. It was borrowed from the disciplinary 
discourse of psychology—a field of “expertise” contributing in unprecedented numbers and 
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ways to the war effort.50 The reflections on the proper meaning of mobilization found in Kepes’s 
notes, in fact, reproduced a pervasive argument grounding the relevance of psychological 
knowledge in the prosecution of the war. “Moods, attitudes, and feelings,” as one historian 
summarized that argument,  
were not simply appropriate objects of military policy; they were the most appropriate… . The naïve 
idea that wars could be won simply by perfecting weapons technology to kill one’s opponents, it was 
noted frequently, was incorrect. By far the most effective road to victory was to destroy enemy 
morale while bolstering one’s own.51 
Within the range of both governmental agencies and privately-funded projects engaged in 
examining the problem of morale, some dealt specifically with public communications and 
propaganda analysis—including, for example, the Rockefeller Foundation Communications 
Group, which sponsored a number of university-based centers dedicated to the analysis of radio 
broadcasts, newspapers, and public opinion formation. Prominent among the latter was the 
Columbia University Office of Radio Research, where the Gestalt psychologist Rudolf Arnheim 
worked for seven months in 1941, examining, as he reported, “the psychological, sociological 
and economic conditions under which art, entertainment, popular instruction, propaganda, etc. 
are produced and consumed in contemporary American society.”52 Kepes had a longstanding 
                                                 
50 As Ellen Herman asserts in her study of the discipline in the first postwar decades, the growth, prestige, and 
popular presence of psychology was catalyzed by the wartime activities of psychologists in Washington. By the 
close of the Second World War, nearly 3,000 psychiatrists and around 1,700 psychologists worked in war-related 
government agencies; between 1920 and 1946, membership in the American Psychiatric Association grew more 
than fourfold, and membership in the American Psychological Association more than elevenfold. See Ellen Herman, 
The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995), 17-20. 
 
51 Ibid., 29. 
 
52 Rudolf Arnheim to John Marshall, 1 October 1941, Arnheim Papers, AAA, Box 1, Folder: Correspondence, 1941, 
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project analyzing newspaper communications at the University of Chicago. See Herman, The Romance of American 
Psychology, 32; see also Christopher Simpson, The Science of Coercion: Communication Research and 
Psychological Warfare 1945-1960 (Oxford University Press, 1994), 22. 
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acquaintance with Arnheim, which would eventually grow into a friendship; in 1941, the latter 
would certainly have been a key reference for Kepes’s developing conception of the image.53 
Around this time, both were thinking about relationships between art and the media of mass 
communications—the de facto subject of Language of Vision, for which Gestalt psychology 
would be credited as the conceptual groundwork.54 However, the central problem of morale 
research—the relationship between the individual and the group, and its mediation in the public 
sphere—preoccupied many key figures in Kepes’s orbit during the early 1940s.  
 Judging by the frequency of Moholy’s references in Vision in Motion (1947), which 
chronicles the work of the New Bauhaus, the school was suffused with the language of 
psychology and psychoanalysis. During the war, the school held sessions in “rehabilitation” and 
“occupational therapy,” initiatives that accorded with the conception of public service Kepes 
accessed in his notes. Sponsored by the Illinois Welfare Department, these were addressed, 
Moholy explained, to “the psychological aftermath of [the] war and the social and physical 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
53 While working in Moholy’s Berlin office, Kepes designed the cover for Arnheim’s book Film als Kunst (Berlin: 
Rowohlt, 1932). See Finch, “Languages of Vision,” 235, n.140. Arnheim was known in Bauhaus circles, as he 
visited the Dessau Bauhaus in 1927 and wrote a review of the Gropius-designed headquarters for the liberal 
periodical Die Weltbühne. See Behrens, “Rudolf Arnheim,” 232. Arnheim’s article has been reprinted as Rudolf 
Arnheim, “The Bauhaus in Dessau” (1927) in Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, Edward Dimendberg, eds., The Weimar 
Republic Sourcebook (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1994), 450-451. Arnheim would correspond 
frequently with Kepes in America, contributing essays to three of Kepes’s publications, as well as a review of 
Kepes’s artworks for one of the first catalogue of his collected works. See Rudolf Arnheim, “Visual Thinking” in 
Gyorgy Kepes, ed., Education of Vision (New York: George Braziller, 1965), 1-15; Rudolf Arnheim, “Image and 
Thought” in Gyorgy Kepes, ed., Sign, Image, Symbol (New York: George Braziller, 1966), 62-77; Rudolf Arnheim, 
“A Review of Proportion” in Gyorgy Kepes, ed., Module, Proportion, Symmetry, Rhythm (New York: George 
Braziller, 1966), 218-230; Rudolf Arnheim, untitled, in Gyorgy Kepes: Works in Review (Boston: Museum of 
Science, 1973), 10-15. 
 
54 In his acknowledgements, Kepes credited the Gestalt psychologists Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, and Wolfgang 
Köhler for providing him with “many of the inspiring ideas and concrete illustrations… to explain the laws of visual 
organization.” Kepes, Language of Vision, 4. Arnheim studied with those three founders of Gestalt psychology, as 
well as Kurt Lewin, at the University of Berlin Psychological Institute. During his years in Berlin, he focused his 
studies on film and radio. His work at the Columbia University Office of Radio Research, he wrote, “provided the 
link between [his] former activities in the field of film and radio and the more abstract research in the field of the 
psychology of art” he intended to pursue afterwards. Arnheim to John Marshall, 1 October 1941, Arnheim Papers, 
AAA, Box 1, Folder: Correspondence, 1941, p.2. 
 
 214
effects of its machines and weapons.”55 Intended not only for wounded or shell-shocked war 
veterans, but also for victims of industrial accidents amplified by wartime hyper-productivity, the 
sessions adapted Bauhaus educational strategies of creative exploration to the rehabilitation of 
“patients,” rather than the training of designers.56 Moholy described the process as the release of 
“buried [creative] energies… for contemporary orientation, … to overcome… old habits, ideas, 
and judgments not any longer applicable to our age”; and the final goal, as “the reincorporation 
of the handicapped as a creative and responsible member into society.”57 But he also drew on the 
authority of an Illinois Mental Hygiene Service Deputy Director, who likened the sessions to 
psychoanalysis, which likewise “reaches down into the unconscious.” The participants, wrote the 
Mental Hygiene administrator, 
found in their ability to navigate in this new field the kind of enriched and strengthened character that 
is analogous to what happens in psychoanalytic therapy, wherein a patient replaces the rigid, 
unconsciously motivated inhibitions of the past with a conscious direction of his life, making social 
use of all his potentialities.58 
For Moholy, however, the endpoint of this “practical rehabilitation” was ultimately located 
within the industrial “production process”59 The “patient” may not have been a designer, but he 
was, nevertheless, still a maker of objects; and the social milieu into which he would have to be 
“reincorporated,” following the optimization of his “productive level,” was still that of “the 
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abilities. We don’t aim to make a designer of him, but to make him conscious of form and space and touch. Perhaps 
he can operate [a] small jigsaw at his bedside, or do sculpture or painting.” Cited in Prosser, “Design for Wartime 
Living.” 
 
57 Moholy-Nagy, “Better than Before,” 23. 
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industrial world.”60 The idea was brought home in the sequence of images Moholy chose to 
illustrate an article on rehabilitation he wrote in 1943: a photograph of a “hand sculpture” class 
for the blind at the School of Design was followed by an example of a pebble-shaped “hand 
sculpture,” which in turn morphed on the next page into images of a similarly ergonomic design 
for a telephone handset and its mass production prototype.61 (Figure 38) Part of that sequence 
was also reproduced on the pages of Vision in Motion, where “occupational therapy” sessions 
were linked to the New Bauhaus basic course as “aptitude tests” for “vocational guidance.” 
(Figure 39) The declared rationale of both was to “free the student… from possible regressions 
and hindrances,” and the goal of both was enhanced productivity.62   
 However, there was another therapeutic paradigm in circulation at the New Bauhaus, 
whose utility was not ultimately realized on the assembly line. Moholy’s choice of words in a 
passage of his 1943 article gestured toward that model. “Creative work and conscious personality 
development,” he wrote, “can overcome maladjustments or feelings of inferiority in the 
competitive and heterosexual relationships… .”63 Such more diffuse and less vocational 
“maladjustments” were the primary concern of the general semantics movement, which was 
conceived, precisely, as a “therapy of attitudes.”64 General semantics was part of the “scientific 
and humanistic studies” sequence at the New Bauhaus. One of its most prominent 
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representatives, S. I. (Samuel Ichiye) Hayakawa, lectured at the school.65 He apparently made a 
rather significant impression on Kepes, who would later ask him to both review the manuscript 
for Language of Vision and write an introduction to the book. It is general semantics that 
provides the point of intersection among psychological discourses, the problem of propaganda, 
and the concept of language.  
Founded by Alfred Korzybski, an eccentric Polish-American thinker, general semantics 
was a quasi-science dedicated to cognitive and behavioral modification.66 Influenced in part by 
analytic philosophy and pragmatism, Korzybski advanced the idea that linguistic abstractions 
create a pernicious “Aristotelian” mindset at the source of a multitude of social psychological 
problems. Systematic recognition of the context-dependent nature of meaning, he proposed, 
could counter such ills.67 The Institute of General Semantics, established in 1938, claimed to 
provide training in the elimination of “semantogenic difficulties,” to be followed by 
“unpredictable psychosomatic results of a beneficial character,” such as the clearing of “different 
blockages, ‘inhibitions,’ excessive drinking,” and the improvement of intelligence and “creative 
capacities.” 68 A central concern of Korzybski and his followers, however, was that the 
misrecognition of the abstract nature of linguistic constructs left the public vulnerable to 
propaganda. The “humanly harmful” abuses of communication, Korzybski wrote in 1933, “breed 
such ‘führers’ as different Hitlers, Mussolinis, Stalins, etc., whether in political, financial, 
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industrial, scientific, medical, educational, or even publishing, etc., fields.”69 Best-sellers such as 
Stuart Chase’s The Tyranny of Words (1938) and Hayakawa’s Language in Action (1944) 
popularized general semantics in great measure by addressing wide-spread concerns about the 
political effects of propaganda, which escalated during the war.  
 The problem of mass communications—the public circulation of information and its 
effects on the body politic—was familiar also to the philosopher Charles Morris, Hayakawa’s 
University of Chicago colleague and an important presence at the New Bauhaus. Morris’s more 
technical and academic work in semiotics drew on the same sources in logical positivism and 
pragmatist philosophy as had the general semanticists’. The impact of Morris on Kepes was, 
evidently, significant.70 The interdisciplinary synthesis of knowledge sketched out by Kepes as 
the backbone of his University of Vision echoed the course in “intellectual integration” Morris 
taught at the New Bauhaus, which introduced students to scientific and humanistic subjects in 
order to “reintegra[te] the artist into the common life.”71 Morris would be credited as the second 
reader and adviser for The Language of Vision, and it is his writings of the period that outline the 
idea of art as a “language of value,” a fundamental conceptual building block of Kepes’s first 
book.  
Morris’s presence at the New Bauhaus was a product of his affiliation with the Vienna 
Circle of logical positivists, for which he acted as the “American clearinghouse” during the 
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1930s.72 The Dessau Bauhaus had found points of ideological affinity and established contacts 
with the Vienna Circle—contacts that were renewed in Chicago, where both Morris and Vienna 
Circle founding member Rudolf Carnap now taught. At the New Bauhaus, “intellectual 
integration” proceeded under the philosophical auspices of the Vienna Circle, reconvened in 
America as the Unity of Science movement. Morris understood the New Bauhaus as part of that 
larger project to found a synthesis of all knowledge in a universally valid, objective and 
empirical “language,” free of metaphysical or aesthetic abstractions. “[W]e need desperately,” he 
wrote in the New Bauhaus prospectus,  
a simplified and purified language in which to talk about art… in the same simple and direct way in 
which we talk about the world in scientific terms. For the purposes of intellectual understanding art 
must be talked about in the language of scientific philosophy and not in the language of art.73 
It was the realization of this very ambition that Gropius would approvingly identify in Kepes’s 
Language of Vision—the solution to the “problem of formulating in definite terms a language of 
design, making objective fact statements instead of talking in terms like ‘wonderful’ and 
‘beautiful.’”74 Kepes scholars have focused on the themes of structure, order, and integration that 
pervade the linguistic analogy as it was employed by both Kepes and Morris.75 The model of 
language engaged by Kepes through his association with Morris and Hayakawa, however, also 
outlined a particular instrumentality that established a circuit of relations among design, 
knowledge production, and political formations. It is that instrumentality that I pursue here. 
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The logical positivist enterprise of the 1920s and early 1930s was motivated by 
opposition to “blood and soil” ideologies of the right, which the Vienna Circle viewed as 
pernicious metaphysical mystifications, to be dispelled through the promotion of scientific 
philosophy.76 Thus their search for a purified language of logic was already marked by an 
awareness of the political power of language, its role in the construction of a menacing—because 
irrational—social body: the masses. The role of ideology or propaganda in the formation of the 
masses as a threatening political agent, defined by its irrationality and volatility, was a central 
preoccupation of political discourse in the first decades of the twentieth century. Its key referent 
was in the antidemocratic sociology of Gustave Le Bon, whose writings were well known in 
Vienna. In progressive era America, Le Bon’s warnings about the irrationality of mass behavior 
were cleansed of their illiberal elitism and elaborated into a discourse on the formation of public 
opinion and its effects on democratic politics. Books like Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion 
(1922) pointed to the effectiveness of World War I propaganda as a lesson in the gullibility and 
emotionalism of the masses and advocated shielding public policy decisions from public opinion 
so as to maintain the grounding of democracy in rational deliberation. Theories of the public and 
its manipulation were in turn operative in the foundation of American social psychology and, in 
the guise of “crowd psychology,” returned during the Second World War to support the 
discourse of morale invoked by Kepes.77  
But the problem of how a social and political unit, “the public,” is constituted through 
language, or discourse, was also fundamental to American pragmatism. In his celebrated 
response to Lippmann, The Public and Its Problems (1928), John Dewey formulated a notion of 
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what has been called “the social self,” constituted in both its material interests and mental 
orientations through participation in democratic debate.78 If the “public” could emerge in a 
convergence of irrational drives, it could also be brought into being through rational deliberation. 
The democratic commonwealth was a collective political subject constituted in the “social 
education” of citizens through argument.79 Likewise, Morris argued in a 1934 essay "Pragmatism 
and the Crisis of Democracy" that the effects of totalitarian ideology on the masses should be 
combated through “the marriage of the scientific habit of mind with the moral ideal of 
democracy."80 In fact, the notion that a democratic polity was constituted through the 
rationalization of public discourse was a hallmark of the period’s political philosophy, and it was 
linked to more fundamental assumptions about the intersubjective structure of political 
formations. Because the polity was thought of as a collection of individuals, the psychological, 
ideological, and intellectual qualities of the individual could be seen to determine the soundness 
of the political institution. The focus on language and its educational or therapeutic 
instrumentality derived from this set of assumptions. Like the social psychology of the period, 
they “melded the understanding of individual and collective behavior [and joined] the 
comprehension and change of self to the comprehension and change of society.”81  
The notion of collective subjecthood constructed through language, and the educational 
tasks it opened up for democracy, also deeply informed the American re-conception of the 
Vienna Circle. The Unity of Science movement embraced Dewey as one of its prominent 
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spokesmen, and pragmatism in general as the new counterpoint to logical positivism in its 
epistemology. Morris in particular explicitly devoted his work to the articulation of links 
between the two philosophies. The physicist and philosopher Philipp Frank, as Chair of the 
Institute for the Unity of Science, also remarked on the affinity between, for example, Carnap’s 
ideas and the pragmatist postulate that “the meaning of any statement is given by… what it 
means as a direction for human behavior.”82 In 1950, Frank would highlight this “pragmatic” 
emphasis on social scientific instrumentality as the defining element of the Unity of Science’s 
pursuit of the “integration of knowledge.” “[I]t has turned out more and more,” he wrote,  
that [all] problems cannot be settled definitely on the basis of logical and semantical analysis. … 
[Some] problems put the question whether a certain formal system, as a whole, with the addition of a 
semantical interpretation, is useful for the orientation of man in the world of experience. Here we turn 
from the logical and semantical to the pragmatical viewpoint. … [The latter] consider[s] science as a 
human enterprise by which man tries to adapt himself to the external world. Then a “pragmatic” 
criterion means… the introduction of psychological and sociological considerations into every 
science… . [T]he sociology of science… has to be connected in a very tight way with every 
consideration which one may call logical or semantical.83 
It was the kind of instrumentality that Language of Vision also tried to access in a project 
oriented to the construction of social subjectivity, models for which Kepes sought among the 
available discourses of perceptual psychology, social psychology, and semantics.  
 Lippmann had described public opinion as “the pictures in our heads.”84 Among the 
Vienna Circle, Otto Neurath was dedicated to outlining the role of images in mass 
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communication.85 The Encyclopedia of Unified Science, a never-completed Unity of Science 
initiative, was projected to include a supplemental “Visual Thesaurus.”86 In a sense, the 
systematic articulation of vision as a language was both anticipated by and lacking in the 
discursive context Kepes entered. His introduction to Language of Vision rehearsed the focus of 
that discourse on the public circulation of language: “The visual language,” he wrote, “is capable 
of disseminating knowledge more effectively than almost any other vehicle of communication. 
… Visual communication is universal and international… .”87 The link between the 
communicative properties of images and the social instrumentality of art was then supplied by 
the concept of “value.” Values, Kepes wrote, expressed the “potential ‘order’ in man’s 
relationship to nature and to his fellow man,” and were therefore “recognized directives toward a 
more satisfactory human life.”88 As a carrier of value, the artistic image represented “a symbolic 
order of [man’s] psychological and intellectual experiences” that “directed and inspired him 
toward materializing the potential order inherent in each stage of history.”89  
Kepes cited as his source Whitehead’s observation that art was the “enjoy[ment] of vivid 
values”;90 but his discussion of art’s potential instrumentality was much closer to Morris’s ideas. 
As previously mentioned, Morris based his New Bauhaus program on the premise that art was a 
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“language of value.” That concept was elaborated in his 1939 article on the subject of 
relationships among art, science, and technology.91 The three disciplines were treated here as 
different types of discourse, understood according to the pragmatist tradition in terms of their 
social “functions”—or as “sign-sustained and sign-sustaining activities.” The “aesthetic sign” 
was defined as that which “designates the value properties of actual or possible situations.” As 
such, aesthetics was a discourse that “presents values for direct experience,” or a “language of 
value.” 92 It was thus distinguished from both the language of science (statements of fact or 
prediction) and the language of technology (statements of command), even as all three were seen 
to be “mutually supporting.”93 Kepes’s notion of value, however, collapsed the distinction 
Morris maintained between the languages of art and of technology. The purpose of the former for 
Morris was to “present a value,” that of the latter—“to induce a mode of action.” Unlike the 
language of art, therefore, technological discourse had “an irreducible… imperative component.” 
94 For Kepes, on the other hand, the artistic image shared that imperative dimension—the image 
itself was a “directive.”95  In transcribing vision as a language, therefore, Kepes invested art with 
the direct instrumentality typically reserved by the discourses around him for other linguistic 
forms. If “the creative imagination” could be thought of as a visual technology, Kepes reasoned, 
it could then be mobilized “for positive social action.”96 
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Language of Vision closed with a full-page reproduction of a 1940 poster distributed by 
the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), a division of the Executive branch set up to 
coordinate national defense measures. (Figure 40) In a dynamic composition inspired by 
constructivist agit-prop it announced that “production” was “America’s answer,” presumably to 
the question of war mobilization. It was an apt metaphor for the kind of creative productivity that 
Kepes’s book sought both to describe and to incite. Reminiscent in both form and function of the 
posters produced by Kepes’s Hungarian avant-garde forefathers for the revolutionary regime, the 
OEM poster was a contemporary example of their notion of art as a political intervention in the 
public sphere. It was also an example of design as a language of public communication, the 
ultimate referent of the discourses on language Kepes encountered in early 1940s America. 
Accordingly, Kepes posited “visual publicity”—the “innumerable” forms of which 
included “posters on the streets, picture magazines, picture books, container labels, [and] 
window displays”—at the apex of the language of vision he sought to define. 97 The other name 
he gave to that public visual language was “advertising art.” As advertisement, however, it had 
only the most tenuous connection to the process of consumption, and none at all to the consumer 
object. Kepes’s discussion of advertisement made a nod, in passing, to the “eye [of the] 
customer,” so important to Moholy.98 Language of Vision, however, was distinguished from both 
The New Vision and Vision in Motion by the total absence of industrial design objects among its 
illustrations. Even the “advertising designs” reproduced by Kepes rarely included images of the 
products they were presumably intended to sell. The social sphere within which Kepes situated 
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his intervention was not commercial—the sphere of production and exchange—but properly 
speaking political—the sphere of communication and the constitution of the collective subject. 
The “purpose” of “visual publicity” images would be twofold: to “disseminate socially useful 
messages”; and to “train the eye, and thus the mind, with the necessary discipline of seeing 
beyond the surface of visible things, to recognize and enjoy values necessary for an integrated 
life.”99 Thus, Language of Vision was less a primer on the production of commercially effective 
visual communication than it was a reflection on the social contingencies and effects of public 
visual reception. It captured the concerns of a nation-state at war and refracted them through the 
medium of aesthetic discourse. With the end of hostilities, the problem of morale, centered as it 
was on communications, was displaced by new national goals in the disciplining of the citizen—
centered, this time, on knowledge production. 
 
4.2 CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE 
  
Much of the technical content in Language of Vision was worked out in an evening 
course program of Visual Fundamentals, which Kepes ran during his tenure in Chicago. If art’s 
language of value implied a certain plenitude of form and meaning, in which the moral 
constitution of society found its perceptual equivalent, Visual Fundamentals entailed, on the 
contrary, an analytic decomposition of the image to reveal its basic substructure. For example, a 
1940 outline for a class on the relationship between color and brightness instructed the student to 
translate a color reproduction of a “great master” painting as a grouping of black-and-white 
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units.100 The book was, likewise, divided into sections on various optical constituents of the 
image, and its illustrations frequently juxtaposed student work focused on the articulation of such 
elements with the works of established artists. (Figure 41)  
Kepes’s strategy invites immediate comparison with the Bauhaus preliminary course, the 
basic principle of which, as Moholy put it, was “to break down complex tasks into fundamental 
components so that they can be digested one after the other.”101 Preliminary course exercises in 
Chicago also occasionally referred the student to the “intuitive research” of artists, whose works 
could inspire those basic explorations “in a simplified version”—as the collages of Kurt 
Schwitters, for example, inspired student “texture exercises.”102 Moholy, however, insisted on 
the essential discontinuity between the fundamentals of creative exploration and the work of art, 
which enjoyed a privileged status. “[O]nce the elementary course,” he wrote, “has brought [the 
student’s] emotional and intellectual power into activity, he will be able to do creative work. 
This does not mean necessarily that it will be ‘art.’ Art is the expression on the highest level of a 
cultural epoch… .”103 Likewise, Moholy segregated his discussions of art and of design in Vision 
in Motion as separate areas of professional activity, and emphasized the New Bauhaus goal to 
educate “designers and craftsmen” as opposed to “free artist[s].”104  
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Kepes’s thought goes against the grain of such discriminations. “From the simplest form 
of [spatial] orientation to the most embracing plastic unity of a work of art,” he wrote in 
Language of Vision,  
there is a common significant basis. … A typographical design, scribbling on paper, color spots on a 
canvas, a photograph, a simple haphazard manipulation of light or a painting with an explosive 
emotional message—all these are spatial expressions by virtue of the process through which the eye 
organizes their visible differences into a whole.105  
At the same time, even as Kepes observed that his findings would be important in the “training 
for visual expression,” his main goal was neither the definition of works of art and design nor the 
education of their producers, but the elaboration of what may be defined as the process of visual 
cognition.106 Thus, although his discussion was bracketed—in the introduction and the 
conclusion—by a concern with the aesthetic properties of the material environment, at the heart 
of his project was a shift of attention from the exteriority of visible forms to the interiority of the 
viewing subject; and specifically, the viewing subject as a thinking subject. Crucial to that shift, 
the notion of “organization” or “order” emerged as the driving force of the language of vision. 
 “The experiencing of every image,” wrote Kepes,  
is the result of an interraction [sic] between external physical forces and internal forces of the 
individual as he assimilates, orders, and molds external forces to his own measure. … Sight is more 
than pure sensation, for light rays reaching the eye have no intrinsic order as such. They are only a 
haphazard, chaotic panorama of mobile, independent light-happenings. As soon as they reach the 
retina, the mind organizes and molds them into meaningful spatial units.107 
A conception of vision as the interaction between “external” physical stimuli and “internal” 
cognitive schemas was a basic tenet of Gestalt perceptual psychology. Kepes cited its founders 
Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, and Wolfgang Kohler as the sources of his insight into the “laws 
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of visual organization.”108 Gestalt theory allows us to understand both Kepes’s focus on mental 
processes—the relationship between vision and the constitution of meaning—and the peculiar 
form of direct social instrumentality he assigned to images by eliding the natural and the social 
forms of stimulus.  
The dominant paradigm of early twentieth-century German experimental psychology, 
Gestalt theory was familiar at the Bauhaus, where it was engaged by Paul Klee, Wassily 
Kandinsky, and Josef Albers, among others. The idea that perception is based on unified 
irreducible wholes or Gestalten, and equally the striking diagrammatic illustrations found in 
Gestalt psychology treatises, influenced Bauhaus artists’ search for an abstract aesthetics of 
elementary forms. 109 Language of Vision also embraced notions similar to those proposed by 
Kandinsky’s aesthetic theory—for example, that “visual balances” or “tensions” among basic 
aesthetic units such as the point or the line are linked to psychological or mental energies.110 The 
concept of formal Gestalten certainly remained a central element of Gestalt perceptual 
psychology in America, where the triumvirate of its founders emigrated in the 1930s, 
accompanied by a number of prominent students, such as Arnheim and social psychologist Kurt 
Lewin. In the new context, however, Gestalt psychologists found themselves having to defend a 
more fundamental premise of their approach: their “introspectionist” methodology that dealt with 
cognitive experience, or “mental life,” discredited as objectively unknowable and therefore 
scientifically irrelevant by the positivist and empiricist doctrines of behaviorism, the dominant 
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school of American psychology.111 Since the accessibility of mental processes was now the main 
point of contention, Gestalt psychology in America became known primarily as the theory of 
“complex mental organization.”112 
The American writings of Arnheim, to whom Kepes was closest personally, emphasized 
specifically the connection between cognitive and perceptual processes, between images and 
thought, expressed in the Gestaltist concept of “organization” or “order.” “Gestalt theory,” wrote 
Arnheim in 1943,  
uses as its method… the description of the structural features… of those natural things or happenings 
in which the character and function of any part is determined by the total situation. The method, 
however, must be understood as deriving from a more basic attitude which… emphasizes the 
formative powers and, if I may say so, the ‘intelligence’ of the peripheral sensory processes, vision, 
hearing, touch, etc., which had been reduced by traditional theory to the task of carrying the bricks of 
experience to the architect in the inner sanctuary of the mind.113   
This latter notion also constituted Arnheim’s basic insight into artistic production in general—the 
focus of his work in America. If perception was the organization of physical stimuli into 
meaningful units, then the work of art had to be seen as a cognitive, rather than a purely 
aesthetic, product; in fact, a clear difference between aesthetic perception and cognition could no 
longer be sustained. That was the theoretical foundation of his canonical 1954 book Art and 
Visual Perception. “[T]he same mechanisms,” wrote Arnheim, “operate on both the perceptual 
and the intellectual level… . 
Recent psychological thinking, then, encourages us to call vision a creative activity of the human 
mind. Perceiving accomplishes at the sensory level what in the realm of reasoning is known as 
understanding. Every man’s eyesight anticipates in a modest way the justly admired capacity of the 
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artist to produce patterns that validly interpret experience by means of organized form. Eyesight is 
insight.114 
 
Equating formal organization with intellectual comprehension as the “apprehension of significant 
structural patterns,” therefore, allowed Arnheim to activate vision as a creative process, rather 
than a static reflection of physical reality.115 The premise that to see an order in the world was at 
once to give an order to the world also grounded the particular agency Kepes assigned to the 
image. “To perceive a visual image,” he wrote in Language of Vision, “implies the beholder’s 
participation in a process of organization. The experience of an image is thus a creative act of 
integration.”116 Unlike Arnheim, though, Kepes invested his conception of vision’s agency with 
an explicitly social dimension. If vision’s cognitive patterning was an essentially creative 
process, Kepes’s goal, as may be recalled, would be to “mobilize the creative imagination for 
positive social action.”117  
 The connection between visual and intellectual processes was still rather implicit in 
Language of Vision. In accordance with its linguistic model, the book focused more on the 
communication rather than the production of visual meaning. In Kepes’s subsequent work, 
however, the cognitive investment of the image would come to the foreground to shape the 
project he pursued from the 1950s forward: that of bridging the visual disciplines of art and 
design and the intellectual disciplines of the physical and social sciences. His next book, The 
New Landscape in Art and Science (1956) stated in no uncertain terms as early as the second 
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paragraph of the Preface: “vision is itself a mode of thinking.”118 When he returned to Language 
of Vision in 1973 with the task to write a new introduction for a reprint edition of the book, 
Kepes also chose to emphasize what perhaps now appeared latent or submerged in the original 
argument: “The patterning of the welter of optical signals coming from outside to make 
perceptual images is a basic form of comprehending… Intellectual life emerges from the life of 
the senses…”119  
As the title of one indicates unambiguously, “Image and Thought” was also the focus of 
several essays Arnheim was invited to contribute to Kepes’s anthology series Vision and Value, 
published in the mid-1960s under the imprint of George Braziller.120 Twenty years after his 
initial forays into the perceptual psychology of art, Arnheim was working on a book on “visual 
thinking,” engaged with the question of how “to discover the best methods of training the mind 
for its profession.”121 But by then Arnheim was far from alone in dedicating his attention to the 
latter question. As demonstrated by the overall contributions to another Vision and Value 
volume, The Education of Vision (1965), the problem of aesthetic education was now identified 
with the problem of vision’s role in the training of cognition. “All the contributors to this 
volume,” wrote Kepes in the introduction “agree on two points. First, that there is a fundamental 
interdependence between perception and conception, between the visual and the rational… the 
sensory and the intellectual … And second, that… there is an urgent need today for a re-
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evaluation of the education of vision.”122 In fact, the training of the creative intellect in general 
emerged in the postwar period as a key item of the national agenda, framing and motivating 
discourses on perception and aesthetics, among others, and opening up a channel for the further 
development of Kepes’s project.  
Starting in the 1940s, the federal government vastly expanded its activities in the area of 
education, implementing a series of studies, legislation, and funding initiatives that accelerated 
into the 1960s. Such measures indexed a tidal shift in the relationship between education and the 
state as schools moved from a matter of parochial concern and jurisdiction to the forefront of 
national attention, and universities emerged as important centers of knowledge production and 
training. The conception of the identity and goals of education as a national priority, however, 
changed dramatically in the span of this short period.  
Its inaugural moments before the end of the war were framed by the social contract logic 
of Roosevelt’s Economic Bill of Rights, discussed in the previous chapter. The Servicemen’s 
Readjustment Act (the “G.I. Bill of Rights”) of 1944 presented education as a civil right, a matter 
of equal opportunity, of social security and economic mobility. In that way, it was a continuation 
and expansion of the 1943 Vocational Rehabilitation Act, which provided for the vocational 
training of disabled veterans to reenter the productive economy.123 The rehabilitation program at 
the School of Design discussed earlier in this chapter may well have benefitted from federal 
allocations under that act. More generally, the social contract language of the mid-1940s was 
invoked by Moholy’s Chicago reflections on education that promised “to add to the politico-
social a biological ‘bill of rights’ asserting the interrelatedness of man’s fundamental qualities, 
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… of his psychological well-being and his physical health.”124 Moholy’s focus on the functional 
psycho-physical “integration” of the “whole man” as the goal of education for “a social 
organization in which everyone is utilized to his highest capacity” resonated with American 
progressive positions on education still dominant in the mid-1940s that combined a faith in 
human engineering with visions of planned cooperative society.125 Similarities have long been 
pointed out between the Bauhaus educational approach, with its stress on exploration and self-
discovery and mistrust of received knowledge, and the progressive educational platform. The 
connection became explicit at the New Bauhaus. “The general [intellectual program of the New 
Bauhaus],” reflected Charles Morris in 1937, for example, “accords with the deepest American 
insights and needs—the dovetailing of Bauhaus plans with Dewey’s Art as Experience.”126 John 
Dewey, the intellectual guiding light of progressivism, saw education as the ethical preparation 
for life in a democratic commonwealth, rather than as intellectual or occupational training. 
During the 1940s, the classic Deweyan premise of education in the “methods of living”127 was 
translated into an educational philosophy of “life adjustment” that emphasized the development 
of personality, mental, emotional and physical health, and social skills. Outlined in reports 
published between 1938 and 1954 by education commissions set up within the NEA and the 
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Office of Education, “life adjustment” was the national model of secondary education, received 
as the practical embodiment of progressive doctrine.128 
Kepes’s writings of the 1940s adopt the signposts of “integration”—both on the psycho-
sensorial level of individual capacities and the inter-subjective level of social organization—and 
identify them with the political ideology of progressivism. “Integration,” he wrote in Language 
of Vision, “planning and form are the key words of all progressive efforts today. … Education on 
an unprecedented scale is imperative if man… is to be really contemporary.”129 He would retain 
this focus on integration even as its relationship to “planning” would fall away in the changing 
postwar ideological context. However, despite such similarities, Kepes did not embrace elements 
of both Bauhaus and progressive educational philosophy that placed those doctrines in 
opposition, specifically, to acquired knowledge. On the contrary, the desired integration would 
proceed, in Kepes’s subsequent work, precisely and exclusively by means of knowledge 
production and acquisition. After Language of Vision, Kepes turned his attention to making the 
education of vision exactly coterminous with an education of the mind. 
At the turn of the 1950s, the tenets of progressivism started to come under attack as the 
social welfare goals that initially drove state involvement in education gave way to new 
imperatives. The coming transition can perhaps be traced already in the language of President 
Truman’s Commission on Higher Education report of 1947. The Commission paid heed to the 
social contract position that “the democratic creed assumes to be [the] birthright [of individuals] 
an equal chance with all others to make the most of their native abilities”; but immediately 
afterward introduced a new argument: “in this day… the complexity of life and of social 
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problems means that we need desperately every bit of trained intelligence we can assemble. … 
[T]alent [is] our most precious natural resource in a democracy.”130 The practical task of the 
Commission, to evaluate the current state of American higher education, arose with the influx of 
veterans into colleges and universities under G.I. Bill provisions. However, the attendant growth 
of the national higher education plant was only the more visible sign of a general shift in the 
status of knowledge that this dissertation has been tracing. The emergence of a political economy 
of knowledge production, signaled by the Commission’s declaration of intelligence as a national 
“resource,” necessitated measures for its cultivation, organization, and definition with respect to 
the state. Education was a key site for their elaboration. The training of intelligence increasingly 
replaced the promotion of the “whole man” as the goal of education across its full spectrum. 
Secondary education oriented its responsibilities to the “deliberate cultivation of the ability to 
think” as preparation for higher education, where the same process would accelerate on an 
advanced level.131 Throughout the 1950s and most of the 1960s, this new credo was elaborated 
across a series of widely-read texts where it was linked explicitly to the concept of the American 
nation-state; and it was echoed in a succession of federal initiatives that advanced legislative 
control to every corner of American education and funneled massive funds into its promotion.132  
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The fostering of the mind required the definition of its desired characteristics and the 
elaboration of methods for advancing them. Of particular concern was the scientific mind, 
especially after the Sputnik launch of 1957 escalated national defense concerns. One of the most 
influential among the many voices speculating on the nation’s education problems, therefore, 
was that of Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, a physicist who had directed the production of the first 
nuclear submarines. In a series of public speeches and congressional testimonies, Rickover 
sounded an alarm about the national shortage of technical personnel equipped to deal with the 
unforeseen challenges of defense research and development.133 From that matter of seemingly 
local concern, he extrapolated to a historic geo- and bio-political shift.  The closing of the 
frontier, the exhaustion of raw natural resources, and exploding population growth necessitated a 
focus on new channels for growth and development and gave rise to a new model of the 
productive citizen. “[T]he kind of American,” wrote Rickover, “who thoroughly mastered his 
environment on the frontier in the muscle, wind, and water state of technology would be totally 
ineffective in the atomic age… . The consequence of technological progress is that man must use 
his mind more and his body less.”134 The focus of national policy should be investment in such 
new “human resources” as a substitute for the shrinking industrial materials base.135 The nation 
must use “far more effectively than heretofore our natural resources in brain power; we must 
substitute intellectual resources for diminishing materials resources.”136 Significantly, the 
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defining characteristic of “brain power,” according to Rickover, was creativity. The 
“brainworker” was, above all, a “creative worker”: “venturesome,” improvising, “inner-
directed,” “obstreperous,” a “troublesome maveric[k],” a “sworn enem[y] of routine and the 
status quo, always ready to upset the applecart by thinking up new and better ways of doing 
things.”137 The intellectual worker, in other words, was the very opposite of the organization 
man. Rickover’s opposition to the “life-adjustment fallacy” of current pedagogy stemmed from 
his belief that education should promote “the ability to think independently,” rather than produce 
the “well-adjusted” conformist.138 
Even as Rickover and some other influential contemporary commentators on education 
derived their authority from a scientific background and its relevance to the defense 
establishment, they did not delimit their area of educational concern to the training for scientific 
innovation. “We need creative thinkers in the humanities,” Rickover wrote, “no less than in the 
sciences.”139 The important point is that, contrary to general assumptions about the Cold War 
period, the productive scientist or technocrat was not the exclusive, perhaps not even the 
primary, focus of national interest.140 The creative mind was to be sponsored in view of the 
widest possible applications and areas of activity—in fact, much of the political and economic 
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capital was invested in the mind’s potential, unforeseen by definition. For example in 1951, 
Columbia University School of Business, in collaboration with General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
set up a Conservation of Human Resources Project to study “changing patterns of work in a 
dynamic economy,” as well as to indentify “the factors contributing to the development of talent 
and superior performance,” and “the factors leading to the wastage of human resources growing 
out of failure to make effective use of the potential of highly talented individuals.”141 While 
growing out of the experience of war mobilization and attendant requirements for technological 
expertise, the problem of “human resources” or “manpower” quickly shifted to a concern with 
the cultivation of “talent” and its “potential” on the widest national scale.142  
By the mid-to-late-1950s, discourses on intellectual creativity and the methods for its 
pedagogical production were widespread, and frequently intersected with Kepes’s professional 
trajectory.143 In the spring of 1958, he was invited to contribute to a Cooper Union lecture series 
“entirely devoted to the problems of creativity,” where he appeared in an interdisciplinary line-
up with, among others, the sociologist C. Wright Mills, and the government scholar Herbert J. 
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Muller—as well as Lewis Mumford and James Johnson Sweeney.144 Around 1956, he was 
among a number of prominent figures interviewed for a radio program “exploring the nature of 
creativeness in American arts, sciences, and professions,” which was transcribed and published 
in 1960 as The Creative Mind and Method.145  Lyman Bryson, Professor of Education at 
Columbia University’s Teachers College, who acted as host and commentator, posed such 
questions as: “how does the level of artistic and scientific creativeness in America compare with 
that of other cultures and other times?” and “can the creative mind be trained and the creative 
method developed?”146 The closing program ended with a panel discussion, featuring Arnheim 
and Margaret Mead, during which the question of creativity was posed even more explicitly in 
terms of what Mead referred to as America’s “educational crisis.”147 Bryson opened by inviting 
the panelists to think about the social conditions favorable to “a high productivity of 
creativeness”: “we’re going to look at the problem of how in a society like ours… we can 
discover the conditions that make creative work more likely, make it a little better harvesting of 
whatever genius we can produce in our population.”148 Again, the question of creativity revolved 
around the imperative of training the “creative worker.”149 
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For his own part, Kepes spoke about “creative thinking in the field of design,” defining it 
as the “solution of problems”—a process not unlike the instrumental innovation of Rickover’s 
“thinking up new and better ways of doing things.”150 His main interest, Kepes reported, was “to 
redress human needs, and to try to apply whatever I know to give the optimum solution for it.”151 
Bryson observed that those were “not quite the terms that most creative artists use in talking 
about their work.”152 However, in the discourse on creativity traced here, visual art was defined 
exactly not by its distance from utilitarian applications, but rather by the utility it could bear as 
an intellectual process in the training of the knowledge worker. While it was assumed that art 
had a privileged position with respect to creativity, the career artist was not the primary concern 
of those who worried about creativity and its training. The definition of art as creative thought 
was, rather, groundwork for its introduction into the system of general education.153  
In 1949, the Committee on Art Education of the Museum of Modern Art in New York 
(MoMA) held its seventh annual conference, dedicated to the question of creativity. The 
immediate motivation for the discussion was the 1948 resolution of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to facilitate efforts by member 
states to integrate the arts into general education.154 MoMA Director René D’Harnoncourt had 
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with the participation of Herbert Read, among others. See Jarzombek, The Psychologizing of Modernity, 155-156. 
 241
been involved in UNESCO discussions on this issue and proposed that the Committee send an 
enthusiastic endorsement of the organization’s actions. “[T]he release of man’s creative 
faculties,” stated the Committee’s resolution 
through practice and appreciation of the arts is considered an important factor in the formation of 
mature and well balanced individuals capable of becoming useful members of a society dedicated to 
the constructive pursuits of peace. 
… [The] practice and appreciation of the arts contributes substantially to the individual’s sympathetic 
understanding of the concepts and aspirations of his fellow men.155 
Arnheim and artist Robert J. Wolff, Kepes’s New Bauhaus colleague, were among the 
conference participants, and both embraced and extended in their contributions the notion that art 
could have a formative role in general education—even though their panel was actually 
dedicated to the problem of training the professional artist.156 According to the conference 
report, Wolff “emphasized the necessity for a general achievement of visual selectivity and 
concluded by saying that he was more interested in the college freshman than in Picasso.”157 The 
occasion was more than apt for Arnheim to advance his developing ideas on art as a form of 
thought. “Any creative activity,” he reportedly maintained, “is the result of the training of the 
mind as a whole.” Those positions became a matter of consensus in the discussion that followed, 
which affirmed that “technical problems were of less pressing importance than those involved in 
making creative activity a part of the general learning process, and that emphasis should be 
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transferred from the teaching of artists to the creation of a more general sensitivity to the values 
of art.”158 
 The MoMA conference was an early example of what would become through the 1950s 
and into the ‘60s a widespread preoccupation of educators. A 1953 Columbia Teacher’s College 
study by Ernest Ziegfeld, Art in the College Program of General Education, frequently cited by 
historians of education, pointed to the escalation of efforts to include studio art courses in the 
basic liberal studies curriculum. The author’s explanation of the pedagogical rationale relied on a 
definition of the “aesthetic experience” remarkably close to Kepes’s own—and indeed drew on a 
set of writers influenced by Gestalt psychology, such as Susanne Langer and Robert Ogden. The 
aesthetic experience, wrote Ziegfeld, is defined by a “quality of organization, of interrelatedness 
of parts in the formation of a unified totality.”159 As such, it is the “intuitive” and “emotional” 
counterpart to intellectual understanding, which is what defines its privileged position with 
respect to creativity—a key desired product of general education:  
[T]he pattern of creative skills is closely related to an imaginative capacity which enables the 
individual to see in given data the possibilities for new relationships. This… is as closely allied to 
intuition and feeling as to pure intellect. … Of equal importance is the disposition and eagerness to 
experiment, to seek… new patterns and relationships.160 
Thus “intellect,” Ziegfeld observed this time citing Herbert Read, another close acquaintance of 
Kepes’s, should be supplemented by a “wider concept—which includes sensibility and insight as 
well as intellect and reasoning, the perception of a pattern in relational cognition, and not merely 
the awareness of discrete relations, the raison sensitive as well as the raison intellectuelle.”161  
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Increasingly, such ideas were becoming the lingua franca of supporters of the role of art 
in general education. When Kepes invited Wolff to contribute to his Vision and Value series in 
1965, the latter was still posing the question: “how can visual studies serve general education at 
the college level?”162 The task of studio courses in higher education, he offered echoing both 
Read and Ziegfeld, was to engage and foster “sensory intelligence” or “visual intelligence,” in 
turn essential to the development of the “independent, courageously exploratory mind.”163 
Wolff’s contribution was generously illustrated with examples of student work from his own 
courses at Brooklyn College, where he had taught since 1946, revealing his debt to Bauhaus 
approaches absorbed during his tenure in Chicago. (Figure 42) The pedagogical logic driving 
such exercises, however, was now entirely different. They were to engage the student in an 
“intense and complex visual exertion” that would become a new “habit of the mind,” both 
augmenting and counteracting the effects of higher education’s focus on “conceptual 
scholarship.”164 The education of intellectual creativity meant bringing to “people blinded by the 
visual fog of ceaseless conceptual cerebration” the discipline of “the eye… set free to think for 
itself.”165  
But perhaps Kepes’s most significant encounter with the problem of art in general 
education occurred through his engagement with Harvard University’s efforts in that area, which 
started in the early 1950s and culminated with the establishment in 1963-1964 of the Carpenter 
Center for Visual Studies, whose directorship Kepes was offered in 1963. Since the history of its 
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foundation has never been traced in detail, I will devote the remainder of this section of the 
chapter to a brief summary.  
 
In 1952, Harvard’s Board of Overseers commissioned a study to explore the future of the 
arts at the university. The aim of the appointed committee was “to increase [the] general 
educational experience [of Harvard and Radcliffe undergraduates] in the visual area and to 
complement their traditional verbal and mathematical training.”166 Under the chairmanship of 
John Nicholas Brown, the committee completed its report in 1956. The conclusions of the so-
called Brown Report were preceded by Harvard president Nathan M. Pusey’s assertion that “the 
study of art belongs in liberal education and in the university,” and that “the appeal of art 
[should] continue strong as an educational asset of great potential.”167 As a guiding statement of 
general philosophy, Pusey invoked the words of Herbert Read, who was visiting as Charles Eliot 
Norton Professor at Harvard in 1954-55 during committee deliberations: “The mind’s growth is 
its expanding area of consciousness, and that area is made good, realized, and presented in 
enduring images, by a formative activity that is essentially aesthetic.”168 Much of the 
philosophical deliberations of the report, in fact, were preoccupied with defending art’s role in 
stimulating “the mind’s growth.”  
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“The artist,” wrote the committee, “is a creative intellectual… . The university should 
welcome him.” The hope was expressed that “the artist can bring into the university his powers 
of comprehension, integration, and expression.” 169 The problem at hand was how to integrate 
“the creative process” into “the educational process”: how to frame, in other words, the 
introduction of studio practice into the university “on a par with other fields of scholarship.”170 
Studio practice, the committee asserted, was a “training of the mind’s eye” and an “instruction in 
relationships.”171 It is because of its status as “discipline of the mind as well as of the hand” that 
art practice “can serve the central purpose of liberal education.” Against assumptions that art-
making is a “mentally inferior activity,” the committee insisted that it “can speed up the process 
of learning, and… transform a student’s attitude from a relatively passive and docile to a more 
active and more critical one.”172 On the basis of such conclusions, the committee recommended 
that the university establish a new Department of Design, to combine courses in “contemporary 
design” with studies in “the techniques of drawing, painting and sculpture,” and house it in a new 
Design Center that should also “serve the entire university community.”173 Such plans were 
implemented by the appointment of a standing committee on the visual arts, and received a new 
impetus the following year with a gift of $1,500,000 from Mr. and Mrs. Alfred St. Vrain 
Carpenter for the construction of what was now called a Design Center for the Visual Arts.174  
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Meanwhile, deliberations about the nature of the projected center proceeded at Harvard. 
As the Brown Report draft was distributed to relevant faculty at the end of 1955, Jose Luis Sert, 
Dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Design, took an active role in refining the concept of 
the center. Meeting with Brown, Sert suggested that the center embrace a “larger vision,” 
initiating under its auspices a graduate Program in Visual Communication, which might later 
grow into a graduate School of Visual Communication—thus maintaining “continuity between 
undergraduate and graduate education in the theory and practice of the Visual Arts.”175 Sert 
forwarded the letter he wrote to Brown summarizing their discussions to John E. Burchard, who 
was then Dean of the School of Humanities and Social Science at MIT.176 Just the previous year, 
Burchard had written a foreword to Kepes’s second book, The New Landscape in Art and 
Science (1956), and it is more than likely that Kepes’s name would have immediately come to 
his mind in relation to the ideas on “visual communication” floated by Sert.177 
 In 1961, Kepes sent Sert a preliminary program for the Vision and Value series of books, 
which he noted “would center on the visual arts [as] key shapers of the environment and 
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powerful conveyors of communications and ideas.”178 Meanwhile, on the heels of his initiative 
in 1955, Sert was appointed as the first chairman of the Faculty Committee for the Practice of the 
Visual Arts, which proceeded with plans for the Design Center.179 The emphasis on “visual 
communication” was retained and advanced to a position as one of the areas of focus in the 
center as a whole.180 The word “design,” however—which Burchard had thought to be confusing 
in relation to the existing School of Design—was excised from the projected center’s name.181 
By 1962, discussions referred to the Harvard Center for Visual Studies. As Eduard Sekler, who 
would become the first director of the Carpenter Center, recalled in 1968, the term “visual 
studies” was coined specifically for the center in 1961-1962. “Visual Studies,” he explained, 
are concerned with visual experience, visual exploration and visual creation. …Visual Studies have as 
their object … visual experience in its relation to the entire complex of human feeling and thought, 
purpose and action. Visual Studies, accordingly, include the study of Visual Communications as one 
system of non-verbal communication which can powerfully parallel and supplement verbal 
communication.182 
The notion of “visual studies” encompassed better than “visual communication” did the circuit of 
ideas at the heart of the center’s rationale, which linked the creation of visual form as an 
intellectual process, its importance in supplementing “verbal” scholarship as part of education’s 
task to train the mind, and its impact on the larger psycho-social environment.  
Even as the center was eventually renamed the Carpenter Center for the Visual Arts some 
time around 1963, it retained this “visual studies” rationale. In what would become the definitive 
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version of the Center’s program, Sekler posited its “foremost obligation” to “an educational 
task”: work toward “the basic goal of all genuine education: to help an individual achieve the 
fullest possible recognition and realization of his inherent potentialities integrated within the 
framework of his society—man in full command of his own capacities and at home in his 
environment.” Thus the Center would engage the student in “learning to see [and] learning how 
to ‘make visible’ conditions and relationships that were unseen before by creating new shapes 
and patterns.” The notion of “seeing as a supreme source of knowledge” was reinstalled at the 
heart of the Center’s mission, where it would serve as a counterpoint to “the dominance of 
conceptual thinking and verbalization in universities”—asserting that “the two are… perfectly 
compatible and even capable of enhancing each other.” 183 The concept was captured in the term 
“visual literacy” that herewith served to describe the Center’s combination of “creative activity” 
and “intellectual content”—its wager that “the creation of visual art is… a legitimate use of the 
mind.”184  
Having thus outlined the Center’s mission, Harvard’s Committee on the Practice of the 
Visual Arts had considerable difficulty in finding a suitable director.185 The members’ 
deliberations “circled inevitably about a mythical figure who would… be all things to all people: 
art historian, artist, authority on communication, expert in visual education, author, scholar, 
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philosopher, and administrator.” They decided with only one dissenting vote to make the offer to 
Kepes—listing Arnheim as a second choice.186 Kepes declined. “As I imagine the task of the 
Carpenter Visual Arts Center,” he followed up with Harvard’s Dean Franklin L. Ford, “it seems 
very close to the dreams and ideas I have had and the only place where they could become a 
reality; I had a very bad night after your [call] for I felt I had buried a great opportunity.”187 
There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Kepes’s words, as he was, in fact, at the very moment 
engaged in lobbying for a very similar institution at MIT. If he had rejected Harvard’s offer 
gambling on a chance to devise his own center at MIT, the wager paid off with the opening of his 
Center for Advanced Visual Studies (CAVS) in 1967—whose history is discussed in the 
following chapter of this dissertation. While it would also depart in a number of significant ways 
from the Carpenter Center model, the philosophy behind CAVS certainly benefitted from 
Kepes’s engagement with the discourse on the educational role of visual art. 
 
4.3 THE CITIZEN’S MIND 
 
 Kepes’s archives preserve a set of mostly undated handwritten notes filed apart from 
drafts of manuscripts and speeches. A number of these bear the heading “Education of Vision.” 
Their content and the piecemeal nature of their accumulation suggests that they may be at once 
records of initial thoughts on what would become the namesake publication and traces of an 
ongoing intellectual project to define a pedagogical problematic of vision, evident already in 
Kepes’s early sketch for a “University of Vision” and resurfacing in the 1960s as a proposal for 
                                                 
186 Minutes of the Committee on the Practice of the Visual Arts, Meeting of 14 January 1963, HUA, UAV 322.7.4., 
IIA, Box 6, p.2. 
 
187 Gyorgy Kepes to Franklin L. Ford, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 13 March, 1963, Kepes Papers, 
AAA, Reel 5303, frame 1080. 
 
 250
an “Institute of Vision,” discussed in the following chapter. “As creative art is forming par 
excellence,” reads one of these notes 
it is imperative that its role as basic educational discipline should be incorporated in the general 
education methods. –But not only as an independent although maybe important unit—but rather as a 
fundamental structural fibre [sic] of the whole. 
Form thinking—structural thinking, configuration thinking is different from simple making little 
painting[s] in an art department of the university. 
Form thinking must penetrate all disciplines of education. 
How to do it?188 
The same experiences that introduced Kepes to the problem of creative intelligence involved him 
also in thinking about “general education”—a parallel postwar project of national scope, to 
which the issue of creativity was inextricably linked, and within which it acquired still another 
set of strategic coordinates. If the need for “manpower” at the exhaustion of the geographic 
frontier heralded the emergence of creative thought as a key national economic resource, the 
intellect was also called upon as an agent of political identification. The aggressive movement of 
the federal government into the educational arena required a corresponding subjectivity as its 
target and goal. National education would be oriented to the formation of the citizen, and 
“general education” became the most direct medium for the articulation of that identity. The 
venerable Deweyan discourse on the intersubjective constitution of democracy—the democratic 
polis as the ethico-political extension of the democratic individual—was a readily available 
reference point. But its postwar application in educational discourses was distinguished by the 
imperative to link a definition of democratic citizenship to the new paradigm of the free, 
independent, and innovative mind. 
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 Kepes was prepared by his wartime experiences to think about the formation of 
subjectivity and its political mediations. His first book, as I have argued, posited that visual art’s 
language of value assisted in the production of what may be called the (implicitly democratic) 
social self. As his concerns now shifted from the area of public communication to that of general 
education, the “language of vision” was replaced with “form thinking,” and Kepes proceeded to 
plot an answer to the question he posed in the note cited earlier: how to make “form thinking” an 
integral part of general education. “First,” he wrote  
mobilisation [sic] of the total personality by active work of forming.  
Second, by pointing out the structural correspondence between one and other types of forming: 
psychological + social, etc.189   
Another note, titled “Education of Vision, General Education” clarified the above position: 
Rorschach has shown that the way a person sees is the [essential] character of the person.  
The structure of his vision—the rhythm, form configuration of his perception—is the microcosmos 
[sic] of his attitude, purposes, concepts-conflicts. 
Not what one sees—but how one sees is today significant. 
The objective reality—the physical stimulus—is only the basis… 
[T]he human purpose—filtered by social convention of language, mores, etc.—makes the structure of 
vision.190 
The problem posed, therefore, was how to articulate a link between vision and socially-mediated 
character formation—the presumed goal of education. Perhaps to remind himself of a related line 
of thought, Kepes noted parenthetically: “Ames, Gestalt, etc.” As Kepes’s thoughts turned more 
and more to education, he continued to build on his interests in perceptual psychology. In fact, in 
the work of Adelbert Ames, a perceptual psychologist with whom Kepes was communicating in 
1947, and from whom he now borrowed terminological signposts such as “purpose,” Kepes 
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would have discovered a necessary discursive link between vision and education for democratic 
citizenship.  
 An idiosyncratic figure, Ames captured the attention of a large segment of the art and 
design community in the 1940s with a series of experiments he was then conducting at the 
Dartmouth Eye Institute in Hanover, New Hampshire.191 Kepes was among many art-world 
pilgrims to the so-called Ames Demonstrations in Perception, which he must have visited after 
the Eye Institute was relocated to Princeton University in 1947.192 The demonstrations involved 
constructed objects or environments that, when seen from a predetermined position (usually 
through a peephole), produced optical illusions whose mechanics were revealed with a change in 
perspective.  For example, what appeared to be an average chair was in fact a chaotic assembly 
of sticks suspended in the air; or a perfectly rectangular room in which objects appeared to 
miraculously change in size as they moved from one end to the other revealed itself to be, in fact, 
of highly irregular dimensions. (Figure 43) These constructions served as a dramatic 
demonstration of the subjectivity of perception, theorized by the Ames circle as a postulate of 
“transactional psychology.” Rather than a passive reception of stimuli from an external world, 
perception was an active collaboration between the environment and the embodied mind, an 
“individual-environment transaction.”193 This process consisted of a “subconscious integration” 
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by the perceiver of past experience, given conditions, and goal-oriented anticipation, which 
Ames referred to as “purpose.”194 In short, the observer altered the observed.  
It is easy to see why Ames’s ideas would have resonated with Kepes. The emphasis on 
the mind’s role in perception was fundamentally in accord with Gestalt psychology. Moreover, 
the Hanover Institute’s interest in perceptual integration paralleled in many ways the interest of 
both general semantics and the Unity of Science movement in linguistic integration. Ames 
shared with both Korzybski and Morris a pragmatist attention to the contingencies of purposeful 
action and context in the constitution of meaning. Likewise, Ames advanced a relativist, 
performative conception of knowledge as the basis for social agency in the democratic polis. As 
he saw it, Eye Institute experimental discoveries had important political implications:  
The processes that underlie our perception of our immediate external world and our perception of 
social relationships are fundamentally the same. … To assure the survival and growth of democracy 
we need to know… how to train citizens  
(a) to recognize their purposes as individuals,  
(b) to rely on them,  
(c) to make them known and carry them out.” 195   
This was an explicit connection between perception’s grounding in the mind and its utility in the 
educational formation of the democratic citizen.   
The link, however, had a crucial mediating term. It was expressed in the notion of 
“environment,” which started to appear in Kepes’s writings at the time of his communication 
with Ames, and soon became the central concept of Kepes’s own educational philosophy. 
“Without ordering of his physical environment,” he wrote in 1947, “[man] cannot survive. His 
creative capacity to construct his environment in terms of his needs, that is, to work out a relative 
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equilibrium, is the very foundation of his existence.”196 The “environment” concept belonged to 
a diffuse discourse, widespread in the first decades of the century, which merged evolutionary 
biology and behaviorist psychology to describe human or social evolution. Before the 1940’s, 
Kepes would have encountered this discourse in the writings of Julian Huxley—also a source for 
Moholy’s notion of psycho-biological “new vision.”197 In America, evolutionary behaviorism 
was especially prevalent in educational circles, where it was associated with William James and 
his student Edward Thorndike, as well as with Dewey. The latter maintained, for example, that 
mental activity was a projection of goals derived from previous experience and oriented to the 
maintenance of “equilibrium” or “adjustment” with a changing environment, by means of which 
the human organism assured itself of ongoing survival.198 By affecting “patterns” of behavior or 
“habit systems,” Dewey and others argued, education could assist in the attainment of the mind’s 
proper adaptive function in its environmental interface.199 The notion of “patterning,” related to 
this discourse on the environment, was captured by Kepes and readily assimilated within a 
philosophical vocabulary in which “order” and “organization” were already key terms. “We 
make a map of our experience patterns,” he wrote in 1956,  
an inner model of the outer world, and we use this to organize our lives. Our natural ‘environment’—
whatever impinges on us from the outside—becomes our human ‘landscape’—a segment of nature 
fathomed by us and made our home.200 
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Ames and Dewey met in 1947 and carried on an extensive correspondence.201 But it was 
Kelley’s Education for What is Real (1947) that would ultimately instrumentalize the Ames 
Demonstrations toward a program for progressive education.202 Education professional and 
Dewey follower, Kelley considered the Ames experiments objective proof that “man is one with 
his environment.” He called upon educators to prepare “good citizens” by investing school-
children with “patterns of living” based on cooperation and communication in accordance with 
mutually recognized and accepted “purposes,” rather than antagonism or submission to authority. 
The expression of responsible self-knowledge in the acquisition of techniques for “self-control,” 
Kelley argued, was crucial for a society based on the ideal of self-government.203 Kelley’s ideas 
were widely adopted in educational circles, where they prompted the establishment of perceptual 
training programs in all degrees of sophistication, from technologies of visual organization 
taught at art schools to “art appreciation” courses incorporated into general education 
curricula.204 Perhaps the best-known of the former was a program of training in “organized 
perception” developed by Hoyt Sherman at Ohio State University, which actually employed 
recreations of the Ames Demonstrations.205 Kepes corresponded with Sherman as well, and even 
made a trip to Columbus in 1950.206  
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Arguably, what made Ames and Kelley critical references for those concerned with the 
overlap between art and education was their success in situating the training of vision as an 
organized response to the programmatic concerns of the general education movement, which, as 
one historian notes, “came… of age” after the war in a “great wave of self-examination.”207 The 
concept of “general education” had been in use in America since the nineteenth century to denote 
a broad education as distinguished from vocational or specialized instruction. Its rationale, 
moreover, derived from the classical conception of the “liberal arts,” a fundamental element of 
which was the shaping of the student’s moral character to the ideal of “the active, virtuous and 
generally capable citizen.”208 Some of the most frequently recurring notions in the educational 
discourses with which Kepes was conversant relate to the ethico-political ideal framed by the 
historical discourse of liberal arts education and its mid-century variants.209 The postwar general 
education program added a new economic logic to the liberal arts ideal, thus linking up in turn to 
evolving conceptions of the liberal-democratic state. In the dual techno-economic and ethico-
political rationale with which the general education program addressed the challenge to produce 
subjects best suited to a changing environment, one can trace the merger of political freedom and 
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economic growth as the perceived defining characteristic of the postwar state. That rationale is 
well expressed in a statement made by Kepes in 1947: 
The scientific and technological equipment we possess today must be brought under human control, 
which implies the ordering of our social relationships upon a basis of true political and economic 
democracy. Man also must be liberated from his present narrowness and weakness generated by fear 
in an insecure world. Without economic freedom on the widest possible social basis it is meaningless 
to speak about free individuals.210 
The influence of postwar liberal-democratic ideology pervading general education discourses on 
Kepes’s educational philosophy was rarely as explicit as it is here.  
The idea that the postwar world was “insecure” certainly brings to mind an atmosphere of 
pervasive dread brought about by Cold War geopolitical tensions—a commonplace of the 
period’s cultural history. However, those who expressed concern with social instability 
frequently framed it, rather, in terms of an environment destabilized and disturbed by an 
accelerated pace of change, driven by techno-economic development. For Admiral Rickover, in 
the text discussed above, the notion expressed a global perception of both America’s internal 
historical development and its current geopolitical position.  It was prevalent and widely 
applicable enough to be rehearsed by George Kennan, Cold War foreign policy mastermind. 
“Wherever the past ceases to be the great and reliable reference book of human problems,” wrote 
Kennan in 1954, “there the foundations of man's inner health and stability begin to crumble, 
insecurity and panic begin to take over, conduct becomes erratic and aggressive. These, 
unfortunately, are the marks of an era of rapid technological or social change.”211 Concerned as 
they were with the moral and psychological cultivation of individuals, postwar educators found 
                                                 
210 Kepes, “Creative Discipline,” 17. 
 
211 George F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (1954), cited in René J. Dubos, “Adaptability for 
Survival and Growth” in Values and Ideals of American Youth, ed. Eli Ginzberg (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1961), 9. 
 
 258
this environmental model appealing, since it linked an outline of socio-economic causes to 
manifestations of social psycho-pathology. “It is a commonplace,” Ziegfeld noted, for example 
that one of the chief characteristics of our age is the fact of rapid and profound change. … Within the 
past two centuries, science and technology have revolutionized the material facts of our existence, 
and as the material environment has been thus altered we have had no alternative but to accept and 
adapt ourselves to radically new patterns of living.212 
Ames and Kelly invoked the same idea in their wager that training in new “patterns of living” 
could assist mental survival in a world in flux.213 The identity maintained here between the 
social and the somatic “environment” guaranteed the capacity of art and design, purveyors of 
perceptual “experience,” to become agents of readjustment to a changing society.  
Kepes advanced a similar program. “When unprecedented aspects of nature confront us,” 
he wrote in 1956, “our world-model inherited from the past becomes strained… . Disoriented, 
we become confused and shocked.” The corrective response Kepes proposed was that of 
“orientation,” a project Dewey himself had posed as the goal of general education.214 “To 
convert this new environment into a human landscape,” Kepes wrote, “we need… to map the 
world’s new configurations with our senses… . Reoriented, we shall then be in a position to cope 
with the new world of forms.”215 Practically, the pedagogical task of “orientation” was carried 
out by Kepes in his Visual Fundamentals courses, which constituted the most concrete 
manifestation of his educational activity. At the same time, however, instruction in the 
“fundamentals” of knowledge was being advanced throughout the country as the guiding concept 
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of general education and the programmatic answer to the dual politico-economic imperatives 
taken on by the nation’s educational complex. 
The search for unifying principles of knowledge had been proposed as a defining 
characteristic of liberal education before the war. As one observer put it in 1922, liberal or 
general instruction should focus on “not saying in advance what will be found but trying to find 
the forms of unity which must be there if we can think at all.”216 In the postwar period, the 
concept became a banner of the general education movement. It was described in a program 
outlined for Harvard University’s general education curriculum in 1945, which soon after it was 
published became the signpost of postwar curriculum reform measures nation-wide. The Report 
of the Harvard Committee on the Objectives of a General Education in a Free Society proposed 
an educational focus on “fundamentals” of integrated knowledge, derived from a balance of the 
humanities with the natural and social sciences. Intended as a counter to the unavoidable 
“centrifugal forces” of specialization, general education in the liberal arts was conceived here as 
a “concurrent, balancing force” permitting the student to “grasp the complexities of life as a 
whole.”217 Notably, the Harvard Committee saw specialization as at once a source of intellectual 
fragmentation and a disjunctive social force—and therefore its prescription for a focus on 
fundamentals was weighted with both knowledge-acquisition and socio-political imperatives.  
The Harvard report, as one historian noted, reflected the “common double-edged 
etymology” of “liberal.” On the one hand, liberal education was defined as education for the 
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“free person,” the liberal-democratic citizen.218 The capacity to understand “life as a whole” was 
viewed here to be essential to the student’s formation as a citizen and participation in the 
political life of the nation. “Liberal” knowledge, therefore, was taken here to mean “that which 
befits or helps to make free men”; and a free man was one who was “able to judge and plan for 
himself, so that he [could] truly govern himself.” General education, thus, was essential to the 
production of a “social freedom” premised upon the possession of an “inner freedom.”219 On the 
other hand, education had to sustain the task of “freeing the person” for a life of ongoing self-
directed inquiry, the free pursuit of truth.220 In that respect, however, the need to “become an 
expert… in the general art of the freeman and the citizen” also had an economic rationale. The 
independent and self-sufficient mind was a prerequisite for success in a rapidly changing 
knowledge economy.  “Specializing in a vocation,” wrote the Harvard Committee, “makes for 
inflexibility in a world of fluid possibilities. 
Business demands minds capable of adjusting themselves to varying situations and of managing 
complex human institutions. Given the pace of economic progress, techniques alter speedily; and 
even the work in which the student has been trained may no longer be useful when he is ready to earn 
a living, or soon after.221  
Thus, following an argument that soon proved to be paradigmatic in educational policy 
discussions, the Harvard report conceived general education as the cultivation, at once, of liberal 
democratic political man and postindustrial knowledge worker.  
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Training in “fundamentals” entailed the acquisition of an intellectual “method and 
outlook”—as opposed to specialized “subject matter.”222 The idea that the student should be 
taught a certain process of thought was the credo of the so-called “inquiry method” that came to 
dominate general educational philosophy in the 1950s and 1960s. The imperative to understand 
fundamental intellectual processes at the heart of specialized knowledge, the idea that “to master 
a discipline was to master its way of thought,” was always supported by a conception of national 
economy defined by the rapid obsolescence of information and productive systems.223 The 
discourse of “fundamentals” increasingly augmented the earlier focus on ethico-psychological 
“patterns” with a new emphasis on “processes” and “structures” of knowledge. At the turn of 
1960, such concepts were publicized by several federally-sponsored committees on education. 
The best known of such reports was The Process of Education by Jerome S. Bruner, where the 
approach to education was discussed in terms of fundamental “structures” of knowledge based 
on intuitive and creative thought processes.224  
General education’s task, therefore, was precisely to restructure the mental apparatus of 
the knowledge worker, to equip him with a capacity to confront and—more than that—to 
embrace and advance the unexpected. It is fitting, then, that an earlier language of bio-social 
evolution continued to distantly resonate in postwar educational reform rhetoric, occasionally 
becoming explicit. This was the case, for example in an essay on “Adaptability for Survival and 
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Growth” by René J. Dubos, included among papers compiled in 1960 by Conservation of Human 
Resources Project director Eli Ginzberg.225 It is a national task, Dubos wrote, to “develop [the] 
adaptive potentialities [of young people], so as to help them deal successfully with the 
unpredictable challenges and emergencies that they will encounter throughout life.” This 
preparation entailed the acquisition of “theoretical knowledge, critical judgment, and discipline 
of learning,” because “in a world where everything changes rapidly, the practical facts learned in 
school soon become obsolete.”226 In 1966, Dubos’s formulation was cited by Daniel Bell, who 
was then arriving at an outline of his canonical definition of the “postindustrial society” in the 
process of writing a faculty report on general education for Columbia College. Dubos’s 
argument, Bell wrote, leads to the conclusion that “the curriculum has to be reorganized not so 
much to teach ‘subject matter,’ as to make fundamental the nature of conceptual innovation and 
the processes of conceptual thought.”227 
 Kepes would invite Dubos to contribute to his last Vision and Value anthology, the 1972 
Arts of the Environment, where the latter extended his discourse on socio-biological evolution.228 
However, Kepes could have encountered Dubos, Bruner, Bell, and other prominent writers on 
knowledge, education, and the environment much earlier.229 In 1952, soon after he arrived at the 
MIT School of Architecture to set up his program in Visual Fundamentals, Kepes joined the 
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Boston-based interdisciplinary learned society, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 
(AAAS).230 Affiliated with the American Unity of Science movement, the Academy was a 
natural extension of Kepes’s Chicago intellectual milieu.231 But, as a forum and community for 
some of the most prominent American intellectuals, it would have also expanded Kepes’s 
discursive references, introducing him to cultural and intellectual issues at the center of national 
discourse. Kepes participated in regular discussion meetings for members of both the Academy 
and the Harvard-based Institute for the Unity of Science, and possibly met there fellow 
participants who would become fixtures in Kepes’s own writings, published projects, and private 
correspondence: such as Gerald Holton, John Burchard, Karl Deutsch, and Norbert Wiener.232  
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, both the Institute and the AAAS engaged in 
discussions on general education. In a 1946 Institute program statement, Philipp Frank wrote of 
the “rich implications” that the Unity of Science research into the “integration of human 
knowledge and human behavior” had for “a practical problem which has been much discussed 
recently, the problem of General Education.”233 In 1951, the Institute reported on its research in 
the Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, as it did frequently at the time. 
Harvard’s President James B. Conant, under whose auspices the Harvard Committee on general 
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education had convened a few years earlier, commented on the affinity of the Institute’s “quest 
for unity in science” to his own efforts in the general education program.234 Burchard, who was 
elected president of AAAS in 1954, set up two committees to explore the subject of education: a 
Committee on the Role of Science in Liberal Education, and a Committee on the Unity of 
Learning.235 In 1959, the fruits of these efforts were published in a special issue of Daedalus, the 
Academy journal, on “Education in the Age of Science.” Much of the discussion struck the 
familiar balance between the imperatives of training the citizen and the intellectual worker.236 
Again in 1954, one of the leading members of the Unity of Science movement, the physicist 
Percy W. Bridgman wrote for Academy Proceedings on the “task of the education of the future” 
on the premise that “such social concepts as human rights or duties or responsibilities will have 
to be modified when the environment in which they arose is altered, as it now is, by 
technological advances… .”237 Citing Ames among others and accessing the established themes 
of educational discourse discussed above, Bridgman asserted that the task of education for 
democracy in an environment altered by science would be the “development of new intellectual 
techniques” as well as of “imagination that can sense the significance of… simple underlying 
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processes and relationships.”238 Had Bridgman accepted Kepes’s invitation to contribute an 
essay to The New Landscape, he would have perhaps extended such reflections.239  
Kepes’s involvement in both philosophical and institutional issues of education was 
extensive during the 1950s and 1960s. He clearly grasped the imbrication of economic and 
political imperatives driving the training of the mind in the discourse of general education, and 
expressed it in a way that was relevant to his own professional sphere of activity—that is, 
translated into the language of visual perception. A number of his “Education of Vision” notes 
posited and proceeded to explore a binary relationship between freedom and security. “Security, 
order,” listed one note, “visual attribute = balance.” To this was counterposed: “growth, 
development, freedom. Visual attribute = proportion, rhythm, movement.” Kepes then proceeded 
to give himself an intellectual assignment: “Try to trace back the two categories [security and 
development] in all possible implications: psychological, physical, biological, social, 
technological.”240 “There was a hope by the progressives,” continued another note, 
that a radical transformation of the economic structure will bring a new social form. … But the 
centralization of the economic power, planned economy, centrally planned-regulated system 
creates… a regulatory class-type security-stability. What were the flags of the progressive 
movements—now became reality. Freedom-change… becomes more and more endangered.241 
Like many of those engaged in the problems of education, Kepes struggled to accommodate the 
new economic imperatives of growth within the structures of security; like them as well, he 
translated that relationship also as the political relationship between freedom and community. 
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“We are apt sometimes to stress freedom,” wrote the Harvard committee on general education, 
for example, as though completing Kepes’s thoughts, “the power of individual choice and the 
right to think for oneself—without taking sufficient account of the obligation to cooperate with 
our fellow men; democracy must represent an adjustment between the values of freedom and 
social living.”242 “Self-determination of people,” Kepes echoed, “self-expression of the 
individual—must be complemented by the common social goals. … What is self-expression 
for—if it cannot express valuable life patterns.” It would be “art’s task,” he observed, to express 
such communal ties.243 Another note completed the series and set the agenda for Kepes’s overall 
project: “order-security, freedom-growth,” he wrote, “are complementary pairs of life 
activities… both on an individual scale as well as on a social political scale. The task is to 
achieve a living unity—a dynamic equilibrium—that is a stage where order, security, balance 
can only be reached in growth, … openness, freedom.”244 
 It was, of course, Kepes’s self-directed research in perceptual psychology that had 
disposed him to think in binary terms. At the opening of perception to thought and meaning, 
Gestalt psychology had posited the relationship of figure and ground as irreducible and 
dialectically bound opposites. Kepes’s allegorical leap was to align that concept of visual form 
with a notion of social freedom circumscribed by the “recognition of… limitations.” “In the wild 
struggle of laissez-faire economy,” he wrote in 1947,  
we were convinced that individualism run riot is freedom. … We believed that being unlimited means 
to be free. [But] freedom can only be reached by recognizing unique historical limitations. … If we 
                                                 
242 General Education in a Free Society, 76. 
 
243 [Kepes,] “Education of Vision, General Introduction,” handwritten note, Kepes Papers, AAA, Reel 5312, frame 
540. 
 
244 [Kepes,] “Education of Vision, General,” handwritten note, Kepes Papers, AAA, Reel 5312, frame 553.  
 
 267
                                                
extend this understanding of freedom to the visual control of our surroundings, we can hope to 
recondition our attitudes, thus paving the way to greater social freedom.245  
 As it had for Gropius, the concept of limits proved central to Kepes’s ideas. It provided him with 
a link, both metaphorical and concrete, between the needs of the postwar liberal state and his 
own professional concerns with the training of vision. “Limitation implies definition by a 
context,” Kepes continued,  
Any individual unit can only unfold its unique meaning through its contour line which connects it and 
divides it from a larger whole. … Things as individual units, are meaningless abstractions unless they 
are assigned their place in a communal, i.e. dynamic structure. … Instead of permitting each thing to 
exist in its own inconsiderate way, we must learn to create cooperation of objects, a community of 
things. … If we learn how to… see the relationships in visual qualities, we can strengthen ourselves 
to recognize bonds in all levels of existence.246 
His project to proceed from a “community of things” to other communal formations, however, 
would unfold in relationship to a specific set of institutional contexts Kepes encountered upon 
his arrival at M.I.T. His accommodation to his new institutional home will be addressed in the 










245 Kepes, “Creative Discipline,” 21-22. 
 
246 Ibid., 22-23. 
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5 THE MIDDLEMAN: KEPES AT M.I.T. 
 
Unlike engineering, the natural sciences are not motivated by immediate utility. 
But when science ranges from the abstract toward the applied, and when 
engineering shifts its focus from immediate applications to underlying principles, 
the two fields merge in a borderland area in which it is impossible to distinguish 
one from the other. … In order for science to contribute to the borderland area, 
and thus for engineering to progress as a result of the progress of science, it is 
essential that the more creative and abstract aspects of science continually forge 
ahead in the direction of the new, original, and hitherto unexplored. 
-- Report of the Committee on Educational Survey to the Faculty of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1949. 
 
Since 1930, MIT’s Walker Memorial has housed an allegorical mural that conveys with 
catechistic solemnity the premise of scientia commanding the labors of the Institute: “Ye Shall 
Be as Gods Knowing Good and Evil.”1 The passage from Genesis hems an image of a scientist, 
white-haired, clad in a lab-coat, releasing with an impartial gesture symmetrical spirits of 
beneficent and maleficent nature from two identical jars. The dogs of war and the cherubim of 
peace counter-align. A group of statesmen and military officers gathered around a conference 
table contemplates the scene. The decision is theirs. (Figure 44) 
The purpose of “service to the nation,” rehearsed by countless postwar MIT spokesmen, 
entailed a vision of scientific knowledge as deferred agency. “Knowledge itself,” in the words of 
MIT President Julius Stratton, for example, “is neither intrinsically good nor evil; but the power 
that knowledge gives can be turned to evil purpose. … [Science] tells us what we can do; we 
                                                 
1 The mural by Edwin Howland Blashfield, titled Good and Bad Uses of Science, is part of a cycle the artist 
executed at the Walker Memorial between 1924 and 1930. The other murals in the cycle are: Alma Mater; Humanity 
Led from Chaos into Light by Knowledge and Imagination; as well as representations of learning through the written 
word and through experiment, and groups of figures symbolizing various fields of study. See Mina Rieur Weiner, 
ed., Edwin Howland Blashfield: Master American Muralist (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 99-103. 
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must turn elsewhere to learn what we ought to do.”2 Such statements echoed the inaugural 
conception of the role of science on the nation’s new frontier expressed in the Vannevar Bush 
1945 report to the President, which opened up the postwar era of federal investment in the 
scientific research enterprise. “[N]ew products and processes are not born full-grown,” wrote the 
President’s scientific advisor, “They are founded on new principles and new conceptions which 
in turn result from basic scientific research.” Bush’s innovation was to champion state support of 
basic rather than applied science. The instrumentality of research, he suggested, was indirect, 
catalyzing development at a distance—much like investment stimulus. “Basic scientific 
research,” Bush offered in terms his audience could readily embrace, “is scientific capital.”3 
Between the agency with which knowledge was replete and its economic or political 
manifestation there had to be a gap, a pause, a delay. That caesura created a space of contingent 
autonomy where science was free to explore the full dimensions of its new frontier, bounded 
only by the requirement of creating potential utility, and otherwise endless. 
From around 1930 through the immediate postwar period, MIT underwent a momentous 
change in institutional identity. Postwar president James Killian fulfilled and expanded the 
reforms initiated by his predecessor Karl Compton in converting the Institute from an established 
engineering school to an entirely new model of a science-based research university.4 Losing the 
focus on immediate industrial applications, MIT assimilated the liberal arts educational model on 
the undergraduate level and promoted basic science in graduate and post-graduate research. No 
                                                 
2 Julius A. Stratton, “The Fabric of a Single Culture,” The Centennial Convocation Address Delivered at MIT on 
April 9, 1961, in Science and the Educated Man: Selected Speeches of Julius A. Sttatton (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1966), 69, 73. Emphases in the original. 
 
3 Vannevar Bush, Science: The Endless Frontier (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, July 1945), 6. 
 
4 See Christophe Lecuyer, “The Making of a Science Based Technological University: Karl Compton, James 




longer a practical servant to industry, MIT dedicated itself to a more abstract master—the nation. 
The transition involved the development of a new logic of instrumentality articulating a 
relationship between knowledge production and citizenship.  
 Since 1946, one of the most prominent faculty members of the MIT School of 
Architecture, Kepes became a spokesman and innovative practitioner of the deferred 
instrumentality that anchored the Institute’s regime of knowledge production. The cognitive-
perceptual technology he started to develop in Chicago was linked at MIT to a new goal of 
giving the arts access to the social agency of the sciences. Adapting the Visual Fundamentals 
program to the professional education of architects allowed Kepes to offer one way—among 
many pursued at the School of Architecture—to articulate design as a discipline of intellectual 
research, analysis, and invention parallel to that practiced in Institute laboratories and seminar 
rooms. But Kepes’s project went well beyond the problems of professional education. He 
focused his real energy on inventing a discourse of the aesthetic image as both analogue and 
catalyst for communities of knowledge—tentative, exploratory and allusive structures, dedicated 
to the production of the ultimate desideratum, the aleatory and opportunistic social potential.  
Kepes’s appointment came on the heels of curricular reform affecting the School as well 
as the Institute as a whole. In 1944, MIT completed an Institute-wide “simplification of 
curricula,” which determined a line-up of first-year undergraduate core subjects and outlined a 
four-year program of required electives. Under the banner of simplification, a program of 
“fundamentals” and an influx of “non-professional” courses announced the Institute’s ambitions 
for a changed profile as a research university “polarized around science,” in the standard postwar 
expression.5 The merger of professional and liberal arts education had been inaugurated in 1932 
                                                 
5 “President Compton Announces Post-War Curriculum Changes; Tells of Institute’s War Service,” The Tech LXIV, 
No.21 (June 9, 1944): 4. 
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under President Compton, who reorganized the Institute into three schools—Engineering, 
Science, and Architecture—supported by two Divisions—the Division of Humanities and the 
Division of Industrial Cooperation—as “service” adjuncts to the schools. A Committee on 
Educational Survey, known as the Lewis Committee, established in 1947 with the task of 
defining MIT’s educational philosophy, traced its lineage to Compton’s reforms, which it 
understood to have “enlarge[d] the purpose and meaning of an MIT education.” 6 Expanding on 
that heritage, the Lewis Committee proposed an “integral plan,” intended to suffuse professional 
education with the objectives of general education “to develop the character traits, the 
intellectual habits and skills, and the understanding of nature and man that an educated person 
should have, regardless of the kind of work he does.”7 The basis for such a policy was found in 
the assertion that “in our increasingly complex society, science and technology can no longer be 
segregated from their human and social consequences.”8 The Committee offered as evidence a 
series of ongoing trends, including shared methodologies between the natural and social 
sciences, the merging of basic science with engineering “in a borderland area,” and finally, the 
growing emphasis in architecture on scientific and engineering expertise in the “solution of 
environmental problems arising from the impact of science and technology upon everyday living 
and working.”9  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
6 Report of the Committee on Educational Survey to the Faculty of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Technology Press, 1949), 13. See also Karl Taylor Compton, MIT Bulletin, President’s Report 
Issue 68, no.3 (October 1932). 
 
7 Report of the Committee on Educational Survey, 19. 
 
8 Ibid., 42. 
 
9 Ibid., 27, 40, 43. 
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In fact, under such new institutional conditions of knowledge, Compton’s pre-war policy 
was obsolete in one key respect. The basic sciences and the humanities could no longer be 
thought of as “service” adjuncts to engineering expertise, intended to provide a compensatory 
cultural and scientific grounding. Instead, they had to be both independently strengthened and 
integrated into the heart of engineering methodology—while the instrumental orientation of 
engineering would in turn pervade all. It had to be recognized that “the method of learning 
typical of technological education also has a general educational value” on par with the methods 
of the basic sciences and the humanities. At the same time, the humanities and basic sciences 
should have “full professional status,” equal to that of the applied sciences.10 All four main 
branches of knowledge that now defined the work of the Institute (basic science, engineering, 
architecture, humanities) would be submitted to the single primary educational objective of 
“developing intellectual power rather than knowledge of routine procedures; mastery of basic 
principles rather than accumulation of information; and sensitivity to a variety of values and 
broad understanding of nature and man rather than specific competence in a narrow field.”11 
In other words, MIT adopted a “general education” platform, discussed in the previous 
chapter, as the philosophical basis of its new pedagogical model. To the conception of 
knowledge as a technology for the formation of liberal democratic political man articulated in 
general education discourses MIT added, however, its own particular brand of instrumentality, 
derived from a reflection on the increasing social prominence of science and technology. “All 
education should prepare men for social responsibility,” wrote the Lewis Committee,  
                                                 
10 Ibid., 22, 35. My emphasis. 
 
11Ibid., 25. The four equal, degree-granting subsets of the Institute after 1948 would be:  School of Engineering, 
School of Science, School of Architecture and Planning, School of the Humanities and Social Sciences.  
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all education should concern itself with ends as well as means, with value as well as technique. We 
reject the view that there is one particular curriculum suitable to prepare men to be the leaders of 
society, and another distinct type suitable for specialists in techniques who are to be the servants of 
the policy makers. We believe that if the problems chosen for study are alive and complex, with 
social and ethical dimensions, the curriculum of the technological school can be an excellent medium 
for the development of leaders competent to handle the urgent social and political problems that now 
confront the world.12 
The idea that liberal arts education participates in the formation of social leadership had also 
been a prominent feature of the discussion in Harvard’s general education program of 1945.13 
The Institute’s bid for new status as a research university involved colonizing the domains of 
social and political agency that had been traditionally associated with the elite universities and 
their graduates—most immediately, those of MIT’s Cambridge neighbor.14 MIT would not 
simply absorb, but reconfigure the liberal arts, investing them with a form of knowledge 
structured by “techniques” to produce a new generation of leaders.  
 The notion of a compensatory, ameliorative, or even a public relations role assigned to 
the arts and humanities within an institution driven by the imperatives of large-scale sponsored 
techno-scientific research and development has typically shaped discussions of Kepes’s 
contribution at MIT.15 It is a position readily sustained by an ideology dominant in both public 
and critical discourses on the relationship between the sciences, on the one hand, and the arts and 
humanities, on the other, in the American academy. The sciences are the bearers of social utility, 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 23. 
 
13 Report of the Harvard Committee on the Objectives of a General Education in a Free Society (1945). See 
previous chapter for discussion. 
 
14 Compton’s reforms took Yale, Harvard, and Princeton as models for creating educational distinction, increasing 
selectivity at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. See Lecuyer, “Science-Based Technological University,” 
162. In addition, MIT’s ambitions had an undercurrent of a long-standing rivalry with Harvard, whose identification 
with “literary culture,” counterposed to the “vocational training” of MIT, had obvious social class connotations. See 
Fred Hapgood, Up the Infinite Corridor: MIT and the Technical Imagination (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1993), 47-62. 
 
15 See, e.g., Elizabeth Finch, “Languages of Vision: Gyorgy Kepes and the ‘New Landscape’ of Art and Science” 
(Ph.d. Diss., The City University of New York, 2005). 
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measured by the inventions they contribute to the life of the nation; the arts have no pragmatic 
purpose, but are important as the carriers of moral and political value, which serve to temper the 
indifferent advance of science.16 This rationale was certainly frequently invoked in postwar 
discussions of the art-science polarity, and it can also be found in Kepes’s own writings. There is 
no reason to doubt the sincerity of those formulations. However, the history of MIT’s reinvention 
as a research university, and especially the history of Kepes’s role in that reinvention, suggests 
that the “humanization” model is a screen obscuring more complex transitions marking all forms 
of disciplinary knowledge at the Institute, submitting all to a framework of deferred utility within 
which the link between knowledge production and the postwar state was forged. Whatever the 
relative significance of the arts measured against the sciences in the MIT community, both forms 
of practice were shaped in a liminal area not accessed by oppositions of value and utility, 
autonomy and instrumentality. The logic of deferred agency and enhanced potential, in its 
function of articulating and sustaining limits, was fundamental.  
 
5.1 VISUAL DESIGN FOR THE M.I.T. ARCHITECT 
 
Kepes would often claim that he discovered his life project of uniting art and science at 
MIT, but it would be more correct to say that the evolving Institute gave him fertile ground to 
implement his long developing reflections on art as a form of instrumental knowledge. Already 
in the mid-1940s, the School of Architecture must have seen in him a potential philosopher and 
activist of its own role within the emergent MIT episteme. It may be said that MIT needed Kepes 
just as much as Kepes needed MIT. Shortly before his appointment as Associate Professor of 
                                                 
16 An example of this position as advanced recently in a non-academic platform may be found in Mark Slouka, 
“Dehumanized: When Math and Science Rule the Schools,” Harper’s Magazine (September 2009): 32-40. 
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Freehand Drawing, the School of Architecture had undergone a set of curricular reforms in line 
with those taking place within the Institute at large. In 1942, a Committee on the Curriculum had 
arrived at two interdependent conclusions: that the curriculum had to be modernized, and that the 
School must “pursue to its utmost the integration of [its] courses with the Institute 
environment.”17 The 1943 President’s Report summarized those twinned premises: “[I]t is 
abundantly clear that the [“modern”] movement is having a profound effect upon architectural 
thinking and practice. The trends emphasize the value of a technological environment around an 
architectural school.”18 The Curriculum Committee stressed the growing importance of 
technology and “scientific method” to contemporary architectural practice and found problematic 
the lack of sufficient basic math and science prerequisites, which precluded architecture students 
from taking higher-level electives in science and engineering. Accordingly, on the one hand, the 
restructured curriculum would include a rebalancing of the overall course load in favor of 
mechanical engineering, building industry economics, and city planning—with a proportional 
reduction of offerings in Graphics, Shades and Shadows, Perspective, and Abstract Design.19 
(“We do not consider architecture as a field for unbridled personal expression” was the terse 
conclusion of the Committee, and a fine index of the “functionalist” ethos.20)  
On the other hand, the School of Architecture would embrace the first year core 
curriculum being concurrently proposed for the Institute as a whole.21 The latter resolution 
                                                 
17 The design staff, ca. 1942, MIT Archives, AC 400, Box 2, Folder 1.  
 
18 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, President’s Report 79, No.1 (October 1943): 21. 
 
19 See Walter R. MacCornack, “School of Architecture,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, President’s Report, 
V.79, No.1 (October 1943): 122-123; Anderson, et.al., Preliminary Report. 
 
20 Architectural Design Staff to Karl Compton, 11 December 1942, MIT Archives, AC 4, Box 16, Folder 9, p.11.  
 
21 Anderson, et.al., Preliminary Report, 4. 
 
 276
would achieve the desired “breakdown of the isolation of [the architecture school] from the 
Institute.”22 In the first year of Kepes’s appointment, accordingly, the architecture curriculum 
featured a first-year core of Chemistry, Physics, Calculus, and Descriptive Geometry, in addition 
to English, Military Science, and Drawing; followed by a heavy course-load in mechanical 
engineering, and required electives in history, urban sociology, economics, psychology, labor 
relations, history of thought, Western literature, international relations, fine arts, and music in the 
subsequent four years.23 In “almost completely de-professionaliz[ing]” the core, architectural 
education was aligned to the transitions taking place within MIT as a whole.24 The architectural 
student, on par with the science and engineering student, was provided with what the design staff 
considered to be “a broad general education” and “a certain mastery of the fundamentals of the 
larger fields of human knowledge,” informing him “with the sense that all fields are related by a 
common basis of understanding.”25 Drawing, “an all-important means of expression” for the 
architect, was merged into this pattern.26  
Drawing belonged among the “fundamental” disciplines of the core because, framed as a 
basic technique or method, it was understood to be a specifically architectural expression of the 
new instrumental knowledge advanced at the Institute. As the Curriculum Committee observed, 
method should take precedence over information in the education of the architect due to the rapid 
obsolescence of technical expertise with ongoing technological innovation. That meant: “more 
                                                 
22 Architectural Design Staff to Karl Compton, 2. 
 
23 William Wurster to E.B.Millard, 15 January 1945, MIT Archives, AC 4, Box 241, Folder 10. 
 
24 Architectural Design Staff to Karl Compton, 2-3. 
 
25 Lawrence B. Anderson, et.al., Preliminary Report of Curriculum Committee, 1942, MIT Archives, AC 4, Box 16, 
Folder 9, pp.6-7.  
 
26 Architectural Design Staff to Karl Compton, 2-3. 
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science, less technology”—a position echoed across the board at MIT in the postwar period.27 
The persistence of this formulation may be witnessed, for example, in a 1965 observation by 
Stratton that engineering calls for “such an understanding of fundamentals as to resist 
obsolescence… [a] requirement of commanding knowledge and adaptability to change and 
innovation... –in sum, a human perspective.”28 In architecture, drawing was an expression of 
design method as organized thought process. “[D]rawings,” wrote the design staff, “like words, 
are only an expression of thought… .” An architect’s drawings were not to be conceived as 
“pictorial” end-products of design activity, but rather made “during the evolution of a design… 
[as] illustrations to logical arguments… [and aids to the architect in] the outline of his research 
and his reasoning.”29 “[U]npretentious diagrams which the architect makes in search of a general 
directive,” drawings were indexes of a cognitive and research-based design process.30 Skill in 
drawing was accordingly conceived, in the words of John Burchard, as a “tool” or a “means to an 
end,” comparable to the physicist’s laboratory practice. As such, it was a metonym for the 
architectural design process in general, given that the latter was defined as “the ability to analyze 
the requirements of a proposed building and to synthesize them into a smoothly working plan.”31 
                                                 
27 “A frequent objection,” wrote the design staff, “made to teaching an architect anything about mechanical 
equipment is that these techniques are in process of rapid development and his knowledge will soon be out of date, 
or likely is even at the moment of instruction. [Therefore] a thorough grounding in science provides the basis for 
understanding what any piece of equipment, choice of material, or method of assembly can do or can not do in a 
building, even though the situation may be encountered for the first time in the field.” Anderson, et.al., Preliminary 
Report, 9. 
 
28 Julius Stratton, “The Humanities in Professional Education,” An address given on the occasion of the inauguration 
of Dr. H.G. Stever as President of the Carnegie Institute of Technology, October 21, 1965, Science and the Educated 
Man, 130. 
 




31 John E. Burchard to James R. Killian, Jr., 6 January 1942, MIT Archives, AC 400, Box 2, Folder 1, p.3. John Ely 
Burchard, Director of the Albert Farwell Bemis Foundation, an independent division within MIT dedicated to 
research on the building industry, had a degree in architectural engineering. Although on leave from MIT during 
WWII, Burchard remained involved in curricular reform at the School of Architecture, as evidenced by this letter of 
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Both architectural design and drawing as its graphic record, in mutually reinforcing fashion, 
were defined as cognitive techniques at the juncture of general or fundamental knowledge and 
instrumental methodology.32 
Kepes was hired to teach this model of drawing, administratively expressed in the 
filtering of the component techniques of Beaux-Arts rendering (Shades and Shadows, 
Perspective) into a single unit of Freehand Drawing, threaded through the five-year curriculum. 
He was to replace the categorically Beaux-Arts approach of previous instructor Johan Selmer-
Larsen: “basic figure construction and anatomy; rapid drawing direction from the human figure,” 
as the 1946 catalogue advertised.33 The term “drawing” itself, however, was clearly inadequate 
to the visual technology of knowledge Kepes’s contribution was to embody. Already in his 
appointment correspondence with Kepes, architecture dean William Wurster referred to the 
subject at issue as “’drawing’… for lack of a more complete word,” and expressed his eagerness 
to “confer with [Kepes] about photography, typography, etc., which would replace some of the 
courses as [currently] described.”34 By 1948, Kepes was teaching a five-term sequence, 
                                                                                                                                                             
response to the proposals of the curriculum committee he addressed to Killian, the acting president of MIT during 
the war. In 1948, Burchard would become the first dean of the School of Humanities and Social Science. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, he was also a member of the American Academy of the Arts and Sciences, as well 
as its president from 1954 to 1957. 
 
32 By 1962, the cognitive conception of design was articulated even more forcefully at MIT. “Architectural 
education,” wrote the faculty, “tends to emphasize the acquisition of insights and skills more than the creation of 
new knowledge. … The aims of [architectural design courses] are: a.) to foster a capacity for observation, 
understanding, analysis, synthesis and creation; b.) to develop a mental discipline to face and solve an architectural 
problem. The design courses are essentially laboratory courses where problems are presented to the students. The 
solution of these problems are [sic] not a mechanical or mathematical process but rather a process of selection; 
therefore the question of a mental discipline becomes of prime importance in the education of a designer.” The 
Professional Curriculum in Architecture, 7 December 1962, MIT Archives, AC 134, box 13, folder IV, pp. 1, 4.   
See also Hyungmin Pai’s discussion of the epistemology of architectural drawing from the Beaux-Arts to the 
modern paradigm in Pai, The Portfolio and the Diagram: Architecture, Discourse, and Modernity in America 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002).  
 
33 “Freehand Drawing,” MIT Bulletin, Catalogue Issue 81, no.3 (February 1946): 91. 
 
34 William Wurster to Gyorgy Kepes, 30 August 1945; William Wurster to Gyorgy Kepes, 14 July 1945, MIT 
Archives, AC 4, Box 241, Folder 10. 
 279
consisting of a rotating set of subjects, which included Visual Fundamentals, Structure of the 
City, Form and Design, Light and Color, Graphic Presentation, Painting, and Advanced Visual 
Design.35  
In hiring Kepes, Wurster clearly had in mind the educational program encapsulated in 
Language of Vision, as the publication of the book had brought Kepes “into certain national 
prominence.”36 It may be recalled from the previous chapter, Language of Vision advanced a 
philosophy of the image as both index and instrument of a visual technology of knowledge, 
oriented to training “the creative imagination for positive social action.”37 At MIT, Kepes 
proceeded to adapt his platform to the concrete task of educating the professional architect 
according to the precepts of the new curricular program. As a number of preparatory teaching 
notes made by Kepes indicate, he approached this task by positioning the design process and its 
outcome as a function of the social subjectivity envisioned by general education philosophy, and 
his own technology of vision as vital to the promotion of that subjectivity. In an undated note for 
a speech, Kepes summarized his activities at MIT as driven by a “dedication to fundamentals—
faculties, sensibilities—and not professional… vocational shortcuts.”38 “Architecture,” he 
concluded in a teaching note, “is made of architects—their vision, [their] ability to form.”39 Thus 
aligning his program with the general education goal of cultivating overall cognitive faculties, 
rather than specific vocational skills, Kepes proceeded to defend the need for such training in 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
35 See, for example, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Bulletin, Catalogue Issue 81, No.4 (June 1946) - 91, No. 
6 (July 1956). 
 
36 William Wurster to James R. Killian, Jr., 10 July 1945, MIT Archives, AC 4, Box 241, Folder 10. See Gyorgy 
Kepes, Language of Vision (Chicago: Paul Theobald, 1944). 
  
37 Kepes, Language of Vision, 14. 
 
38 [Gyorgy Kepes,] handwritten undated note, Kepes Papers, Reel 5312, frame 867. 
 
39 [Gyorgy Kepes,] handwritten undated note, Kepes Papers, Reel 5312, frame 461. 
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architecture. “Architecture is in [a] blind alley,” he noted by way of introducing his sequence of 
courses. Beaux-Arts methodology had been superseded by a focus on “economy” and “material,” 
identified with “functionalism,” reflecting a society defined by a “quantitative approach,” and a 
“survival [of the] fittest” mentality. Thus a one-sided approach had been replaced by another 
equally limited one. In this context, the visual arts, Kepes averred, become “an important 
discipline in [the] architect’s education” inasmuch as they are able to provide a “sense of organic 
relatedness,” integrating the “structural, biological, technical, … psychological, … sociological 
[and] intellectual… frames of reference.” In other words, Kepes’s visual education program 
would respond to the goals of MIT curricular reform by making the professional architect a “full 
man sensitive to issues of [the] present.”40  
I have argued here that Language of Vision was not a primer for training the visual arts 
professional. While his target was, instead, a generalized cognitive-perceptual social subject, 
Kepes nevertheless assigned a privileged role in its cultivation to artistic vision, broadly 
conceived. Professionals of the image – “painters, sculptors…, photographers, advertising 
designers”—were invested with the task of “teach[ing] to see” the rest of society.41 The MIT 
architect, positioned within a newly de-professionalized knowledge regime, was perhaps an ideal 
mediator between the general social and the specific artistic subjectivity. “Today,” Kepes 
remarked in another teaching note, “the needs of the eye, the human spirit, are not [fulfilled], 
mainly because of [the] lack of visual sensibilities. The education of architects must, therefore, 
include the education of the eye.”42 Kepes’s strategy focused on articulating the products of 
                                                 
40 [Gyorgy Kepes,] “Introduction,” handwritten undated note, Kepes Papers, Reel 5312, frame 441. 
 
41 Kepes, Language of Vision, 67. 
 
42 [Gyorgy Kepes,] handwritten undated note, Kepes Papers, Reel 5312, frame 446. 
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architectural design as functions of their psycho-perceptual reception, and the architectural 
design process as a function of the architect’s ability to mediate in that reception. “[T]he goal” of 
his teaching program, he posited, was “to synchronize physical structure and visual structure.”43 
Judging by the content of his teaching notes, Kepes’s courses consisted in the detailed 
elaboration of that principle through the systematic translation of spatial properties in terms of 
perceptual experience. For example, a Visual Fundamentals class dedicated to the analysis of 
“expansion and contraction of color” focused on the exploration of the general rule that “light 
rooms appear larger [and] wider than dark rooms.”44 (Figure 45) Kepes then asked his students 
to “study the effect of color on the relative illusory size of a closed and an open space,” through a 
series of graphic exercises.45 Another class dedicated to the study of color effects involved 
students in working to “induce consciously [the perception of] border contrast” by means of 
making models of rooms with a single window covered by a color filter and photographing these 
“against strong light.”46 (Figure 46)  
Visual Fundamentals were enumerated in a 1946 course catalogue as “point, line, shape, 
value, form, texture,”47 described in Language of Vision as constituent elements of perceptual 
“event[s].”48 “The picture-surface,” Kepes wrote in the latter text, “becomes a vital spatial world, 
not only in the sense that the spatial forces are acting on it—moving, falling and circulating—but 
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also in the sense that between these movements the field itself is charged with action.”49 In other 
words, Kepes understood such graphic units or qualities to be indexes of the perceiving mind’s 
dynamic “creative act.”50 The same concept would now be extended outward from the “picture-
surface” to the spatial environment. On the most basic level, “graphic elements”—such as “point, 
line, shape”—could be analogically linked to structural elements—such as “trusses, beams, 
arches, cantilever[s]”—understood “in a visual plastic illusory sense.”51 But Kepes’s larger point 
was to translate those perceptual properties of inhabited space as psycho-cognitive attributes of 
the socially-situated subject. “Every visual structure,” he explained, “is more than [an imprint] of 
the outside… material environment. 
Each visual perception… stands for corresponding human attitudes. 
Extension—is lived as [a] need to extend beyond individual enclosure, [as a] search for 
connectedness… . 
Figure-shape—stands for cohesion of individual completeness… . 
Solidity—also for inner cohesion, strength, vigor, inner fiber, security, integrity. 
Gravity—bondage to nature… . 
Motion—growth, flexibility, contact, variety, enrichment, change. 
Rest—harmony, repose, recovery of strength, etc. 
With disciplined vision, one [derives] orderliness from the visual ordering of the surroundings. The 
greater the ability to see intensely, the greater the possibility to make [one’s] life richer [and] 
stronger.52 
The identity between the physical and the psycho-cognitive environment that Kepes focused on 
articulating at MIT was essential to the translation of professional skill into social value in 
training the citizen-architect. In addition to his teaching program, Kepes engaged in two long-
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term projects that serve as fine illustrations of that relationship: his collaborative research with 
MIT planning professor Kevin Lynch on the perceptual form of the city, started in 1954; and his 
creative exploration of light, started at MIT around 1947. The history of the former would 
require more space than can be given here, so I will briefly focus on the latter.  
In 1947, as Kepes would later report, he was commissioned by the Sylvania Electric 
Company to “prepare some comments on the architectural role of illumination.”53 He developed 
a proposal for a “kinetic light space,” which would respond to the “capacity of the visual sense 
[to be] fed by renewed excitation,” and to the perceived need for an “integration of illumination 
with the total environment.” The installation was to set a wide range of animated light sources 
within a given spatial volume, creating “a luminous envelope that had no stationary dimension 
but still revealed a persistent space pattern as it fluctuated, pulsated, opened, and closed.”54 
Although Kepes never carried out the design, a graphic outline of a very similar proposal for “a 
building in which all facts connected with light and space could be demonstrated” was published 
in a 1951 article.55 A cross between a didactic exhibition and an architectural structure—or, as 
the introductory text (not written by Kepes) put it, “not… an exhibition superimposed on an 
architectural framework, but… an architectural layout which itself is the exhibited material”—
the installation would illustrate the perceptual effects of light and color through “distorted 
planes,… undulating walls, varied textures, and sculpture.”56 (Figure 47) Diagrammatic layouts 
provided by Kepes demonstrate that he conceived the installation as both a sensory and an 
educational journey, dissolving the physical space into a series of perceptual experiences and 
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then explaining their sources. (Figure 48) The idea of linking sensory immersion and conceptual 
understanding would become a central feature of Kepes’s light projects. 
In 1953, Kepes’s independent exploration of the perceptual qualities of light in the 
environment was matched at the School of Architecture by the establishment of a Laboratory of 
Lighting Design, sponsored by a grant from the F. W. Wakefield Brass Company. The laboratory 
was inaugurated with a program to study “all factors of environment which contribute to the 
process of seeing,” including “the effects of various distributions, quantities and qualities of 
light, heat, sound [and] color” and “various principles of producing and controlling daylight and 
artificial light.”57 In sponsoring the study center at the School of Architecture, Wakefield 
understood architecture to be one of the research fields “which may affect the seeing process,” 
among others like psychology, physiology, ophthalmology and optometrics.58 MIT architecture 
professor Lawrence Anderson, who spearheaded the project, fully agreed that research into the 
psycho-physiological properties of visual reception was a properly architectural domain. “Since,” 
he wrote, “the architect conceives the environment…, he bears the main responsibility for the 
success or failure of lighting. The project should therefore start from an architectural base, and 
aim at influencing architectural concepts in the direction of better seeing.”59 This might as well 
have been a summary of Kepes’s own agenda in the area of light studies. Although his 
involvement in the laboratory appears to have been tangential, Kepes would certainly have been 
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aware of its activities.60 The laboratory’s inaugural project involved the construction of an 
“experimental box,” intended to simulate a typical office cubicle, where responses of test 
subjects performing various tasks would be measured against controlled changes in lighting 
conditions.61 (Figure 49) The notable similarity between this experimental set-up recorded in 
documentary photographs and Kepes’s sketches for student exercises involving model rooms or 
“cubes” may suggest a pattern of influence, or simply the confluence between Kepes’s own 
program and concurrent notions of design at the School of Architecture as a whole.62 
 In 1965, Kepes succeeded in realizing the immersive sensory and educational light 
environment he had first conceived in 1947, as an exhibition on Light as a Creative Medium, 
held at Harvard’s Carpenter Center for the Visual Arts. The exhibit, Kepes wrote in a proposal 
draft, would “show the basic contributions that light and color make to our understanding of the 
visual environment.”63 Juxtaposing historical and contemporary works of art, artifacts, and 
student work from Kepes’s courses at MIT and the Art Institute of Chicago, the exhibition was a 
carefully choreographed trajectory through various fields of sensory experience, during which 
the visitor—or “receiver,” as Kepes had it—would become aware of his or her own role as one 
of the constitutive “attributes” of the environment. “In order to have any awareness of space,” 
Kepes wrote,  
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there must be a light source, an object to intercept the beams of light and a receiver to register the 
image. The exhibition must simultaneously work with [those] three attributes of ‘visibility.’ The 
receiver will necessarily be man and the human eye… .64  
Working directly on a sketch of the Carpenter Center gallery floor-plan, Kepes diagrammed his 
installation design as a “hypothetical walk” through a succession of zones delimited according to 
speed of movement, sight lines and focus points, and “degree of spectator involvement.”65 
(Figure 50) The viewer was to be guided on this journey by a series of “guide posts,” introducing 
him to a “basic vocabulary” of light and color effects—such as reflection, color contrasts and 
complementarities, and the effects of surface and texture—aiding in the ultimate transformation 
of sensory experience into conceptual understanding. “Spectator enters,” Kepes narrated, 
and straight ahead is [the] introductory ‘basic vocabulary’ room. … Beyond, but still straight ahead 
[there] is [an] eye-catching focal point—perhaps a painting borrowed from the Fogg [Museum]. [A] 
calm, conventional beginning, at first appearance. But, though spectator may not be aware of it, 
already light is effecting [sic] his appreciation of the space. First ‘room’ should be quiet so people 
will go slowly through it. Later, around the corner, the light and color interaction area will pulsate and 
dazzle the spectator. … To reinforce the first simple demonstrations, a painting which is subsequently 
analyzed for texture, surface, color area, etc., is displayed. … Moving from close scrutiny of single 
objects the spectator is drawn ahead by a plan, a map of a larger environment. … Transition to 
presentation of analysis of vision or the eye… . The physiological and symbolic demonstrations 
which follow… wind up the exhibition.66 
In summary, “enter ignorant observer,” Kepes telegraphed on the final sketch of his schematic 
design sequence, “educated observer exit.”67 (Figure 51) This would also be a local expression 
of the general principle Kepes never tired of illustrating: perception “begins with an event in 
space, and ends with an event in our brain.”68 
                                                 












 Installation photographs published in the exhibition catalogue convey some sense of how 
this plan worked out. (Figure 52) It was important to convey at least in some areas of the show 
an experience of a specifically urban environment—“a larger environment,” Kepes wrote, 
“which confronts [the spectator] as a small scale model of a city-scape through which he can 
walk.”69 The culmination of the show, the point of the most “intense involvement,” was situated 
next to the fully glazed exterior wall, where the visitor could catch glimpses of Cambridge city 
life among exhibits placed directly on the glass. (Figure 53) The exhibition’s larger goal was to 
demonstrate the potential for “a stupendous new civic art” in the “creative management of light” 
on the urban scale, which would “hol[d] out to all, both as individuals and as members of a 
society, [a] sense of harmony with life.”70 Ultimately, light was for Kepes a metaphor of unity 
between the perceptual and the material, the subjective and the objective, at the heart of the idea 
of architecture and its social instrumentality he advanced at MIT. Light, he wrote in 1967, “is not 
a substance; it is energy. Without boundaries, it molds, shapes, clarifies, and joins forms and 
spaces, connecting perceiver and perceived and bringing them to vital coherence.”71 Not 
surprisingly, he saw an aesthetic expression of this principle more readily in contemporary 
glazed curtain-wall buildings, which “have opened themselves up to the flow of light,” than he 
did in contemporary artworks.72 This merger of the psycho-perceptual and the material 
environment would be, for Kepes, the manifestation of a unified contemporary social subjectivity 
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in the “interdependence principle of the modern scientific urban-industrial world.”73 The 
aesthetic reflection of this social subjectivity, in turn, would invest design practice with the 
deferred social instrumentality defined as the model of MIT production as a whole—the 
projection of socially fruitful potential. “[A]s citizens and practicing members of this society,” 
Kepes wrote, “we are committed to the search for public forms that express our collective values 
and symbolize our shared needs and common aspirations.”74 His exhibition, therefore, was to be 
understood as a “prolegomenon,” a demonstration of “enormous promise,” whose “major tasks 
lie ahead.”75 “Suggestive rather than definitive, and tentative rather than conclusive,” Kepes 
emphasized, the installation was intended “to heighten the awareness… and thus stimulate 
creative thinking.”76 
 
5.2 INSTRUMENTAL COLLECTIVITIES OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
The specifically architectural elaboration of instrumentality was, however, only a small 
part of Kepes’s overall activities at MIT. He concurrently developed other practices of 
“interdependence,” in turn influenced by another set of conditions he encountered at the Institute. 
MIT’s postwar educational philosophy was a claim to institutional status on par with established 
major universities, but it was equally motivated by the dramatic impact made by the influx of 
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defense funding on campus—the largest share of any US university in the postwar period.77 
MIT’s ambitions for a new profile were both prompted and justified by its ballooning faculty, 
student body, and physical plant.78 At the same time, the model of instrumental knowledge 
linking “techniques” and “fundamentals” advanced at the Institute also described new graduate 
research structures. Defense R&D spending privileged approaches that blurred boundaries 
among academic disciplines and between basic and applied research. Writing during the Lewis 
Committee deliberations, Killian linked its activities to concurrent administrative 
experimentation with so-called “centers of research” intended to accommodate “those interests 
which reach outside the traditional departmental boundary lines and require the cooperation of 
the specialists from several disciplines.”79 Independent organizations jointly operated by two or 
more departments within the Institute, those centers were a concrete manifestation of 
“integration” in their mobilization of disparate disciplinary representatives “into a cooperative 
whole” and their “full coordination” of the functions of research and education.80  
The inaugural facilities of this kind at MIT were the Instrumentation Laboratory, 
established in 1934 and working after 1945 on inertial guidance systems for the military, and the 
Research Laboratory of Electronics (RLE), which grew out of the wartime “Rad Lab” dedicated 
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to developing and producing defense radar applications.81 Already by 1948 there were five 
similar “centers” at MIT, and such interdisciplinary consolidations continued to proliferate. In 
line with the “integral plan,” the centers were not limited to the natural sciences. The newly 
founded School of Humanities and Social Studies immediately engaged in classified 
interdisciplinary research, and in 1951, only a year after its inauguration, produced a new Center 
for International Studies, increasing the new School’s prestige and funding.82 Architecture was 
not left behind. The Research Center for Group Dynamics, established at the Institute under the 
direction of social psychologist Kurt Lewin in 1948, was affiliated with the Albert Farwell 
Bemis Foundation, transferred under the direct administration of the School of Architecture the 
same year. In 1959, the Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies became the most prominent 
MIT example of the “research center” model as applied to architecture. Kepes’s collaborative 
research with Lynch, started in 1954 with a Rockefeller Foundation grant, became an inaugural 
project of the Joint Center. In 1967, the Center for Advanced Visual Studies would extend this 
model to the visual arts at MIT. The Center’s roots, however, can be discerned in Kepes’s next 
(and final) major statement of philosophy – The New Landscape in Art and Science of 1956. 
Arriving at MIT in 1946, Kepes would later recall, he discovered “a new cosmology 
[opened up by the sciences], a new broad vista of the world that for... artists was not given.”83 
This other-than-human landscape composed of phenomena beyond the threshold of “sense 
experience” revealed through the aid of advanced imaging technologies—“invisible viruses, 
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atoms, mesons, protons, cosmic rays, supersonic waves”84 —would inspire a significant new 
departure in the “language of vision.” Collected in large part during the period between 1947 and 
1952, when Kepes reportedly “went like a bulldog who never gives up from one laboratory to the 
other” in the burgeoning complex of MIT’s “research centers,” these photographic records 
combined to form the central visual and conceptual argument of The New Landscape.85 At once 
a definitive theoretical statement and a practical experiment in the production of instrumental 
knowledge, the book was articulated around a matrix composed of the visual products of the new 
knowledge economy crystallizing at the Institute.  
By his own admission, Kepes’s interest in “images from the scientific world” actually 
pre-dated his arrival at MIT.86 His first reported encounter occurred in Weimar-era Berlin when 
a metallurgist friend introduced him to photomicrographs taken in his laboratory. The role of 
scientific images like the x-ray and the photomicrograph in the work of Moholy-Nagy is well-
known, and Kepes must have shared the latter’s enthusiasm for a technologically-mediated “new 
vision” presumably accessed through such imagery. Rediscovered at MIT, however, was an 
entirely new generation of scientific images, entailing a conceptual shift in approach. For 
Moholy, the microphotograph signified an expansion of time achieved in space through 
technological means—“our substitute for the longer period of time that primitive man could 
devote to observation.” Analogously, its opposite, the aerial view or “macrophotograph,” 
represented a compression of space in time.87 Such images, therefore, were indexes of an 
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existing, natural-historical—or bio-technological—condition of space-time. The New Landscape 
also had its share of images of the new “scale,” from the micro to the macro; but they were 
shuffled in with others, like a spark photograph of model projectiles in flight, a high-speed 
photograph of a falling drop of water, or photo-elasticity records of the effects of shear forces. 
(Figure 54) Such images were records of experimental manipulations of material conditions, 
enabled by imaging devices developed for the purpose of tracing the effects of processes 
unfolding in time.  
The products of the oscilloscope, stroboscope, and interferometer, the images on radar 
screens, radiographs, and spectrographs, were diagrams of events, rather than descriptions of 
“things” or “properties.” “The path of a cosmic ray,” wrote Kepes, “the growth of a crystal, the 
stroboscopic record of a raindrop are meaningful only as interrelations. We are compelled to 
interpret them as intersections of events.”88 Because, in practice, these images functioned as 
experimental data in research and development applications, the “events” they chronicled were 
exposed to vision not as preexisting natural conditions but as outcomes of interventions, at once 
purposeful and open-ended. Inasmuch as they necessarily showed nature as a medium of 
transformation and manipulation, their content was both operative and descriptive—a point 
emphasized throughout the book: “The patterns of structure are also patterns of action!”89 Here 
was an empirical parallel to the cognitive intervention in the material world that Kepes had 
earlier identified with the process of perception, when he described the mind’s creative act 
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transforming visual data into “vital spatial event[s].”90 But the scientific photographs now 
collected by Kepes register most directly as epistemological traces of the blurring of pure and 
applied research carried out at the Institute. 
Following his initial encounter with photomicrographs in the 1930s, Kepes invented a 
technique he called “photo-drawing” or “photo-painting.”91 (Figure 55) He would later offer this 
retrospective assessment of his early photographic work: “When I did those photograms, I almost 
tried to imitate scientific data, or scientific images, without having a justification.”92 Kepes 
would place an ink drop on a glass plate and press down on top of it with another plate, creating 
“really beautiful patterns, which [sic] were really an expression of the logic of nature.” In those 
patterns Kepes now saw the same “inevitability of texture” revealed in photomicrographs and 
electromicrographs. Before putting the plate into a negative enlarger to produce the final 
photogram, he would draw directly on the ink pattern to nudge it towards abstract or figurative 
forms in what he described as a “dialectical process, a dialogue with the material.” Through this 
process, a “hidden [natural] image” exposed through the force of pressure between the two glass 
plates would emerge invested with signification, to reveal “a hidden symbolic image.” Kepes 
would thus act as the “midwife” of the symbolic image, the facilitator for the emergence within 
these records of natural processes of what his interviewer perceptively called a “latent moral 
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condition.” “It’s not really me who is doing it,” Kepes quipped, “I’m just the middleman.”93 The 
scientific images of natural processes set in motion through experimental manipulation, gathered 
by Kepes in The New Landscape, shared with his own photograms this constitutive mixture of 
indexicality and instrumentality.  
Kepes had used the metaphor of the artist as middleman or “midwife” in one other prior 
context. Writing of artists affiliated with Dada and Surrealism in Language of Vision, he had 
described their practices as “reduced only to a sheer assistance of chance happenings.” The artist, 
Kepes had explained,  
acts the role of the midwife. He only assists at the birth of a living form that grows from deeper strata 
than his conscious efforts could reach. He invents techniques that give the fewest obstacles to the free 
flow of organic formation.94  
Notably, he reproduced a photomicrograph as illustration to this part of the text, juxtaposing it 
with a Hans Arp cutout, in the only identified example of the former medium included in the 
book.95 (Figure 56) When Kepes later spoke of his own art installations involving light he 
similarly emphasized the “acceptance of randomness” and the “creative invocation of chance 
events” as crucial design elements.96 Now, however, he also insisted on the presence of 
conscious control—an imposed and not simply found pattern—as an equally important 
counterweight. For example, his Kinetic Light Mural of 1959, a site-specific design for the New 
York offices of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, consisted of an aluminum screen with “some sixty 
thousand random perforations,” behind which were placed multiple artificial light sources 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 8. 
 
94 Kepes, Language of Vision, 194. 
 
95 An image of a magnetic field on page 28 might also be a photomicrograph, but it is not identified as such. 
 
96 Kepes, Kinetic Light as a Creative Medium, 26.  
 
 295
controlled by switching devices.97 (Figure 57) “The purpose,” Kepes wrote, “was to create… a 
fluid, luminous pattern with random changes, alive through the continuous transformation of 
color, intensity, direction, and pattern.”98 Designed to invoke “the visual richness of the city seen 
from the air by night,”99 the mural employed “random, chance movement as against a rhythm of 
the mechanical environment.”100 Interstitially situated between natural contingency and human 
purpose, the mural too was an indexical-instrumental image. In such expressions of an 
intermediary condition, Kepes sought to locate the necessary balance of freedom and control to 
which he would in other contexts give a more explicitly political dimension.101 “[T]he freedom,” 
he wrote, “that comes from the spontaneity of chance events that we so much appreciate in the 
forms of nature… could become [a] valuable guid[e] for reshaping our ever more complex inner 
and outer world. [The task, however, is to] evoke experiences with qualities both of life and of 
order….”102 
 If Kepes identified his creative persona as that of the “middleman” in the sense outlined 
above, it was also a fitting description of the role he sought to occupy within the new knowledge 
regime advanced at the Institute. The task of The New Landscape, Kepes explained, was to 
mobilize a “pattern-seeing” that would enable one to “trace the interplay of processes in the 
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world.”103 Kepes’s notion of “pattern,” as may be recalled from the previous chapter’s 
discussion, signaled the cognitive basis of perception. Whereas Language of Vision had not 
stressed the link between vision and knowledge, it was stated in no uncertain terms already in the 
second paragraph of The New Landscape: “vision is itself a mode of thinking.”104 The “pattern” 
concept now served to translate into perceptual terms what Kepes understood to be the 
intellectual condition of a contemporary world marked by “rapid expansion of knowledge and 
technical development.”105 This world of knowledge was a result of scientific production that 
specifically merged instrumentality and indexicality. Science has produced a “vast and 
constantly expanding armory” of “powerful tools and ideas with which we may either create or 
destroy,” Kepes wrote, which were at the same time “resources for new sights and sounds, new 
tastes and textures”—perceptual markers of an already existing “new landscape.”106  
It is not surprising that the MIT environment would fuel Kepes’s interest in the cognitive 
investment of the image, nor that it would direct his attention to visual documents of scientific 
research as ideal manifestations of the image as bearer of potential knowledge. The postwar 
period witnessed a wide-spread use of images as aides in the scientific laboratory in general.107 
Some of the very same stroboscopic photographs that inspired Kepes’s awe as examples of  
“tools and ideas” for creation and destruction figured as sources of more targeted “mystery” in a 
regular “Strobe Probe” column of MIT’s Technology Review journal. Here, a split-second image 
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of a bullet’s impact, for example, could be reproduced as a conceptual problem for the student to 
solve by identifying the physical processes it documented.108 (Figure 58) Poetically translating 
the logic motivating such exercises, Kepes too identified the scientific image as both a new 
knowledge product and a new tool for the education of vision.  
The scientific image, however, was not the only type of instrument collected in the book. 
The New Landscape interspersed a compendium of scientific photographs with reproductions of 
works of art from different cultures and eras, as well as short textual quotations from various 
sources, and essays by invited contributors—all set within the framework of a master narrative, 
written by Kepes himself. The “method” driving this presentation of material, Kepes explained, 
was “a kind of laboratory experiment [that] 
fuses visual images and verbal communication in a common structure… [T]he visual and verbal 
statements neither parallel one another in exact correspondence nor follow one another in a strict 
causal chain. They complement one another in an interwoven sequence. The structure builds, then, as 
the observer proceeds from one experience to another, and finally a new aspect of perception is 
outlined.109  
The book functioned, if it may be so described, as a collage of instruments and agents, a 
subjects-objects collectivity within which “pattern-seeing” would spring forth from multiple 
sources, including the viewer’s own active participation. (Figure 59) As such, it was a precursor 
to the strategy Kepes would later use in the Light as a Creative Medium installation. “The 
exhibition,” he would write in that context, “can best be described as a projected picture-
book.”110 Its “technique,” he continued, 
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is what we call ‘collage,’ i.e. various works taken out of their context and juxtaposed. Due to this 
juxtaposition, the beholder is compelled to fill in the missing links—this process should lead them to 
a different level of awareness… .111  
In both the book and the exhibition, “pattern-seeing” had to be conceived as a collaborative 
enterprise. Too much control, Kepes wrote of the exhibition, and the project would not inspire 
“involvement,” becoming instead “an exhibition of a more pedantic type where everything is 
spelled out.”112 Ceding total authorial control in another effort to balance chance with purpose, 
Kepes again tried to “midwife” the process. This strategy of facilitating the formation of 
instrumental collectivities of vision and knowledge is traceable in every major endeavor he 
would pursue from this point forward.113  
 In 1956, Kepes started a series of themed interdisciplinary seminars at MIT that brought 
together specialists in the arts and the sciences to discuss such issues as “structure” or “the man-
made object.” The intellectual products of those seminars were gathered in 1965-66 into a six-
volume Vision and Value series of books, published by George Braziller.114 The books modified 
the New Landscape model, consisting of more conventional anthologies of essays by seminar 
participants, augmented with short introductions by Kepes, as well as consolidated segments of 
scientific and artistic images titled “visual documents.” In 1960, Kepes was invited to edit an 
issue of Daedalus on “The Visual Arts Today,” which he executed again much on the same 
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model. Education of Vision, one of the Vision and Value books, substituted the “visual 
documents” section with a documentation of student work from MIT visual design courses—
their remarkable similarity to scientific images qualified these explorations of fledgling MIT 
architects and scientists to enter the proliferating knowledge collectivities orchestrated by Kepes. 
(Figure 60) By 1965, he was advancing plans for an “Expanded Visual Arts Program” at MIT, to 
be jump-started through a series of seminars intended to “produce new patterns [of] concepts and 
inter-relationships.”115 The rest of the program would include artist residencies, curricular 
programs for “studies in seeing anew,” exhibitions, and even a “common cafeteria where people 
working in different disciplines [could] meet.” The key, Kepes stressed, was to “involv[e] the 
total community in this new approach.”116 Finally, in 1967, a major milestone in this ongoing 
project was reached with the establishment of CAVS.  
In describing the new organization, Kepes referred to it, variously, as a “research 
center… for new creative objectives,”117 a “research laboratory,”118 or a “small work 
community” that would produce “interthinking between different disciplines in the visual arts 
and scientific and technical fields.”119 “[M]ajor creative achievement,” he maintained, “comes 
from the confluence of many types of creative personalities.” The proposed “small work 
community,” therefore, “by recognizing common problems of adjoining or related fields, could 
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accomplish the dovetailing… of knowledge and knowledge.”120 CAVS is typically identified by 
historians as an effort to breach the cultural divide between the arts and the postwar techno-
sciences, and linked as such to other contemporaneous initiatives claiming the same ideological 
banner—such as Experiments in Art and Technology (E.A.T.).121 Kepes, however, dwelled less 
on the notion of an art-science polarity than he did on the idea of the artist’s cultural isolation 
from what he called “the total contemporary world.”122 Likewise, his efforts focused on 
overcoming a generalized condition of isolation or fragmentation, which he read at once in 
intellectual and in social terms.  
The “common life of society,” he wrote for example, is “frozen into separate 
compartments each with its specialized interests and jargon,” proceeding seamlessly from a 
vision of disciplinary specialization to that of social disintegration. The overriding goal, thus, 
was the creation of a cultural community based on established channels for communication and 
the exchange of knowledge—a social-intellectual zone where all involved could 
“communicate… in the same language and could pool their feelings and knowledge in a common 
cultural stream.”123 So much was this the dominant idea that Kepes tried to select CAVS artists 
primarily for their ability to collaborate successfully or “interact” with others, and only 
secondarily for their interest in engaging with scientific or technological practices. He frequently 
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reiterated this in letters to current and potential CAVS fellows. “The choice I have to make when 
I ask people to work at the Center,” he wrote to Keiko Prince for example, 
is not guided by my liking for them nor by my estimation of their creative qualifications. To be at the 
Center… means more than just being there. There should be an interaction which produces a vital, 
creative ‘gestalt’ and not merely a co-existence of gifted, sensitive, human humans. … [T]he people 
working here have to have, aside from their creative gifts,… a quality that… could create a 
relationship that opens up in collaboration—in the exchange of ideas with other people—a new 
climate which could generate new ideas and new insights.124 
Much as he continued to envision the artist’s intervention in the physical environment he first 
proposed in 1947 as the cultivation of a “community of objects,” forming a unified Gestalt, 
Kepes now stressed that it must spring forth from a community of subjects.125 
The term “interthinking,” used by Kepes to describe the key characteristic of such a 
community, was derived from the writings of evolutionary paleontologist George Gaylord 
Simpson, who predicted that it would succeed “interbreeding” as the catalyst for human 
evolution.126 But the ideal of a tightly-knit small-scale intellectual association, linking 
heterogeneous forms of knowledge by means of a shared language of communication, and 
dedicated to creative innovation, was widely shared in postwar academic circles—and especially 
prominent at Cambridge. As historian Jamie Cohen-Cole has argued, the evident success of 
interdisciplinary research practices in the postwar academy gave rise to an ideology of 
interdisciplinary communication as a “heuristic model” for a unified pluralist national society.127 
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First voiced in the social sciences but quickly spreading to the natural sciences and the 
humanities, this disposition tended to associate the increasing proliferation and complexity of 
specialized knowledge with increasing social heterogeneity in postwar America, and 
consequently held functioning interdisciplinary collaboration as a paradigm of social 
cohesion.128 In the context of a discursive culture rooted in intersubjective conceptions of the 
polity, it is not surprising that the success of this intellectual-social community depended on its 
constitution through a specific desirable type of subjectivity.129 Just as, Cohen-Cole proposes, 
ethnic, cultural, or racial tolerance was not premised on the erasure but rather the acceptance of 
differences, so “interdisciplinarity was not so much an issue of knowledge of several fields, [but 
rather of] the ability, cognitive skills, and personality to get along with people of other 
disciplines.”130 It was likewise precisely a communicative and cooperative capacity—an 
intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic disposition—that Kepes sought to cultivate at CAVS. 
Although this ideological disposition was widespread in postwar academic intellectual 
culture, Cambridge was an important hub. The Cambridge academic world, Cohen-Cole writes, 
was “a web of intimate intellectual exchange,” woven in dinner clubs, discussion groups, 
academic societies, and research centers that both frequently grew out of high-level 
interdisciplinary conversations taking place in such settings and had the continuation of those 
conversations as their primary raison d'être.131 Kepes must be considered a member of that 
intellectual society. He participated in the interdisciplinary Macy conferences on cybernetics and 
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the regular meetings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS), which he joined 
in 1952.132 The series of themed interdisciplinary seminars he organized, discussed above, were 
certainly based on the same model; and the interdisciplinary conference in general remained an 
important site for the articulation of Kepes’s goals.133  
AAAS, for example, is a good lens through which to trace the intellectual-social 
community ideal. Discussion of the social value of interdisciplinary communication pervades its 
publications.134 In fact, its house organ, the journal Daedalus, was launched in 1955 under the 
auspices of Burchard, by then Dean of the MIT School of Arts and Sciences and Kepes’s friend, 
to enable the Academy to “make its mark on the whole nation or even the world” specifically by 
organizing and publishing “vigorous conferences on topics of cross-disciplinary interest.”135 In 
1959, the anthropologist Margaret Mead, an active voice on the intellectual-social community, 
wrote in Daedalus on the relationship between scientific and general cultures.136 Her solution to 
“closing the gap between the scientists and the others” focused on the “intoxicating” process of 
“face-to-face… specialized communication” characteristic of the scientific “working 
conference.” In a passage that could have been written by Kepes, Mead extended that emphasis 
on communication to the fine arts, asserting that  
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[s]o long as the arts fail to come to grips with the findings of those sciences that are changing the face 
of the world, there is a danger that the group within which communication is really possible will 
become narrower and narrower. Thus it is imperative for the arts to come to terms with the physical, 
biological, and social sciences, so as to preserve and enhance their own powers of communication.137 
The same themes were again replayed in an AAAS conference on the relationship between 
science and culture, the proceedings of which were published in a 1965 Daedalus special 
issue.138 Kepes participated in the conference, dedicating his remarks to the announcement of his 
initial plans for CAVS.139 After rehearsing the classic “two cultures” idea, the conference 
focused on the possibility of communication in an age of specialized knowledge. “[D]etailed 
professional knowledge of the other’s specialty,” it was agreed, “is not necessary for 
acknowledging common elements in science and scholarship… [there will always be an 
inescapable] tension between recognized commonalities and… necessary differences.”140 Thus 
perhaps the clearest, and most frequently invoked in the proceedings, expression of the 
conference’s ideal was in the art historian James Ackerman’s notion of scientia – a “single, 
evolving structure of ideas and of images that characterizes [the culture of a given time, and 
thus] pervades the attitudes of scientist, artist, and humanist-scholar alike, even though they are 
working on very different materials and in different languages.”141 It was also Kepes’s goal to 
access this scientia. 
The idea of CAVS was in so many ways the ultimate expression of Kepes’s career 
trajectory that it is difficult to date its origin. It may be remembered that, already during the war, 
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Kepes had tentatively sketched out a plan for a University of Vision.142 Around 1964, the MIT 
School of Architecture had on file a proposal he made for an MIT Institute of Vision.143  Kepes 
himself has asserted that he had been pressing for the establishment of a visual arts center at MIT 
since the mid-1950s.144 But, evidently, it was not until 1963 that he started to make headway 
with the MIT administration in his plans to develop a “work center [that would be] a 
complementary part of the general education program.”145 By the start of 1964, President 
Stratton had been converted to “the concept of a Center for the Visual Arts, modeled after the 
pattern of [the Institute’s] other interdisciplinary centers, such as the Center for International 
Studies.”146 The brochure produced for the opening of the Center would explain that CAVS was 
established “to be the common focus of … a continuing, Institute-wide, interdisciplinary 
program,” conditioned by the structure of “scientific enterprise, [which] has been losing its own 
sharply defined boundaries, [with] specialties… become less distinct and frontiers 
interdisciplinary.”147 The administrative extension to CAVS of the research center model was 
clearly premised on the conceptual extension of the interdisciplinary research science paradigm 
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to the visual arts accomplished by Kepes. Indeed, the proximity was so tight that, in its early 
years, CAVS was frequently assumed to be a research center in perceptual psychology.148  
The interdisciplinary center model, explained Max Millikan, head of the MIT Center for 
International Studies, was “focused around problems rather than disciplines.”149 A similar 
concept of gathering collectivities around problems was evident in all of Kepes’s post-New 
Landscape projects. CAVS would become one more mode in this ongoing production of “a 
collective vision born of pooled feelings, ideas, and knowledge”—“the vector, as it were, of the 
creative impulses of artists, city planners, scientists, and engineers, all working together.”150 
Practically, this was accomplished by appointing artist fellows to engage in “a sequence of major 
collaborative projects” with each other as well as with Institute scientists and engineers, and with 
groups of graduate students and postdoctoral fellows in architecture, painting, sculpture, and 
film-making.151 (Figure 61) The inaugural CAVS brochure collated the work of the first set of 
artist fellows—Otto Piene, John Whitney, Takis, and Harold Tovish—with the already 
established members of Kepes’s visual-cognitive collectives—scientific images and Kepes’s 
photograms. Their integration was emphasized through the use of a uniform format—black-and-
white—and scale for all. (Figure 62) A set of studio photographs taken in the Center’s first years 
restages the deskilling implicit to the visual collectivity: a pair of scissors in the foreground of 
one photograph is the lone and feeble evidence of manual craft in an environment set up for the 
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production of texts and images. (Figure 63) CAVS fellows, Kepes’s visual design students, MIT 
postdocs—all would be engaged in the production of devices whose ur-form, the instrumental-
indexical scientific photograph, was the epistemological record of postwar academic knowledge 
as it was shaped at the Institute. 
 However, there was another crucial element operative in the Center’s inception at MIT. 
In 1952, the Institute expanded from the bases of the liberal arts curriculum defined by the 1947 
Lewis Committee to broach the visual arts. A Committee for the Study of the Visual Arts at 
MIT, chaired by Bartlett H. Hays, Jr., concluded its deliberations in 1954, and its 
recommendations were adopted by 1957. Departing from the general premise that contemporary 
science “seeks to educate experts who can perceive relationships instead of specialists who 
apparently do not,” and that art “is a response to ever changing relationships,” the Committee 
proceeded to embrace the educational value of art for its access to a form of cognition--
“intuitive” rather than “logical”—deemed crucial to the intellectual development of the scientist 
and engineer.152 As a form of thought, participation in art would increase the creativity of the 
scientist.  The committee consulted Kepes, along with Wilhelm Koehler and Rudolf Arnheim—
names that hint at an interest in implementing for the Institute the theory of visual art practice as 
aide to intellectual innovation explored in the previous chapter of this dissertation.153 In fact, 
Kepes’s activities at the Institute were much more central to this initiative than his marginal role 
in committee deliberations might suggest. Hays Committee recommendations were conceived, as 
Burchard wrote seeking funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, as part of an “expanding 
humanities program at MIT.” The Institute, Burchard explained, felt “well equipped” to initiate 
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an “experimental art program” because it could build on the “laboratory for architectural 
students” directed by Kepes, and given that “the relations between the Schools of Architecture 
and of Humanities are so cordial and so complete.”154  
Starting in 1957, an Institute-wide curriculum of art history and studio art courses, known 
as Field Ten (Visual Arts), was brought under the administration of the School of Architecture. 
Its studio program was developed by Robert O. Preusser, an artist originally hired to help teach 
visual design with Kepes and thoroughly imbued with Kepes’s philosophy and technique. The 
studio course, Preusser explained, consisted of a “sequence of visual forming tasks, spanning the 
extremes of spontaneous and analytical procedures.”155 MIT science and engineering students 
were encouraged to manipulate in new ways the industrial materials and experimental procedures 
of the scientific research and development laboratory, exploring their aesthetic potential. (Figure 
64) The goal, Preusser maintained, was not to make artists out of scientists, but to make possible 
the “comprehension of the artist’s thought process without emulation of his product” in order to 
encourage the “development of imaginative thinking and inventive procedures.” The program 
was an exercise in testing the fundamental hypothesis that “creative processes in art and science 
are similar and that participation in the former can, in turn, heighten performance in the 
latter.”156 But in addition to its role in enhancing intellectual innovation in the sciences, Field 
Ten would contribute to rebuilding the intellectual-social community splintered by 
specialization, proving that art and science are “mode[s] of understanding” that can “vitalize 
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[each other] with points of view and concepts seldom considered in their isolated formats,” thus 
leading to “interdisciplinary understanding and collaborative action.”157  
 Design knowledge, having been invested with the instrumentality devised for the MIT 
scientist, was thus returned full circle to help train the scientist to see and think. The goal of Field 
Ten, wrote architecture Dean Lawrence Anderson, was “to graduate scientists and engineers who 
are fully aware… of their responsibility for improving [the] physical environment.”158 This was 
an expression of the only slightly wider goals set for the program by the Hays Committee itself. 
“The ideal [art education] program,” the Committee had written,  
is virtually an experience in social education presented visually… [Its goal] is to develop the capacity 
of the technician to undertake responsibility for the forms that his technical training creates. The 
quality of these forms, as of his own spiritual insight, ultimately affects the social atmosphere and 
climate of thought of his entire world.159  
Retracing CAVS origins at the time of the Center’s inauguration, Kepes recalled the formative 
influence of Hayes in the development of his own recognition of “what art education should be 
in a university.”160 Accordingly, the Center’s inaugural brochure emphasized the 
“reinforcement” CAVS would give to the Institute denizen in the carrying out of “the present 
extremely significant role of the scientist-citizen.”161 Thus CAVS could be traced back to 
Kepes’s initial activities at the School of Architecture, in turn an expansion and realization of the 
fundamental social goals of The Language of Vision: the formation of a cognitive-perceptual 
vanguard for social change. CAVS was established to undertake an “education of the educators 
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of sensibilities,” Kepes wrote, echoing his first book.162 Only now, from within his mature 
conception of vision that no longer admitted any distinctions between formal design and 
advanced knowledge-production, the ranks of the “educators of sensibilities” would expand to 
include the “scientist-citizen” as well as the artist and the architect. 
 










Soon after CAVS opened in 1967, the MIT campus, like many university campuses 
across the country, was convulsed by student and faculty protests. The radical discourses of 
1967-68 brought the politics of knowledge, whose history in relation to design has been traced in 
part in this dissertation, into the national spotlight. But they also gave a new ideological shape to 
that politics, inflected by the strategic demands of the moment. That discursive formulation has 
had lasting effects, coloring historical assessments of the postwar American regime, and also 
impacting the evaluation of design practices situated within it.  
The conflict erupting at MIT around 1967-68 turned around the constitution of political 
agency in scientific production in the Vietnam era. In a 1967 issue of the New York Review of 
Books, MIT linguistics professor Noam Chomsky published an essay titled “The Responsibility 
of Intellectuals” that became one of the lightning rods in the debate on knowledge. Chomsky 
took as his targets prominent scholars like Arthur Schlesinger, Thomas Schelling, McGeorge 
Bundy, and MIT’s own Walt Rostow, who held consulting positions with the federal 
government, appeared to contribute to the formulation of policy, or whose presence at the White 
House was increasingly prominent under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Those were 
the men who embodied the ideal of leadership for which MIT education—newly infused after the 
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war with liberal arts methodology—had been preparing its students: instrumental knowledge 
placed at the disposal of the state. Chomsky’s essay, in effect, shifted attention from the 
production of instrumental knowledge—the problem which had occupied MIT since the war—to 
its application. He observed that “scholar-experts [solving the] technical problems that arise in 
contemporary society” surreptitiously embrace the dominant ideology driving Washington policy 
when they find themselves in positions of access to the formation of that policy.1 Their 
elaborations of objective solutions to specific (foreign) policy problems in fact reveal a basic 
ideological consensus on state policy objectives, even when the latter obviously contradict 
“fundamental human values.”2 In this way, Chomsky’s critique brought to bear directly on the 
basic logic of the deferral of value sustaining MIT’s educational philosophy. “Quite often,” he 
wrote, “the statements of sincere and devoted technical experts give surprising insight into the 
intellectual attitudes that lie in the background of the latest savagery.”3 
Like many left-leaning intellectuals formulating the new discourse of the politics of 
knowledge, Chomsky did not address the content of the knowledge produced, but rather its 
position with respect to the institutions of the state. Intellectual dissent at MIT was structured in 
the terms of an inter-faculty confrontation between “inside men” and “outside men”—those with 
and those without Washington contracts. (Figure 65) The physicist Jerrold R. Zacharias 
expressed the position of the former as “the most basic axiom of politics: ‘It’s better to be on the 
inside heaving out than on the outside heaving in.’”4 The position of those on the “outside,” 
Chomsky prominent among them, was enacted through a one-day “research stoppage,” led by 
                                                 
1 Noam Chomsky, “The Responsibility of Intellectuals,” reprinted from the New York Review of Books, February 23, 
1967, in American Power and the New Mandarins (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), 348. 
 
2 Ibid., 342. 
 
3 Ibid., 357. 
 
4 Cited in Richard Todd, “The ‘Ins’ and ‘Outs’ at M.I.T.,” The New York Times (May 18, 1969). 
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forty eight MIT professors, as a “symbolic gesture of protest” against defense work, refusing 
instrumentality as such.5 The same solution of programmatic disengagement was played out in 
the demands on the part of student protesters for the university’s divestment of two of its 
affiliated “research centers”: the Lincoln Laboratory and the Instrumentation Laboratory (later 
Draper Laboratory).6 This spatialization of political agency around a borderline dividing power 
(vested in the political institutions of the state) and resistance (situated outside of them) placed 
the question of the social responsibility of knowledge-production in the terms that Kepes—the 
man in the middle—never considered. To him, the merging into a collectivity of instrumental 
knowledge and cultural value would in itself produce positive social effects; the relationship 
between the construction of values and the distribution of powers eluded him.  
The strategic topography of knowledge with respect to the state as a coercive 
“establishment” or “complex,” in the familiar language of the period, would dominate discussion 
of the practices of instrumentality developed over the prior decades—the ideological division 
between instrumentality and autonomy mirroring the positions of political right and left.7 While 
this discourse has been enormously successful in animating practices within a broad cultural 
arena, including that of design, its validity as a critical paradigm illuminating reflection on the 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 MIT divested the Instrumentation Laboratory in 1970. See Dorothy Nelkin, The University and Military Research: 
Moral Politics at M.I.T. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972). 
 
7 In a 1965 “Science and Culture” issue of Daedalus, the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, to 
which Kepes contributed the first public statement of his plans for CAVS, Herbert Marcuse published a version of 
his influential polemic against “technological rationality.” The “operational” dimension of technology is integral to 
the scientific method, he rehearsed; and the ongoing merger of the sciences and the humanities extends that 
instrumentality to all of knowledge, effectively removing from the “technological society” every expression of 
resistance contained in “non-operative” forms of rationality, whether “pure” science or “autonomous” culture. To 
pass from an “affirmative” instrumentality to a genuinely creative one, therefore, would require a (temporary) 
negation of all operative, or socially productive, dimensions of knowledge. Herbert Marcuse, “Remarks on a 




postwar period has certainly been exhausted. The opposition between autonomy and 
instrumentality as models for cultural and political practice must itself be historicized, and its 
function explored according to the contingencies of its formulation.8 Although that project is 
outside of the scope of this dissertation, I have engaged here in an analogous investigation of the 
political constitution of instrumentality for the preceding historical era. From 1937 to 1967, I 
have argued, the political instrumentality of design as a practice of knowledge was dependent on 
its ability to successfully delimit its own range of control in the various social spheres it 
attempted to enter. This form of instrumentality, or this distribution of agency, positioned design 
practices in confluence with the state, itself constituted in relation to the social sphere, over 
which its jurisdiction extends, as a topography of limits, constraints, and retrenchments.  
In that context, the process-based conception of design practice developed in the 
European 1920s had a powerful resonance. Gropius’s programmatically non-prescriptive 
formulation of design method as a disciplined response to contingency was embraced by the 
American architectural profession working to define its relationship to the national economy 
newly constituted as a medium of flexible and open-ended interventions. His progressive 
immersion in this professional environment evidently made only more pressing the imperative to 
champion a pliable design expertise, to further define its parameters, and to variously develop it 
in the spheres of its multivalent application: from the training of the architectural student to the 
articulation of planning approaches at the national scale. Thus, for example, Gropius’s and 
Wagner’s almost ritualized invocation of “flexibility” in 1942 must be read less as an index of 
their ideological proximity to the economic-managerial discourse of Hansen and Greer—with 
whose concrete analysis and recommendations, it may be recalled, the former two actually 
                                                 
8 Such a project is carried out in relation to postmodern “autonomy” in Reinhold Martin, Utopia's Ghost: 
Architecture and Postmodernism, Again (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 49-68. 
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disagreed—than as a record of the designers’ eagerness to position their own professional 
competences as fully coextensive with the instrumentalized knowledge regime represented by 
those intellectual disciplines with direct access to the formation of state policy.  
Kepes’s efforts to extend the utility of design in the sphere of general education made no 
claims—however indirect—for policy influence, but he nevertheless aspired to create a key role 
for design in the shaping of the social subjectivity that was called upon to express postwar 
economic and political citizenship. While Gropius and Kepes shared the same general 
philosophy of education, based in progressive educational reform models, Kepes expanded, and 
perhaps radicalized, its field of application—from the flexibly-skilled designer, which remained 
the target of Gropius’s pedagogy, to the flexibly-skilled knowledge worker and open-minded 
citizen in general. At the same time, already around the crux of the Second World War, Kepes 
foresaw the imminent advancement of the politics of expertise onto the frontiers of the national 
mind, while Gropius focused his attention instead on the tasks of expertise in the coordination 
and management of large-scale building operations. In Cambridge and in Chicago, respectively, 
Gropius and Kepes oriented their reflections on design knowledge towards the two frequently 
outlined and juxtaposed dimensions of national mobilization: the organization of material 
resources and the management of human resources. Likewise, after the war, the model of design 
practice that the two protagonists of this study embodied diverged—Gropius increasingly 
assuming the conventional role of the architect as producer of physical structures, especially after 
his retirement from Harvard in 1952 to dedicate himself full-time to TAC; while Kepes went on 
to develop at MIT a model of the designer as producer of image and discourse communities. 
Throughout this history, the relationship between the politico-economic goals and 
techniques of the state and the discourses and strategies of design has been construed neither as 
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causal, nor as a matter of ideological representation or mediation. The hypothesis I have explored 
in the preceding pages under the heading of the relationship between design and the politics of 
knowledge is, rather, that the development of the state since the New Deal entailed the 
elaboration of a specific instrumentality for intellectual practices, characterized above all by the 
imperative of self-delimitation, and that design participated in that elaboration. In other words, 
the relationship between the practices of design and the processes of state formation has been 
fundamentally symbiotic.9 Without in any way claiming a total collapse of the cultural into the 
political, I have tried, nevertheless, to consistently resist any reading premised on the assumption 
of an essential heterogeneity between these two “spheres.” A search for modes of mediation or 
communication would be beside the point here. Thus, Gropius and Kepes—as well as the other 
designers and intellectuals who appear in this study—did not collude, whether wittingly or 
unwittingly, with the regime of governmentality described here. Nor, of course, did they resist it. 
Dispelling the identification of instrumentality with collusion (or at least affirmation) that still 
tends to dominate politicized readings of modernist and late modernist design practices should 
not lead to a revisionist celebration of those very practices as progressive or liberalizing. To 
present Gropius and Kepes as heroes, villains, or dupes would be to assign to each at once too 
much power and too little relevance. Instead, I have tried to understand their practices as 
indexical of design’s constitutive role in the historical formation of the political agency of 
knowledge, and thus to the emergence of knowledge as a political “object of contention.” 
It is possible, and becomes at certain points unequivocally necessary, to imagine other 
modes and strategies of agency, other targets and potentialities. But thinking and acting 
                                                 
9 Here, to reiterate, what I mean by the processes of state formation is not the development of specific policies in 
Washington, nor the conduct of professional party politics, but rather the emergence of a particular regime of 
governance, defining and regulating the relationship between “society” and the (centralized, national) “state.” 
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otherwise—both in design and in the production of knowledge—requires an unflinching 
confrontation with the limits of agency as currently constituted, without which the potential of 
the imagination can only dissipate. As contemporary vanguard architecture increasingly turns to 
socially-engaged and research-based practices, and as contemporary thought increasingly 
examines the classical problem of the state as the starting point for revisions of current political 
practice, the contribution of design practice to the history of state formation in the New Deal and 
after, explored in this dissertation, could provide a model for the examination of the social 




10 See, e.g., the recent exhibition Small Scale, Big Change: New Architectures of Social Engagement, The Museum 
of Modern Art, New York, October 3, 2010–January 3, 2011; Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, Daniel Bensaid, 
Wendy Brown, Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Ranciere, Kristin Ross, and Slavoj Zizek, Democracy in What State? (New 


































Still from Dziga Vertov’s The Man with a Movie Camera,  








Analysis of table shapes proposed for Vietnam Peace Conference.  


































Park Avenue pre- and post-Pan Am, from Vincent Scully,  
































Park Avenue pre- and post-Pan Am, from Peter Blake,  










Claes Oldenburg, Proposed Colossal Monument for Park Avenue, New York City:  













Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, Composition (Glass Architecture),  











Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, Kinetic-Constructive System, schematic diagram, 1922,  









Top: Walter Gropius and Fred Forbat, Baukasten im grossen (Large-Scale Building 
Blocks), 1921-23. Bottom: Exhibition of International Architecture, Bauhaus, Weimar, 












Lajos Kassák, Pictorial Architecture, 1922 




































Walter Gropius, “Architecture at Harvard University,”  








Top: From Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(1932). Bottom: From The Structure of the American Economy,  











“From Keynes to Roosevelt: Our Recovery Plan Assayed,”  














Diagram of the building industry within the national economy, from  
Benjamin F. Betts, “Jobs for Millions Through Revival of Building,”  








From W.R.Morton Keast and A.B.Randall, “The Minimum Building for  
































From Elmer Roswell Coburn, “Economics—The New Basis of  


























Left: London. From Architectural Record, March 1943. 













Top: Levitt & Sons defense housing community, Norfolk, VA, ca.1941. 
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Survey responses from “Architects and Engineers at Work,”  







From “Albert Kahn,” The Architectural Forum (August 1938).  









From “Small Arms Ammunition Plants,” The Architectural Forum (December 1942).  


















































Advertisements from (left) New Pencil Points (July 1943) and  
(right) The Architectural Forum (December 1942)  












   
 
    
 
Top: Martin Wagner and Bruno Taut (plans), Gross-Siedlung Zehlendorf, ca. 1926-32. 
Bottom: Model of a township, from Walter Gropius and Martin Wagner,  







Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA) model community (plan). Clarence Stein  








Top: Walter Gropius, Hirsch system model for the Wachsende Haus exhibition,  
organized by Martin Wagner, 1932. 
Bottom: Walter Gropius, “A post-war ‘growing and shrinking’  
prefabricated family dwelling,” based on the Packaged House system  








From Gropius and Wagner, “A Program for City Reconstruction,”  
Architectural Forum (July 1943).  
Clockwise from top left: location of proposed township in the region;  







From Gropius and Wagner, “A Program for City Reconstruction,”  























Partial plan for Chatham Village, Pittsburgh, by Clarence Stein  
and Henry Wright, 1930-32, showing relationship of plan to dwelling design.  
From Francesco Dal Co, “From Parks to the Region,”  

























Optical illusions published in Life articles on psychology.  
Left: “Perception Tests,” Life (16 January 1950).  








Optical illusions as applied in historical works of architecture,  







































Charles Forberg, exhibition building, 1946, a GSD student project  




























Comparison between the Bauhaus and Harkness Commons,  










Views of Harkness Commons, from Walter Gropius, Jean B. Fletcher,  
Norman C.Fletcher, John C. Harkness, Sarah P. Harkness,  
Louis A. McMillen, Benjamin Thompson, eds.,  






Student work from Kepes’s School of Design workshops, from  



























Advertising designs by (top left) Lester Beall, (bottom left) Harold Walter, 










Sequence showing industrial adaptation of hand sculpture made in the School of Design 
rehabilitation class, from “Better than Before,” Technology Review (November 1943). Top: 
Blind people testing tactile charts and hand sculptures at the School of Design; middle: a hand 













Top: Ann Brinkley, hand sculpture, 1939; middle and bottom:  
Noland Rhoades, telephone, 1941, “a practical adaptation of the hand sculpture,”  








Jean Carlu, poster for the Office of Emergency Management, 1940, 

























Works representing “dynamic equilibrium” by (top left) Harold Walter;  
(middle and bottom left) Ruth Robbins, student in Visual Fundamentals,  
School of Design in Chicago; (right) Kazimir Malevich 









Didactic images and student work from Robert Jay Wolff’s courses at  
Brooklyn College, from Robert Jay Wolff,  
“Visual Intelligence in General Education”  

























A “distorted room” installation from the viewing point.  









Edwin H. Blashfield, Good and Bad Uses of Science,  



































Gyorgy Kepes, “Education of Vision:  



















































































“Experimental box,” Laboratory of Lighting Design,  




























































































































From left to right: Spark photograph of a model projectile;  
photo-elasticity record or strain diagram;  
high-speed photograph of a falling drop of water,  





























Left: Gyorgy Kepes, Untitled, photo-painting, 1941. 






















Gyorgy Kepes, Kinetic Light Mural,  















Left: 30-caliber bullet impacting a Plexiglas bar,  
from “Strobe Probe,” Technology Review (July-August 1968). 
Right: model projectile in flight,  



























Two-page spread from Gyorgy Kepes, The New Landscape in Art and Science (1956)  























































A CAVS “work community,” ca. 1977. Around the table clockwise,  
beginning second from left: O. Piene, A. Hiemer, H. Casdin-Silver,  
E. Goldring, L. Burgess, J. Brigham, K. Kantor, A. Sina, M.  
Chow, K. Bacon, N. Doll, W. Ahrens, M. Moser, P. Earls,  





     
 





Clockwise from top left: Lichtenberg figure of electric discharge,  
photograph taken under the direction of Prof. Arthur R. von Hippel, M.I.T.;  
Gyorgy Kepes, Light Projection, 1953;  
Otto Piene, Onion Flower, 1964-65;  
Takis, Electronic Flower, 1957. 
From Massachusetts Institute of Technology,  
The Center for Advanced Visual Studies,  


















































































   
 
   
 
 
Work from Robert Preusser’s courses at M.I.T. Clockwise from top left: 
H. P. Nightingale, Family of Hexagons, crayon, 11 x 15 in., 1955; 
Robert Preusser, Relief planes illuminated from the rear and distorted in  
a semicircular mylar wall, n.d.; 
Anon., Virtual volume produced with luminous 'lightline' utilizing 
 plasma technology, n.d.; 
Anon., Lens distortions of concentric circles and light, n.d. 
From Robert Preusser, “Relating Art to Science and Technology:  
An Educational Experiment at the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology (M.I.T.),”  
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